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Summary
The thesis attempts to reinvigorate the universalist credentials o f  Western liberal political 
theory by (1) illustrating the centrality o f  the concept o f  human agency fo r  universal 
political liberalism, (2) arguing for the significance o f  the concept o f  agency fo r  
understanding the Russian societal transformation, and (3) suggesting that political theory 
may most usefully be conceived as a universal discourse which is in constant need o f  
appropriating and constructively integrating different accounts and conceptualisations o f  
political liberalism.
In order to accomplish this it will be argued that Western political theorists have to take 
seriously the ways in which Russian scholars think about political liberalism and, to this 
end, the thesis will present an overview o f  the Russian debate on political liberalism during 
the first post-communist decade.
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Part I
Western Political Theory, 
Universalism and Agency
1. Introduction
‘Politics’ Michael Oakeshott once wrote, ‘is the art o f knowing where to go next in the 
exploration o f an already existing traditional kind of society’ (Oakeshott, 1991, p.406). Trying 
to rebut the ‘ideologically oriented’ re-crafting o f social affairs, he emphasised the relevance 
of existing social structures and norms from which the citizens o f the polity would glean some 
intimations as to where to go and how to proceed. Although such a moderate conservatism 
might reverberate increasingly well in Western societies and a growing number o f liberals 
may take refuge in his portrayal of politics as a ‘vernacular’ spoken by, and particular to, the 
participants (cf. for the most recent conservative reformulation Cahoone, 2002), Russia 
currently neither has the privilege nor can it afford such a moderate conservatism since it 
lacks any established and widely accepted rules o f the political game. While the conservative 
critique of political liberalism in the West aims at preventing the dissolution of an already 
existing and highly valued political fabric that evolved over centuries, Russia knows only a 
caricature of politics in its ideological deformation. Thus Oakeshott’s warning against an 
understanding o f politics as a formulaic project is conditional upon the temporal primacy of 
liberal politics. But what about those societies like Russia which so far have failed to establish 
successfully liberal politics throughout their history and now, exiting the disastrous 
Communist experiment, are faced with a choice of ad hoc instituting liberal institutions? If 
Western liberals have expressed growing discontent about unfettered liberalism of late, and a 
‘mitigated’ liberalism is dependent on existing well-established politics, where shall they 
turn? Is there a fast lane for learning the liberal ‘vernacular’? And are such political linguistics 
suitable for societies in transformation at all? Or are some societies simply doomed to remain 
averse to political liberalism for the foreseeable future?
Looking at the situation in Europe’s former Communist states, the picture is varied. 
Some societies have managed in the wake of the collapse of the Communist regimes to
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revitalise their political traditions, as it were, peeling off the veneer of Communist politics and 
thereby baring the healthy (or not so healthy) past political arrangements. Russian society, 
however, has faced a different challenge since 1991. The furrows of the Communist project 
ran deeper here and the veneer is thicker, rendering it impossible to declare a simple ‘return’ 
after an ‘accident’ that had lasted more than 70 years. Ever since the dissolution o f the Soviet 
Union Russia has been a country in search of the meaning o f the suffering that Communism 
had exacted over the last seven decades. Since neither a simple ‘return’ to pre-revolutionary 
times nor a consensus on an entirely novel, modem Russia seemed to emerge for a long time, 
Russian historians and political scientists had to do it the hard way: to come to terms with, 
and try to make sense of, the Soviet experiment and thereby address the needs o f the present.
The magnitude of this change can barely be glimpsed using the terminology employed 
by Western political scientists. What Western and some Russian scholars call a triple 
transition (political, social, economic) is in fact nothing less than an attempt to grasp the 
complexity of the current processes by neatly packing them into workable ‘spheres’ of 
society, each following its own rules and hence requiring its own particular treatment. For 
Russian historians and political scientists the terminology o f transition is often not much more 
than a euphemism for an intellectual challenge that stares them into the face every day, while 
they try make sense of the quandary that is called post-Soviet politics. For many ordinary 
Russians it has been an existential challenge that could never have been anticipated Russia 
embarked on something that, back then, was innocuously termed ‘perestroika’.
Beyond the recriminations for the current problems, Russian academics were caught in 
a dilemma. Most o f them had worked under the Soviet regime, where the accommodation 
with the authorities would take various forms: some honestly supporting the regime; others 
paying lip-service to the Communist creed; a few ‘internally emigrating’ as a means of 
salvaging their academic independence. Yet, any way of living under Sovietism called for 
explanations, and so the search for new historical interpretations was always bound to possess
a (in the West rarely noticed) personal dimension. Russian historians and political scientists 
had often been socialised in a totalitarian society that had tried to ruthlessly obliterate any 
remnants of the past. Hence recapturing a lost tradition was, and still is, for Russians often 
synonymous with a denial of their own upbringing, aggravating an already existing enormous 
confusion of values and day-to-day principles of life. Although this personal dimension o f the 
Russian transition is not part o f the subject-matter of this thesis, it has left its mark in the re­
forging of interpretations by historians and political scientists and it has not gone unnoticed 
that often paradigms may have been replaced, while patterns of thought persisted (Shuravlev, 
1999).
Carving out a meaningful interpretation o f Russia’s history from under the rubble that 
totalitarianism has left behind is then an intellectual, just as it is a personal, challenge and 
such an intertwining o f problems is particularly relevant for the liberal project which Western 
observers want to see Russia embarking on. Since the concept of freedom cannot simply be 
understood as an absence of external impediments, it has a personal dimension that reaches 
deep into the question of identity and ‘interpreting yourself in a rapidly changing 
environment such as Russian society in continuing transformation. Seen this way, the 
situation of the Russian historian may very well encapsulate the complexity of the problem of 
how the national process o f identification and self-interpretation coincide with the personal 
dilemma to create a meaningful and reconciled vision of a good life in transition. As tempting 
as it may seem to gain some insights into the process of transformation by peering into the 
mind of a Russian historian, this present study is not a work of discursive re-construction of 
historiography, but an attempt to determine the chances o f liberal politics in Russia from the 
outside by analysing the interpretative devices employed by Russian political theorists and 
historians as they try to get a glimpse of the fate of Russian liberalism. The seeming 
circularity of this approach has important methodological consequences and determines the 
limits of this study. Yet, the main thrust of the argument aims elsewhere. The thesis will try to
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show that the way Russians theorise liberal politics under the conditions of transformation (or 
initiation of politics per se) can be hugely instructive for Western political liberalism. In other 
words, the way others think about politics tells us something about the way we ought to 
represent the case for a liberal political order, the way we narrow down or inflate our own 
tradition, which components of our tradition we have lost or decided to deem insignificant. 
Looking at somebody else’s liberal vision is, so it will be suggested, a valuable path for a re- 
evaluation of our own way of thinking.
Yet, there is another reason why it would be appropriate to consider the personal 
dimension of the Russian transformation in the context o f political theory. Over the last 
decade or so political scientists have emphasised the role o f agents for the success or failure 
of political transformations. Although this novel approach has come under severe criticism for 
its alleged bias towards recognizable agency, that is its pronounced focus on political elites, 
this new emphasis has, I believe, revealed a potential intersection between the work of 
political theorists and political scientists that can and ought to be explored further. Although 
political scientists usually do not make use o f elaborate conceptions of human agency that go 
beyond highly schematic descriptions o f ascribed intentions or motivations of political actors, 
political theorists have long invested an immense amount of work into this field, which still 
seems to remain an untapped resource for transformation theorists. Human agency, so my 
arguments runs, can furnish us with a focal point for understanding societal transformations 
from whichever perspective we chose to view it, be it that of the political theorists or the 
viewpoint of the political scientist. While the various notions of human agency are familiar 
‘playground’ for political theorists, transformation theorists may be more reluctant to accept 
that a desideratum actually exists as to a more fully sketched concept of human agency. Since 
the main impetus of this thesis lies with Western political theory and its possible re-appraisal 
from the perspective of the Russian scholarly efforts, I will not pursue this argument for 
political science any further apart from a more detailed portrayal o f the case in the fifth
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chapter. As to the centrality of human agency for political theory, some more remarks are 
certainly required. The chapter following the literature review will be the place to make this 
point in a clear and systematic way.
While political agency may turn out to be crucial for a better understanding of the 
Russian transformation, the main motivation for this study lies somewhere else and has even 
somewhat grander parameters. Western political philosophy has consistently been trying to 
identify the main ingredients that are required for liberalism’s universal applicability. 
Paradoxically, what we may call the universality claim (henceforth: UC) of theoretical 
liberalism has, however, never looked more beleaguered since (European) Communism has 
disappeared from the global stage. Never have Western political theorists questioned 
liberalism’s main aspiration towards global ascendancy so severely than in the nineties of the 
last century.
On the other hand, some scholars have been engaged in building bridges by 
formulating a satisfying compromise between warring schools o f thought. Onora O ’Neill has 
convincingly argued in ‘Towards Justice and Virtue’ (1996) that human agency can usefully 
be deployed as the primary focus when trying to minimise the differences between virtue and 
justice theorists. Following in her footsteps I believe that it is time to put her approach to the 
test and re-formulate ‘what is living and what is dead’ in the universality claim of liberal 
political theory. The concept of human agency will be instrumental in achieving this 
objective, but the path to such a re-appraisal o f Western political liberalism takes a detour in 
this study through the work of Russian scholars on the theory of liberal politics.
Corresponding to these two broad theoretical concerns, there are two equally 
interconnected claims which will form the centre of this thesis. Firstly, adopting the scheme 
of argument put forward by Onora O ’Neill I will suggest that the conditions o f human agency 
furnish us with the first evaluative building blocs of normative theorising about Russian 
political liberalism. The pivot of successful transformations, so I will argue, are unimpaired
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capacities of political and social actors to orientate and locate themselves in a constantly 
transient environment. Adding to O ’Neill’s theoretical considerations I will try to sketch the 
importance of intact resources of social and cultural traditions on which agents can draw 
when faced with societies in transformation. Given the elaborate construction o f O ’Neill’s 
work on human agency, my account of the significance of cultural and social resources for 
meaningful agency differs from hers in emphasis rather than substance.
However, there is one particular element in O ’Neill’s attempt to reconcile virtue and 
justice theories which still appears in need of substantive change. And it is here that my 
second proposition has its origin. Inspite of the insistence of many constructivists to the 
contrary their hope often seems to be that the provision o f guiding principles for liberal 
institution building pans out almost with a certain automatism into actual liberal politics. 
Although more careful thinkers like O’Neill stress the need for deliberation and further 
interpretation of the various standards of political liberalism, some scholars seem to believe 
that a great deal is already achieved when such norms are identified and consistently applied. 
In fact, many constructivists rely on a fairly strong, if  possibly unjustifiable, account of either 
public reason and its infallibility or pin their hopes on practical reasoning as though this 
would inevitably lead political agents along the right path into the liberal future. For the 
proponents of such automatism or semi-automatism, the appropriate playing field of 
normative political theory would thus lie in deliberating the consequences which such basic 
norms for human agency entail. What receives less attention is that deliberation is conditional 
upon a convergence o f the words in which we use to discuss the various configurations of 
liberal political institutions. This point may seem superfluous when looking at a 
terminologically standardised philosophical debate as we have accomplished in the West but 
gains significance when considered in the context o f the universality claim of liberal political 
theory.
12
What for O ’Neill and others may be a case of reconciling abstract principles of justice 
with ‘context-sensitive judgement of [particular] cases’ (O’Neill (2000), p .145), acquires a 
wider remit once we acknowledge that terminological convergence of our theoretical 
vocabulary cannot be taken for granted once we look beyond the (predominantly English- 
speaking) Western discourse. If we wanted liberal political theory in a fashion true to 
O ’Neill’s scheme o f things to address a universal audience we would notice fairly quickly that 
deliberation must encompass the essence and meaning* of the things political theorists talk 
about. While for O ’Neill from a Kantian perspective deliberation focusses on, and is neatly 
confined to, the interpretive work o f linking abstract principles to specific circumstances, a 
truly universal frame of reference offers a far fuzzier picture of the deliberative tasks. Looking 
at the Russian attempts to theorise liberal politics any observer must be struck by the lack of 
terminological convergence between Russian scholars themselves as well as between ‘their’ 
and ‘our’ conceptual tools in the West. Crucially, this additional task of public and theoretical 
deliberation applies not only to the political terms which lie beyond the basic principles of 
justice but suffuses the very meaning o f justice and virtue. This seems to reiterate the need for 
a contextual approach towards even these abstract principles of justice which we may have 
thought to be determinable and justifiable prior to, and independent of, interpretation of 
particular cases. Isolating these principles from interpretive work and judgement coloured by 
local traditions thus means to misunderstand the real task of political theory, a point evocative 
of such expansionist approaches to political philosophy as championed by Hannah Arendt.
The revaluation of Western political theory thus gains a new dimension. If the 
categories of human agency do not translate automatically into a constructivist programme of 
liberal institution building, Western political theory has to take serious the hermeneutic 
disparities between Russia and itself. As will become clear these differences are not simply
* I am using these words in everyday parlance while I acknowledge the considerable philosophical ambiguity o f  
these concepts.
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some of degree which require only minor terminological adjustments. Rather the 
predominance o f conceptions such as civilisation in Russian political thought throws up the 
question o f how to ensure that localised forms o f theorising do not invade abstract principles 
o f justice. The reason for this concern is obvious: once abstract standards o f justice (and 
virtue) lose their unimpregnable status, Kantian universalisability is equally undermined. I 
believe that this is exactly the point at which conservative liberals must part company with 
Kantian theorists such as O'Neill if  they wanted to salvage the relevance of political thought 
to particular social and cultural environments. I will argue that abandoning O'Neill's 
constructivism at this point does not entail surrendering the universalist project to Kantians. 
Yet, in such a conservative-liberal frame of mind, universalism is, beyond the conditions of 
human agency, a function o f discursive interrelation and hermeneutic deliberation, rather than 
o f agreement on fixed and culturally neutral terms o f political reasoning. Thus this work 
posits a necessarily open-ended understanding o f political theory against any conventional 
attempts to fixate definite meanings of political liberalism while drawing heavily on Western 
political experiences as congealed in its own discourse.
If theoretical agreement amongst political philosophers then is a result o f deliberation 
on principles o f justice as well as locally variant meanings of political terms, Western political 
theory has commited a cardinal mistake when discussing the applicability o f political 
liberalism to Russia and other post-communist countries (although it rarely did discuss it at 
all) in terms that carry weight mostly within the framework of Western historical experience.
To criticise the conventional modus of Western theorising o f course must mean that we 
would have to suggest substantial changes in the nature of political thinking as activity, as 
Oakeshott would have put it. Recovering the universality o f political theory as result o f a 
debate conducted from the perspectives of various proponents o f culturally inscribed 
Sittlichkeiten, in contrast to a discourse amongst theorists broadly in favour of thinned-out 
standards of social interaction (Moralitaet), political theory has to perceive its universality as
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an ‘openness’ in several ways. Firstly, as dialogue about the meaning of the terminology used 
to describe political phenomena; secondly, as an acknowledgement that conclusions are 
tentative and revisable; and thirdly, as recognition that the ultimate aim of theorising, defining 
political liberalism, must remain elusive since cultural and historical circumstances pervade 
the theoretical debate ‘all the way down’.
To sketch this revisionist philosophical programme in more detail will be the task o f 
the third and fourth chapter following a brief literature review. The bulk of the thesis, 
however, will try to create some basic referentiality between the West and Russia by 
selectively presenting and analysing some of the categories of the post-communist Russian 
debate on liberalism. The highly selective character of this study may seem to provide only 
narrow parameters for this exchange and only a slim basis for such a project of reconstructing 
universalism. Yet, in my defence, presenting most of the political terms that may matter in a 
debate on liberal politics would be a gargantuan task. Still the selection is not without any 
rationale. The main point of reference for any discussion on political liberalism must of 
course be the attempt at globally defining the term itself, a task that clearly dominated the 
agenda o f Russian political theory in the first post-communist decade judging by the foci of 
publications. Yet, apart from these 'expansionist' approaches, Russian scholars have early on 
started to point to the significance of conceptions that are rarely in the centre o f attention in 
the West, such as civilisation, civility, chaos and the role o f societal conflict. In my opinion, it 
is mainly these heuristic devices that provide us with the most difficult but also with the most 
rewarding features o f the Russian discourse if we wanted to successfully incorporate them 
into a universal debate on political liberalism. Cross-referencing some significant aspects of 
the Russian and Western debate may assist in identifying where our specifically Western 
understandings of politics and theory have invaded the aforementioned supposedly universal 
principles of justice and virtue.
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Yet, as this study derives it main impetus from the agenda of political theory, so this 
motivation also clearly demarcates the limits of the thesis. As theorists usually do, I will have 
very little to say on the actual prospects of political liberalism in Russia for the current time. 
Although I believe that the categories of theoretical inquiry do intersect with those of political 
science, and I will sketch one of these junctures in chapter 5, there will be no analysis of the 
chances to establish liberal politics in Russia. The reason for this is simple. Although political 
theorists may at times be participants in a wider public debate on politics, the objective of this 
work is, as Oakeshott would put it, to reveal the postulates of theoretical thinking as a 
reflective activity, not to contribute to or engage in political activity itself. As Oakeshott 
rightly pointed out, the characteristics of political agency are different to the postulates of any 
theoretical enquiry. The former may or may not be reflective, may or may not be launched 
from correct starting places, but, above all, it proceeds from a contingent situation in which 
the agent is 'thrown'. Political action reflects this contingency and the historian is due to 
reconstruct this interplay between contingency and available resources for the agent’s 
understanding. Yet, theoretical (as distinct from historical) debate proceeds from a different 
launching pad. It reflects on the postulates of human and civil agency. It asks for the 
prerequisites of our understanding o f a 'going-on'; it thus does not call upon us for a re-action 
relating ourselves to a previous activity (i.e. a judgement), but is interested in disecting what 
allows me to understand human and specifically political action. Just as this is the proper 
locus of political philosophy, so it is the seed of universality.
Hence the restricted focus of this thesis: Analysing the way in which Russian scholars 
think about liberal politics may point to shared resources of universal political theory. 
Whether this helps political liberalism in Russia is another matter altogether and one that 
cannot be addressed within the narrow theoretical boundaries of this study.
Finally, and crucially, I do not intend, nor could I manage, to present a comprehensive 
account of contemporary Russian political philosophy. Russian scholarly activity and output
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has increased considerably since the days o f the perestroika and not always have academic 
efforts congealed around identifiable themes. To many observers, Russian academic discourse 
often still looks like a cacophony of voices rather than a disciplined engagement with each 
others’ arguments. That does not mean that, at times, significant debates have evolved, one of 
them to be selectively presented here, but that pursuing a comprehensive portrayal of 
contemporary Russian political theory would dilute the focus o f this study unnecessarily.
Furthermore, there have been important voices on the political liberalism in Russia 
which have mostly come from a position conventionally hostile or adverse to liberal politics 
which equally receive short shrift in this thesis. Some of those were formulated from the 
orthodox perspective, others from the far left. I believe that the revival o f Russian 
conservatism (while drawing on some o f the most important and interesting Russian 
philosophers) may constitute in the long run the most valuable contribution to both the 
political spectrum in Russia and the politico-theoretical and philosophical scene. So far, 
however, most of those who have attracted much public attention for their arguments of 
conservative drift, however, seem to be heavily coloured ideological and thus exclude 
themselves from serious scholarly debate (cf. the works by Alexander Dugin). Others face a 
Western observer with seemingly unsurmountable difficulties to detect a consistent 
philosophical thesis (cf. Sapronov, 2001).
Therefore this study will confine itself to those formulations of political liberalism in 
Russia whose proponents have more or less adopted a broadly benign and approving attitude 
towards liberal politics. Bearing in mind that liberalism can denote many things in Russia, 
such approval of political liberalism in general is not tantamount to an endorsement o f any 
liberal political party, or (least o f all) the liberalisation project as pursued by the Yeltsin 
administration and its successor.
The thesis is divided into two parts, the first o f which contains the theoretical argument 
whereas the second mainly deals with the empirical material. The connection between the two
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is that repaired account of universal political liberalism requires the integration o f ‘alien’, in 
this case Russian, concepts used in the theoretical debate. It would, however, be misleading to 
suggest that the material presented in the second part could somehow sustain the theoretical 
thesis formulated in the former. This is not the intention o f the author nor, given the nature 
and foci o f the Russian debate, would this be methodologically sound. Rather, the theoretical 
argument contains the contention that an increase in referentiality between the Western 
theoretical debate on political liberalism and its Russian counterpart is indispensable for a re­
constructed universalism of liberal political theory. For this purpose the second part will 
present a broadly thematic account of the Russian debate which will allow Western theorists 
to familiarise themselves with the different terms of reference of the Russian debate.
Besides the literature review (chapter 2) part I consists of three essays which outline 
the theoretical case for universal political liberalism. The first chapter (3) deals with the 
concept of agency and tries to establish the significance of this idea for a universal political 
theory. The next chapter (4) argues that liberty as an un-reconstructed concept provides little 
guidance in interpreting abstract principles of justice whereas weak foundationalism may 
provide us with some building blocs for a re-constructed account o f political liberalism that 
can prove relevant for the Russian debate. The last chapter of part I (5) will try to identify the 
reasons why the concept o f agency could play a beneficial role in understanding the Russian 
post-communist society and its difficulties to institute political liberalism. Agency, so I will 
argue, may provide some common ground on which political scientists and political theorists 
can meet and this shared conceptual tool may usefully be employed as a focus o f some 
intellectual efforts by both sides to bridge the often insurmountable differences.
The second part of the thesis contains a selective account of the Russian debate on 
political liberalism in the first post-communist decade. It is grouped around various themes 
that either have special relevance to Russian scholars or have crystallised as focal points of 
the debate. Following a chapter concerned with methodological considerations (6) and after
providing an overview o f the theoretical positions in chapter 7, the first theme to be explored 
is the views o f Russian scholars on the appropriation of Western concepts and ideas in 
Russia’s intellectual past and present. The second chapter (9) underlines the importance which 
Russians attach to the ideas of civility and culture, while the subsequent chapter (10) deals 
with the complex notion of civilisation as espoused by Aleksandr Akhiezer. His work has 
been one of the most fruitful in historiography as well as sociology and chapter 11 will try to 
distill some lessons for a universal political theory from his conception of Russian statehood. 
Chapter 12 will introduce mainly the thought o f the eminent Russian political theorists Boris 
Gurevich Kapustin on modernity and political liberalism. His notion of modernity as an 
‘experiment’ echoes the thought of Hannah Arendt and may present a particularly helpful 
starting point for a further exploration o f common ground between Western and Russian 
political theory.
Theoretical explorations of chaos and political liberalism by the philosopher Kara- 
Murza and the political scientist Fedotova round up the portrayal o f the Russian debate in 
chapter 13. The last chapter (14) will briefly summarise the presented Russian positions and 
provide some co-ordinates for assessing the relevance of these views for a revaluation or 
reconstruction of the universal nature of liberal Western political theory thus closing the circle 
by returning to the initial theoretical argument made in part I o f the thesis.
All translations from Russian into English are my own. I have used the Library of 
Congress system for transliterating Russian words. Within quotes I have only included 
Russian transliterations when the Russian original would allow alternative terms than the one 
I have used.
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2. Literature Review
There is an immense number of articles and monographs on the post-Communist 
transformation in Russia written by Western and Russian scholars alike, and the studies 
dealing with Russian political thought, liberal, conservative, or Communist, are by now 
legion. The purpose o f this literature review is briefly to sketch the main contributions made 
to the area of interest within the confines of this study and to identify a possible research 
desideratum. Since the Russian theoretical debate on political liberalism is itself subject 
matter of this thesis, it will not be reviewed in this part of the study but be presented as 
comprehensively as possible in more appropriate places.
Yet, there are many other works written by Russian or Western scholars that are 
located within a grey area in between political science and political theory that have made 
important contributions to a theoretical understanding of Russian liberalism. It is on these 
articles and monographs of varied character that this review is focused.
No student o f the history of Russian political thought can fail to benefit from the 
seminal studies by Walicki and Leontovich. While Leontovich's monograph on Russian 
liberalism has clearly become out of date, it is still the only work that, to my knowledge, deals 
with the history of Russian political liberalism in such a focused fashion. The enormous 
amount of research conducted subsequently to the collapse of the Soviet regime surely 
warrants a radical review of Leontovich’s interpretation, but any new comprehensive study of 
Russian political liberalism has yet to emerge. Although there have been important 
publications that partly deal with Russian liberal political thought (Schopflin, von Beyme, 
Novikova/Sizemskaia, Utechin), which have proven to be extremely useful for the argument 
presented here, the lack of any new coherent account of Russian political liberalism represents 
a lamentable gap in research. Two collections of articles dealing explicitly with political 
liberalism have been published over the years.
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Firstly, there is a collection of conference papers edited by Timberlake in 1972, which 
seems hopelessly out of date by now, given the amount of, and access to, more recent work by 
Russian scholars which has been published since the collapse o f the Soviet regime. Secondly, 
Zdenek Suda and Jiri Musil have published the proceedings o f an international conference on 
‘The Prospects of Liberalism in post-1989 Europe’ (Suda/Musil, 2000). This collection is an 
example of otherwise rare collaborative efforts between East and West to discuss what 
liberalism may amount to in a common cultural space. Although the theoretical angle from 
which the various authors approach the subject differ considerably, the book is instructive, if 
only for illuminating the immense differences between Eastern and Western scholars, just as 
it offers a snapshot of a cross-section of the intellectual undertakings to re-define liberalism in 
face of different historical and political urgencies and academic agendas. It seems telling that 
the theoretical section of the book is dominated by contributions from Western scholars (with 
the exception o f Srubar’s article on Hayek and the relevance o f his ideas on Eastern European 
transformations), while East European political scientist and historians focus more on the 
question of recovery and revival of pre-Communist traditions (cf. Musil, 2000). 
Unfortunately, the theoretical considerations of Western scholars in the monograph seem to 
be far removed from the relevant issue which East European scholars try to analyse, with the 
exception perhaps of Stephen Holmes’ article who has, there and elsewhere, consistently 
criticised the notion o f laissez-faire liberalism, or the de-institutionalisation of political power 
in the wake of the collapse of the Communist regime.
From a more theoretical perspective, some important progress has been made by 
scholars such as Szacki and Ackerman. The former has attempted to conceptualise East 
European liberalism as part of the wider historical picture. The most important contribution of 
his work to a better understanding of liberalism as a theoretical endeavour seems to be the 
differentiation Szacki makes between ‘proto-liberalism’ and liberalism proper. Szacki’s 
definition of proto-liberalism reiterates what others, not least Akhiezer, have identified as the
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main problem of East-Central European and Russian liberalism respectively. For Szacki as 
well as for many other observers, liberalism in East-Central Europe is conditioned by the 
particular circumstances o f its genesis. This adopts a situational or re-active profile, rather 
arrogating a philosophical essence. Szacki notes that liberalism in East-Central Europe lacks 
any integral function and thereby brings into focus the particularist cultural and social aspects 
of liberalism in contrast to the universalist strictly political notion of liberalism that is often 
favoured by Western political scientists. As he outlines what he calls the three forms of Polish 
liberalism, it becomes clear that he understands the main difference between East and West to 
reside in the utopian and ‘imported’ character of Eastern liberalism, whereas Western 
liberalism is integral and often assumes a legitimising function in Western societies (Szacki, 
1995, p.60). What he appears to try to portray here is the transformational process which 
political liberalism underwent in many Western societies that converted it from a purely 
political principle into a social and cultural worldview which often provides the glue that has 
held Western societies together. In contrast, Szacki argues, liberalism in East-Central Europe 
remains largely ‘the property of a particular group’ for which the main problem is ‘passing 
from ideas to reality, from postulates to facts’ (ibid.).
Although this seems to be a poignant description of the largely abstract theoretical 
nature of East European liberalism, Szacki fails to notice the normative function which this 
political liberalism can and ought to play in the development of post-Communist politics. He 
notes for example, mistakenly I believe, that the relationship between the private and public 
sphere had lost its cutting edge in the struggles of the dissidence movement with the 
Communist regime, since the real problem was not to enhance liberties in the private sphere 
but to gain more participatory freedoms in the public (Szacki, 1995, p.88). This exemplifies 
the extent to which he underestimates the normative confusion in which most political 
principles and institutions have actually been operating in the post-Communist era. The 
separation of private and public realms is problematic, especially for post-Communist
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societies, precisely because they involve free standing normative principles and yet draw the 
justification of their complex relationship from the political precepts of ethical individualism. 
Thus they require vindication, particularly given the different understanding of such basic 
concepts as the individual, and the community and society in East-Central Europe and Russia. 
Therefore Szacki attributes only a far too diminished role to the normative function of 
liberalism. Although his observation of the largely utopian character of post-Communist 
liberalism is appropriate, the question must arise as to what the nature o f political liberalism 
could be in a post-totalitarian environment, bereft of any viable and stable political tradition 
other than the discredited Communist one. If Szacki meant to criticise the utopian idealism of 
liberal political programmes, his is actucally a critique of the political strategies and the 
chances of liberal parties aspiring to gain political power. In this respect, any Utopianism 
must appear misplaced.
Yet, if he is concerned with the theory of liberalism, his critique fails to notice the 
inevitability with which political liberalism is utopian. As a theoretical enterprise liberalism is 
a critical engagement, thus juxtaposing the actual with the desired. For Oakeshott the criterion 
of desirability is the coherence which obtains between the principles and maxims that the 
liberal doctrine (or any other) incorporates. There are very few arguments as to why 
liberalism as a view of politics should be preferred to other worldviews (conservative, 
Communist), but once good grounds for a liberal structure of a given polity are established 
and possibly shared by the majority of the population, liberal political theory is engaged in 
eliminating the inconsistencies that linger on in the relationship between ideal political rules 
o f conduct and actual social and cultural traditions and outlooks. This is an ongoing project 
and liberalism thus is unlikely to ever lose this critical or utopian edge.
Szacki also makes much of the difference between notions of civil society in East and 
West and usefully notes the overly harmonious and communitarian overtones of this concept 
in the political discourse of East-Central Europe (Szacki, 1995, pp.90-117). He maintains that
23
one of the reasons East-Central European liberalism remained in the stage o f proto-liberalism 
is that civil societies were intermingled with ‘elements of collective thinking’ (Szacki, 1995, 
p.l 17). This reveals the multitude of meanings and political functions that the concept o f civil 
society has often adopted, and has brought it to the brink o f ceasing to serve any useful 
purpose in liberal theory. In order to salvage it from being captured for many different 
political agendas liberal theory would have to reassert and reformulate its normative role in 
the development of political institutions in the past and present, a task that will not be part of 
the present study. What remains of Szacki’s study then is the notion o f ‘proto-liberalism’, 
which may be a useful concept in describing the particular theoretical and conceptual 
elaboration of East-Central European liberalism but is of limited application in political 
theory.
Walicki’s monograph on the legal philosophies o f Russian liberalism is probably the 
most comprehensive treatment of the history of liberal Russian political thought. It is an 
excellent study and one which has clearly broken new ground. Dealing with six prominent 
Russian liberal thinkers, Walicki focused on the problematic philosophical linkage between 
law and morality, a problem that is of direct relevance to the concerns of the present study. 
His work shows how deeply Russian philosophers have penetrated this problem and how 
closely their work was related to the Western legal philosophy of the late nineteenth century. 
Although some particular Russian colouring o f the pertinent problem was most evident in the 
thinking of scholars such as Soloviev, Russian philosophy is shown in Walicki’s study to 
have latched on to a debate conducted in the West, and often gravitating around the question 
of legal positivism, while this discussion seems to have often been perceived in Russia 
through the eyes of the German scholar Jellinek.
Walicki’s contribution to the theory of political liberalism through his work on the 
legal philosophies o f Russian liberals can hardly be underestimated. It ranges from presenting 
the depth of philosophical thinking to identifying clearly the particular Russian components in
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the ongoing debate. Although mostly descriptive, it furnishes any political theorist with an 
inexhaustible fund of philosophical positions that indicate the peculiarities of the Russian 
political and cultural conditions to be taken into account by any review of the applicability of 
political liberalism to Russia. I have made extensive use of Walicki’s work in the sub-chapter 
that delineates the tradition o f liberal philosophy on the state, preparing the conceptual ground 
for a discussion of Akhiezer’s relevant expositions.
There have also some extremely valuable contributions to Russian philosophy by some 
Western as well as Russian scholars, who attempt to describe the course Russian philosophy 
has taken in the post-Communist decade. Swiderski and van Zweerde’s articles on Russian 
philosophy have elucidated the complexities and intertwining of philosophical traditions in an 
era when stable philosophical discourses and themes have yet to emerge. The concept of 
heuristic radicalism (henceforth HR) used in this study echoes these difficulties and the 
semantic and conceptual fluidity that equally applies to the Russian philosophical debate on 
liberalism. A contribution to a recently published collection of articles suggests that Russians 
may find the notion of the philosophical or interpretative paradigm (Thomas Kuhn) useful in 
describing this discursive instability in conjunction with the sudden de-legitimation of 
particular philosophical approaches (Pigrov, 2001). However, the present study eschews the 
description of theoretical formations in terms of paradigms. I believe that it obfuscates rather 
than illuminates the necessary interplay of discursive flexibility and stability that is required 
in political theory. It is also problematic with respect to the concept of heuristic radicalism 
and the universality claim, since it may be taken to insert a normative aspect into both 
concepts that is certainly not intended by its use in the present study. HR and UC are to be of 
merely descriptive purpose, while the conditions that they are used to summarise have strong 
normative implications for political liberalism as a theory. This normativity of political 
liberalism, however, must not be understood to ensue from the descriptive conceptual 
capacity of HR or UC.
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Progressing to explicitly theoretical work that has focused on East-Central European 
liberalism, the disappointment of any political theorist must be great. There have been only a 
handful of articles and monographs that set themselves the task of determining the 
applicability or validity of Western political liberalism as expounded and elaborated by 
mostly Western political philosophers. The disappointment must be all the bigger, given that 
the East-Central European transformations could represent real-life case studies of the genesis 
of liberal polities. Some political scientists have attempted to relate the two projects (theory 
and practice) and have come to interesting conclusions (for example, Friedman, 1998). Yet, 
apart from these laudable exceptions, regrettably there have been few cross-over engagements 
from either side. The few exceptions from the ‘theory viewpoint’ are Ackerman’s work on 
Eastern European revolutions as part of a recovery o f the revolutionary content of liberalism 
and Haddock and Caraiani’s work on the ‘existential’ aspect o f political post-Communist 
transitions.
Ackerman seems to pursue his own theoretical objectives, which are probably more 
firmly anchored in the vagaries of the Western philosophical debate than relevant to the East 
European transitions. His notion of the role o f constitutions in the transitional process takes 
curiously little notice of Havel’s idea of radical continuity and the constraints within which 
the newly instated governments often necessarily operated (for a critique o f the idea of radical 
continuity cf. Stanger, 2000). In Ackerman’s picture o f the liberal potential of the anti- 
Communist revolutions across Central and Eastern Europe, much hinged on the chances to 
convert anti-communism into constructive liberal state- and constitution-building. This is an 
assumption that reckons little with the resilience of past political traditions, with the 
ambiguity of resuscitated pre-Communist ideas of nation and political community, and last 
but not least with the often non-political impetus of anti-Communist sentiments. Moreover, 
Ackerman sees little reason to review critically Western political liberalism from a genuinely
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Eastern perspective, that would transcend his own essentially intra-Westem agenda of 
theoretical investigation.
Things are somewhat different with the work by Haddock and Caraiani. Both have 
collaborated on a number of articles and their findings have been insightful and very 
instructive for Western and Eastern political philosophy alike. Their work offers the 
indispensable embeddedness and groundedness in local theoretical debates (in this case 
Romania) to an extent that is regrettably lacking in Ackerman’s monograph. Their articles 
highlight the difficulties transitional Romania has had in forging a stable discursive 
environment which thrives on a shared terminology and conceptual tools and devices. 
Haddock and Caraiani also intend to illuminate the enormous depth of the problem of 
transition as reflected in the local theoretical discourse. They point to the easy utilisation of 
the theoretical debate for political objectives and postulate that an intellectual hegemony 
appears to be indispensable to political stability of any kind. They identify the most imminent 
danger that the newly founded democratic regimes face as being the resurgence o f ‘the 
language of identity’. While these observations are of practical as well as theoretical 
relevance, they emphasise the extent to which any liberal political order must be vindicated 
publicly, and thus forge a sturdy connection between theory and practice that coercive 
regimes can afford to dispense with (Haddock/Caraiani, 2001, p.379).
Their conceptual approach to political theory under the conditions of post-Communist 
transformation is even more instructive insofar as they describe any theoretical engagement as 
an open-ended attempt to specify rules according to which politics can be executed, while the 
manner of identifying the adequate rules of the game simultaneously remains highly contested 
among the participants of any future political game (Haddock/Caraiani, 2001, p.377). This 
perspective reveals the dilemma of liberals in defining the appropriate limits of future political 
engagement. What Haddock/Caraiani fail to do is to analyse further this theoretical dilemma 
and understand it as having a profound impact on the shape and content o f Western political
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philosophy. Although their vision of political liberalism remains easily compatible with 
particular political, social, and cultural traditions which may be discordant with Western 
historical experiences, they fail to notice that much of the difficulty that Western political 
theory has in gaining any significant purchase on East-Central European transitions is that 
Western political philosophers often advance a notion of liberty and a set of liberal political 
institutions that claim to be universal and hence universally applicable. What is needed is 
therefore a scrutiny of the idea of liberty as construed by Western political theorists and a 
project to replenish and re-establish the resources for the universality o f political liberalism. 
This is a task whose shape and content will be tentatively sketched in the present study, which 
emanates from an analysis of the reflections of Russian scholars on political liberalism.
In the field o f more descriptive work on Russian liberal theory there have been only 
few publications in the West. One study that deserves mention is Ignatov’s working paper 
(Bericht) on Russian liberalism for the Bonner Institut fu r  Ostwissenschaften (Ignatov, 1994). 
It presents a thorough overview of the then recent Russian published research on liberal 
political theory (the Liberalismus-Debatte) and mostly concurs with the selection of Russian 
philosophical work favoured in the present study. Akhiezer and Kapustin’s works assume a 
prominent place in Ignatov’s paper, just as the present study judges the work of both thinkers 
to be the most valuable Russian contributions to the theory of political liberalism.
Echoing the findings of many other Russian and Western observers, Ignatov points to 
the fuzziness and instability of Russian theoretical discourse on liberalism, and portrays it as a 
reflective engagement with the advantages and disadvantages of radical and conservative 
liberalism in the intended and necessary reconciliation between indigenous political traditions 
and Western political concepts. In conclusion, he adds a note of caution, pointing to the 
changes which concepts and ideas undergo when transferred or ‘translated’ from their original 
location to an intellectually alien environment (Ignatov, 1994, p.30) a perspective which
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resonates with the findings of many of the Russian theorists surveyed for the purposes of this 
study (cf. part II, chapter 7).
This brief literature review permits a tentative delineation of the research desideratum 
relevant for this study. Apart from sketching the Russian debate more comprehensively than 
Ignatov has done, the bulk of the theoretical work would consist in critically reviewing and 
elaborating upon the link between political theory as predominantly formulated in the West 
and the theoretical views and perspectives that are particular to the participants of the Russian 
debate on political liberalism in the nineties. It has already been mentioned above that critical 
to this review is the notion o f liberty as construed in Eastern and Western discourse, and that, 
while this study only refers to the Western position in a highly selective fashion, this may not 
always do justice to the enormous variety of theoretical positions advocated in the West. The 
selective manner in which Western political theory will be utilised for the purposes of this 
thesis is justifiable on the ground that those notions of political liberalism that come under 
criticism here are often those to which Russian political philosophy has been most susceptible 
in recent years (and, as it turns out, often in the past as well). In sketching the conditions of 
theorising in post-Communist transition this study will hopefully enable Western and Russian 
political philosophers to address the shortcomings of an abstract concept o f political 
liberalism as it has often figured prominently in Central and East European public and 
theoretical debate. On the basis of a thorough critique of any idea of abstract liberty, this 
study then hopes to give sound reasons for a rejuvenation or re-construction of a viable form 
of UC compatible with Russian political, social and cultural traditions.
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3. Agency and Political Universalism
At first glance the fairly wide range of theoretical intentions o f this thesis must look 
ambitious. It targets not less than three distinct but interconnected areas of theoretical enquiry. 
Firstly, it strives to say something about the reasons and possible remedies for the failure of 
contemporary political theory successfully to formulate a robust notion of universal political 
liberalism. Secondly, it intends to present a convincing case for the centrality of agency for 
any viable account of liberal political theory, thus bolstering -  yet also gently modifying -  
already existing arguments for human agency as the primary focus of theorising (cf. O ’Neill, 
1996 and 2000). And, thirdly, it will argue that the case of Russian transformation in the 
1990s can be instructive for the work of political theorists, thus (with the necessary care) 
merging the vocabulary of political science with political theory by pointing to the mutual 
interest in the concept of political agency.
The path towards accomplishing this ambitious agenda may equally arouse some 
doubts and misgivings. I would like to suggest that an analysis of the contemporary Russian 
debate on political liberalism presents us with a unique chance to access the intellectual 
resources for a repaired account of universal liberalism. But, clearly, such a strong claim must 
rest on a plausible notion of the nature of political theory, that is to say, why and how the 
Russian debate would matter to Western political theory in the first place. I will address the 
last problem first and will then move on to sketch the arguments for the first two central 
claims. The fifth chapter is exclusively dedicated to an investigation of the third claim. 
Although, naturally, these claims are interconnected I will try to tackle them one at a time. 
Thus some overlapping may occur, while the overall emerging picture should be one of 
synthesis rather than division.
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IThere is probably almost universal agreement that political philosophy is an open-ended 
discourse about how to calibrate the moral demands of justice in political institutions. Or, in 
the words of Oakeshott, political theory may be seen as an ongoing conversation where the 
participants contribute to a deeper understanding of politics and ethics. Others (cf. Habermas,
1999) would prefer to see political theorising as a discursive engagement under particular 
conditions, such as absence of coercion, which permit the practitioners to subscribe only to 
rational principles of inference and thus guarantee that the discursive exchange arrives at 
conclusions commanding universal authority amongst (what are for some theorists 
hypothetical) participants. Despite these different angles from which theorists view their own 
activity, the bottom line seems to be that this is an invariably discursive endeavour and that 
certain (still to be agreed) conditions should prevail. Such a tentative definition o f political 
theory would also avoid the treacherous waters of specifying the final end o f this activity 
(truth or temporary agreement), about which diverse opinions exist which in turn are often 
grounded in different philosophical doctrines.
When conceiving of political theory as a discourse, the issue of universality receives a 
different spin as well. Superficially, universality may appear as a feature o f the way in which 
a debate is conducted, that is with greatest possible inclusivity, hence encompassing, at least 
hypothetically, participants in a universal domain. There is at least one good argument why 
universality would, if anything, be augmented by a universal scope o f the debate. This 
argument goes back to Hannah Arendt's notion of plurality and human conduct. Arendt 
thought that human beings inhabit this world in their plurality. This enables them to recognize 
different points of view on their social affairs. This, however, also entails the possibility that 
something like a public space develops between men in which rules of civil conduct can 
evolve. Thus, man's capacity to take up someone else's position facilitates the emergence of 
such regulated public space. Although Arendt was less clear about whether this picture of
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human interaction would also apply to the activity o f philosophising, conventionally 
presumed to be a solitary engagement with the world rather than with other fellow scholars 
(for this problem cf. Cano van, 1992), her thesis would provide us, when slightly modified, 
with a powerful argument in favour o f a serious engagement with Russian political thought. If 
we think of (liberal) political theory as an open ended activity trying to define the proper 
setup o f political institutions according to our shared, yet often diverse, notions o f justice (and 
virtue), then approximating the ideal rules of the discursive practice will depend on the extent 
to which we manage to increase the plurality of views within the debate. This may 
temporarily lead to unworkable amorphous disparities, yet recognising the validity of 
someone else's point of view in the debate would foster the emergence of rules of the 
discursive practice, in effect augmenting the chances for a rational debate.
At least two important objections may be raised against such a notion o f political 
theory as a universal discourse. Ironically, one of them has recently been formulated by a 
scholar whose philosophical preferences may squarely be placed on Kantianism. The other 
objection originates in the debate on relativism.
Onora O'Neill has argued that justifications for ethical conduct must be subject to the 
principle of accessibility and intelligibility. Strangely enough, she eschews an entirely 
universal Kantian position and notes that the radius of accessibility is determined by the scope 
of the audience which the agent intends to address (O’Neill, 1996 and 2000). She contrasts 
her practical account o f reasoning on justice and ethical conduct with that of theoretical 
reason which would advocate the entirety of the human race as the proper scope of justice.
As far as her account of such contingently limited practical reasoning convinces, her 
argument furnishes us with an important objection to political theory as universal discourse. 
Just as agents do not necessarily address a global audience, so are the resources o f practical 
reasoning of local and possibly particularistic colouring. What would go against the grain of a 
Kantian in O'Neillian mould is to fail to grant to those who are unmistakably part of this
32
audience the right to participate in determining whether or not ethical reasoning possesses 
authority and is broadly accessible. Denying such treatment to recipients o f conduct means to 
base ethical reasoning on an unsound basis insofar as my actions will result in situations in 
which some or all other agents will no longer be able to pursue similar courses of action.*
Yet, beyond this requirement of coherence, so O ’Neill argues, agents have no 
obligation within this limited notion of Kantian practical reason to count in agents into their 
deliberation who do not belong to the audience to which the conceived action is to be 
directed. The implication of this argument for our concerns here is that O'Neill has built a 
legitimate and sufficiently sound basis for particularistic reasoning, and hence for a 
geographically restricted political discourse. If correct, O'Neill’s line of reasoning implies that 
hinging the advantages o f an integration of the Russian political theory (or any other 
strikingly different theoretical discourse) simply on the point that it contributes towards the 
universality o f political conceptions o f justice as the supposed final objective of liberal 
theorising is not sufficient. The discrete spheres of national debates may very well be self- 
sufficient. O f course, neither communitarians nor the protagonist of such a limited 
cosmopolitanism would want to go as far as claiming that such self-contained bubbles o f 
meaning and discourse do still exist in the modem world. O'Neill does, however, introduce an 
element of reality that is hard to rebut. Justice and virtue matter most to agents within clearly 
determinate circumstances and contexts, and so these contexts must provide the intellectual 
resources for practical reasoning. That human action has a wider remit at times does not 
contradict the fact that much of human conduct is conduct between identifiable agents, rather 
than between hypothetical ones. Along these lines, we may have to admit that Russian 
theorising is primarily o f interest to agents located within this circumscribed terrain which 
conveniently supplies its own (contested or non-contested) standards o f accessibility and 
authority.
* O f course this argument is a modified version o f the principle o f universalizability as advocated by O ’Neill.
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There are two problems with this view, however. Firstly, given that O'Neill admits that 
the modem world is less and less a conglomerate of discrete national or cultural units in 
which concepts of justice can remained unchallenged by adjacent interpretations, O'Neill’s 
idea of practical reason reduces the urgency of thinking about a truly universal concept of 
justice, but cannot eliminate it altogether. The questions remain whether or not, and how, 
ethical reasoning may differ between international (institutional) agents and those who live 
and act within more determinate contexts. In essence, O ’Neill’s argument faces inherent 
tensions between her universal theoretical ambition and the advocated limitations o f practical 
reasoning.
The second counterpoint, however, is more fundamental. It is of meta-theoretical 
character and directs us to the requirements of accessibility as O'Neill’s precondition of 
coherent practical reasoning. What is the nature of her own account of practical reasoning? 
Does any justification of practical reasoning not require a universal framework insofar as it 
must necessarily address and fulfil the requirements of global accessibility? O'Neill surely 
must think of her own proposition about the scope o f practical reasoning as universally 
applicable. Is she not constructing a practical account of reasoning out of the very theoretical 
reason which, according to her, was not required for the limited remit of her project? Is her 
account of practical reasoning not silently feeding upon the Kantian framework of 
universality? Does her argument for the limited scope of practical reasoning presuppose the 
existence of a universally authoritative form of reasoning? This, however, would throw us 
back to square one. Although we could go along with O'Neill's argument for the sufficiency of 
localised ethical thought for particular contexts, this would indeed be a transient stage, the 
more so as agents increasingly operate in global contexts rather than narrow arenas with 
easily identifiable recipients of human action. The temporary status of her argument would be 
philosophically questionable and can by no means present us with good reasons to argue in 
favour of an interminable differentiation between Russian and Western political theorising.
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Thus it seems that O'Neill has marked the path with only a temporary milestone, one to be 
superseded as soon as it was placed on the ground.
The second objection is more difficult to refute. We may formulate it the following 
way. What standards of theorising can we identify for our universal debate on the ethical 
norms for political institutions if  dialogue between East and West lacks the cultural seedbed 
required for practical reasoning in the first place? Or, to put it differently, if  agency is 
anchored in, and facilitated by, cultural traditions, do we require an already existing set of 
universal cultural norms and standards to think about justice and politics in its universal 
applicability? In O'Neill's terms this would be an issue of authority and accessibility, and 
hence o f an epistemological nature. Agents rooted in cultures alien to universal forms of 
reasoning may lack the necessary conditions for understanding these norms and principles of 
political justice. But, clearly, this presents us with the problem of finding and defining 
something like a universal social context that would feed in the heuristic capacities for agents 
to act on a global plane. Kant's delicate construction of the interplay between theoretical and 
practical reason just does not seem to be so readily dispensable as O’Neill may think.
Yet, we may approach the topic from another, hopefully more fruitful, angle. We may 
find it more helpful to view the problem of universal discourse on ethics and politics and its 
epistemological prerequisites as an ongoing process of assertion, scrutiny and refutation. As 
Oakeshott has noted, agents may be conditioned by the contingent contexts which deliver 
their hermeneutic resources. Yet that does not mean that they are not able to, and at times 
even have to, transcend preconceived explanatory frameworks in their search for sense in as 
yet inexplicable circumstances that confront them. So, although human understanding may be 
culturally conditioned, it is by no means shackled to conventional and inherited modes of 
thought, but often needs to cope with challenges which reveal the previously sufficient 
sources of understanding as being painfully inadequate.
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There is nothing new about conceiving a potentially universal theoretical debate as a 
series of challenges which would set in motion a process of proposition, affirmation, and 
refutation. The broadly Hegelian cycle of human thought shines through in MacIntyre's 
portrayal o f epistemological crises as well as in Kuhn's account o f the emergence and decline 
of paradigms in scientific theories. Also, to conceive of political theory in such a manner 
would release us from the grip o f the two ills mentioned above. If theoretical debate is a 
sequence of epistemological problems, then the authority of theoretical answers (such as the 
contours of political liberalism) is a result o f the successful interaction and integration o f their 
different conceptualisations of the social, political and ethical contexts to which their work 
refers. Thus we do not have to, and often cannot, specify the proper standards of universal 
reasoning as we do not yet know the entirety of theoretical contributions to this debate. 
Equally, neither do we have to postulate a mysterious universal form of theoretical reason on 
which the accessibility o f our ethical thinking depends, nor do we have to disavow our own 
political cultural and social commitments which form part and parcel o f our hermeneutic 
capacities. The answers we may find for our problems are as universal as the questions we 
care to ask. And we can hardly ask the questions which have no reasons to arise, that is to say, 
that have still not happened to grow out of challenges to our hitherto established and 
confirmed modes of understanding. One such a challenge, then, is to make sense o f the 
Russian ideas of political liberalism within the discursive context o f liberal Western political 
theory.
Thus, the recognition of the plurality of viewpoints receives an epistemological 
vindication in the discursive scheme of things. The scholarly work of integrating differing 
accounts of justice and politics contributes to the rise of epistemological problems and 
therefore precipitates the emergence of less particularistic forms of ethical and political 
thought. This is why the Russian debate ought to matter to the practitioners o f Western 
political theory; it represents a challenge that delivers us the means to transcend the
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preconceived conceptual devices. By taking the Russian debate seriously, Western political 
theory gains in scope and accessibility, something that O'Neill's describes as the indispensable 
attributes of a universal form of practical reasoning.
To be sure, such a task is not simply reducible to 'listening up' and translating alien 
conceptual tools into its own hermeneutic framework. Rather, it is a search for the different 
way o f thinking, or as MacIntyre would have it, finding out about the theories of truth that 
sustain the epistemological conventions of different cultures and discursive contexts. This 
point will receive particular importance when we look at the linguistic mismatches between 
the Russian and Western debates at a later stage (part II).
II
The debate on the universality of liberal conceptions o f justice and politics has spawned a 
complex and sophisticated field of inquiry since Kant. More recently, the issue is 
conventionally looked at from the angle o f the validity of epistemic or anthropological 
foundations for successful theorising. While there are those, such as Gray and Rorty, who 
eschew universalism as an operationalisable feature o f social, cultural and political evolution 
and emphasise liberalism’s character as being conditioned by particular historical 
circumstances and political configurations (resonating deeply, albeit inadvertently, with the 
traditional Russian critique of Western liberalism), there are, on the other hand, those who see 
modernity itself as a process in which individuals lose their fundamental ethical orientation 
since moral precepts are being subjected to a rationalistic critique which allegedly severs them 
from an intact shared cultural background. MacIntyre notes that ethical norms only make 
sense within contexts of social life, not as commands of abstract (de-contextualised) reason 
(MacIntyre, 1996). Once we rid ourselves of the cohesion of social and political traditions, 
morality ceases to receive the necessary justification which it drew from these conventions. 
For him the deeply teleological structure of ethical reasoning in the pre-modem period was
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crucially undermined by the Enlightenment and left us bereft o f a coherent chain of 
legitimation for the moral norms and standards that still continue to regulate our lives 
(MacIntyre, 1994 and 1996). Although it is less clear what his alternative suggestion is with 
regard to a stable and shared vindication o f political morality in the modem world (cf. Beiner,
2000), his analysis does make a significant contribution to the problem of universalism. His 
portrayal of the sequence o f the various traditions o f ethical thought as a cycle of 
epistemological crises points to the way in which liberalism's universal (theoretical as well as 
practical) appeal may be repaired. If there is any path leading out o f the collision between the 
various Sittlichkeiten, as O'Neill would have put it, then it leads through the arduous process 
o f becoming aware of the numerous conceptual disparities between the debates in question. I 
think MacIntyre's notion of epistemological crises can help us acknowledge and ultimately 
overcome the impasse in our thinking on shared justificatory resources for liberal politics.
However, not all political theorists have given up all hope that some ideas of common 
anthroposophic or epistemic human features can furnish us with a foundation on which to 
build a universal theory of political liberalism. And, insofar as these attempts represent a 
viable challenge to the theoretical view put forward here, we need to engage with them and 
outline the reasons why these alternative visions of political liberalism have less appeal when 
it comes to viewing universality through the lenses o f the Russian debate on liberal politics.
If strong foundationalism has largely fallen from grace, its weaker twin still commands 
considerable respect. The term weak foundationalism unites a motley crew of theoretical 
approaches, but two of them seem most promising with regard to the issue o f Russian political 
liberalism. The first stresses the role and underlying assumptions o f a legal framework in 
social and political interaction. The second approach goes back to H.L.A. Hart's concept of 
the minimum content of natural law. Although it resurfaces in modified form, and plays a 
supportive role in the former version of weak foundationalism, it is quite different from it 
insofar as it formulates some assumptions on 'simple truisms ... without (which) ... laws and
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morals could not forward the minimum purpose of survival which men have in associating 
with each other.' (Hart, 1997, p. 193). While this proposes the conceivably minimalist project 
o f foundationalism, weak foundationalism as advocated by Haddock comprises more and 
goes considerably further. Besides adopting Hart's notion of a minimum content of natural 
law by resting his argument on the role of mutual vulnerability in premising the terms of 
social co-operation, Haddock identifies a second pillar on which to build his weak 
foundationalism. He notes that 'the idea o f a legal framework implies some normative 
standards that can help us distinguishing between liberal political orders and others' 
(Haddock, 2000).
He thereby endeavours to shift the argument from the identification o f the conditions 
for the survival of social forms of life per se to vindicating distinctly liberal politics. While 
Hart's minimum content of natural law allows us to differentiate between necessary and 
redundant requirements o f human societal survival, liberal or otherwise, Haddock raises the 
stakes and asks for the differentia specifica of liberal political institutions. The thrust of his 
argument stems from notions of the transparency and predictability of rules and the ways in 
which these facilitate social co-operation -  a faith in the differentiating potential of both that 
is, so I will argue at a later point, unfortunately misplaced.
That weak foundationalism may still harbour some valuable resources for liberal 
political theory might, however, be glimpsed from the fact that few versions o f political 
justice (utilitarianism notwithstanding) can dispense with it. Not even the most 
comprehensive and notable attempt at constructing 'A Theory of Justice' seems able to rely 
solely on non-foundationalist, constructivist premises. As many critics have pointed out, 
Rawls' vision of political liberalism owes much to a silent notion of reasonableness. His 
modifications in Political Liberalism have not entirely convinced his critics while they have 
often frustrated his Eastern European colleagues who have seen his new stress on existing 
democratic cultural traditions as doing some serious damage to its universal appeal (Barsa,
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2001). For Eastern Europe the question was often thought to be 'how to get there' in the 
absence of widely shared liberal or democratic political allegiances, not 'how to sustain an 
already existing if fragile political consensus' (cf. Barsa, 2001).
That Rawls has narrowed the inclusivity of his approach by speaking solely of 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines may have been a methodologically shrewed move, yet 
this overlooks the fact that political discord occurs between individuals of strong democratic 
or liberal convictions just as often as it does between citizens who in fact do not share even 
the most fundamental commitments of Western societies. As Cahoone and others have 
pointed out, some of the most highly ranked values of Western societies may easily be viewed 
as the unacceptable summum malum from the perspective o f other participants in the political 
process. The hotly debated issue of abortion in the United States may illustrate the point that, 
when we consider the issue of reasonableness, we do not necessarily have to think of the 
commitments o f non-Westem immigrants. The discrepant notions o f reasonableness may be 
running even through communities and sub-cultures which have genuine claims to being part 
of the historical foundations of such a broadly liberal society as the United States.
So, we may simply resign ourselves to the fact that some parts o f the political 
consensus which sustain a political framework may appear profoundly incompatible with the 
idea of the good held by some of the participants in liberal societies. The problem is that these 
citizens who may hold views that would place them outside the reasonable political consensus 
might never be able to count themselves as full subscribers to the basic rules o f societal 
engagement. A disturbing theoretical effect of such exclusion is, however, that some of the 
most famous libertarians, such as Henry David Thoreau, would equally fail to qualify for 
membership in this exclusive club of reasonable citizens. To put it differently, Berlin's 
problem of the incompatibility of values strikes deep and, in the long run, must fundamentally 
undermine any rushed attempt to determine the circle of those who are entitled to voice their 
doctrines in the Rawlsian Olympus of reasonable debate.
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Alternatively, we could go along with O'Neill's suggestion that circumscribing the 
participants in the debate prior to determining the action to be considered (in our case the 
Russian debate on political liberalism) is counterproductive since it deprives us o f the objects 
of definition of what a liberal outlook is and ought to be. In this respect, her Kantian vision is 
more consistent than Rawls' attempt to wed Kantian reason to contractarianism.
O'Neill's argument that action must be the primary focus for ethical thought engenders 
a constructivist agenda out of the material provided by the strictures of practical reasoning. 
Her theory offers us the immense advantage that the recognition o f differing starting places 
and contexts for practical reasoning is always already part and parcel of the framework. The 
move from abstract principles of justice and virtue to concrete judgements on obligatory 
human action is not predetermined by standards of what could or could not count as being 
compatible to a hypothetically agreed liberal political consensus. That produces the 
extraordinary appeal of her theory while it eminently also leads to the most pressing problem, 
which is the lack of differentiating criteria for categorising liberal and illiberal human 
conduct. As much as she stresses that the audiences o f human actions are diverse and 
determine the scope of justice, she fails to notice that her benchmarks o f liberal justice, the 
avoidance of violation, coercion, and violence, are problematised only as a result of the 
particular diversity of the outlooks and attitudes of the participants o f modem societies. Forms 
of coercion (for example, ‘arranged’ marriages between minors) to which adherents of 
Western liberal values would react with abject horror and instant rejection may often appear 
unproblematic in contexts with deeply enshrined cultural traditions and practices.
O'Neill's theory thus builds on the cmcial, if  seemingly unnoticed, premise that 
coercion, violence and injury are readily detectable and identifiable to the addressees of 
human action. What remains opaque is that this detectability is an outcome of the process in 
which differing notions of these attitudes have become a point o f contestation, forcing agents
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to exit for good the realm of habitualised unreconstructed and unreflective practice into 
consciously affirmed or rejected traditions.
Yet, perhaps when we ask why O'Neill's broadly Kantian reformulation of universality 
of liberal justice fails, we need to probe not so much the tenacity o f the philosophical side of 
her account, but rather the concrete interplay between abstract principles o f justice, particular 
local practices and the origins and sources of human deliberation and judgement. A brief look 
at her remarks, I believe, reveals the epistemological gap that opens up between these various 
components of her vision of liberal justice.
To summarise her idea, O'Neill suggests that we conceptualise the way in which 
abstract principles o f justice are operationalised in concrete situations from the perspective of 
the recipients o f a prospective action. The move from an individualistic perspective of the 
categorical imperative, as advocated by Kant, to action as the primary focus o f reasoning 
entails, as O'Neill convincingly argues, that we approach the issue o f vindicating action from 
the angle o f consent. Now, three possible scenarios are offering themselves. We can think of 
consent as actually existant, leading us into the Lockean quagmire that Mill so scathingly 
criticised. Alternatively, we may believe that any legitimising criterion is o f hypothetical 
nature. The consent of individuals is conveniently redundant when we declare as our main 
standard of legitimation the possibility that everybody could agree to a proposed set of ethical 
norms. O'Neill seems to mistrust this proposition since it throws up the problems of 
idealisation. Which conditions, so we may ask sceptically, must be fulfilled for agents to 
express their genuine consent? And, if the situations are hypothetical, so are the agents in our 
equation. What features, capacities and preferences must agents have to acquiesce into a 
course of action or to reject it? This, however, is the muddle of idealisations and configuration 
of preferences o f agents which O'Neill carefully attempted to avoid since she identified it as a 
seedbed of theoretical discord.
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Instead, and thirdly, so she argues, consent must be thought of as a reflection of the 
potential of the prospective recipient of action to reject or 'renegotiate' the proposed course of 
action (O’Neill, 2000). This gives us an excellent handle on the problem of consent since it 
moves centre stage the issue o f empowerment of the individual(s) from whom the consent is 
to be elicited. This move translates the whole issue of consent into a debate on what 
incapacitates (i.e. is to be rejected within a liberal political framework) or enables agents to 
act (i.e. ought to be facilitated). Despite the ingenuity o f this shift o f perspective, which 
O'Neill illustrates poignantly with examples of the subordination o f women in many societies, 
it is presented by her in the overall scheme of things as a guidance or even exemplification of 
how to individuate abstract principles of justice in particular situations.
However, it is by no means clear that the principle o f empowering the recipients of 
actions in particular situations offers any more concrete guidance in adjudicating between 
differing options of human conduct in particular contexts. As things stand, we now may have 
available two equally abstract principles which still require translation into the world of 
reasoning on action. O'Neill may be right with her insistence that no principles of action can 
offer an algorithm for action, but that still leaves uncorroborated her claim that local practices 
could only serve a subordinate role in deliberating action. What receives little light is how 
individual judgement in fact works and what it requires. This, customarily, has also been the 
point of departure for disputes between Kantian liberals and communitarians, and her account 
is no exception to this rule.
How then can we envisage the process of judging? Starting with her two principles of 
justice, agents may, firstly, ask themselves whether or not a particular action infringes the 
norm of avoiding injury, coercion and violence. Following on from this, agents have to probe 
whether or not the envisaged action would harm the capacity of prospective addressees to 
consent to this action. This last requirement is quite strict. There are not a few actions that 
social agents or governmental institutions take in reality which deliberately disregard the
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invocation of consent or preclude thinking about possibly renegotiating the course o f action. 
Some actions are meant to be prohibitive o f certain forms of human behaviour which at times 
includes incapacitating agents to act or consent, for example restraining a person for the 
purpose of preventing harm to another. O ’Neill may be inclined to exclude from consideration 
these ‘hard cases’. However, they similarly require justification, just as any clear-cut example 
o f violating the rights o f economically, politically or socially impoverished agents would. Yet, 
it is hard to see how vindication for actions in many o f the 'hard cases' can come about by 
without recourse to everyday practices of social and political interaction.
But here we reach the watershed: O'Neill would have us adjudicate along the lines of 
the principles of justice as primary decisive criteria, whereas communitarians believe that 
prevalent practices can occupy a prime position in practical reasoning. It may appear to 
liberals particularly hard to accept that some forms of impairment of agency can be vindicated 
at all. But this is what the use of governmental authority is all about. If O'Neill wants us to 
make the transition from abstract principles o f justice to concrete recommendations o f actions, 
then she must provide us with an outline as to how abstract norms are mitigated or qualified 
without being undermined by particular conditions and practices.
O'Neill must believe in the differentiating potential of abstract principles of justice 
within the process o f selecting appropriate action. Yet, when deliberating on the desirable 
conduct, local practices consequently gain the upper hand. They offer several advantages over 
abstract principles as final arbiters in a range of conceivable activities. Practices are less 
hegemonic than principles, i.e. they do not restrain our options beyond the immediate action 
concerned; they often offer themselves in a structured way, that is to say they have attached to 
them rules of applicability guiding us in our search for valid options o f action. Furthermore 
they are often grounded in contextually constructed matrices of significance indicating why 
certain actions ought to matter to us, thus allowing us to offer justifications to the recipients of 
our actions, thus facilitating consensus and eventually consent.
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That does not mean that O'Neill's standards of ethical reasoning may not be evoked for 
ethical vindication. Yet, what they rarely possess is the superiority and overriding potential 
over other ethical norms that O’Neill attributes to them. To be clear about this, we can readily 
agree to demand compliance of economically powerful agents with the principle that 
stipulates avoidance of injury to weak members of society. What is far more difficult is to 
identify the extent to which coercive behaviour is wrong in societies whose survival may 
depend on social and political hierarchies that involve injustices of which most Westerners 
would disapprove -  not to mention the epistemological doubt, hinted at earlier, that injury, 
violence and coercion are concepts that invite interpretation and require normative conflict to 
be problematised and to be detectable to agents.
So, the focus for any thinking about practical reasoning must be the conditions and 
resources of ethical judgement. And it is here that O'Neill's account leaves us in the dark. If 
O’Neill does not offer any constructive help, despite her insistence on the significance of 
translating abstract ethical norms into practical guidance in particular cases, Oakeshott does. 
His account of practical reasoning takes us one step further insofar as he construes ethical 
reasoning on human conduct as a process of understanding. Without sketching the intricacies 
of his complex philosophical position, we may gain sufficient leverage for tackling our 
problem simply by contemplating his thesis that any orientation in the world for the agent 
starts in determinate circumstances and with a definable amount of knowledge about the 
individual’s surroundings and conditions. To assume that any agent has neither any idea of his 
being in the world (not even a profoundly mistaken view of his circumstances) nor that he 
may med one is to fundamentally misunderstand how human conduct is made possible.
As Oakeshott argued in On Human Conduct (Oakeshott, 1990), whenever agents are 
faced vith a situation which invites their action they enter a process of diagnosis at the end of 
whichthey have resolved either to act or to abstain from action. The outcome of this process 
is conditioned by the resources o f interpretation and diagnosis available to them and they may
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indeed gravely misjudge the situation they are supposedly in. Thus, for Oakeshott, practical 
reasoning is a process which entails learning from and reconsidering the decisions previously 
made. Although he would broadly agree with Kantians that reflective consciousness forms 
the core of the deliberating process (Oakeshott, 1990, p.36-37), he notes time and again that 
deliberation on action does not start with abstract principles o f justice but with the necessary 
orientation of agents in the contingent situations they face. The main argument that Oakeshott 
offers communitarians in defence o f the prevalence o f locally endorsed practices rather than 
universal abstract norms is that understanding is a process by which agents interpret the 
characteristics o f all the variables in their situation, yet do not attempt to analyse their 
contingent circumstances in terms o f the postulates of conduct. But is this just philosophical 
hair-splitting? What is the difference between postulates and characteristics of agency?
To Oakeshott, thinking about action requires agents to identify, as it were, the personae 
o f all the elements in the equation that make up the situation in which they find themselves 
(Oakeshott, 1991; esp. part I, pp. 1-107). Whether or not somebody misinterprets his own 
position in the broader scheme of things, he is still called upon to understand what the various 
components of the situation are and what they could possibly mean to him. This is the core 
task of agency and insofar as such an understanding of the contingent situation is his own, so 
he is the author o f the conclusion which he draws from his analysis.
What agency does not usually comprise, however, is to inquire into the conditions of 
the elements that make up the situation he is faced with. Oakeshott gives a poignant example 
when he describes the difference between understanding the action that is required when 
somebody is asked for the time and the analysis that a philosopher would want to undertake 
when thinking about the postulates of time (Oakeshott, 1990, p.9). The ordinary individual 
faced with the question ‘What time is it?’ may easily take for granted that the concept of time 
is unproblematic. His concern is not with what renders the question as well as his response 
intelligible but with the veracity of the answer he gives.
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For a philosopher, the conditions of this interaction, however, are part and parcel o f his 
work. He queries the postulates o f agency rather than the various characteristics and possible 
misunderstandings of the interaction. That does not mean that agents may never consider the 
conditions that enable them to respond appropriately to other agents when the philosophical 
basis of their interaction proves profoundly out of sync amongst each other. These, however, 
are rare cases, and reconstituting the theoretical foundation of agency does not add much to 
their interpretative capacities. It is a move to reassure themselves o f the conditions of 
accessibility, not an addition or adjustment to their understanding o f the situation.
Oakeshott’s discrimination between theoretical and practical knowledge, between 
characteristics of a situation and the postulates o f this practical understanding of this situation 
in which agents find themselves, allows us to adopt a new perspective on the problem of how 
to move from abstract ethical norms to concrete adjudication in particular cases. With 
Oakeshott’s thesis in mind, this whole relocation becomes redundant as far as practical agents 
are concerned. For Oakeshott, O ’Neill and many Kantians put the cart before the horse. 
Agents do not face the problem of applying abstract principles of justice to particular cases. 
Rather, they work their way up from understanding contingent situations through locally 
endorsed practices to, eventually, more abstract norms o f social behaviour that may transcend 
the narrow boundaries o f the locally established moral rules. Construing practical reasoning 
from the bottom up is thus an epistemological necessity resulting from the structure and 
evolution of human conduct, not simply one of ideological preference for inherited cultures or 
established practices.
The significant advantage of inverting O’Neill’s sequence o f practical reasoning is that 
this perspective resolves the tension between abstract norms and particularistic rules. The 
former may easily enter the realm of deliberation of agents at any stage if these principles 
have become part o f the corpus of valid moral rules for a specific community. Yet, they do 
not acquire a superior status or somehow become unassailable standards for acting. The focus
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of legitimation of these norms of behaviour remains with the agent when considering the 
applicability of these universal rules in the concrete situation that he faces. An intention, in 
fact, that motivated O’Neill in her account of practical agency.
This means that abstract principles of justice, insofar as they are precipitated in their 
application and validity for specific communities and particular agents in virtue of the 
categorical imperative (or the coherence principle as formulated by O ’Neill), are not part of 
the ethical considerations of agents. They are integrated into the process o f understanding and 
agency as norms that happen to prevail in societies but not on account of being an act of 
inference that rejecting them will contradict the very essence o f acting itself. Such would be a 
thought of theoretical nature and thus represent the result o f thinking about the postulates of 
agency. These are the subject matter of philosophical works, not of agents’ practical 
engagement with the world.
Oakeshott’s argument on the difference between the spheres o f reasoning furnishes us 
with a powerful point in illustrating the potential benefit o f analysing the Russian debate for 
Western political theory. If Oakeshott’s claim on the structure o f human understanding is 
correct then local practices and traditions are privileged in the process of practical reasoning 
of agents. The universal twist of this claim, however, is that nothing bars O ’Neill’s abstract 
principles of justice from becoming an important part of practical reasoning as long as they 
figure in the agent’s resources for understanding and responding to the situation(s) he faces. 
In order to do this they must have orientating potential; and they gain this by being part of 
lived, endorsed or contested but recognised norms of a society or community.
In this scheme of things political theorists and philosophers are free to make an 
argument in favour of universalism, that is to say, to point to the fact that in societies without 
a shared religious, political or social conception of the good, universal principles of justice 
may be re-conceptualised as indispensable components of political institutions. What we have 
to keep apart, however, is the articulation of such a theoretical argument and the epistemic
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conditions of agency in concrete situations. Principles of justice may or may not become part 
of practical reasoning for actual agents, but if  they do they do so by virtue o f being an integral 
part of ethical practices, not by virtue of being an irrefutable superior norm for human 
conduct as reason dictates.
This is by no means an entirely novel line of argument. Communitarians have 
advanced similar arguemnts in defence of the priority of the shared background of experience, 
(practical and theoretical) vocabulary and commitments. What I believe communitarians of 
the stricter variant have often failed to recognise, however, is that universal values which by 
now dominate theoretical debates in the West have become a legitimate and vital component 
o f practical reasoning by forming an indispensable part o f the political social and cultural 
orientation o f individuals. Universal values belong to the moral equipment o f individuals 
living in those societies that are marked by a lack of religious, political and cultural 
homogeneity; something that initially gave rise to the universalist and constructivist theories. 
What distinguishes the revised account o f practical reasoning from O ’N eill’s version of 
Kantianism is that it identifies the capacity to judge as the core of political agency. While 
O ’Neil] remains faithful to her Kantian roots by speaking about the capacity to act as a result 
of the absence of coercion and injury, reiterating the latitudinal aspect of agency (Cahoone, 
2002), the alternative would be, without diminishing the universal drift and potential of the 
concept of agency, to complement her account with the notion of the propriativity (Cahoone,
2002) of agency, the ‘actualisation of choice’ which is dependent on the capacity to make and 
revise meaningful judgements. If liberalism as a historical phenomenon is, as Oakeshott 
convincingly argued, the result of a series of contingent choices by a multitude of diverse 
historical actors, then universal liberalism must salvage its universalising impetus by locating 
it in the conditions that make human conduct possible.
No doubt, some of these conditions are contributory to the evolution o f liberal politics. 
Others, however, may simply facilitate the solution of conflict in human interaction. Most
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historians and political theorists may suspect that the economic and political institutions that 
have developed over the last decades and the social pressures (and opportunities) that have 
come to bear upon individuals as well as whole communities predetermine or (less 
stringently) prearrange the range of choices for individuals that figure in their judgements on 
political action and result in a proclivity of modem politics towards universal values and 
norms. This may well be true, but none of the visions o f universal practical reasoning can 
augment the defects of an O’Neillean conception o f agency. As much as the absence of 
coercion, injury and violence contributes to the exercise o f agency, it represents only the 
penultimate step on the path towards meaningful agency. The core problem to be thematized 
is which circumstances permit agents best to bring their judgements to bear upon particular 
situations in the specific contexts requiring action. By refusing to characterise judgement as 
subsumptive or determinate, O’Neill concentrates on the relation between act-descriptions and 
principles. That this connection requires interpretation based on reflective consciousness is 
willingly conceded. What O ’Neill fails to notice, however, is that act-descriptions and 
principles themselves are the outcome of an interpretative process that is conditioned, yet not 
inexorably determined, by the culturally or socially inherited and reaffirmed meanings of 
these descriptions.
This furnishes us with a solid argument for the significance of the diverse categories 
and concepts of human orientation. The normative work that the project of interrelating the 
Russian and Western debate requires liberals to do is to describe their initial concepts of 
understanding and to evaluate them in terms of the standards of liberal views of social and 
political life. This translates into an agenda with two main tasks. Firstly, to determine or to try 
to delineate what the various political ideas and concepts in the shared discursive space of the 
Russian and Western theoretical debate may mean for the Russian liberal project, and 
secondly, to clarify the extent to which the impairment of meaningful agency can be eased 
and the capacity for judgement so critical to ethical reasoning can be facilitated.
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I l l
It remains to establish the relevance of the conception of agency for a better understanding of 
the Russian transformation. Most theorists would leave this academic field to political 
scientists and note that there are only the most tenuous links connecting political theory with 
the various analyses o f post-communist transformations. The absence of any extensive writing 
by political theorists on the East European experience, with notable exceptions such as Bruce 
Ackerman (Ackerman, 1992), speaks for the need to make a cogent argument for this link if 
we find it warrants any attention at all. There will be a place in chapter 5 to sketch the 
common ground between political science and political philosophy in more detail with regard 
to the Russian transformation; for now the following remarks will focus on the theoretical 
gain any conception o f agency can bring to re-constructing a universal conception of political 
liberalism.
As noted earlier, both Oakeshotf s broadly descriptive account o f meaningful agency 
in On Human Conduct and O ’Neill’s revised Kantian notion o f practical reasoning refuse to 
privilege either abstract principles of justice or thick obligatory frameworks o f social life. 
Both accounts also remarkably (and deliberately) fall short of presenting us with normative 
guidance for building liberal political institutions. The emphasis on choice and the capacity to 
choose relegates to the background norms of social life which are conventionally thought of 
as core standards of liberal politics. Although O’Neill undoubtedly believes that the identified 
principles of justice and virtue take agents a long way towards liberal institutions, the 
indeterminacy of these principles introduces an element of uncertainty. In other words, 
O ’Neill trusts the proclivity o f her rules for just and virtuous action towards liberal politics, 
but the overall tone o f her exploratory account remains sceptical.
Oakeshott’s account offers even less straightforward hope for a liberal universalism. In 
fact, his theory of liberal history eminently precludes liberal politics as the outcome of human 
conduct regulated by detectable and followable principles o f political actions. His notion of
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agency delivers us more and less than O ’Neill’s at the same time. While he refuses to view 
any political order as the result of human design, he simultaneously creates ample space for 
human action in its complex interrelationship with the particular requirements of social life. 
His description of the agent’s understanding points to the crucial role o f judgement and the 
epistemic preconditions for it. Oakeshott’s account of understanding reminds us that all 
agency is premised on deciphering the various elements that momentarily constitute an 
agent’s situation. Within this perspective the distance between local particular practices and 
universal principles is reduced. Both figure as components o f the agent’s cognitive make-up 
and the particular constellation between both, the entire absence or any pronounced 
imbalances in favour of either, is down to the ethical culture that constitutes the resources for 
the agent’s practical reasoning.
There are several problems with both Oakeshott and O ’Neill’s notion of agency. 
Although it is not my intention to suggest that a simple combination of both will take us any 
closer to a feasible reconstitution of universal political liberalism, what should have become 
clear however is that both accounts offer us the prospect of significant progress insofar as they 
both refuse to acknowledge an interpretative chasm between abstract universal principles of 
justice and particular practices and traditions. Agency seems to suggest a unique way to 
diminish this rift. While O’Neill stops short of identifying the requirements for practical 
judgement, evidently in order to remain faithful to the Kantian frame of practical reasoning, 
and Oakeshott notes the central importance o f it, it has become clear that the Russian debate 
on political liberalism is first and foremost an attempt to appropriate to itself the epistemic 
concepts and ideas that have informed the Western debate on liberal justice and ethics. 
Facilitating this appropriation, then, is constituting the foundations o f practical judgement and 
complementing the fundamentals of a universal liberal theory o f politics at the same time.
To wring some genuinely liberal principles out of a barren account o f agency may be 
impossible. But, as noted above, Oakeshott’s description of agency (though his politics are
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widely held to be profoundly conservative) seems to go further insofar as it elaborates on the 
capacities to act. While O ’Neill thematises the problem of incapacitation o f the agent from the 
angle of coercion, injury and violence, she fails to acknowledge that aspect of choice which 
conservatives are conventionally more attuned to: the capacity to judge. Many 
communitarians would want to speak of the embeddedness of the individual will in this 
context. But we do not need to mince words here. Emphasizing human judgmental abilities 
and capacities does not mean that abstract ethical norms will be supplanted in their entirety by 
local traditions and practices, which would make it extremely difficult for theorists to arrive at 
a truly universal debate on political liberalism. As MacIntyre’s notion of epistemological 
crisis indicates (MacIntyre, 1996; esp. chapters 17-20), it is in fact a prerequisite o f normative 
work to acknowledge and identify the discrepancy o f concepts and to interpret conceptual 
disparities creatively in light of the various interpretations that East and West offer. In the 
course o f such an exercise, a certain amount of ‘naturalisation’ of abstract principles is 
unavoidable, but only in order to allow these principles to re-emerge as part of a shared 
reservoir of ethical reasoning. It is the willingness to take seriously Russian interpretations of 
liberal politics and to seek a feasible integrated account of concepts and terminology that will 
deliver us the means to re-forge the universal theoretical debate on liberal politics and ethics 
which we seek to establish. An example may illustrate the, admittedly ambitious, parameters 
of this project.
Aleksandr Akhiezer (bom 1929) has, over the last decade, become one of the most 
prominent proponents of a Russian Sonderweg thesis. Akhiezer, who currently works at the 
Institute of Economic Forecasting of the Russian Academy of Sciences, has not only caused 
quite a stir amongst historians and theoreticians of culture with his influential work Rossiia: 
Kritik istoricheskovo opyta (Akhiezer, 1997) but has also managed to create something like a 
school of thought to which so eminent and equally prolific cultural historians and political 
scientists as Aleksandr Sergeievich Panarin belong. Although Akhiezer’s theory of cycles in
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Russian history gained him little friends amongst Western scholars, it was exactly the aspect 
of predictability that has made his work hugely popular amongst Russian historians. More 
recently, his thesis on cultural cycles has informed a raft o f publications by various members 
of the Institute o f Economic Forecasting in Moscow. He has repeatedly claimed that he wrote 
the bulk of the three volumes of Rossiia long before the perestroika era (he started writing the 
first volume around 1974 but lost a substantial part o f the manuscript in 1982*) but was 
unable to publish it for reasons of stringent censorship practised under the communist regime. 
Whether this is true or not, the changes since the collapse o f the communist regimes have 
certainly reversed his chances of being published and Akhiezer has not only become an 
immensely prolific writer, but also a scholar who has strenuously striven to enhance the 
applicability of his theory to collateral disciplines. Raised and educated in Moscow he studied 
at the Faculty o f Economics of the Agricultural Economic Institute in Moscow and worked 
subsequently for the planning commission at Tulsk. Having never received formal 
philosophical education and, allegedly for lack of time, never been able to complete his 
doctorate, he has shown remarkably little reluctance to widen the remit of his theory to other 
social sciences. Whether or not part o f his initial intention, his work has assumed a scent of 
all-embracing system building, reminiscent of the German philosophy in the nineteenth 
century.
( The focus of our concern, however, is not Akhiezer’s theory of historical cycles but hisI
) notion o f ‘raskol’ or schism. Central to his work is the thesis that Russian society is
X
I characterised by a curious rift which has persisted throughout modem history. His thesis willI
j be outlined in more detail at a later stage (cf. part II, chapters 9 and 10). What is of interest to
; us at this preliminary theoretical stage is how theorists can possibly create a singular
j discursive trajectory out of two disparate historical narratives. The story o f the liberal West
; * For a brief summary o f Akhiezer’s work and life see Matveieva’s introduction to V ol.3 o f  Rossiia (Akhiezer,
‘ 1997 )
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has often been recounted and goes thus: Deep disagreement over fundamental religious and 
political issues and the solidification of this disagreement in institutional form have in the 
course o f the modem era led to the evolution of institutions that manage conflict resolution 
which in turn pacified Western societies and set free their immense dynamic resources for 
economic and social development. Akhiezer’s portrayal o f the Russian contrasting picture 
provides a poignant reminder o f the contingent nature o f liberal political institutions in the 
West. He argues that a societal rift lying at the heart o f Russian modem society had mainly 
led to the absence o f a similarly stmctured political arena with conflict-resolving capacity. 
Instead the Russian polity was, and still continues to be, characterised by the development of 
separate spheres of life, each regulated by exclusively and singularly valid rules and practices. 
One of the main features of this lack of spill-over between domains o f life is the utter 
redundancy of politics as a playground of diverse interests and their regulated exchange, 
mediated collision and eventual reconciliation. Quite in contrast to the Western experience, 
Russian politics grows out of the need of an imperial ruler to deliver the administration o f the 
polity in a most efficient way, reflecting the needs of modernity. At best, Russian politics thus 
remains imposed on society as a whole, which persists in being relatively impervious to the 
development of political values. At worst, politics is continuously colonised by norms and 
values extraneous to it, inhibiting the evolution o f a genuinely political set of ethical 
principles.
Akhiezer’s thesis is a truly multifaceted highly sophisticated illustration o f an 
alternative path to modernity, which stands in remarkable contrast to Western history. 
Historians have seized upon various of his more questionable claims and Western scholars 
have voiced deep reservations about the cyclical aspect of his thesis. Yet, for our purposes, his 
theory confronts us with a pertinent though classic question as to how politics can be justified 
in a society which, in the various spheres of social existence, has somehow adopted codes of 
practices peculiar to these compartmentalised domains while generating a sufficient capacity
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to solve interior problems. It is the problem of the justification o f politics as a ‘latecomer’, 
where economics and social sphere have developed deeply entrenched and perhaps frequently 
malign rules of existence, sentencing politics to be the subordinate to others. It is the question 
posed by Russian conservatives time and again: What grounds can we give to establish 
politics if locally prevalent ethics would prove to be the better guide?
There can be no doubt that Russian reality has long radically undermined the claims of 
Russian conservatives that ethics could supplant politics. In face o f the great extent to which 
Russia is nowadays a religiously, politically and culturally diverse (and divided) polity, 
political institutions as means of conflict resolution are necessary and do not require any 
further justification. It is harder to dismiss Akhiezer’s thesis, however, when it comes to 
constructing a reconciled (European) theoretical account of liberal politics.
I will illustrate briefly what I mean by the need to integrate the Western and Russian 
debate as a requisite for a discursive universalism of political theory. At first, Akhiezer’s 
argument seems to strike a note that is mainly historical in nature. He points to the remarkably 
redundant features of Russian politics as opposed to the organic development of Western 
politics out of the need for the mediation of conflict between political forces. At a deeper 
level, however, Akhiezer’s thesis does resonate with concepts and ideas which would 
conventionally be considered the home of political theorists. The question of the status and 
nature o f politics, which AJdiiezer is concerned with, possesses more than a fleeting reference 
to the problem of the primacy of ethics over politics which Russian conservatives have so 
fervently articulated in the debate of the nineteenth century (perhaps most eloquently 
formulated by Leo Tolstoi). In a society where politics has continually been unable to 
establish its own boundaries and prevent its domain from being colonised by economic and to 
cultural norms, the question of the exact relationship between the right and the good emerges 
with deep urgency.
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Politics itself, being stripped of its habitual embeddedness in societal practice and 
institutions, becomes an object of theoretical inquiry. For some, its very existence ultimately 
appears to require justification. From the perspective of the Western theorist, this may seem a 
call from a distant past and the argument hardly worth contemplating. As pointed out earlier, 
however, modem political theory owes its very existence to the fact that societies have ceased 
to be based on homogenous, uncontested conceptions of the good that can command 
unanimous allegiance amongst all o f its citizens. Thus, political theorists assume that the 
problem-solving capacities which the various spheres o f human life have evolved are per se 
insufficient and require one way or another the appeal to a set of political principles which 
regulate potentially destructive disagreement between individuals. Akhiezer’s thesis must 
therefore appear curiously out of step with modem reality and the absence of all-embracing 
and homogenous notions of national or cultural identity.
Yet, sketching Akhiezer’s account of Russian society does generate a different view on 
the role of normative theoretical justification in politics. It alerts us to the fact that the relative 
autonomy of politics and the emergence o f norms and values intrinsic to the exercise of 
political action is something that cannot be presupposed. The definition of politics in political 
liberalism thus gains a wider remit. Any theory o f politics must resist the colonisation of the 
political realm by economic and cultural categories o f understanding, if  it wants to create the 
initial conditions for liberal politics. This sheds light on the disparate positions of politics in 
Russia and the West. Western political theorists, when arguing over the neutrality of the state 
towards cultural, religious notions of social organisation, look at domestic politics as a 
domain exhibiting co-ordinates and standards that are essentially ‘homegrown’ and intrinsic 
to its existence. Russian theorists talk about politics as a source of power in a society where 
the rules that distribute and legitimate this power are at best opaque if not simply adopted 
from the dynamics of the economic sphere.
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This illuminates how frustratingly superfluous many o f the arguments in the Western 
debates on political liberalism must appear in the context of Russian transformation. As 
Akhiezer notes in his work Russian Statehood, co-authored with Il’in (Il’in, 1997), the rift 
between society and the state apparatus prevents the development o f a viable political arena. 
Yet, such a space for politics is necessary for the articulation of ideas about the desirable 
shape o f political institutions. In lieu of such a public arena and sustainable politics itself, the 
elaborate argument for the relative independence of the various spheres of life which are 
supposed to generate civic freedoms falls through. In Russia the withdrawal of the uninhibited 
influence of market forces from politics would leave behind only a simulacrum of politics, 
easily falling prey to the only functioning forms of social organisation, the bureaucracy, the 
military, and the secret services who would appropriate the state for their own interests.
Thus, to discuss political liberalism solely within the contexts of individual freedom 
and its preconditions is to disregard the very foundations on which any political debate rests: 
the existence of a distinctive set of principles indigenous to politics and sustaining a widely 
autonomous realm o f politically motivated civic articulation. The integrity of agency thus 
requires in their standards and rules distinguishable spheres of life. On the back of such 
distinction, an argument for their mutual interdependence can develop and political agency 
can begin to show preference for, or reject, market oriented norms and principles. Taking note 
of this fact, I believe, can propel us forward to a truly universal notion o f political liberalism.
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4. Building Blocs for a Viable Universal Liberalism
The previous chapters have advanced an array o f different arguments and claims. Some o f 
them might still appear unrelated and it is the objective o f this penultimate section of the first 
part of the thesis to tie these loose ends together. What has received little attention so far is 
that liberty as an abstract concept has played a significant role in the reform efforts of the 
Russian liberals after the collapse o f Communism (cf. Gaidar, 1995). Yet, while liberty may 
seem of central importance for the Russian political debate, to Russian scholars it has been to 
be of little guidance when trying to define what Russian liberalism could be. Despite many 
attempts to circumscribe as accurately as possible what Russian liberalism is, most Russian 
political theorists would reject as unsuitable to their country a vision of political liberalism as 
founded on abstract individual liberty. Thus a more contextualised concept of political 
liberalism may have more appeal to Russian scholars, and the second part o f this chapter will 
argue for some considerable benefits in trying to construct liberalism from ‘weak 
foundations’. A brief overview of the points formulated in the previous chapters will help to 
illustrate what remains to be done.
It has been argued, firstly, that agency is central to a viable universal notion of 
political liberalism. The chapter following these theoretical considerations will then make the 
case that agency can provide solid common ground between political science and political 
theory, facilitating the benefits when looking at the Russian transformation from what are 
oftten thought to be mutually preclusive perspectives. It has also been argued that, secondly, 
universalism is conditional upon the succesful integration o f other (in our case: Russian) 
notions of liberalism without marginalising the differences and dissonances between Western 
and Russian political and ethical concepts. A third argument pointed to the need for ethical 
resources of liberal theorising and institution building, something that may have notably been 
absent in many post-communist societies. Before this argument receives any further
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elaboration, I would like to return to the problem of what the foundations o f liberal theorising 
could be and whether or not weak foundationalism may provide sufficient grounds for 
political liberalism. In the first part of this chapter I will try to further establish the case for an 
integrated and historically sensitive account of political liberalism. The second half o f this 
chapter then critically reviews weak foundationalism as providing such a basis for a 
reconstructed account o f liberal politics.
I
Rationality and abstraction are the inseparable twins that define UC in political philosophy, 
and there have been thorough and sometimes scathing criticisms o f them by distinguished 
Western philosophers (Rorty, 1991; MacIntyre, 1994 and MacIntyre 1996; also see the critical 
call by O ’Neill for differentiation between idealization and abstraction in political theory, 
O ’Neill, 1988, 1996 and 2000). On a positive note, the effects of conceptual abtraction may 
render philosophical constructs accessible to any prospective participant in the debate and 
ultimately foster the incontestability of the results, but they also ensure the irrelevance of the 
findings within actual environments. Hence, liberal political theory may become a discourse 
of topicality rather than one of pertinence. O ’Neill has warned against confusing abstraction 
with idealization in political theory. While the former is inevitable insofar as theorists must at 
some stage ‘bracket’ some or other features of moral agents, they may not ascribe arbitrarily 
capacities or capabilities to agents that they do not possess. Where abstract accounts o f agents 
increase the appeal of these accounts to actual agents operating from within diverse concepts 
of Sittlichkeiten, idealized notions of agents falsify reality and reduce the applicability of 
these concepts of agents across a varied spectrum of ethical and social practices (O’Neill, 
1988 and 2000).
To illuminate the incoherence of such idealized concepts of human agency and its 
effects on political theory, one could usefully employ the ideas of the British ‘contextualists’,
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such as Skinner and Pocock. In an article on social action and meaning Skinner tries to carve 
out a middle position between strict positivism and the rigid Verstehen tradition expounded by 
thinkers like Dilthey. He writes,
‘We can imagine an alien system of beliefs in which the paradigms used to connect the 
system together are such that none of the evidence which we should regard as evidence 
in favour of abandoning those beliefs is taken to count as decisive evidence either for or 
against them. We can then imagine an agent, operating within this belief-system, who 
accepts on trust these prevailing paradigms, recognising and following only those 
moves accepted as rational within the given system, but never challenging the 
rationality of any part of the system itself.’ (Skinner, 1972, p. 151)
Hypothetically, we may think of political theory as one such system of belief. In the present 
context, what matters is not how this may possibly undermine the truth credentials o f any 
theoretical discourse (an issue positivists would be concerned with) but the best possible 
manner in which an observer can understand the various parts o f this system of belief or 
discourse. Skinner again,
‘...to disclose the meaning of such a work, (one) must ... begin not by making an 
intensive study of the text in itself, but rather by trying to see what relations it bears to 
... existing conventions.’ (Skinner, 1972, p .155)
For Skinner, the task of the historian of ideas is to reveal the conventions and assumptions 
that govern a discursive practice. Buried in these conventions are the intentions of the social 
actor, which can, once identified, give a plausible explanation as to why an action was 
initiated. From here one can criticise the lack of referentiality of modem political theory. If 
any form of UC can be upheld it must be via a re-constmcted link between what political 
liberalism means in a given environment and what it could mean in others. This gives us a 
theoretical justification for forging an integrated debate on political liberalism. If liberalism is 
not to renege on its universal promise it must be understood as a theoretical inquiry into the 
conditions and norms of human life that need to be honoured if a liberal order is perceived to
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be desirable. And this argument can by no means serve as a justification for unbound 
particularism. The resources for universalism are no doubt extant. Irrespective of the varying 
social and cultural circumstances in which theorists operate, weak foundationalists are correct 
to point out that the motivation for universal liberalism resides in the desirability o f a political 
structure that honours the most basic characteristics of modem human life, those that are 
inescapable across the globe, such as human vulnerability, scarcity of resources, division of 
labour that necessitates co-operation, and some form of equality. Given the irreducible 
plurality of faiths, convictions and outlooks on all forms of human life in the modem world, 
this would give us an essential pool from which to draw the most general requirements of a 
modem political order, although not neceessarily a liberal one. Note that neither of the 
characteristics above can be taken to condition any specific shape of political institutions. All 
they provide us with is some guidance in the selection of those norms and principles which 
political regimes ought to respect if  they aspire to be liberal.
The sheer variety of ways in which liberty and liberalism are invoked in public debate 
or theoretical discourse makes it necessary to stmcture the following thoughts so that 
irrelevant aspects of political liberalism can be omitted from the discussion. The objective of 
this penultimate chapter of the first part therefore is to sketch the connection between the 
conclusions drawn about the UC and the nature of political liberalism on the one hand and the 
particular situation in Russia on the other. I indicated above that it can be useful to think of 
the Russian ‘condition’ as an impairment of agency and I will elaborate on this in the next 
chapter. Political scientists may prefer to describe the Russian situation as a loss of history, or 
alternatively, they may find the idea of a radically contested national identity more suitable. 
Since this study is motivated by a politico-theoretical impetus, however, the concept of 
heuristic radicalism highlights accurately the dilemma which the transformation period poses 
for those people who are faced with the gargantuan task of what Tismaneanu called the 
‘reinvention o f politics’ (Tismaneanu, 1993). It was already hinted at above that the notion of
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agency and an idea of what Hart called the minimum content of law may be helpful in 
conceptualising the guidance that is required for a successful advance from the pre-political to 
the political. In this very limited space lies the manageable task of liberal political theory. 
Bearing in mind the necessity to continually reconstitute the historical context of theorising, 
all that political theory can deliver is to provide these general rules which political orders tend 
to internalise. Somewhat more reminiscent of the language political scientists employ, one 
could rephrase this objective as identifying the essential aspects to be considered in the 
constitution-building process of a polity (Ackerman, 1992).
It has been suggested that the notion of agency as formulated by Oakeshott and the 
concept of a minimum content of law as advocated by Hart provide some essential common 
ground for a re-constituted political liberalism which could be shared by East and West. One 
might object that such a thin notion of the foundation of liberalism is on the brink of being 
irrelevant to the Russian case. But I do believe that the several components or guiding rules 
which Oakeshott and Hart’s arguments propose for instantiating a liberal political order do 
have some ‘pulling power’ in a hitherto mainly non-liberal political environment. 
Incidentally, they also do translate into substantive requirements rather than fulfilling only a 
formal advisory role in the politics-constituting process.
But first, the field of concern requires some further circumscription. Four broad areas 
of theoretical inquiry offer themselves for the purpose of initial categorisation. There is, 
firstly, liberalism as a problem of distribution or distributive justice. When dealing with this 
category liberal political theorists are mainly concerned with specifying the amount o f liberty 
that each individual can justifiably be allocated in a modem society. Several main ideas have 
regulated this field of inquiry. Most dominantly, there was the classic notion of liberty as 
being placed under restrictions by the harm principle. Not incidentally, this stood at the very 
inception of liberal political theory in a historical situation where individual freedoms had to 
be defended and boundaries of state interference required a firm vindicative strategy.
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Secondly, however, a further issue came gradually into view. With the ascent of the 
republican view of liberalism came the awareness of the particular urgency of re-ascertaining 
and re-conceptualising the boundaries of the activities of the political authorities, while the 
latter, this time, were seen as emerging organically from the nascent social communities in 
need of political organisation. The Federalist Papers epitomise these theoretical efforts, trying 
to define the conditions under which a threatening concentration of political power can be 
averted and viable political institutions be built. Broadly speaking, while liberalism of the first 
variety was vindicatory, political liberalism of the second order was constructive.
What remains out of sight for these two foci comes under the spotlight from the two 
other perspectives of liberalism. As liberal political structures developed in the West 
liberalism also came under challenge from the appalling destitute living conditions in whose 
creation its economic counterpart o f laissez-faire was undoubtedly implicated. Liberalism 
accordingly changed its tune and problematised the social conditions that were perceived as 
being conducive to the sustenance of a liberal political order. Ideas such as social liberty and 
the nowadays pervasive language of opportunity are manifestations o f this readjustment of the 
liberal doctrine. Liberalism received a social and cultural edge in addition to its political 
weight. Thus liberalism was increasingly seen as intricately related to social and cultural 
circumstances, and this revealed how much it created its own (economic, cultural, social and 
political) resources for stability. Broadly speaking, the holistic views of liberalism were 
strengthened and it gradually lost its solely political and economic meanings. Most o f the 
difficulties encountered by Russian reformers in the nineteenth century occupied this 
theoretical field. Under conditions that lacked an independent civil society as a forceful 
initiator of the demand for individual liberties, as well as a strong middle class operating 
within a well regulated economic sphere, few demands were placed on the state authorities to 
implement progressive political institutions. In fact, the roles were tragically swapped insofar 
as the state appeared to many liberals as the only viable ‘societal’ force to initiate and carry
out reforms and would ideally restrict its own power ultimately by introducing 
constitutionalism.
A fourth mode in which political liberalism can be theorised is markedly different from 
all the preceding versions and it might not be a coincidence that this manner of political 
theory has, apart from the English tradition that was engendered by long civil strife and 
religious plurality, strong roots in German philosophy. Although Germany did not lack the 
economic impetus for liberal political theory, its anti-statist and republican orientations (1 and 
2) have remained considerably underdeveloped. In contrast, this fourth perspective strives to 
reveal liberalism as an apt response to the ‘modem condition’ o f human life. The 
Heideggerian philosophical baggage is apparent. He probably came closest to a satisfying 
description of the existential dilemma posed by modernity. This approach left deep traces in 
the Russian tradition of philosophy and the two most valuable contributions to the theoretical 
debate in Russia (Akhiezer, Kapustin) contain clear references to an understanding of 
liberalism as a problem of modernity.
The first three perspectives on political liberalism certainly have relevance to the 
Russian transformation in several ways. Yet, if one follows Oakeshott’s characterisation of 
political theory none of them would constitute a field o f inquiry for this discipline. Political 
theory, according to Oakeshott, has little to do with the definition of the final end or objective 
of societal life, nor has it any task in determining the principles towards which a given society 
will want to orientate its decision making. Rather political theory is the endeavour to reveal 
the inconsistencies that arise from the process of constant re-adjustment and change which 
any society is inevitably subjected to in the modem world (Oakeshott, 1993a and 1993b). In 
other words, political theory must fail if it strives to set the conditions for modem life 
unequivocally. The pluralistic nature o f modem life would undermine any such attempt to 
enshrine some basic principles in any conceivable form, be it a written or an unwritten 
constitution. Plurality results in contestability and political theory is not capable of reducing
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contestability, but only to bring about the momentary equilibrium of the present norms and 
principles by which a society has decided to live.
The fourth perspective thus remains as the only valid playing field for liberal political 
theory. And it has already been hinted that the extent of this field is still truly colossal. In the 
remainder of this chapter I will attempt to, as it were, move into this field in incremental steps 
so as not to expose the findings to a lack of rear support. It has been indicated that the 
condition of modernity as an irreducible factum of social life can be immensely helpful in 
venturing into this field in a guarded fashion. The notion of modernity as being one of an 
inextricable plurality o f worldviews, social norms and values has emerged as a point of 
convergence for most political philosophers in East and West, irrespective of the 
disagreement amongst them about the nature o f this plurality (cf. Akhiezer, 2002). Yet, 
arguably, political liberalism must involve some understanding of individual liberty.
Liberals in the West have long preferred to think of liberty as an ultimate norm and 
individual in nature. In fact, despite some valuable criticism, the idea of liberty as essentially 
individual and a ‘trump’ over other values has a long, though not uncontested, tradition in 
Western political philosophy. Returning briefly to the aforementioned first three perspectives, 
one can see how much damage this individual, and normatively ultimate, notion of liberty has 
done to the Russian reform efforts. If freedom is taken to reside only in the individual, and is 
conceived as an insuperable norm, most aspirations for a republican or vindicatory 
formulation of liberty fall apart or make little sense in the Russian context. Some Western 
critics have argued that positing such an essential and ultimate norm did not and does not 
make sense even within the context of Western traditions of political culture and sociality 
(Cahoone, 2002).
Given this deficiency of the notion of liberty as the supreme principle and solely 
individual in nature, the problem of modernity, in contrast to all other three notions, shifts the 
focus dramatically to the contribution liberty can make to finding a solution for the inevitable
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conflicts of norms and values that exist in any modem society. Liberty here is understood as 
being conducive to bringing about a state of affairs rather than being a norm to be honoured at 
any rate. There can be no doubt that this would run counter to the very intention and supposed 
meaning o f political liberalism, as some Western political theorist find it reasonable to 
advocate. Yet, what is less clear is why this alternative perspective of freedom as a means 
rather than an ultimate end would make less sense of the modem world than its theoretical 
contender. The Russian post-Communist reforms have demonstrated that neither of the 
various conceptualisations of liberty, whether republican, vindicatory, or social, would 
receive appropriate manifestations in the social and political life of the Russian polity if  
reformers mostly operate with an abstract notion of liberty. What seems untenable is not that 
freedom represents an indispensable value in the life of any modem society. Rather, what 
seems so mistaken is to take it as an absolute norm not qualifiable by cultural, political or 
social traditions. To believe that the removal of any constraints placed on the individual by 
society could act as a viable principle for the generation and evaluation o f political and social 
institutions in times of far-reaching transformations runs counter to the need for societal 
arbitration between inevitably conflicting values and norms.
One may object that hardly any Western liberal political theorist would advocate such 
a radical position. Yet, the dividing line here is thin and not always clearly detectable. The 
separating line runs between a notion of liberty as the overriding principle in all cases of 
‘normative conflict’ and an idea of liberty as the most likely contributor to an enhancement of 
societal peace. Conceptually these two areas are as different as they can be. In Oakeshottian 
terms the former notion of liberty involves a recommendation or proposition of an ideal or 
insuperable norm, which no political theory can sustain, while, on the other hand, in the 
second position liberty is taken as a property of social actions. As the former may very well 
be (mistakenly) a regulatory idea for the establishment of a political order, the latter is a 
qualification of human actions. While some may argue for the increase of human freedom in
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the latter sense and advocate the condition of utter independence, such an argument can be 
refuted philosophically, while the former is simply an ideological contortion of politics. In the 
words of Cahoone,
‘The problem of the notion of freedom as independence is that while freedom and 
necessity may be antithetical conceptually, they are intertwined in reality. .. (F)reedom 
is not the absence of constraint, it is the constrained selection o f  constraints. ’ (Cahoone, 
2002, p. 169)
However, there is nothing political theory can sensibly say about ideological politics apart 
from the fact that it is profoundly discordant with the conditions of modernity, i.e. the 
identified plurality of beliefs, faiths and worldviews. What we should be concerned with in 
the Russian case then is to exhibit the structure and limits o f a reasonable idea o f liberty as 
property of human activities, rather than as an overriding norm.
II
From a theoretical point of view, why did the Russian reforms found themselves on such 
difficult terrain? It was clearly a laudable aim to increase everyone’s personal liberty by 
liberalising the economy and introducing market elements. For a liberal political theorist the 
crux of the matter must lie in the idea of liberty that the reformers thought to promote. It 
transpired fairly quickly that to posit personal freedoms simply as a value in themselves 
neglects the conditions for such freedoms and the ways in which they require sustenance from 
social and cultural forms of life. If one accepts that the Russian society was, and still is, 
engaged in a fundamental process of re-constituting politics, what political theorists may want 
to term the transition from the pre-political to the political, or in Rawlsian language the 
creation of an overlapping consensus, then one must ask oneself how useful an abstract idea 
o f liberty can be in this process. To put it simply, do we get from the ‘war of all against all’ to 
viable politics simply with the guidance of one principle? There seem to be two arguments to
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deny this. Firstly, liberty, taken as an abstract principle, does not allow any differentiation 
amongst the many norms and values that any society has to accommodate. An example o f this 
difficulty would be the question of the continuity o f the old state constitutions. The repeal o f 
these constitutions would certainly have increased momentarily the extent of personal 
freedoms available to every individual. Yet, so would the repeal of any constraints. Liberty 
taken as an abstract trump over other values thus appears to inhibit, rather than facilitate, a 
necessary differentiating account of the complex interplay between values and norms existing 
in a society.
Secondly, and more importantly, however, any transformation is inevitably a process 
in which past traditions are weighed and evaluated from a new, and sometimes, radical 
perspective. Any society in the throes of transformation undergoes the introduction o f an 
aspect of uncertainty whose extent very much depends on the ability and tenacity o f the 
population to reject any old political, social and cultural arrangements. This evaluative 
process involves criteria that are constantly shifting, the more so as the Russian society 
operates under what has been called heuristic radicalism. Russian reformers have tried to 
introduce an element of stability by suggesting that the idea of liberty would represent a 
reliable criterion for the successful execution of this assessment process. However, this 
attempt to insert stability by reference to such a highly ambivalent principle as liberty must 
now appear naive. It posed a serious problem for the reformers as well as to society at large 
insofar as liberty carries little endorsing or disapproving capacity in respect to social and 
cultural norms. The increase of personal liberty for the sake of liberty hardly helped people to 
make more sense of the dilemmas in which they found themselves than operating without any 
postulate at all would have done.
Or, as political theorists prefer to put it, the question is in which circumstances one 
would want to exercise one’s freedom, and this involves an aspect of personal relevance. 
Things must matter to people to be identified as objects of desirable change or retention
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(Taylor, 1985; Cahoone, 2002). Although this characterisation o f personal choice may be 
conventionally understood to be fundamentally individual, it is informed by experiences that 
are social in nature. And it seems of crucial importance to understand that the meaning that is 
imbued in someone’s action is derived to a great deal from these social practices. That does 
not mean that individual choices never reject sometimes deeply embedded social practices 
and rules. But it does mean that individual actions are enabled in a profound sense by a 
person’s capacity to judge what matters most to him, and this capacity is implicitly a result of 
social experiences. Contrary to the usefulness of liberty as a criterion for appeal in public 
discourse, liberty as an abstract idea offers no guidance in this process o f personal arbitration. 
It has little potential to assist selection when it comes to people trying to make important 
choices. We can want to live under circumstances where we are allowed to do as we wish, but 
expressing the desire to be free in the sense of ridding ourselves of all constraints would also 
rid us of all benchmarks o f evaluating our lives. In this way, liberty is a deeply flawed 
standard when it comes to judging past and present norms and values. Societies in 
transformation require more than an abstract idea; they need principles that reflect those 
aspects o f human life which matter to the people concerned and can be expressed through 
particular types of social and political arrangements.
A helpful heuristic device for the conceptualisation of the Russian political and social 
transformation may be to understand it in terms of the relationship that does and ought to 
obtain between morality and law. This approach has resonated well with Russian scholars 
more recently as they try to understand the failure of the liberal reforms either in terms of 
their collision with received social and cultural traditions (Fedotova, 2001), or as a project of 
the imposition of legal norms that conflict with deeply ingrained Russian moral standards, or 
as a result o f the magnitude of the impediments to the establishment o f the rule o f law in 
Russia. Several Russian political theorists have argued that the phenomena of rampant crime 
and gangsterism are a result of the striking lack of congruity between what is morally
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legitimate and what has legal endorsement (Sergeyev, 1998). This theme, developed most 
clearly recently by Sergeyev, corresponds to the intention of this study to understand the 
normative implications of the recent upheavals in Russia as a translation of the prevailing 
transformation of the existing moral norms into legally binding codes. A closer look at 
Sergeyev’s thesis is therefore warranted.
In his book on law and crime in Russia (Sergeyev, 1998), Sergeyev begins by outlining 
the various concepts of crime in respect of different ideological perspectives. He calls these 
representations of the varying concepts of crime ‘caricatures’, but maintains that they 
nevertheless have heuristic value. Conservatism understands crime as a lack of public order 
and as the result o f the weakness of law-enforcement. In contrast to conservatism, socialism 
or communism (what Sergeyev dubs ‘the left’) conceive of crime in terms of exploitation, 
deprivation and the way in which people react against these maladies. There is no crime as 
such but only the individual’s will to reveal the in-built injustices o f society that inevitably 
leads to ‘crime’ as an act of rebellion against the order that protects or even perpetrates these 
injustices. In contrast, liberals view any violations of public order as originating in a lack of 
individual freedom. Although Sergeyev’s characterisations may be highly contestable, his 
conclusions are insightful. He argues that any tenable concept of crime must understand it as a 
discrepancy between the law enacted and administered by public authorities and the moral 
codes embedded in prevailing social and cultural practices. While traditional societies were in 
a privileged position insofar as they operated on the basis of a near congruity between law and 
morality, in modem societies this concordance has vanished for good.
Thus, all ideological currents must develop an idea of how to reconcile legal standards 
with the increasingly discrepant moral norms existing in any society. For liberals, so Sergeyev 
argues, the law represents an instrument which has been deliberately chosen by modem 
citizens to promote a peaceful societal life, whereas morality continues to function as a 
regulatory principle of intra-human relations that are not legally prescribed or circumscribed.
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Thus, Sergeyev draws attention to the fact that law is an artefact, an instrument, and, as he 
believes, not a value (Sergeyev, 1998, p. 13). He then distinguishes between three kinds of 
law. Firstly, law as tradition, secondly, law as social instrument, and thirdly, law as a device 
for exerting power (Sergeyev, 1998, p. 14). The insufficient overlap between these three forms 
of law produces so-called ‘gray zones’ in which no notion o f law operates, and hence the 
social activities taking place there are comprehended as being outside the legal system 
(Sergeyev, 1998, p. 15-16). These ‘gray zones’ expand in societies in flux as the interpretative 
systems that correlate the three understandings of law are impaired or have broken down 
altogether. Sergeyev writes:
‘Significantly, in the case of societies in transition, complicated mechanisms aimed at 
co-ordinating the different understandings o f law either do not exist or work poorly. 
Tradition, ‘instrumental’ law, and administrative power seem to exist independently.’ 
(Sergeyev, 1998, p. 15)
And later
‘If a considerable part o f social activity takes place in the ‘gray zones,’ members of 
society lose their idea of what crime is.’ (Sergeyev, 1998, p. 16)
Sergeyev now argues that since any societal transition involves a profound re-definition of the 
legitimacy o f administrative power, of law as instrument o f social regulation and of its 
congruity with traditions, the rise of crime and the ‘criminalization of society’ are inevitable. 
According to Sergeyev, the question is now under which conditions three new interpretations 
of law can emerge and eliminate this process of criminalisation as an upshot of a lack of 
overlap between the three forms of law.
For Sergeyev then, the transition process can be conceptualised as a translation of 
group rationality and group objectives into a public reason that comprises all social sub­
groups. He calls this the emergence of ‘a collective cognitive coherence’ that transcends the 
particularistic aims and interests of groups operating in ‘gray zones’ (Sergeyev, 1998, p.50-
72
51). The difficulty of this process, however, so Sergeyev notes, is that the natural process o f 
self-organisation in ‘gray zones’ only reaches this collective stage via the elaboration of 
common stereotypes o f behaviour, and therefore requires a considerable degree of 
homogeneity within the polity (Sergeyev, 1998, p.50-51). Whether this really reflects the 
actual plurality that exists in such societies can be doubted. What remains even more 
questionable are two ramifications of Sergeyev’s argument that relate to the normative 
content o f his conceptualisation and the character of legal codes emanating from illegal yet 
commonly accepted practices, respectively.
The first point draws attention to the differences between law and moral practices that 
need to be respected conceptually. As he states accurately, when writing on the liberal view of 
law, moral codes are incongruent with legal norms in a variety of ways. There are social 
practices that attract moral disapproval, even though they are not necessarily illegal. For 
example, not on all occasions is lying an illegal behaviour, yet most people would say that lies 
are unacceptable judged by moral standards. Thus legal constraints and moral maxims do not 
seem to be synonymous in everyday life. And the occasions on which moral condemnation is 
invoked against certain human conduct are often clearly different to the occasions on which 
legal sanctions are threatened in response to human actions. This does not mean that there 
exists no ‘overlap’ between what is morally reprehensible and what is illegal at certain times. 
Yet, any conceptual link between morality and law must take account of this existing 
incongruity between human actions endorsed or condemned by moral or legal codes. 
Sergeyev appears to assume that only complete synonymity between morality and law ensures 
that the ‘gray zones’ o f human behaviour are suppressed and hence the society which 
observes the ‘overlap’ between moral and legal norms avoids the danger of condoning 
criminal behaviour by one of the three forms of law.1
1 Law here not as enacted and codified law but as form o f  rule or standard o f  behaviour. Cf. above p.
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More significantly, however, Sergeyev’s efforts to deduce law from morality confuse 
the different character of these two forms of rules for human behaviour. Although it would be 
highly desirable to find the golden way to travel from the prevailing moral codes of 
communities to the legal norms a society has given itself, even if this was possible, law 
nonetheless would still lack one of its most important normative components. It seems that 
Sergeyev is over optimistic about the moral congruity between ethical norms and legal codes, 
a viewpoint which he shares with other Russian scholars (cf. Reshetnikova, 2000).
The problem is one of origin, and political theory since Hobbes has tried to define it as 
clearly as possible. While Sergeyev is right in stating that even communities riddled with 
crime possess some norms and maxims that regulate behaviour for the relevant members, the 
transition to law involves something more than a mere extension o f the applicability of these 
rules to a greater membership. If this was so, the peculiar conversion o f morality into law 
through this path would have to explain the voluntarist component that has been inscribed in 
law ever since Hobbes first conceived of politics as a realm based on individual volition. For 
Hobbes and every liberal political philosopher since, law in any free society has included an 
element of approval originating in the will o f the individual which is quite redundant for the 
validity o f moral norms. Since Rousseau and Hegel, furthermore, this aspect of volition has 
become the bedrock of liberty in free societies and thus represents the indispensable 
normative core o f liberal legalisation. Envisaging the transition of post-Communist societies 
as a process of extension of norms inscribed in the somehow rule-guided behaviour of groups 
that are bound together by common interest has the problem that it cannot explain that 
normative aspect of law which rests on individual liberty.
Liberal societies are indeed, as Sergeyev accurately noted, different to traditional 
societies in that they require a law-giving process which respects individual freedoms. Most 
modem societies have thought that democratic participation or some form of representative 
democracy honours this requirement. The rules of mafia behaviour cannot become the rules o f
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a free society -  not because they are not rules at all, but because they do not acknowledge this 
voluntaristic requirement.
Oakeshott has formulated a similar argument (to that expounded by Rousseau and 
Hegel) against the vision of a society as a group of people bound together by common 
interests and regulations that are conducive to the procurement of these interests. His point 
focuses on the implications for individual choice and freedom of human actions if society is 
guided not by formal rules but instead by substantive aims and common interests. He terms 
these different ideals of society civil and enterprise association, respectively. A civil 
association is regulated by non-substantive rules for behaviour. These rules do not prescribe 
certan actions but stipulate certain requirements that everyone has to adhere to in acting. In 
contrast, enterprise associations are governed by the stipulation of a common interest, and the 
achievement of this interest is supposed to be the objective of the actions o f every member of 
such associations. Oakeshott now argues that, if  we were to think of modem societies as 
entenrise associations, we would eliminate any personal freedom insofar as societal 
membership is not voluntary, with the result that the subscription to the substantive ends and 
interests of this society would not be a matter o f choice for any particular member. The 
coerrive nature o f any state would bear down on any behavioral deviation from these 
precrbed substantive ends and obliterate any individual freedom. Thus, modem liberal 
socieies must necessarily be conceived as civic associations, prescribing rules for conduct, 
but abstaining from prescribing substantive ends of human actions. Oakeshott’s argument is 
little more than an elaborate and sophisticated reformulation o f Hegel’s presentation of the 
intricate relationship between right, law and freedom, which he explores in Grundlinien der 
Philcsophie des Rechts from the angle of the requirements for liberal states if the predication 
‘liberal’ is to be taken seriously at all. However, Oakeshott presented a truly theoretical 
argunent while Hegel sought the philosophical path.
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Both arguments reiterate equally strongly, however, the normative aspect of law in 
liberal societies. And Hegel’s argument in fact indicates, as he argues against Kant’s idea that 
both morality and law originate in the categorical imperative, the profound difference between 
law and morality. Yet, to delineate the likely transitional course from the pre-political to the 
polit cal in a community regulated by a basic form of morality, one does not need to take 
recourse to either Hegel’s or Kant’s idea of law.
More significantly, the transformational process can be described as intrinsic to the 
differences between moral norms and positive legalisation. In trying to frame a moderate 
versian o f legal positivism, H.L.A.Hart has enumerated a range o f characteristics of natural 
law lhat could constitute the core overlap between law and morality. His argument is simply 
that vithout honouring these, what he calls, truisms o f social life, neither morality nor law 
would be able to ‘forward the minimum purpose of survival which men have in associating 
with each other’ (Hart, 1997, p. 193). He cites five aspects of human life that need to be 
inscrbed into moral and legal codes if human survival is correctly thought to be the ultimate 
regulative idea of human existence. Two of these aspects warrant closer attention for the 
purposes o f the present argument. Both can easily be translated into the conceptual framework 
requfed according to Oakeshott for civic associations. Hart writes on ‘human vulnerability’:
‘O f these (common requirements) the most important for social life are those that 
restrict the use of violence in killing or inflicting bodily harm. The basic character of 
such rules may be brought out in a question: If there were not these rules what point 
could there be for beings such as ourselves in having rules of any other kind?’ (Hart, 
1997, p. 194)
The iule to avoid bodily harm thus can act as a grounding maxim that renders human life 
possible and further legislation meaningful. The parallels to Hobbes’ hypothetical state of 
nature and its function in the course of his argument for a strong unitary public reason are 
quiteapparent. Hart on the second principle of relevance here, ‘limited resources’:
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‘It is a merely contingent fact that human beings need food, clothes, and shelter: that 
these do not exist at hand in limitless abundance but are scarce, have to be grown or 
won from nature, or have to be constructed by human toil. These facts alone make 
indispensable some minimal form of the institutions of property (...), in the distinctive 
kind of rule which requires respect for it.’ (Hart, 1997, p. 196)
For Hart this necessitates some form of co-operation and division o f labour without which no 
society can survive in the long run. Any modem society thus must ensure that, in whatever 
form property is instantiated at a particular time, it receives protection so as to enable people 
to engage in co-operation facilitating some basic amount o f tmst and reliability. No viable 
society can disregard these two ‘truisms’ of societal life. While this constitutes the area o f 
overlap which Sergeyev intended to circumscribe, any further alleged congmity between 
morality and law must be judged by the criteria that Oakeshott and Hegel formulated as 
binding for any society that aspires to be liberal in character. The small pool o f common 
principles for law and morality reveals the strict limitations o f any attempt to deduce legal 
norms from existing forms of morality.
Haddock (2000) has tried to alleviate this shortcoming of foundationalism by pointing 
to the fact that legal systems provide individuals with a preferable amount o f predictability in 
organising their lives. Arguing in favour of stable and transparant legal systems thus may 
appear the next logical step from Hart’s minimum requirements o f social life. The problem 
with such ‘amended’ weak foundationalism is, however, that Haddock’s opposing alternatives 
are a far cry from fairly representing real ooptions. It is easy enough for political agents to 
express their preference between an arbitrary ruler (Rex I) and a liberal legal framework that 
is enacted and codified according to transparent and followable procedures. What is less 
obvious is how agents would place their preference when choosing between a thick matrix of 
social obligations and a liberal legal framework. The criteria of predictability cuts little ice 
between the two. Arguably, social webs as they solidify into practices are just as little, or even
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less, arbitrary as liberal legal systems. In fact, they can often muster an extent of legitimacy 
that newly established legal systems may lack.
That Haddock’s attempt to augment weak foundationalism fails is due to the fact that 
his political agents are, implicitly and ideally, rational choosers, while the actual process of 
expressing preferences for one or another political (or legal) system must take into account 
that differentiating criteria (such as predictability) are evaluated by agents not from a 
standpoint extraneous to the vision of social life they have pursued.
Thus, weak foundationalism may give us a list o f standards that need to be observed if 
societies in transformation are to progress towards liberalism. However, any supposed 
automatism fails to recognise the difference between assessing the options agents have as they 
are reconstructed by theorists and their actual preferences as outcomes o f particular siuations.
As to the Russian case I have claimed that their particular condition of HR impacts 
considerably on this transitional process and needs to be taken into account in any feasible 
description o f the transitory path towards liberal politics. HR was supposed to highlight the 
lack of unambiguous resources from which societies can rebuild the boundaries of the 
political realm and some hope has been placed (by Russians theorists of all political 
persuasion) that existing moral practices may act as an incipient core o f legal norms. While 
many observers have hinted at the disarray and condition of distortion in which these moral 
norms currently are, Sergeyev seems to argue that even particularistic ethical norms can 
function as a reliable foundation for the genesis of social standards of behaviour within the 
polity. It was argued that this disregards the normative implications of legalisation as 
enshrined in the idea o f representative democracy and articulated in a long tradition of 
political thought. But, even more than this, Hart’s definition of the minimum content of 
natural law indicated that the common sources o f law and morality are fairly restricted indeed. 
W hib morality may be more resilient to sudden change and HR only applies to the 
regularities that make politics possible and are most usually inscribed in constitutions, to
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deduce (legal) rules of conduct from commonly shared moral principles would not suffice for 
any properly regulated society that aspires to be liberal.
This additional charactaristic requires the observance o f Oakeshott’s suggestion that 
any liberal society must be based on non-substantive prescriptive rules o f behaviour. This is 
an argument that corresponds to Akhiezer and Kapustin’s emphasis on the irreducible 
heterogeneity of any modem society and is echoed in Sajo’s warning that ‘public opinion in 
post-Communist countries is full of the cobwebs of ‘constitutional’ delusion from the past’ 
(Sajo, 1999, p .l), lacking the awareness that neither law nor constitutionalism can ‘substitute 
morality, tradition, and common sense’. Law and constitutions, Sajo observes, ‘cannot replace 
the cement of society’ (Sajo, 1999, p.9).
How far HR can be overcome by a single constitutional act has been explored by 
Ackerman. Besides his somewhat misplaced but unflinching optimism and belief in a world 
revolution o f liberal colouration, he argues along more moderate lines when characterising the 
constitutional act in which most post-Communist states have had to engage sooner or later. 
Contrary to Havel’s notion of ‘radical continuity’ that served the practical purpose of holding 
the old elites to account on their own ground, Ackerman sketches the aims and objectives 
involved in the operation of constitution making. Unfortunately, the analytical capacity of his 
description is overwhelmed by his burgeoning faith in the success of the collective efforts of 
East-Europeans to define themselves in the face of deeply contested traditions, histories and 
territorial claims. He remarks that ‘the revolution is a collective effort to repudiate some basic 
aspects o f the past, (where) the constitution offers the revolutionary polity a chance to define 
affirmatively principles that will mark off the ‘new era’ from the ‘old regime’.’ (Ackerman, 
1992, p.69)
There is little sensitivity in these words to the particularly difficult business of 
determining to what degree this soon to be discarded past may still be useful for shaping the 
future of the prospective polity. Ackerman seems to assume that identities and trajectories are
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based on acts of affirmation effortlessly performed and engendered by the sheer will o f the 
populace to ‘walk a different path than before’. What he fails to conceptualise is the 
continuity o f politics, the lack of complete breakdown of political practices and institutions, 
even though the revolutionary events in many Communist countries suggested the imminence 
o f a fresh start’.
HR therefore captures more accurately the situation insofar as it intimates that what 
had become obfuscated were the principles according to which politics had hitherto received 
its basic definition and shape. Or as Kapustin puts it, polities require some prior ideas about 
‘kto m y’ iest” before they can set about in determining the constitutional framework which 
they believe most adequately reflects their prior decisions on the boundaries of belonging 
(Kaspustin, 1995, p. 140). Kapustin and others thus prioritise the identity problem over any 
constitutional choice (cf. Batalov, 1996, on identity and state ideology). This may strike one 
as overemphasising the distinctiveness o f both processes and disregarding the 
interconnectedness or simultaneity of these processes, yet it highlights a centrality o f identity 
politics to which Western political theorists are rarely attuned.
Summarising, one could say that Ackerman’s argument features a peculiar absence of 
any deeper notion of what informs revolutions. For him, post-Communist revolutions are 
liberal because they have a liberalising agenda and will therefore come to subscribe to various 
characteristics of Western liberal politics. What he fails to see is the resilience and obstinacy 
of past traditions and the fact that liberalism in the West as well as, if likely, in the East will 
be borne out of a dilemma, a struggle for finding a solution to the problem of contested 
histories and values, something akin to what Kapustin called an ‘experiment’ (cf. chapter 12).
Ackerman’s false projection of political liberalism into the post-Communist space 
must not be taken, however, as the only possible conceptualisation o f a liberal political order. 
It has been argued that liberals do have certain basic principles at their disposal which can 
assist in shaping the future political framework. This does not relieve them of any persuasive
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efforts, neither of the theoretical resources for political liberalism cited above is either self- 
evident or uncontested. Yet, they can guide the process of identity formation once the 
‘modem dilemma’ has been acknowledged by most of the prospective participants. This is 
bound to be a dynamic process, in which none of the delineations o f the future polity are cast 
in stone. Oakeshott’s characterisation o f politics seems most accurately describing this 
activity of constantly readjusting and questioning the desirability o f political arrangements in 
the light of new insights and inevitable social change. As Gray paraphrases Oakeshott’s 
notion of politics: ‘It is an inherently open-ended activity in which people [continually] renew 
their identity and communities’ (Gray, 1989, p.205). Therefore any prescriptive nostrums on 
what Russia ought to become or what traditions and values are eternal, immutable or simply 
ephemeral, are only short-cuts to another disaster. Laudable though Tolz and others’ visions 
o f a Russian ethno-pluralistic pan-civic idea o f politics are, they are only ideal-typical 
representations of desirable conditions of Russian political life. Politics, however, does not 
emerge from desires or wishful thinking but from the complex interplay of traditions and 
customs that come to be seen as either valuable or detrimental, and dispensable or 
indispensable, for the survival of the polity. Outlining the particular difficulties of forging a 
new political consensus in Russia will be the objective o f the following chapter.
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5. Russian Transformation and Agency -  Why Agency Matters to 
Russia
In this chapter I will refine the previous argument about the conditions that need to be met to 
render Western political theory applicable in the Russian context. This requires some 
clarification of the common ground that political science and political thought could possibly 
share. Arguably, both enterprises could be perceived as different forms o f enquiry altogether. 
Yet, I have argued above that, while Western political theory shares this assumption, it 
thereby dismisses too easily one important component which any form of intellectual 
endeavour in politics must consider: the relevance of historical conditions to the process of 
theorising as well as to scientific political research.
Hence I will propose to do something unusual. Political theory as a form of intellectual 
inquiry is generally considered to have its own methodological tools and areas of concern. 
The former are supposed to be mainly borrowed from philosophy and feature amongst others 
conceptual clarity and rigour, as well as plausibility o f inference. Although there is less 
agreement on the initial assumptions of philosophising, the academic community certainly 
shares a basic reservoir o f methodological tools. For political theorists there is equally 
considerable disagreement on what the project of political philosophy entails. There are quite 
a few divisions which run through the academic community, most o f which are of no concern 
for us here. For some (the optimists), political theory has a guiding capacity in our search for 
a well-structured political order that may be acceptable to the many. For others, it can do little 
more than to elucidate intellectual fallacies and conceptual incoherences in the day-to-day 
business of political life (Oakeshott, 1993). Those who belong to the latter category, we may 
call them the sceptics (Gerencser, 2000), remind us that philosophy has no subject matter as 
such and that to disregard this fact would take us inevitably to the political utopias that have 
wreaked so much havoc on humankind in the last century. Although this particular strand of
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political philosophy has been fashionable at times, its significance has receded and the 
‘construction workers’ clearly have won out over the last two decades or so, taking courage 
by the success from so eminent works as Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’ or the contributions by 
Barry (Barry, 1996) and Gauthier (Gauthier, 1986). A wide range of differing political 
theories have evolved from the time of its alleged ‘rebirth’ in the 1970s (Gaus, 2000), only 
replicating the state of affairs prior to the revival of political philosophy induced by Rawls’ 
work. No particular philosophical conviction will be advocated here. Yet, for the purpose of 
our objective we will proceed from a notion o f political philosophy as a project which sets out 
the conditions o f a legitimate political order in a modem society. This represents somehow the 
essence and indispensable common ground for almost all political theorists and it will be 
sufficient for our purposes. Despite its confusing variety, political theory will be treated in the 
argument to follow as an intellectual enquiry which shares a certain aspiration, that is to 
understand the terms of social co-operation which would be acceptable to most participants. 
Such a political theory is not necessarily liberal in all its attributes (Cahoone, 2002) but it may 
involve reasoning from the principles of individual liberty and a form of (non-substantive) 
equality.
One further premise should be equally uncontested amongst almost all political 
theorists: the normative nature of the enterprise. The normativity of this form of inquiry has 
more than any other (possibly contested) characteristic of political theory engendered the 
epistemological boundaries and limits within which political philosophy operates. It clearly 
distinguishes political theory from political science, which is generally thought to be 
descriptive and explanatory. These boundaries seem to demarcate areas of an entirely 
different methodological and theoretical nature and the fences erected around them appear 
daunting and insurmountable. Yet, I will attempt to question the usefulness of this division in 
the following chapter, since I believe there is a resource of theoretical overlap between these
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two, originally distinct, projects which needs to be explored if  we want to make sense of the 
East European transformation.
Such an attempt does in fact break new ground and therefore the risks o f producing 
pseudo-insights for both forms of enquiry are considerable. The initial reaction o f political 
scientists to an attempt by a political theorist to encroach upon his territory might be one of 
benign neglect. And so might be the reaction o f a political philosopher when he is asked to 
think about the consequences which the collapse o f the Communist regimes (i.e. reality) may 
have on his theorising. Yet, I think the particular impasse at which both have arrived with 
regard to the East European transformation warrants a look over the academic fence. Since we 
must proceed here with care (the wasteland between the sciences resemble methodological 
and epistemological minefields) I shall try to specify below as clearly as possible what this 
impasse consists in for both enterprises. This will be easier for political theory than for 
political science, but then the gains for the latter will be bigger too.
I will, firstly, discuss separately the literatures for political theory and political science 
which deal with Eastern Europe. In a second part I will outline the particular problems which 
both academic enterprises encounter and which could benefit from an infusion of the insights 
the other has produced. This will only be setting the scene for the actual work of correlation 
which I will undertake in a third part.
I
Since the collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, area studies (and in 
particular, Sovietology) have been counted among the fatalities in political science. They had 
ostensibly failed to predict the collapse of the regimes even when their demise was imminent. 
Arguably, their methods of enquiry as well as the results they yielded had been insufficient 
and needed to be replaced (criticism of Sovietology has been widespread amongst political 
scientists in East and West. For an example of post-collapse reappraisal see the various
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articles on the merits and prospect of Sovietology in Cox, 1998 and Hanson, 1995; or for a 
Russian view on the matter cf. Kapustin, 1998, esp. pp. 195-267). Democratisation theory, the 
successor o f old-fashioned modernisation theory, has risen to prominence once again. As 
political scientists sharpen their conceptual tools and debate what a most reasonable definition 
o f democracy might look like, there has been an odd silence from political theorists with 
regard to the developments o f the last decade in Eastern Europe. The field of East European 
regime transformations appears to have fallen under the interpretative hegemony o f transition 
studies and democratisation theorists rather than political philosophers. However, I believe 
that this area constitutes a serious desideratum o f philosophical research as well, for two 
reasons.
First, political science in its mundane form of transition theory would benefit 
immensely from the insights which liberal political theorists have gained about the necessary 
conditions o f a viable liberal political order. Secondly, transition studies would be able to 
adopt a critical perspective on their own enterprise, in which theorists often seem to assume 
that only operationalisable factors count in the transformational process. Political theorists 
and philosophers have naturally emphasised the conditions o f personal autonomy and choice 
thereby focussing on the contingent factors of historical development. Consequently, political 
scientists could treat philosophers as trespassers on their territory rather than as providing a 
welcome complementary (critical) perspective on their project. The stress on the contingent 
aspects o f political transformations renders the theoretical foundations o f interpretative 
models fragile. Equally, political theorists have rarely crossed the fence that marks their 
academic fiefdom. Comparative political science relies on models which sit uneasily with the 
language of autonomy and obligation which liberal philosophers preferably employ. Theirs is 
the realm of moral choices which lies squarely in opposition to (semi) deterministic models. 
The rare exception here is rational choice theory, whose language, however, is often clouded 
and obscure to political theorists.
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I suggest that this is a regrettable state and point to a range of overlap which would 
enable political theorists and transitologists to reassess this artificial schism within political 
studies. I will outline below what I call points o f juncture. Initially these are locations of 
possible common interest; eventually, however, I believe that we can generate strong 
transmission belts o f mutual theoretical influence from these points.
To outline these points of juncture we need to reiterate as clearly as possible the 
theoretical differences. Besides the normativity of political theory and the descriptive and 
explanatory nature o f political science, there are at least two further aspects which would 
impede a project o f common theoretical interest. Firstly, political science most usually 
theorises the East European transitions with the help o f the concept of democracy (see the 
remarks o f the most outspoken critic of this approach in Cohen, 1999b and Cohen, 2000). 
Although there is considerable disagreement over what democracy exactly means, political 
scientists with few exceptions shun the language of liberalism. Liberal political culture may 
appear in some of their conceptualisations but rarely represents an integral part of their debate 
(cf. Weigle, 2000). In fact, liberalisation is often treated as a first step towards 
democratisation (Munck, 2001; Hughes, 2000), and refers to the relaxation of strict 
totalitarian or authoritarian control of society rather than the development o f wider liberal 
political attitudes or attributes o f political institutions. In short, liberalism is not a focus of 
conceptualisation in political science and only plays an ephemeral role in democratisation 
theory. Most political scientists may (personally) favour the emergence of a liberal political 
culture in post-Communist countries yet they largely exclude it from their theoretical 
considerations which focus on democracy as a regulatory framework for political competition.
In contrast, liberal political theorists are of course concerned about the requirements of 
decidedly liberal politics. This involves reasoning from a position of individual liberties. Thus 
the objectives of political liberalism as a theoretical endeavour are defined both more widely 
and more narrowly at the same time. Political liberalism sets out to identify the conditions for
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a liberal political order in a society of social, religious, and economic diversity and seeks to 
define the terms under which all political orientations can be accommodated in such an order. 
Its premises are therefore narrow and strictly defined, while the goals o f reasoning are open 
and undefined and hence wider than political scientists would permit. Democracy might offer 
the best form for political accommodation but liberal political theorists are notably divided 
over this.
Democratisation theorists and transitologists, in contrast, define the objectives of their 
debate more narrowly. They focus on how to institute a democratic order while 
simultaneously leaving their starting point variable in order to subsume as many cases as 
possible under their models. These points of departure have attracted more and more attention 
amongst political scientists as they became aware of the relevance o f historical, political and 
social traditions for this institutionalising process (for an overview cf. Beyme 1994, Beyme,
1996). There have been attempts to narrow models o f democratisation to the most likely 
successful transitions, just as some political scientists have emphasised the need to widen the 
net in order to be able to subsume even those cases which so far have failed to democratise 
(Hawkins, 2001). This is fundamentally a debate on the attributes o f comparability (DiPalma, 
1991/1992; Terry, 1993).
Despite the wide differences between liberal political theory and political science with 
regard to the goal and the initial premises of theorising (liberal political culture vs. 
democracy), political theory and political science are, in a more general sense, concerned with 
a similar problem: to specify the terms of non-coerced co-operation within a polity. Where 
liberal political theory differs from political scientists is that, for the latter, liberties are 
consequences of democratic institutions whereas, for the former, they are non-negotiable 
fundamentals of reasoning. To put it differently, both academic projects possess profoundly 
different epistemological thrusts in their theorisations but a similar vision of outcomes.
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Undoubtedly, this must have an impact on the possibility o f relating the two forms of inquiry, 
as will become clear later on.
Thus we have a range of differences between political theory and transitology which 
we need to be aware of: normativity vs. descriptive and explanatory approach, variance in 
their points of departure or premises and objectives of theorising, as well as an emphasis on 
agency and freedom vs. the relevance of structures (democratic institutions) as guaranteeing 
free agency in the political realm (political participation). Out of these differences emerges 
some common terrain between them: non-coerced co-operation, the importance of rules for 
such co-operation and a desire to universalise their conceptual results. This may allow us to 
characterise the incompatibility of transition studies with political theory as mostly heuristic, 
while their compatibility may be identified in the desired outcome o f theorising. I believe that 
this provides sufficient space for an attempt at mutual referencing.
What would be the advantages of such a project? I will argue that transition theory 
underestimates the importance of agency for the success o f political transformation. Such an 
argument is not new. It has been advanced before in more sporadic attempts to rescue area 
studies from the onslaught of comparative science (cf. Kopecky/ Mudde, 2000, esp. p.528f.; 
for an over view of this debate cf. King, 2000). Yet, I will try to provide a philosophical 
justification which Sovietologists have not usually employed.
Since their inception in the mid-seventies, transition studies have been afflicted by an 
extraordinary amount of division on a whole range of issues. Political scientists first o f all 
disagree on what ‘transition’ could designate and which processes and attributes it requires for 
its success. Additionally, the time frames of transitions have been questioned and this has led 
to the articulation of the concept of ‘consolidation’ which has, so it appears, amplified 
problems rather than solved them (Schmitter/Karl, 1994; for a critical review see Guo, 1999; 
and offering an alternative to transitology Kubicek, 2000). There is also considerable 
disagreement over the end result of transition, i.e. how to define democracy and how universal
ths concept needs to be. This strikes at the very core of comparability, and political scientists 
art highly divided on this issue. Instead of discarding the concept altogether, some have tried 
to specify attributes of democracy which resulted in a narrowing of the comparative cases, 
wlereas others maintained the openness of the concept, not least to salvage a reasonable 
enpirical basis for theorisation (for methodological implications o f this disagreement cf. Guo, 
19)9; Bunce, 1995 doubting the usefulness of some comparisons). I am here less concerned 
wth a further contribution to this process of conceptual clarification than with the implicit 
assumptions which underlie the theory of democratisation. Speaking in philosophic-scientific 
terns, their problems originate in the nature o f models as ideal characters, and the parallels to 
the discussion o f Max Weber’s concept of ‘ideal cases’ at the inception o f German sociology 
are siriking (cf. W eber’s famous article on the ‘objectivity’ of knowledge in the social 
sciences, esp. his comments on the logical structure of the conceptualisations of ideal cases. 
Weber, 1988, pp. 190-213). A brief overview of the debate in recent years is particularly 
instnctive.
Although it has been claimed that transition studies are only a further elaboration of 
modernisation theories (Kapustin, 2001a), this claim appears highly questionable. 
Modernisation theories seek to identify characteristic attributes of modem societies which set 
them apart from traditional political and social orders. Irreversible societal processes such as 
industrialisation and urbanisation, so modernisation theorists argue, require new (preferably 
democratic) forms o f political and social institutions if  the polity is to remain stable. 
Traditional state institutions may prove unable or unwilling to react appropriately to these 
chcngps and this might undermine political regimes but modernisation theory says little about 
democracy as a political and social requirement for the stability o f a particular regime. In fact, 
the ccnnection between economic performance and democratic political institutions is often 
weak Przeworski, 1996).
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Definitions of democracy oscillate between a merely procedural understanding and 
attempts to qualify democracy as a qualitatively different category to mere rules and 
regulations. This indicates the significant conceptual flux in which transition studies persist. 
Equally fluid has been the understanding of political scientists of whether democracy is a state 
o f affairs or a process. Although political theorists have pointed out that both concepts are 
inherently flawed (Haddock, 2002), I believe that viewing democracy as a process constitutes 
a remarkable progress in conceptualising the subject matter and represents a significant 
departure from a static idea of democracy which has failed to capture the most fundamental 
mechanism of democratic transformation. Ironically, however, this conceptual redefinition 
also moves democracy theory closer to its final demise and undermines its model character. 
Since this is important to the argument to be advanced in this chapter, I shall briefly outline 
what it implies.
Democracy is traditionally defined in terms of political institutions (elections, political 
parties, parliamentary system) and/or as an aggregate of these in various combinations of 
significance. This constitutes its model character with its components being easily 
operationalisable. This also allows political scientists to generalise democracy as a concept 
and render it applicable to new cases, a precondition for its use in comparative political 
science. However, this way democratic theory sits uneasily with the fact that Eastern 
European countries undergo transformations towards democracy and that it is this process 
which political scientists endeavour to describe. Democracy as conceptualised above 
represents a state of affairs rather than a process. It is an end product defined by the existence 
or prevalence o f some clearly identifiable attributes. The description of the interim period of 
transition towards democracy thereby remains out of reach for this theory. Some political 
scientists have therefore suggested that conceiving of democratisation as a process is more 
appropriate to capture the transformations which are going on in post-Communist countries. 
They point to the sequential nature of the genesis of democracy and the possible varying
paces at which the various attributes of democracy may evolve. This introduces an element of 
temporality that democratic theory hitherto lacked. Yet, the problems arising from this are 
daunting. It amounts to less than a dissolution o f the conceptual rigour of democracy. 
Democracy is now taken to mean a whole range o f differing degrees of manifestations o f the 
defining aspects (elections, political party systems etc.) and this can only decrease the lack of 
conceptual clarity as to the exact location and nature of democracy. Hypothetically, one could 
now point to a myriad of differing positions on the sequencing scale on which countries may 
be identified as democracies.
The problem can be described as one of temporalising a model or ideal type, in 
Weberian terminology. This is something that scientific logic precludes since, although the 
hope of being able to submit these models or ideal cases to historical sequences is tempting 
(cf. the recent work by Ertman, 1997), only a narrative can produce plausible descriptions of 
historical developments -  a point we need to come back to later.
The impact on the generalisability o f such a temporalised model of democratic 
transformation should be apparent now. With the plurality o f ‘entry’ points to democracy on a 
sequential scale of different attributes comes a fuzziness o f the concept itself that is hard to 
eliminate. This also decreases the possibility of generalisability o f the overall concept of 
democracy. The more attributes are co-ordinated on a time scale and their applicability as 
sufficient conditions of democracy is debated, the more the generalisable concept shifts 
towards descriptions of singular cases and thus loses its comparative potential -  something of 
which Max Weber was already aware a century ago. He pointed out that ideal types can 
collapse into cases of singular applicability when characteristics are too much refined 
(Weber, 1988). This is the basic logical tension at the bottom of democratisation theory which 
we need to bear in mind.
A similarly contentious issue arose when political scientists debated the role of agents 
in the transformational process. Usually agents are readily operationalised as independent
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variables, which does not pose a problem to the overall theory of democratisation. In this 
respect, the growing sensitivity of political scientists to the effect individuals can have in the 
transitional period has increased the applicability of the theory rather than diminished it. 
Problematic, however, is the often unexplored relationship between agents and the 
institutional and social structure that surrounds and conditions their behavior. Comparative 
studies have pointed to the significance of individual players in the transition period for 
regime stability. Yet, the explanation o f their intentions and motives requires separate theories 
which can hardly be integrated into theories o f democratisation. To explain agents’ behaviour 
political scientists need to problematise the political and social environment as well as the 
potential goals and aspirations o f the agents (cf. Lewis, 2002). Agents thus connect different 
situational contexts by acting intentionally and on discernible motives. This is a problem for 
democratisation theory, not because the agent’s role cannot be taken into account, but because 
the agent’s intentions are naturally informed and conditioned by an environment which, 
during transitions, is (by definition) constantly in flux. Democratisation theory does not lack 
the component o f agency itself but the necessary flexibility to account for changes in 
motivation and intention which necessarily occur as transitions progress and accomplish 
partially or entirely the targets pursued.
In order to operationalise agency in transition studies, stable surrounding structures are 
required which may allow the agent to define lasting objectives. Yet, this prerequisite for 
stable agency is exactly what is absent in such fundamental economic and political 
transformations as occur in the post-Communist countries. This calls for a readjustment or 
redefinition of the agent-structure relation in transformation studies.
These two aspects, I believe, provide the points of juncture where political theory can 
be usefully employed for the theory of post-Communist transition. To recapitulate: the theory 
of democracy has diversified its operationalisable components and subsequently submitted 
them to sequencing. This inclusion of a temporal element is duly reflected in the use o f the
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term democratisation, which indicates a process rather than a fixed state o f affairs. 
Additionally, and inadvertently, it moves transition theory closer to a narrative structure of 
affairs which undermines its model or ideal type character and thus its comparative 
aspirations. The second aspect under review was how transition theory conceptualises agency. 
And it appears questionable that a simplified account of agency as being conditioned by 
extraneous structures will be sufficient under the conditions of radical transience in post- 
Communist societies. Although the fact that political scientists have become more sensitive to 
the issue o f agency in transformations represents a big step forward, it is doubtful whether a 
merely descriptive approach to agency in transitions can be sustained. It reiterates the doubts 
raised earlier about uncertainty as an abstract principle. However, in times of post-Communist 
transformation, I believe it reaches deeper than suspected and this demands a 
conceptualisation rather than a mere incorporation of it as an exogenous factor in transitional 
processes.
II
The absence of concern with East European transitions among liberal political theorists is 
startling not least because a vital component of most political theories is but a process of 
transition. The following remarks serve as a clarification of the extent to which political 
transformations in Eastern Europe can be comprehended as mirroring political contractarian 
theories. This requires us to take a closer look at how deeply involved normative issues are in 
‘really existing’ transitions. In what follows I will be mainly concerned with locating and 
evaluating the normativity of political order as construed by liberal political philosophers. 
This will enable us to assess more closely the chances of relating transition theories to 
political liberalism and how far their different nature could inhibit such an endeavour.
Ever since Hobbes formulated his theory o f societal compact in 1651, many liberal 
political theorists have followed closely in his steps. Most contractarian theories involve a
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pre-political stage in which human behavior is governed by principles o f human rationality 
and a limited amount of co-operation. This allows members of the community to grasp the 
necessity and desirability o f a political order which is to be established by a minimum of 
mutual obligation which everyone undertakes to pledge. Even more recent re-formulations 
follow this pattern closely, although emphasising the consequences of reasoning from the 
position o f individual freedoms and equality (Rawls, 1992 and 1993). The normative 
character o f contractarian theories springs from the basic principles which are deemed 
necessary to establish an ideal (but not utopian) political order which accommodates various 
political, religious or economic conceptions o f the common good. Since these conceptions 
might be mutually exclusive, some political theorists indicate the framework character of such 
a political order and its non-comprehensiveness or non-substantive nature (Rawls, 1992; 
Oakeshott, 1990). Now, it seems important to realise that, however liberal political 
philosophers reach their conclusions, the order to be established encapsulates a normative 
content as long as their foundations represent principles o f human nature which are taken to 
imply the inevitability of ethical behavior.
Or, to put it differently, freedom as an essential condition for a fulfilling life is a value, 
not a fact. Whether or not it is a value in itself or derivative since it enables us to pursue other 
valuable goals is of little consequence here (cf. Raz, 1986). The normative character of liberal 
political theory as an intellectual inquiry therefore hinges on its foundations: personal liberties 
which inevitably carry normative implications.
Does this mean that liberal political theory has no bearing whatsoever on the issue of 
political transformations? If liberal political theory is concerned with normative questions, 
what can it contribute to a form of inquiry that is admittedly descriptive? Given this sceptical 
argument we need to establish the exact realm in which the overlap between the two academic 
disciplines can possibly be located, while we can surmise that the boundaries of such a field 
o f congruity will mostly be determined by the extent to which political liberalism can assert
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the relevance of normative principles within the area of transition studies. Thus, the following 
tentative considerations are motivated by the need of a justification for the encroachment of 
the theory of political liberalism onto transition studies.
There are some liberal political theorists who have pursued a similar project. Haddock 
and Caraiani have persuasively argued that political debates on the future of the polity 
inevitably take the shape of normative arguments. To believe that democratisation is a process 
according to a pre-conceived plan is naive (Haddock/ Caraiani, 2002). Yet, they have not 
provided a reason as to why transition theorists should take notice o f this other than an 
acknowledgement of the deep personal dilemma in which former elites as well as ordinary 
people have been placed by the post-Communist transformations. I will argue that we can 
construct a good reason for such an adjustment in transition studies by exploring and 
characterising the particular situation in which agents operate under conditions o f transition.
Liberal political philosophers operate with a distinction between two different spheres 
which are hypothetically arranged along a time sequence. Usually, these spheres differ in 
either their basic principles or some additional attributes. They are often called the pre­
political and the political stages. Political liberalism grapples with the problem of how to 
generate the latter from the former in a logically consistent fashion and by adhering to 
principles which are contained in the former. Hobbes thought that a form of limited rationality 
would be sufficient for people to agree on the fundamentals o f a social contract which would 
engender a stable political order. This limited rationality endures beyond the moment of 
contracting and ensures that (now) citizens remain convinced o f the benefits of this 
arrangement. The environment in which people form this contract ideally features individual 
freedom and absence of coercion. Thus, although some political theorists might emphasise the 
generating capacity of the contract and would stress the difference between the pre-political 
and the political stage, the relation between the two is one o f continuity rather than 
discortinuity. It is, however, exactly the possible surplus produced by the contract which
95
allows us to understand contractarian political liberalism as a form of transition. One could re­
formulate this issue by re-phrasing the process in constitutional terms. Establishing a liberal 
polity rests on a constituting act. This act cannot be governed by principles which can only be 
an outcome of political competition submitted to an agreed regulatory framework (such as 
parliamentary democracy). This difference contains its singular character and also its 
problematic nature. Although we can specify the principles according to which people must 
decide on the future concrete shape of the polity, they do not have un-contentious rules of 
interpretation at hand (Locke, 1993).
Empirically this fundamental difference between the actions constituting a polity and, 
subsequently, the establishment of its political arena is corroborated by the existence of 
constitutional councils or assemblies in many states which have collapsed due to external 
pressure or have had to be re-built due to historical circumstances. Often these constitutional 
assemblies were in fact not legitimated in the ordinary democratic fashion, a story easily 
recognisable in contemporary pre-constitutional councils such as the current EU Convention 
on the Future of Europe.
The intrinsic relationship between these constitutional assemblies and subsequent 
ordinary political parliaments is then one o f continuity and discontinuity alike. Often the 
former are informed by democratic ideals yet do not necessarily conform to the political rules 
which are an outcome of their work. The resemblance to political liberalism in its 
contractarian form should be apparent now. The pre-political, as contractarians define it, is 
governed by principles which continue to influence politics as it comes to be established 
subsequently. Yet, in addition to this, rules and regulations are introduced, not least to provide 
the necessary legitimation of punishment in case of non-obedience. So although political 
liberalism is suffused with normativity which resides in its guiding principles of the pre­
political sphere, structurally it resembles closely the empirical process of constituting a polity. 
To put it differently, just as the pre-political differs from the political proper, so
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reconstructing politics is a different engagement to practising politics under agreed norms and 
regulations which are enshrined in a constitutional document.
Consequently, the question as to how agency could possibly differ in the pre-political 
realm as opposed to the sphere of established politics must be at the centre of theoretical 
concern. This is something in which political theory can guide us, even though the range of 
alternative answers to this question comprises wildly different philosophical approaches. I 
will outline briefly below what could be called a general account of agency, stripped of the 
particularities of the various philosophical doctrines. Proceeding from there I suggest ways of 
differentiating between the pre-political and the political in terms o f human agency and, 
lastly, delineate some ways in which consequences of previous considerations can be traced 
for transition studies.
Neither transitology nor any particular theory o f politics has claimed to be able to 
dispense with a conception of agency altogether. In fact, transitology was thought to represent 
a considerable theoretical advancement in comparison to modernisation theory insofar as the 
former provided some room for the role of agency in the transformation process. Critics have 
pointed out that this conceptual space was severely limited, and hence flawed, since the 
efforts of transitologists focused mainly on capturing the influence o f elites upon the 
instigation o f democratic politics.
Furthermore, I have already remarked on the ironic side of this development, since it 
brings democratisation theory considerably closer to political theory than political scientists 
may like to admit. The motivation for such a slow undermining of the theoretical core 
premises of democratisation studies must be seen in the limits for explaining the events of 
1989 without taking into account the contingent and often irritable effects o f human agency. 
As pointed out earlier, since human agency is operationalisable to a certain degree it does not 
pose a particular problem to democratisation studies, yet, it does present a challenge to the 
coherence of its theoretical foundations.
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For liberal political theory, in contrast, human agency has always formed a critical part 
o f its enterprise, even though it has not been sufficiently problematised with regard to 
societies in transformation. Without penetrating too deeply into the bewildering range of 
different conceptions of agency, it will suffice here to outline a reasonable conception of 
agency that commands widespread philosophical backing, and would assist us in formulating 
the possible requirements for stable (or meaningful) political agency.
The objection might arise that human agency as a general category of understanding is 
necessarily different from political agency. This claim would undermine any chances of 
philosophy to be in a position to say anything substantial and valuable for political science. 
Although there is a philosophical justification as well as a repudiation of this claim 
(Oakeshott, 1993a and 1993b), I will avoid this issue here. I believe that the philosophical 
doubts with respect to the viability of differentiating between accounts of political and human 
agency in general have merits but limited relevance to the matter dealt with in this section.
For some political philosophers of our day, human agency hardly invites specific 
consideration beyond the conventional Kantian frame of reference. Rawls adopts a broadly 
Kantian notion of human agency and deems it sufficient, mainly because he focuses on the 
issue of autonomy but also because his is an analysis of political morality as it exists in 
functioning non-transitional societies where the norms and principles o f political interaction 
grew out of the existing political institutions. The benign neglect with which many liberal 
political philosophers have treated the problem of human agency and the readiness on their 
part often to adopt a Kantian position might have contributed to the fact that a conservative 
political thinker has increasingly moved centre stage on the issue o f human agency. Michael 
Oakeshott’s notion of civil association has received heightened interest in recent years, while 
the conservative thrust of his thought is by no means diminished or neglected (Coats, 1985; 
Coats, 2000; Devigne, 1999, Gerencser, 2000). In fact, we might witness currently a modest
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revival o f conservative thought spurred on by the need to come to terms with the possible 
modification of what have been hitherto immutabilities of human life (Cahoone, 2002).
Two notions developed by Oakeshott might be particularly useful here. His idea of 
civil association aims to clarify the necessary conditions for free human agency. This in itself 
can provide the normative backdrop to the present considerations. On the other hand, his 
conception of authority supports and underpins this notion of civil association insofar as the 
normative condition of human behaviour consists in a recognition of rules whose voluntarism 
is less than sufficient for the sustenance o f the polity. Oakeshott derives this idea from 
Hobbes and points to the invaluable suggestion that to undermine and diminish authority, 
which is based on voluntary agreement of the individual to non-substantive rules of behaviour 
to be subscribed to in the course of his actions, is to reject any meaningful notion of authority 
as well as to endanger the liberty which the establishment of authoritative powers is supposed 
to enhance. Oakeshott thus illuminates the crucial, and often neglected, connection between 
political order, as a set of rules to be coercively implemented, and human freedom. The 
viability of his link, he argued, depends on the character of these rules rather than on the 
extent of authority, which by definition is not circumscribed.
Transferring this argument to the context of political transitions, this would reiterate 
the need for a stable political order in times of transformation if human agency is to be 
effectual. It reinforces the idea of the primacy o f rules over unregulated conduct -  a point 
which has repercussions for the concept of liberty. Yet, within the Oakeshottian theoretical 
setting, the problem arises how a lack of rules affects human agency and Oakeshott’s 
normative account of personal liberty and authority say precious little about this.
The most significant dimensions in which agency would be a focus of theoretical 
debate would be to understand how actions grow out of, and are embedded (in terms of 
justification) in, a usually rich and often ambivalent web of social structures. Agents and their 
actions are often fatefully conditioned by this ambivalence which, in an extreme case, can
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inhibit acting altogether. In a Heideggerian sense, to act is to reveal the commitments one is 
willing to make, just as it exhibits one’s interpretation of the various and often conflicting 
meanings of social norms and precepts. In Oakeshottian terms, by acting one is disclosing 
one’s identity or, alternatively, one is taking a stance on the project of one’s life into the 
future (Heidegger). Yet, existentialist language obfuscates rather than elucidates the extent to 
which acting is dependent on the offerings of pre-existing social structures and norms.2 The 
latter, as it were, pre-digest the sheer multitude of options for any agent and relate them in a 
hierarchical way which makes them meaningful for individuals. Without such a pre-selective 
screening or filtering function, acting would be almost impossible since an agent would lack 
the tools for evaluating his options (Taylor, 1985; Cahoone, 2002). This is a consequence of 
the view which portrays values as a necessary condition for human choice and of Berlin’s 
claim that these values might well be incompatible. Accepting this would involve shifting the 
significance of factors which enable meaningful agency to the traditions and customs which 
surround the prospective agent. Such a picture o f human agency has, more recently, often 
supported the argument for the positive impact o f civil society on viable choice. Yet, 
traditions are not as unambiguous in the modem world as they might previously have been. 
And the theoretical challenge to utilise the customs and traditions encoded in stable societies 
as a benchmark for agency could not have been far off (Raz, 1986). The challenge then is to 
decipher the causal connection between action and social stmcture (Lewis, 2002).
It might be helpful to differentiate between four argumentative scenarios which require 
separate attention. These are logically possible arguments, yet not of the same reasonable 
standing. Firstly, one could argue that rules and norms engendered by the agent’s 
interpretation of society’s actualities are neither applicable nor necessary for human agency. 
These are mere justifications which agents provide for their own actions rather than an 
intrinsic and indispensable part of agency. Philosophically such a position would require an
2 Existentialism intended to merge the two rather than to differentiate
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amount of ‘decisionism’ (in Nietzschean usage -  random choice) to explain human action 
which appears quite difficult to sustain. A more moderate version, however, can be 
formulated in order to generate a justification for the inauguration o f a polity or constitutional 
choice. The term radical constitutionalism might appropriately capture the amount o f 
‘decisionism’ in this reconstruction of agency and political norms. Secondly, one could 
contest the relevance of rules and norms on a more general level and defend this position with 
the argument that agency is the actual generator of rules. This position is theoretically 
different from the previous one insofar as the latter does not adopt a radical stance towards the 
relevance o f justification of action. A proponent o f such a position may want to stress that, 
although agency might emerge out of an environment devoid of rules and norms, it is 
nevertheless not arbitrary or pure decisionism. If one wanted to sustain such a position one 
would have to indicate alternative sources for providing grounds for actions other than a 
normative framework enshrined in pre-existing societal habits and traditions. On a more 
useful note, however, such a view hints at the creative role agency plays in exercising choice.
Thirdly, one could conceive of agency and rules as mutually sustaining and inseparable 
but logically distinguishable dimensions of human action. Such a view would have to explain 
how we came to differentiate between agency and structure and why an argument in favour of 
a more pronounced distinction between the two is philosophically mistaken and hard to 
sustain in practice. Although this third view might appear to be acceptable in a general sense, 
it would have to provide a philosophical backing that seems hard to come by. Existentialism 
has attempted to formulate just this and I do not propose to assess the validity of its 
philosophical claims here. Yet, what appears more to the point is that such a view would 
render the guiding question of this inquiry quite irrelevant. If rules and agency are the two 
sides of one and the same coin and we accept that no rule free environment as such exists, 
however distorted and morally twisted some political traditions and social habits might be, 
then the question about the depth of the challenges of transitions to human agency is
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trivialised. It side-steps the issue of how they are related and what the nature of this relation 
is. Such a notion, however, needs to be distinguished clearly from a similar view of agency, 
the fourth, which accepts that agency cannot be and is virtually never exercised without some 
pre-existing rules. In this last view the connection between the social environment and agency 
is yet to be problematised, while in the former it is circumvented on its problematic side. This 
last notion of agency seems to be most reasonable and represents a convenient starting point 
for the present considerations. It neither privileges nor prioritises agency or social rules, 
something which matches neatly the fact that transitional societies do not operate in a vacuum 
of rules but under conditions of a radical re-evaluation of them. To characterise these 
conditions more clearly is our next task.
Political theorists notably disagree on what conditions must be met in order to facilitate 
meaningful agency. These conditions have one thing in common, however. They are suffused 
with normative assumptions, whether as a form of (Western) rationality (Kant, Rawls) or a 
thicker description of social institutions and habituated traditions (Hegel’s insistence on the 
role Christianity played in the evolution o f Western society. Hegel, 1991; Patten, 2001). In 
fact, encapsulated in Hegel’s critique of the contractarian model are some significant aspects 
which are worthwhile considering when examining the conditions of agency.
In understanding agency one engages in an enterprise o f the intellect. Therefore we are 
concerned with actions which are not accidental but deliberate. The quest for a thorough 
understanding of agency builds on one or another form of rationality and precludes the 
acceptance and affirmation of the coincidental as valuable conditions of reasoning. 
Proceeding from this position, we can lay out some circumstances which are deemed 
necessary as well as desirable for this rational engagement. Although political theories are 
highly diverse in structure, objective and method, they concur in accepting that societies are 
arenas of human interaction with certain specifiable frameworks which ultimately have to 
render this social co-operation possible. Thus philosophers have constructed a minimum of
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requirements of human existence upon which any model o f social co-operation must rest. It 
must provide a matrix of valuable options which enables choice. This is identical neither with 
political stability nor with societal pluralism. The latter features would require an additional 
argument, but Oakeshott and others have articulated a minimalist foundation for politics in 
pointing to the necessary consequences of the need for social co-operation and the frequent 
tension or even conflict between the various ends people pursue. He characterised the political 
order as a coercive framework stipulating conditions to which people must subscribe in 
pursuit o f their more substantive wants and desires. These conditions are non-substantive and 
do not prescribe certain actions. They act as a form of grammar of conduct and politics is 
consequently the way we think about changing and re-adjusting these grammatical rules to 
bring them into line with the changing ethical outlooks and norms in society. For societies 
undergoing major transformations the question arises then as to which rules are the most 
desirable or suitable to foster a viable outcome, a stable political regime. The particular 
dilemma remains unsolved with this notion of politics insofar as it does not indicate the 
guiding principles which need to inform the pre-political engagement from which politics 
could arise.
Hegel’s critique of the social contract, however, is more indicative here (Hegel, 1991; 
Taylor, 1995, esp. pp.428-461; Patten, 2001). For him freedom as precondition for human 
agency is only possible in a situation in which people act from a pre-existing social 
environment which provides meaningful choice and the capacity to choose. Others have 
argued along similar lines that some social institutions are antecedent to and facilitate human 
choice, in much the same ways that language, a national identity and culture do. In the context 
of post-Communist transformations, to emphasise these prerequisites of human agency would 
be to magnify the standing of at times rather malign principles and ideas. East European 
transformations have often been acompanied and afflicted by a reiteration of ethnic and 
nationalist conceptions of identity. In fact, in the historically discontinuous context of Eastern
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and Central European post-Communist societies, the occasional lack of conceptions of ethnic 
and cultural identity have often motivated Central-East Europeans to resuscitate chauvinistic, 
rather than cosmopolitan, notions of citizenship as well as exclusive, rather than inclusive, 
concepts o f nationality (cf. Cohen, 1999). Thus, although Hegel’s critical remarks concerning 
a free-floating agency remain valid, they throw the argument back to square one.
If the fourth notion of agency is somehow concordant with general assumptions about 
social action we are confrontedwith two logically distinct problems. Firstly, which means are 
available to people in constructing a stable lasting political order. And secondly, which 
guiding principles can assist in this endeavour. I have already hinted at the argumentative 
force o f what liberal political theorists call weak foundationalism (Haddock, 2000). This in 
fact might do a lot of work here. The need to co-operate and the awareness of human 
vulnerability have a constraining effect.
It should be clear now that the hitherto insoluble problem of how to derive the political 
from the pre-political is not one of guiding norms and principles. It is one o f means, o f how 
this inevitably normative engagement is forged in an environment broadly hostile to Western 
liberal political categories and assumptions. It is therefore a problem of re-structuring a 
normative engagement, not one of determining the norms and precepts which will guide 
participants in this debate. To accept this point is not to accept Western political order 
(Haddock/Caraianu, 1999). It is neither to confirm the universality of Western politics nor to 
regard such a universality as desirable. It is only to adopt Oakeshott’s argument that, if one 
conceives of politics as a stipulation of the conditions o f social interaction, one inherently and 
simultaneously must take on board the assumption that the way one thinks about politics helps 
to define the configuration of this intellectual engagement. To perceive politics as a debate on 
the desirability of moral precepts cast into legal non-substantive restrictions is to concede that 
it is a conversation between free citizens.
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Naturally one could think of forms of politics which depart from this prescription. Yet, 
in Oakeshottian terms, this would hardly qualify as politics in the sense of a dialogue between 
intelligent and free people deliberating the norms and ethical principles to be applied and 
enforced through a political order. However, the resources for this conversation that are 
available to people in transformation societies vary immensely and pose the real obstacle to 
democratic politics. This ongoing conversation is thus constantly endangered by the 
possibility that people might draw upon illiberal conceptions of nationality and ethnicity or 
other notions of identity which are discordant with the principle of non-substantiality laid out 
above.
If post-Communist transformations can be understood fundamentally as challenges to 
the means for re-constructing a viable polity, the first reservoir of available rules may reside 
in the already existing patterns of co-operation. It seems entirely plausible to assume that 
these societies do not operate in an utter void o f rules and regulations but retain a whole range 
of more or less functioning institutions which originated in the previous regime. Even in the 
post-Communist world it would be hard to envisage a society under total collapse in which no 
institutions are working and everything would have to be built from scratch. In fact, transition 
theory has had to come to terms with the lingering continuities of formal institutions as well 
as of informal personal networks. Reformers have often expressed their dismay at the fact that 
post-Communist societies are built on existing foundations which inform (and deform) the 
process of political re-construction and permeate the future polity with Communist legacies. 
Havel’s notion of radical continuity epitomises the desire to turn this into an advantage for the 
post-totalitarian society.
The theoretical challenge, however, consists in the lack of congruity between these 
preconceived traditions and the ideal of democratic political societies sketched above. 
Traditions usually carry precepts prescriptive of certain behaviour in given situations. This 
would conflict with Oakeshott’s definition of political association as a framework of rules of
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conduct. Politics as a practice ought to differ from prescriptions o f behaviour insofar as it is to 
identify the degree of desirability of conditions o f conduct, not certain activities themselves. 
Oakeshott’s terminology is particularly instructive here. Politics as a conversation (Oakeshott, 
1991) can only materialise if there are certain ground rules set out and widely accepted which 
stabilise the public realm in which negotiation and deliberation about the desirability of these 
conditions take place. These basic rules which facilitate politics as conversation cannot, 
however, be subject to the deliberating process, lest politics is never initiated in the first place. 
For Oakeshott this is a historical problem, not one of political theory (Oakeshott, 1990, esp. 
chapter 3). And he responds by presenting the process o f the emergence of Western liberal 
(and democratic) politics as a story contingent on a myriad o f factors, comprising not least of 
all the element of the slow but steady retreat of substantive religious and ethnic conceptions of 
political order (Oakeshott, 1990, chapter 3).
Yet, for post-Communist societies the hurdle cannot be overcome in a period of time 
of such historical dimensions. Re-constructing politics, or the shift from the pre-political to 
the political, is a momentous process burdened with the pressing economic and social needs 
of the population. It is, indeed, a dilemma of existential scope (Haddock/Caraiani, 2002).
The question then is not how to derive non-substantive political rules from substantive 
conceptions of politics, but how to inaugurate and maintain politics as a mode of non-coerced 
conversation with basic rules that facilitate more or less equal participation of the adherents of 
the various political views (resembling a Habermasian scenario). These pre-political 
principles that regulate the initially unimpeded exchange of views and opinion, however, will 
not be found in such intellectually high-flying ideas as rationality or reason, as some Kantians 
and Neo-Kantians suggest. Such a view would not correspond to the realities of the post- 
Communist societies in which political institutions (however distorted and often appropriated 
by particularistic interests) do exist and impact upon the process o f re-construction. To rest 
the work of political re-configuration on mere ideas of rationality and/or reason would only
106
increase the remoteness of liberal political theory from the dilemmas o f actual political 
transformations. It thus must be only through shrewdly nurturing and re-adjusting the existing 
institutions that politics can come to life. But how can post-Communist institutions, 
understood as forming the pre-political, assist in building the political arena?
I l l
Part of the problem of employing the language of liberal Western political theory in the 
context of post-Communist states is the attractiveness o f its high level of abstraction. It 
suggests a universality which is constantly belied by the very real difficulties of economic and 
political transformation in Eastern Europe. Western liberal political philosophers may no less 
be implicated in these problems than the East European reformers who naively thought that 
the biggest transformational challenge would consist in a mere West-East transfer of abstract 
ideas while simultaneously readjusting them to the particular local conditions. In contrast, 
liberal political theorists in the West seemed to have perceived the abstraction of their 
terminology as a sufficient shield against the suffusion o f their semantic constructions by 
particular Western historical and political traditions.
Western political observers then too often and too glibly have attributed subsequently 
the political and economic dilemmas of Eastern Europe to a lack of proper application of 
Western conceptual tools. What remains out o f sight, with sometimes tragic consequences, is 
that the belief in the universality of the abstract language employed in liberal political theory 
is profoundly mistaken and may rather be seen as serving as a deceptive tool in order to 
maintain the integrative function of liberal political theory within the West. The extent to 
which Western liberal political philosophers seem to be oblivious to this function of political 
theory as a reassuring prop for a now glabalised political debate on the merits of liberal 
democracy and their claim of the conceptual superiority o f the West, which hinges on its
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capacity to abstract, reveals little more than the absence o f critical reflection on the historical 
contingency of the Western mode o f political thought.
In the context of an attempt to relate Western liberal political theory to the Russian 
transformation, however, the delicacy of such an undertaking should now become obvious. 
What is required is a de-construction of the appropriation o f Western terminology, in order to 
provide the critical element which Western political theorists try to fend off by persistently 
fusing rationality with universality.
To put it differently, one needs to delineate the boundaries and internal structures of 
what the pre-political could look like in a post-Communist society, or how borrowed 
terminology acquires new meaning and is often converted into its opposites due to the 
historical and intellectual context (for an excellent analysis o f the post-Communist Russian 
political ideologies cf. Lester, 1995; and for a convincing account o f the transfer and 
modification o f a Western intellectual concept into the Russian context cf. Shlapentokh,
1997).
Political transformations are highly complex bundles o f relationships in a process of 
re-appraisal. They are characterised by factors that can be operationalised, such as status and 
formation of elites, exit strategies from the failed regime, emerging party systems, preference 
for certain constitutional configurations, the existence or absence of charismatic political 
leaders and so forth.
Yet, in the language of political normativity, periods of far-reaching transformation in 
post-Communist countries are above all framed by the moral and ethical claims and failures 
of the previous political regime. And whereas liberal regimes advocate only a minimum of 
political and legal standards which are supposed to facilitate uncoerced social co-operation, 
Communism has held and promoted an incomparably more comprehensive view of politics. It 
is this comprehensive character o f the Communist doctrine which, in conjunction with its 
historical origin in the (West) European Enlightenment, frustrates the constructive re­
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configuration o f the pre-political. To disentangle the Communist legacy and to grasp its 
impact on the viability o f any political order is therefore a function of two distinct processes 
o f comprehension. Firstly, to set out what Communism was and which claims it propagated, 
and secondly, to determine what these claims amounted to in reality. Both areas (claim and 
reality) contribute in the interim period to the disparagement of prospective liberal and 
democratic politics and delegitimise crucial components of the conversational form of politics 
for which Oakeshott argued so persuasively.
Stating the claims and theoretical pretences o f Communism as an ideology is to step on 
a well-trodden path. I shall therefore focus specifically on those aspects that bear some 
significance in the current theoretical context. Apart from its various claims on the political, 
social and economic life o f humankind, Communism transmitted a particularly disturbing 
message about the nature and possibility of knowledge which matters for our context. It 
asserted that the history of societies as well as their future are decipherable and that there 
would be one singular interpretation which approximated the truth most closely and which 
thus mandated a specific social class to act in a particular way. This epistemological claim 
about the past and future o f societies rested on the allegedly scientific character of Marxism. 
With it came the alleged validity of Marxist ideas on societal structures (classes) and 
economic relations (mode of production, means o f production etc.). These views informed an 
idea of politics that envisioned a non-competitive, harmonious political arena based on the 
concurrence of interests as opposed to the antagonistic class struggle pervading pre- 
Communist societies. This promise o f a harmonious and non-conflictive politics is of 
particular interest here. It predetermines popular post-Communist expectations in two ways.
On the one hand, the failure o f Communist politics prepares popular sentiment for the 
futility of expecting a harmonious political life and increases the acceptance of political 
conflict which exceeds the framed and regulated political negotiation and competition. Two 
results may be an overemphasis on politics as a struggle and a delegitimation of political
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compromise. Post-Communist opposition parties which have originated in dissident groups 
have painfully experienced exactly this rift between expectations and the dissident’s idea of 
politics, which defines politics mainly in opposition to the state.
On the other hand, however, Communism’s ideal o f politics may also have influenced 
popular sentiment in the opposite way. It might have inculcated citizens with an idealistic 
portrayal of what politics ought to look like and which will, in any case, be hard to sustain. 
Democratic politics after all is the art o f compromise, which by definition is precluded from 
absolutist ethical considerations. Politics that has been infused with ethical claims (such as 
harmony and substantive equality) is inevitably inimical to negotiation. Any democratic 
political order would appear strangely incompatible with such an ethically underscored 
political vision.
This may serve as an example as to how Communist ideology has distorted normal 
understanding of political institutions. The reason for this process of distortion seems clear. It 
is the double nature of Communism as an heir to the enlightenment tradition of thought as 
well as a propagator of claims to have transcended the project’s sceptical component and 
transformed it into a proper science of human relations. This double nature acts as something 
like a prism through which Western liberal political discourse is sent and fans out in a myriad 
of disparate positions. To rein them back in is a prerequisite to make sense of the Western 
debate on post-Communist politics and its usefulness for Central and Eastern Europe. It is 
essentially nothing less than a project of semantic de-construction under the circumstances of 
shifting historical interpretations.
In fact, however, Communist politics in practice approximated nothing like its own 
pretentious ideal. This is the second dimension of the pre-political stage from which 
democratic politics must be instigated. Political life in the Communist reality involved high 
levels of physical and psychological coercion. This intrusion of the authorities into private 
lives was commonplace. In fact, the private realm largely ceased to exist as a distinguishable
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sphere of non-political social relations under the constant pressures from the regime to 
standardise human life and punish ‘aberrations’ from the declared norm. More importantly, 
civil society was incapacitated to such a degree that it probably all but ceased to exist (cf. 
Hosking, 1992, for a different account; for useful analyses o f the concpet of civil society in 
the Russian context Zweerde, 1999, and Kharkhordin, 1998) or, when revitalised through the 
dissident movement, it adopted a decidedly anti-statist/anti-institutionalist approach. In the 
Russian context this unfortunately coincided with the traditional stance of the intellectual 
elite, which consistently defined itself in opposition to a authoritarian state (cf. Yelena 
Bonner’s characterisation of political opposition as portrayed in Gessen, 1997, p.l67f.). This 
has palpably hampered a constructive role for civil society in the re-constitution of political 
order: Applying the stricter criteria of Hegel’s notion of civil associations, we might even 
speak of a serious malfunction of civil society. On the other side, Communist reality had 
shown little concern for the proclaimed goal of acting in the interests of the ‘working class’. 
Once the small Communist elite had hijacked the state apparatus, it removed all constraints on 
the ways it was used and produced an elaborate system of co-opting new members without 
endangering its grip on the political institutions. The nomenklatura system was probably a 
shrewder version of power retention by an elite than any ‘elite theorist’ could have ever 
imagined.
This is a highly selective list o f some salient features of Communist reality. The 
particular ways in which they have interacted with the Communist ideals and pretences have 
decisively shaped the post-Communist pre-political sphere. Transformation periods are thus a 
transmutation of Communist politics both as it existed and as it was thought to be. Most 
importantly, the idea o f liberalism suffered from being projected through this perverted prism 
of human relations (on the problem of ‘being a liberal’ cf. Chuprinin,1995). This has 
motivated observers to speak of the merely relational character o f political ideologies in 
Russia (Simonsen, 2001, esp. pp.266-269). The contents of political positions cannot stabilise
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themselves in an environment that is little more than a playful employment of words and 
concepts emptied of any meaningful reference to reality whose stable frames have evaporated 
before the vagaries of life in a country undergoing shock ‘therapy’ and ‘big bang’ institutional 
transformation.
From here we can re-formulate the dilemma of post-Communist societies as it presents 
itself to a more fortunate participant in the political order in the West. Not only have social 
and political institutions been delegitimised, but they also carry a variety of meanings which 
can only be determined referentially rather than in absolute terms. We might usefully read the 
operating conditions of societal participant as conditions o f heuristic or semantic radicalism. 
The pre-political as the arena for the generation o f societal conversation on the future of the 
polity is in a retarded state. How does this translate into the domain of political theory?
One of the functions of the pre-political is to constitute the participants of the 
‘conversation’ that is to be established. It configures the way future political citizens want to 
talk about politics. The outcome of such a prefiguration is open: one could envisage that most 
of the prospective members of such prospective community may find any such conversation 
uncongenial and prefer not to subject themselves to any structure or pattern of rules. They 
may believe that they would benefit most from an unregulated political sphere rather than 
from one which stipulates rules and norms to which citizens are required to adhere. It is, in 
effect, the problem that people can and do anticipate their position in a future society whereby 
they extrapolate from their current situation and capabilities. Rawls’ veil of ignorance is an 
attempt to solve this problem by introducing a hypothetical device which screens out any 
prior information from which people can deduce their rank and status in a future society (for 
one of the very few attempts at relating Rawls’ political theory to actual political 
transformation cf. Friedman, 1998). But the present concern exhibits a different perspective 
for theorising the pre-political in societies undergoing transformation. Whereas Rawls seeks 
to erect a universal edifice of political justice and asks how this may influence the shape of
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political institutions, transformation societies act and operate not only from a platform of 
diverse personal aspirations and outlooks but also in an environment in which political 
meanings are referential rather than absolute (heuristic radicalism). This deviates from mere 
societal diversity insofar as it inhibits the initial discourse that is so essential to the pre­
political. As Kizelev writes about the loss of an unambiguous political culture and its effects 
on language:
‘...we borrow from the West not so much institutions as terminology. But terms alter 
their meaning when translated, and no longer represent what they did in the Western 
thought. Therein lies our great difficulty with contemporary intellectual disputes, in 
particular in regard to politics. People do not so much effectively oppose one another as 
they become confused over terms, because o f the lack of culture o f Russian political 
language. Once there was only one political culture- the Orthodox culture and the 
language that corresponded to it. But since the imperial period, Russia has discussed 
political topics only in a ‘French-Nizhnii Novgorod’ dialect.’ (Kizelev, 1999, p.73)
Or as Western liberal political theorists would put it, the hitherto uncontested foundations of 
public reason which allow convergence of views relating to a ‘distinctive public set of issues’ 
(Ridge, 1998, p.538) have evaporated under the onslaught of modernity. While the story of 
Western liberalism is much entwined with the gradual renascence of political discourse which 
underpins the various emanations of public reason and produces a minimum of (semantic) 
accord, post-Communist societies labour under the effects o f communism’s distorted visions 
of the Enlightenment tradition often seem to have great difficulty in recovering or 
reconstituting this bare minimum of heuristic concordance.
It should be noted that, while ‘common’ heuristic radicalism can be perceived as 
mainly a semantic issue, the fault-lines of the same phenomenon occurring in post- 
Communist societies run deeper than the mere discordance of views on how to settle (rules to 
solve) disputes in the public sphere. Richard Sakwa has argued that Russian ideas of 
subjectivity inhibit the formation of a viable political sphere insofar as they grow out of an 
expansive notion of private sociality which abrogates political life as regulated social
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interaction. Or, to put it differently, the social sphere has been dislocated under the pressures 
of Communist pseudo-politics to the private realm (Sakwa, 1995). The result is an anti­
political sentiment which can be understood as a political culture inimical to the very idea o f 
politics.
This strikes at a deeper and more debilitating level than mere semantics and indicates 
an additional aspect o f the heuristic radicalism which conditions the pre-political in post- 
Communist societies. It relates to the conditions o f agency on which transitional politics must 
build its foundations. It also illuminates the prerequisite for liberal hypothetical 
contractarianism. If political justice is to be an outcome of contractarian deliberation, it 
requires a willingness on the side of prospective citizens to conceive o f the political to be 
constituted as an essential part or precondition o f their life-plans. Political liberalism in the 
contractarian mould might feed on an Aristotelian conception of politics/ republicanism that 
most Western liberal political theorists are unwilling to explore as their foundation for 
politics.
The concept of heuristic radicalism (in lieu of a more suitable term) captures the 
theoretical challenges of political transformations in Russia and by the same token relates to 
the difficulties of transitology and liberal political theory in the little common ground 
identified above. If political theory is preoccupied with reducing or eliminating altogether the 
uncertainty o f transition, i.e. facilitating the transfer from the pre-political to the political 
stage by institutionalising contingency, then it must specify the enabling conditions for human 
agency. Heuristic radicalism may indicate a profound obstacle (besides many others) for a 
Russian successful transformation, which lies in the absence of a minimum of stability o f the 
interpretative or discursive framework. Without this heuristic edifice, the initial stage of 
liberal politics, the pre-political ‘conversation’ which is supposed to specify the rules o f 
negotiating or, to put it in Oakeshottian terms, the way the future participants of political 
negotiations decide to talk about politics, is unlikely to materialise.
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A couple of points are emerging from this argument which political scientists as well 
as political philosophers need to take into account. Firstly, it illustrates that political 
negotiations on the foundations of polities require a degree of terminological stability as a 
pre-requisite for agency that appears to be crucially absent (as yet) in the Russian context. To 
rephrase this point in the language of liberal political theorists, successful political 
transformations might considerably depend on a stringency of the (pre-political) discourse 
between the participants o f the prospective political order. It seems more likely than not that 
such a minimum of discursive coherence which enables meaningful agency is a product of a 
long historical development and is therefore absent during the periods of far-reaching 
transformations. It also appears highly unlikely that it will either be successfully adopted from 
the West, or that it will emerge from Russian indigenous traditions of political thought. In 
fact, a possible scenario, the first symptoms of which we might be witnessing currently, is the 
emergence of a hegemonic discursive practice (of politics) that is fundamentally undemocratic 
or authoritarian. There should be no doubt that the easiest way to mitigate this heuristic 
disorientation is to take recourse to exclusive, often nationalistic or chauvinistic, ideas of 
Russian identity. This would indeed facilitate the evolution of a political practice, needless to 
say, of an illiberal kind. Thus, the hopes o f liberal political theorists to see some sort o f 
political structure emerge which, in conjunction with the bare rationality o f political actors, 
may generate a liberal-democratic political order are likely to be frustrated.
This leads to a second point which an account of agency under the conditions of 
heuristic radicalism in times of transition can demonstrate. To view the Russian 
transformation from the angle of the condition for political agency might help us in 
understanding the protracted character (or possible failure) of the Russian transformation. 
Political scientists might gain insights from a perspective which emphasises the necessary 
circumstances of successful transformations as conditions for agency. Equally, the failure of 
some transformations may also be a function of the heuristic radicalism, or, to put it
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differently, the absence of the minimum of interpretative overlap which facilitates (collective) 
agency. This may warrant a closer analysis of discursive strategies of political actors and how 
far their conceptual terminology approximates Western connotations. From this we might be 
able to gauge the proximity of the Russian transformation to Western democratic politics.
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Part II
The Russian Debate on 
Political Liberalism
6. The Problem of Parallel Debates -  Some Methodological Remarks
Relating two debates which are largely separately conducted is a precarious undertaking. It is 
not only that debates have their own destination (leading questions) and internal authorities 
(paradigms), they also operate with terminology whose meaning is often peculiar to them. In 
the case at hand these divergent meanings of the central terms could not be more conspicuous. 
To illustrate this point one only needs to attend to the term liberalism itself. For Russian 
political theorists and for the wider public, liberalism has come to be synonymous with the 
enrichment of the few and the deprivation of the many. To reconstitute liberal political theory 
for the Russian scholarly community is often tantamount to the task of distancing oneself 
from the economic and social policies or the rent-seeking capitalist vision o f liberalism o f the 
Yeltsin era. Liberalism in the Russian context often means the bare minimum of political 
order, the priority of economic considerations over political and social ones, and a widening 
gap between the privileged and the disadvantaged. In part then, the philosophical discourse on 
Russian liberalism and what it could mean has been and still is the endeavour to reinvigorate 
for liberal theory its mandate to exist in resistance to the discursive hegemony of practice.
Why then should such an interrelation be relevant, given the dissimilarity of meaning 
of terminology? Must Russians then not find their own answer to the problem of political 
liberalism, if the meanings o f the terms employed are peculiar to their discourse? An 
argument along the lines of particularity o f meaning is not new. It goes back to the Slavophil- 
Westemism debate. Yet, to advance such an argument requires a philosophical defence, and 
ultimately it may signify the abandonment of the project of the Enlightenment and rationality. 
In the West, such a philosophical defence has found its most articulate proponent in relativist 
philosophy, engendered by the works of Luke and Bergman (‘The Social Construction of 
Reality’), and found further elaboration in some linguistic philosophy. Yet, in political theory 
(despite Rorty’s popularity in newpaper feuilletons) this has not found many friends and the
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thesis on the need for the contextualisation of political thought elaborated by Pocock and 
Skinner does not deny the possibility of inter-cultural understanding per se , nor does it imply 
a general philosophical reason for the lack o f translateability o f meaning across times and 
historically distinct cultures.
Given that not even the strongest historically-minded critics of the adherents of 
abstract political theory maintain a position of radical relativism, it should be safe to assume 
for the purpose o f this study that interrelating two different discourses is philosophically 
unproblematic, even though it requires theoretical clarification. In order to accomplish this 
theoretical task the following section will be divided into two parts, each of them looking at a 
sub-theme. Firstly, the theoretical implications of the general are to be assessed in terms of 
their methodological appropriateness. This part thus focuses on the idea of bridge-building 
and the complex inter-relations of meanings. The question to be tackled is how meanings and 
their contextuality impact on the process o f correlating the two discourses in question and 
how this limits the possible findings of the work.
In the second part, it will be suggested that the subject matter of the study is not only 
theoretically problematic but has also philosophical implications which need to be examined. 
In short, the argument put forward throughout the work attempts to carve out a more viable 
(and more inclusive) definition of political liberalism, and the nature and structure of such an 
argument is not self-evident or self-justifying. Yet the focus o f this second section is not the 
question what this concept of political liberalism could consist in, but how to proceed in a 
consistent manner in forming such an argument. Some considerations on the nature of 
normative work in political theory round up this section.
I
When analysing the seemingly parallel discourses on liberalism in Russia and the West it 
becomes quickly apparent that, contrary to the natural assumptions that discourses are
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similarly structured and require similar interpretative devices, the Western debate on political 
liberalism varies considerably from the Russian one. A recent study on the vagueness of the 
Russian term ‘dusha’ [soul] (Pesmen, 2001) should have cautioned me against any unfounded 
assumptions about discursive commonlities. Given the findings of this study, it might even 
appear naive to presume a structural similarity. Therefore the thinking behind this 
presumption may warrant some comments.
Western political theory has over the last decades achieved a terminological coherence 
that speaks for the high level of its academic credentials. In fact, one could perceive the 
evolution of theoretical agreement as a result of the high quality and intensity of academic 
exchange. Although disagreement persists with regard to the approaches favoured in solving 
the theoretical issues in question, within philosophical orientations there exists a high 
consistency in the use and interpretation of terminology. So, for example, utilitarian theorists 
might disagree with contractarians about the proper way the problem of political order should 
be conceptualised, favouring the principle of utility whereas contractarians prefer the idea o f 
the social compact, yet within those academic orientations, there exists considerable 
understanding as to what counts as appropriate uses and meanings o f the terminology 
employed. Their disagreement regarding the philosophical foundation is not a matter of mere 
preference. Good arguments have been formulated for or against the utility principle or the 
notion of the social contract. Yet, looking at a range of criticism brought forward against 
Rawls’ conception of liberal political theory, it is properly fair to say that most constructive 
(that is eventually eradicable) discordance emerged within the camp o f social contract 
theorists.
Although Rawls explicitly understood his theory as a theoretical challenge to the utility 
concept, engagements with his theory by utilitarians are few and far in between. This seems to 
indicate that theoretical progress relies on a high homogeneity o f initial approaches and 
philosophical foundations. While this is not the place to illuminate the detailed epistemic
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justification for this view, it may suffice to acknowledge here the considerable theoretical 
coherence of employed terminology and its meaning as a condition for successful intellectual 
engagement and constructive debate. Western political liberalism, regardless of its exact 
geographical origin3 in the West, as a debate appears to be a result o f the great extent of this 
terminological consensus (which extends to the methods employed in political theory) 
amongst the participants.
At first glance there was no indication that the Russian debate, even though differently 
focused and concentrating on different issues, on political liberalism might not feature a 
similar terminological consensus as a precondition for constructive exchange and mutual 
influence. The term paradigm may be overused, but it could adequately describe the 
expectations of a foreign observer of the Russian debate, hoping that the Marxist-Leninist 
paradigm would be quickly replaced by the new paradigm o f Russian political theory where 
political philosophers re-adjust topic and terminology along the lines of Western discourse. 
Although such a process of re-adjustment has undoubtedly taken place, the result is far from 
unequivocal, hence the methodological problem of relating two discourses which purport to 
dedicate themselves to the same subject matter but, at a deeper level, are divergent with 
regard to fundamental terminological meanings. This disagreement is not philosophical at 
heart. No Russian political philosophers who favour a utilitarian approach are under review 
here. The problem is of a different nature to the philosophical dissent between contractarians 
and utilitarians in the West. Rather, as will become clear during the course o f the second part, 
it is a lack of theoretical sophistication and terminological fine-tuning on the side of the 
Russian theorists that produce the disparity between the two debates.
But perhaps, it could be objected, this lays the blame at the wrong doorstep. Russians 
have long argued that the cause o f their particularity is either the inapplicability of Western
J The term ‘Western debate’ throughout the thesis refers to the Anglo-American discourse on political theory 
which originates mainly in the analytic tradition o f philosophising and excludes post-modern, structuralist 
approaches or hermeneutics.
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terms in the Russian context or the infusion of Western terms with different meanings. One of 
the greatest Slavophil critics of Western liberalism and o f its imposition on Russia through ill- 
conceived reforms, Konstantin Aksakov, famously argued in the 1840s that the idea of 
freedom as it congealed in the West around the concept o f politics would inevitably fail to 
resonate with Russian people since their notion o f freedom is ‘moral’ not ‘political’ 
(Aksakov, 1966, p.234). And others, like Tolstoi (though not endorsing the Slavophil doctrine 
or its political agenda) did so in a similar vein. At the centre of this argument resides a 
presumption about the primacy of human life over language, a course o f argument that has 
gone out of fashion in the West at least since the relative independence of linguistic structures 
were discovered. This is not the place to decide this debate, yet it is important to point out that 
any such radical view of language as a mere reflection o f social and political life would 
prohibit any substantial as well as critical referentiality o f debates conducted in different 
social and cultural environments. Political theory, just like this project, thus hinges on the 
philosophical assumption that this position o f the primacy of life over language is false.
More constructively, however, Russian academics have pointed out that the problem of 
disparate meanings is describable and therefore manageable when awareness o f the lack of 
homogeneity is raised amongst the practitioners of political theory. This would entail an 
analysis of terminology and how its meaning diverges from that of the Western discourse. 
Il’in (1997) has argued that this has long been a problem not only for Russian academics but 
also for the more general public and politicians. The root of the problem, he argues, lies in the 
continuous process of terminological formation for aspects and components of politics that 
have no indigenous existence. To borrow terminology from the West has been a natural 
solution. Regime became ‘rezhim’, and constitution became ‘konstitutsia’. But, transliterated 
terminology poses a problem insofar as historically these terms constituted a vacuum of 
meaning. To fill this vacuum two developments have taken place, so Il’in argues.
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Firstly, Russian, not accustomed to the way of thinking of the West, and inheriting the 
word but not the meaning, ‘cut o ff  the rich and varied content and connotations o f the 
borrowed term from the original word and the vacuum was filled with specifically Russian 
interpretations. This ‘hollowing-ouf of the term gave rise to a de-rationalisation of political 
thought and its mystification, reducing the term to its ‘self-evident’ meaning. On the other 
side, some Russian terms, taken to be roughly equivalent, have been related to the borrowed 
terms of Western origin and therefore immensely complicated the cross-cultural 
understanding. ‘Pravovoe gosudarstvo’ is imbued with different meaning in the Russian 
context insofar as ‘pravo’ and ‘gosudarstvo’ are rarely synonymous with their German or 
English equivalents (Il’in, 1997, pp. 35-39). An apparent agreement in a debate can thus 
easily turn out to be premised on the identity of meaning of the similar terminology -  
something that requires a degree o f semantic control.
This issue has characterised the difficulties facing this study throughout. However, 
since it is the objective of the present work not only to give an overview of the Russian debate 
on political liberalism but also to initiate a further exchange o f ideas, the problem can receive 
a different, more positive twist. If it is correct that Western political theory has achieved a 
comparatively high consistency of terminological meaning and that this permits a formidable 
degree o f exchange and constructive engagement, then this consensus could be understood as 
a result o f a process of interaction over time rather than as residing in the unequivocal 
meaning of terminology per se. Interrelating two different discourses then is an undertaking 
achieving such a consensus, a laborious crafting of referentiality, rather than an enterprise 
based on the presupposition of the existence of such a semantic agreement. It would make 
sense then to perceive this study as a contribution to a desirable increase in referentiality, 
rather than simply a correlation o f the semantically incommensurable. From these 
methodological difficulties then emerges an additional task o f the study: to raise awareness of
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the initial semantic differences and to contribute to their careful overcoming without imposing 
the predominant Western meanings.
An additional problem of the approach taken in this work is what could be described as 
an element of circularity, given that Russian political theorists not only make use of Western 
terminology and concepts, but also undoubtedly are beginning to latch on to the Western 
debate more specifically. However limited the reception of more recent political philosophy in 
Russia might be, the considerable problem arises that, to reconstruct the Russian debate, is a 
reconstruction of a reconstruction. To put it differently, originality and semantic differences 
are the necessary sources for theoretical contributions if  one works from the assumption, as 
this study does, that political liberalism is conditioned by cultural and historical circumstances 
and must mean something that is at variance with the Western connotations and that this, in 
turn, could be the origin for a productive re-appraisal of the concept of political liberalism in 
the West. Thus, the loss o f originality o f Russian political thought that is certainly inaugurated 
by the willingness of Russian political theorists to join Western political philosophers on their 
agreed terminological terrain is a loss to the potential project o f the critical re­
conceptualisation of political liberalism in the West. Circularity is then a function o f the 
approximation of the Russian debate to the terminological or semantic consensus that has 
evolved in the West. In other words, as Russian political theorists and philosophers exclude 
references to the particular circumstances and meaning of liberal politics in their country from 
their theoretical considerations, they might gain access to, and level with, Western theorists in 
a semantic sense, yet in doing so they loose the potential contributions they can make to a 
theoretical debate that often abstracts from their own socio-cultural peculiarities. The line here 
seems to be fine but walkable. The few reflections by Russian political theorists on the 
Western debate that concerns itself almost exclusively with political liberalism as it has 
emerged there over the centuries (and is often not conceived as particular but universal!)
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would be of little interest to the intended course of the present analysis (see for example the 
work by Kusmina, 1998).
This entails a deliberate selection that derives its justification from the intended 
objective o f this work and is thus methodologically contestable. The findings o f the study 
would be predetermined by the selection of the material considered. Yet, examining more 
closely the intended outcome and the argument presented, any methodological misgivings 
should disappear. The course of argument is not directed towards denying that Russian 
political theory can represent a valuable contribution to Western political liberalism if it 
adopts the terminological stringency and consistency that Western political philosophy to a 
large extent possesses. Neither will it be argued that Russian philosophers are not capable of 
conducting their work in a Western fashion or that they do not already do so. In brief, what is 
at issue here is neither the concept of rationality per se nor its function for the internal 
coherence o f an academic debate. Instead what will be argued is that the particular 
circumstances obtaining in Russia have impacted on theorisations o f political liberalism that 
can be conducive to a re-formulation of Western political theory or rejuvenation of a more 
inclusive philosophising strategy, and in particular of the concept of liberty and politics. The 
conditions of liberal politics are varied and this should be taken into account by any political 
theory of liberalism. A re-formulation of liberalism can take its inspiration from the work of 
Russian political theorists who are compelled to take issue with problems that Western 
theorists can neglect, for example the problem of societal rift (‘raskol” ) as formulated by 
Aleksandr Akhiezer (cf. chapters 9 and 10).
A final objection might, however, be raised at this point. Perhaps, so it could be 
argued, the participation of so few Russian theorists in the Western debate on political 
liberalism is evidence of the misguided orientation of Russian political philosophy in general. 
Russians have frequently doubted whether the philosophical issues they debate have any 
significance outside their Russian cultural and intellectual milieu (for the re-structuring of
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Russian philosophy cf. Swiderski,1998; and van Zweerde, 1998). To counter-argue this 
objection one would have to point to the assumption on which it rests. It is the assumption 
that an existing discursive hegemony can draw its philosophical justification from the exertion 
o f influence and the resultant further strengthening of the hegemonic potential. This, however, 
makes little sense. Theoretical paradigms might have a justification insofar as they 
homogenise terminology and concepts for internal practicability, yet this says little about the 
degree to which they are justifiable or superior vis-a-vis other interpretative paradigms. To 
question and analyse their feasibility across the paradigmatic boundaries is to engage in the 
philosophical work that is needed and to undermine the hegemonic structure of paradigmatic 
thought that crosses over into dogma..
II
This last section of the methodological chapter will be concerned with the impact o f the 
immense variety o f definitions o f political liberalism on the thesis to be put forward in this 
work. Given the sheer multitude o f notions o f liberalism, is it feasible to suggest a singular, 
comprehensive definition of liberalism? Perhaps, as has been argued recently (Gaus, 2000), 
the fact that liberalism does not come in a singular form has added to its appeal over the last 
century and helped ensure the eventual predominance of liberal politics not least across 
Central and Eastern Europe. What would we lose if liberalism would remain a pluralistic 
theoretical enterprise, comprising so diverse philosophical approaches as communitarianism 
and individualism or constructivism and anti-constructivism (Gaus, 2000)? Ever since Hobbes 
laid down the principles o f human nature in fDe Corpore' and 'De Cive', liberals have engaged 
in controversies on the potential o f human reason. While some philosophers have adopted a 
sceptical stance towards man's reasoning capabilities, others have credited human beings with 
greater degrees of comprehending capacity. The latter might have predicated the road to the 
illusory belief in the possibility o f absolute control of nature and human affairs, and
126
eventually to political totalitarianism, yet the line that divides the sceptics from the believers 
in human capacities is a fine one. Not least so, because any sceptical theoretical endeavour is 
still premised on a certainty of intellectual elitism. Sceptics argue about the extent and 
potential of public reason to capacitate man to identify the most ideal (or feasible) political 
order, yet any theory about the absence or presence of such capacity is only made possible by 
the belief that human reason can find out the limits of its own deployment. This might 
invalidate only the position of the most radical sceptic, but it highlights also the tension that 
exists between the Enlightenment project (of rationality) and the theory of public reason. 
Liberalism as a theory o f public order which is to be based on only a minimum of coercion 
and a maximum of discerning concord is then squeezed between the two. Kant still argued 
from a position of cognitive hope and expectation, whereas later liberals have scaled down 
any prospect of wider human understanding of the intricate problems of political order. In a 
sense, political theory has gradually found itself compelled to reinvigorate the concept of 
instrumental rationality from which pre-Enlightenment thinkers such as Hobbes deployed. 
Yet, the history of political thought is far to diverse to be encapsulated in a singular trajectory. 
Thus what is o f present concern is not how such an alternative concept of liberty can 
justifiably be actuated but how permissible it is with regard to the principles of logical 
coherence and conceptual consistency.
Given this question, there are two broad areas which would come into focus. The first 
relates to the standards of theorising that need to be met by Russian theorists in order for their 
conceptualisations of political liberalism to ‘count’ for the Western debate. The second area 
would concern the way these are made to ‘count’, i.e. the particular manner in which these 
conceptualisations are used in an argument for a re-formulation of political liberalism. One 
could call this the standards o f discursive practice.
With regard to the first, Russian theorists must conform to the most basic rules of 
rationality in setting out their conception of liberal politics. This precludes any assertion that
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particularity extends to the forms of rational argument and reasoning. Arguments must be 
generally conclusive, possess an internal logical structure acceptable to the Western debate, 
and be translatable. This does not imply that Russians must abstain from using their own 
terminology but that the rules of inference must be upheld. This may sound banal but the 
history o f Russian thought shows that theorists have frequently asserted Russian particularity 
on the grounds of arguments that did not observe these most basic rules o f inference. The 
result was often dogmatic thought rather than argument and open debate. Even today 
Slavophil positions are often advanced in similar fashion.4
On the other side, the question of how these arguments can be invoked for the stated 
purpose of the re-appraisal of political liberalism is more difficult terrain. It involves a 
distinction between what is a valid definition of political liberalism and what can constitute 
good reasons for accepting any singular conception as the only valid one. As has been pointed 
out above, the various forms of political thought have usually claimed being exclusively valid. 
Arguing against utilitarianism from a contractarian position only makes sense if one assumes 
that, firstly, a contractarian position can be shown to be relevant also in the discursive context 
of utilitarianism, and secondly, that one position is not incompatible with the other to the 
point of irrefutability. What has received less attention by philosophers is that varying 
concepts of political liberalism might better be complementing each other rather than be 
competing for universal validity. The present work does not intend to forward an argument 
that could sustain this idea. But it seems methodologically admissible not to rule out the 
possibility of the complementary character of differing versions of political liberalism rather 
than their exclusivity. Being able to show that a particular conception of liberal politics can be 
theoretically sustained and is logically coherent, would present at least some indications that 
making such an argument would be worthwhile.
4 By definition, religious positions may have to resort to dogmatic forms o f  argument.
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7. Characterising the Debate
Much of past and contemporary Russian political philosophy has been preoccupied with the 
deep divergences between the Western ideal of liberal statehood and the existing Russian 
political order (for excellent overviews see Ignatov, 1996, Novikova/Sizemskaia, 1994/1995 
and 2000, Sizemskaia, 1999, and, o f course, Walicki, 1992). The chasm between these two 
traditions and the possibility of bridging this gap has been a major, if  not the most prominent, 
theme in Russian state theory, past and present. Historically, the question of this divergence 
between Western precepts and Russian reality was posed as the problem of how to bring 
about a limitation of political power in Russia without having enjoyed any lengthy tradition of 
intermediary institutions that would have contained, or completely prevented, the unhampered 
exercise of absolute powers concentrated in the hands of the Emperor. Or, in other words, 
political power in Russia never reached the stage of feudalisation and therefore was never 
able to utilise the mitigating effects of gradually institutionalised contractual relationships 
(Sashalmi, 2002). It never experienced or comprised the elements o f mutual assistance or 
benefit that could make inroads into the indivisible justificatory centre o f power. This might 
be misleading if it is taken as evidence for not only absolutist but also strong pervasive power. 
In fact Russia experienced throughout its history a persistent weakness exactly because the 
failure to develop feudal contractual arrangements required its rulers to exercise power in a 
much more immediate personal fashion than did their Western counterparts. IT in et al write in 
summarising the pre-Petrine state-society relations:
‘The absence of legal codes of authority, ..., the lack o f regulation of the hierarchy of 
governing institutions (the legislative non-specification of the authoritative structure in 
the pyramid of power) engendered a non-legal (nepravovoi) type o f government of the 
country on the basis of a tax-class system. The foundation of social interaction was 
constituted by obligation, which was emasculated in any civic and legal sense.’ (ITin, 
1996, p.30)
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In other words, although formally indivisible, Russian statehood was nevertheless 
continuously afflicted by a striking weakness in implementing and exercising its political will.
The present chapter will try to give a brief survey of the theoretical positions as they 
have been formulated by Russian historians and theorists over the last decade. However, to 
speak o f the Russian debate as one in which discussants pursue leading questions and clearly 
defined objects of inquiry may be misleading. Academic debates necessarily possess a fluidity 
and dynamism which prohibit the imposition of pre-conceived objectives and interpretative 
purposes. Yet, observing a debate through the lense of thematic foci may serve a useful 
purpose here. Such leading questions or areas o f concern introduce a coherence into research 
with regard to the external limits o f any discussion. Additionally, they also direct attention to 
particular areas on which research can then focus and attempt to solve it. Besides the general 
limits that are set by the vague notion of political liberalism no such clear demarcation of the 
area o f concern has emerged in the Russian debate. In fact, one might even argue that treating 
the concept of political liberalism as a demarcating feature somehow carries an arbitrariness 
by the observer rather than being an intrinsic focus of the articles and contributions discussed 
here. Indeed some extremely valuable contributions to the debate have been formulated 
outside the concern of political liberalism and are by-products of modernisation and 
civilisation theory, which, strictly speaking, possess only fleeting relevance to political theory. 
Yet, insofar as the historians or political philosophers have aspired to widen the application of 
their theory to politics, it started to bear on political liberalism and Russian politics and this 
would justify to see them as being part of a wider debate.
If the outer demarcations o f the debate are hardly discernible, its inner coherence is 
even less so. More accurately, the term ‘debate’ should not be understood in the strict sense 
but rather as a cacophony of voices (Oakeshott) with all its implications of looseness and lack 
of referentiality. This looseness is mostly a result o f the particular way in which the debate
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has been (and still is) conducted and it can only be guessed at this stage how far the 
incoherence is a function of a conspicuous lack of research interaction and terminological 
consistency. Below the more general category o f political liberalism exists a multitude of 
often conflicting methodological approaches (even within political theory) and thematic 
orientations. There is hardly any particular topic around which some attention by more than 
one political theorist has congealed and been sustained. Although several publications on the 
general topic of political liberalism in Russia have appeared over the years and there seems to 
be a core o f participants who attended successive (annual) conferences and contributed to the 
conference proceedings, the level of theoretical collaboration seems minimal.
One particular publication offers a unique insight into the conference discussions, yet 
the level of engagement with other conceptual approaches appears to be surprisingly low (cf. 
the discussion pages in Liberalizm v Rossii, 1996). This produces a situation where the 
theoretical debate on political liberalism appropriates more a plurality of different unrelated 
conceptions. There is little effort either to relate these conceptions appropriately or even to 
agree on terminology and its usage. The resultant picture is one of a variety of singular 
interpretations, exclusive with regard either to the meaning of the terminology or to the 
approach favoured. One notable exception to this rule is Akhiezer’s theory of Russian history, 
which has spawned a whole range of similar interpretations and works and has proven to be a 
theory exercising a remarkably widespread influence among historians.
To create some unity in diversity then is the purpose of the following section o f this 
chapter. Without imposing a particular interpretation of the various works and contributions, 
it will be attempted to categorise them in two distinct genres in order to gain an overview of 
the positions adopted. Since the categories have been selected so as to not to privilege or pre­
empt any interpretation of the various components of the debate, they possess a high 
generality. With few exceptions no specific works will be cited or categorised at this stage
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since this would in most cases fail to reflect the fact that many of the contributions favour a 
multiplicity of conceptual approaches or explanatory patterns.
Two main approaches offer themselves for a categorisation of the contributions to the 
debate. These two broad categories then invite further ‘branching out’ into sub-categories 
where the interrelations of the upper categories then become apparent. A diagram illustrates 
the location of the different theoretical positions with regard to the two general groupings.
Universal Particular
Theory -Core concepts of 
liberalism: liberty, rights, 
rule of law
-Particularistic 
definition of core concepts, 
role o f state in development 
o f Civil society and liberal 
values
History -Modernity 
-European 
civilisation incl. Russia 
-Codification of 
moral norms
-Conflictuous 
political culture 
-principles 
facilitating pol. Liberalism: 
civility, tolerance, mutual 
respect
-capitalism, 
entrepreneurial class
-Russian civilisation 
(Orthodoxy) as opposed to 
Western Europe
-‘Democratism’ 
-ethical principles as 
regulating politics
-consensual political
culture
Table 1. Categories o f the Russian debate
Two different approaches have crystallised over the last decade in the debate on political 
liberalism in Russia. Each implies a different prioritisation of how to understand political 
liberalism in Russia. Normative and empirical aspects are subsumed under the same category 
at this stage. On the one hand, Russian theorists have endeavoured to define political 
liberalism in theoretical terms by identifying a core of concepts and ideas that are irreducible 
ingredients of liberalism, such as individual rights and liberties, rule of law, limitation of state 
activities and the like. These can be taken to be universal in meaning and application or, 
alternatively, be interpreted as assessing particular shape and content in Russia’s past and
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present. Such an approach to defining political liberalism can hence accommodate a 
universalist as well as a particularist notion. On the other hand, political theorists and 
historians have taken on the task of understanding Russian liberalism in its historical 
formation and historical conditionality. Despite the emphasis on history as a conditioning 
force for political thought, universalist positions have been formulated here too, just as this 
approach has provided some room for a particularist interpretation o f Russian liberalism.
A universalist reading of Russian liberalism could take various forms. It could either 
be maintained that liberalism is a feature o f Western society and can be explained as a 
combination of various social and political factors. The idea o f a strong middle class as carrier 
of a liberal ideology is an aspect that has received particular attention and represents, in a 
way, a revival of the interpretative pattern o f political liberalism as it emerged in the previous 
debate at the beginning of the twentieth century. The fate o f Russian liberalism in this view 
depends on the emergence of such a social stratum. Moreover, the idea that the state should 
play a ‘constructive role’ here has been re-formulated in various shapes (not least amongst the 
opponents of the liberal reforms during the nineties). Yet another universalist position has 
stressed the particularity of Russian political and social conditions which are taken to be 
detrimental to the emergence of liberal politics along Western lines, while maintaining that 
beyond the Western form of political liberalism lies a core of concepts and precepts that might 
prove compatible with Russian conditions. By relegating Western liberalism in its concrete 
manifestations to a particularity and denying it its universality, some theorists and historians 
have striven to identify aspects of liberal politics which sustain a universal core of political 
conditions. Such a position might be bom out of the need to comply with some components of 
any political system as perceived to be essential to a modem state, yet at the same time 
grounding these in Russia’s specific path towards modernity. It is not surprising then that 
some proponents of a Slavophilist way towards what they take to be a liberal political order in 
Russia have argued in this fashion.
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The particularist versions of the historical approach to Russian liberalism are 
understandably many and need little further introduction here. Not all of them are strictly 
liberal, but their valuable contributions lie in the arguments they adduce with regard as to the 
non-feasibility of political liberalism for Russia.
A substantial area of research is located in between these two approaches and crosses 
the theoretical boundaries sketched by the division between theory and history. Some of the 
capacity to straddle a historical and theoretical approach is due to the terminological 
confusion or lack of conceptual clarity. But the attempts to conjoin in their interpretation of 
Russian liberalism a historical with a politico-theoretical explanatory schemes constitute some 
of the most valuable contributions to the discussion on Russian liberalism. Akhiezer and 
Kapustin certainly belong to this category and their works are characterised by a high 
awareness of the complementary roles of history and theory in defining Russian liberalism.
Two central concepts prefigure this area of overlap between theory and history. Some 
historians derive theorisations of political liberalism in Russia from the concept of modernity 
and its concomitant effects on political order. Others make use of the idea of ‘civilisation’ to 
explicate the absence or presence of a liberal political order. Both concepts play prominent 
roles in universalist as well as particularist interpretations that fall into the history category as 
well as into the category o f (political) theory. The notion o f a ‘catch-up’ modernisation and 
the role therein of liberal reformers and/or a liberal ideology prescribing a specific course of 
modernising reform is especially popular amongst Russian historians and theorists. The 
influence of Western historiography is palpable here.
In concluding this brief overview of possible theoretical positions, it must be stressed 
that no singular category exhausts the diversity of views that is expressed often within one 
article, let alone within the works of one particular thinker. Equally, the presented categories 
taken altogether are not exhaustive of the multitude of views that can still be formulated. The 
purpose of this brief exercise in categorisation was simply to provide some co-ordinates that
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will allow the thesis to allocate positions and identify theoretical orientations at a later stage. 
It should also be noted that, within the field of research under consideration here, each of the 
positions which it is possible to adopt under these general terms has received a formulation. 
As mentioned above, it must also be stressed that this debate has rarely congealed around 
particular topics or acquired a specific focus that would enable researchers further to 
collaborate and to identify semantic dissonance. Hence it would be premature to infer from 
the dichotomous categorisation invoked here that the debate would have occurred along the 
lines of universalism and particularism, often taken to be roughly equivalent to the ideas of 
Westernism and Slavophilism. As has been pointed out above, often any o f these latter 
positions could be subsumed under the universalist or particularist label. In fact, one of the 
upshots of the analysis o f the debate is that the dualistic categories of Westernism and 
Slavophilism, as well as their concomitant pair universalism and particularism, provide 
surprisingly little co-ordinating value for the identification of singular theoretical positions. 
This might be because of the generally amorphous character of a debate which is still in the 
process of locating themes around which the discussion can coalesce, or, alternatively, this 
might indicate that the past discursive dichotomies have lost their strength to shape and define 
the theoretical debate amongst Russian academics. Such a diversion from this interpretative 
dualistic scheme of the past can only be of advantage for the debate, considering the tenacity 
with which the proponents of opposing views were locked into their positions during the 
second half of the nineteenth century and how this situation stifled real theoretical progress. 
Hopefully, then, the by-passing o f these dualistic frames of reference might signify a lasting 
diversification of the theoretical debate. Following on from this initial categorisation a brief 
more detailed overview of the theoretical position may be helpful to prepare the field of 
discussion and the justification of further selection and foci.
The section on political theory proper yields the lowest number o f sub-themes. 
Roughly speaking, they can be identified as four theoretical ideas. Firstly, some Russian
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theorists have attempted to define the notion of political liberalism in its particular formation 
under Russian conditions or, more generally, in its universal manifestation, by isolating some 
central concepts or arguments that characterise political liberalism as a theoretical discourse.
Secondly, Russian theorists have attempted to link the problem of political order (or its 
obverse disorder and chaos) with considerations about the evolution of political liberalism. 
Hobbes’ ideas on how to overcome a ‘war of all against all’ had particular pertinence for 
some thinkers, not least because of the striking similarity of Russia’s slowly disintegrating 
society to the hypothetical picture painted by Hobbes. Thirdly, some theorists and 
philosophers have engaged in a critical self-reflection on the methods and concepts of 
political theory and have tried to describe some features that are supposed to be peculiar to 
liberal theorising or philosophising. Their critical commentaries on Russian political 
philosophy or theory often utilise the concept of an interpretative paradigm. Two more sub­
themes are located in the overlapping area between theory and history, yet have resulted in 
some considerable theoretical work as long as their initial approach has been more theory- 
guided in nature.
The question of modernity and its connection with a liberal political order plays a 
prominent role in Russian political theory, just as the idea of a liberal civilisation does. 
Instances o f Russian political theory as a critical engagement with Western ideas and concepts 
are remarkably rare and hence do not warrant to be subsumed under a separate category. Yet, 
two examples of outstanding quality will figure in the survey of Russian political philosophy 
and the evaluation of its contribution to political theory in general later on.
Given that political theory is a very young academic discipline in Russia, it should not 
be surprising that the historical approach to political liberalism is far more diverse and offers 
an incomparably wider range of interpretations. For the purpose of convenience, six different 
sub-approaches can be listed. There is, firstly, the history of political thought in the strict 
sense, which has enjoyed an unrivalled revival over the last decade. Books on particular
136
political thinkers, whether strictly liberal or more accurately described as conservative 
liberals, have been produced over the last ten years in great numbers and it seems to have 
turned out to be the most fertile ground for studies on political liberalism at the moment. 
Sometimes related to this area of interest, but often rightly seen as a research area in its own 
right, is, secondly, the historical analysis of the political programmes of liberalism during the 
reforms of the 1860s, the turn of the twentieth century and, last but not least, the brief period 
o f constitutional democracy in 1917. Although the role of individuals in the reform era and 
during later attempted reforms cannot be overstated, the analysis of liberal reforms either as 
events in themselves or embedded into a wider social, economic and cultural context has 
come to be more appreciated recently (IFin et al, 1996). Often not distinguished in the 
Russian debate from political theory proper is the theory and history of political ideologies 
which constitutes a third, sub-field o f the debate. Although Western political theorists clearly 
differentiate the theory of political liberalism and the political ideology o f liberalism, Russian 
theorists often use the terms interchangeably. This lack of terminological differentiation might 
have its reason in real political life, i.e. that liberalism as a notion of a well-ordered society 
has in the hands of the liberal reformers o f the nineties turned out to be merely another 
ideology stipulating abstract conceptions o f a capitalist market economy and liberal politics. 
Or, alternatively, it may have its roots in the Marxist view of ideology as direct expression of 
class interests. The strongly deterministic variant of Marxism-Leninism would allow ideology 
to assume the role o f critical reflection on politics which was previously occupied by political 
theory, or as Robert Conquest once put it: ‘the pre-scientific gropings that had hitherto 
prevailed’5. The resultant rather benign understanding of ideology might still linger on in the 
conceptualisations of some Russian political theorists and thus preclude a clear differentiation 
between political philosophy and ideology.
5 Conquest (2000), p.44
137
The view o f liberalism from the angles of historical interpretations of modernity would 
constitute the fourth sub-theme. The intricate connection between liberalism as a view of 
politics and the reforms that were an essential component of the process of Russian 
modernisation have in fact originated in the historical interpretation of Russia’s nineteenth 
century. Insofar as the references of this approach still provide some evidence of its inception 
in Russian historiography it would be justified to treat this sub-theme as conceptually and 
theoretically distinct from the similar views theorised from the perspective and with the 
concepts o f political theory.
Russian liberalism has been considerably influenced by some competing programmes 
of political reform or explanations of social and political change. As political liberalism was 
pressed to develop ideas on democracy and political participation as well as a conception of 
national sovereignty, its notion of politics creatively incorporated some concepts that are 
peculiar to the political debates taking place in Russia. The relation between the democratic 
ideal and ‘narodovlastie’ have therefore received considerable attention from historians who 
argue that the influence of these concepts on, as it were, a premature political theory of a 
liberal social and political order informs many of the peculiarities o f the Russian variant of 
political liberalism. This constitutes a fifth sub-theme elaborated by Russian historians of 
political thought. A methodologically unique approach is offered by those historians who 
apply a comparative technique of historical interpretation to political liberalism in East and 
West. Their analyses warrant special attention insofar as they are rare examples of cross- 
cultural and cross-theoretical engagements.
As with theory, historiography possesses a self-critical component whose findings will 
constitute not a separate sub-category but will be referred to at times throughout the survey. 
Theory and history might be seen to cover the main ground of the arguments that were 
advanced in the debate. Yet, there are other theoretical considerations that do not fall into 
either of the above categories but are relevant for the question of Russian political theory in a
138
meta-theoretical sense. There has been some work over the last decade which attempts to 
clarify the extent to which Russian philosophy (political, moral or ethical philosophy) is a 
distinct form of thinking, informed by cultural, political and/or social conditions. These 
considerations can at times illuminate the bistorico-philosophical background o f political 
theory and Russian historiography. And inasmuch as Russian political thought succeeds in 
recovering its rich philosophical heritage from pre-revolutionary times, these meta-theoretical 
considerations might become increasingly relevant for an analysis o f Russian political 
liberalism.
For the following review of the detailed positions a cursory thematic separation seems 
in order. Although many positions will appear in more than one part o f the review, such a 
separation allows us to introduce a focus that would otherwise be lacking. It should be 
emphasised that the particular way of thematically grouping then has been selected for being 
beneficial to the subsequent discussion. Other topical arrangements are entirely feasible, 
depending on the focal interest of the observer.
The debate will be presented in four main parts. The first section will deal with all 
theoretical positions that describe or analyse Russian political liberalism as a form of political 
culture and civility. In a second sub-section those views of Russian liberalism will be 
considered which emphasise the dependency of the theoretical shape and content o f Russian 
liberalism on the interaction between East and West. The justification for subsuming these 
approaches into one bigger category is that all positions show an awareness or even theorise 
from the observation of mutual influence of intellectual concepts and terminology between 
West and East. There will be space for a more detailed discussion of the views of the eminent 
scholar Aleksandr Akhiezer on statehood. The concepts of culture and civility, as has been 
pointed out before and will become clearer as the discussion progresses, serve by no means as 
sole references to particularistic ideas of Russian liberalism. Therefore it would be equally 
mistaken to imbue such concepts as political culture with the connotation of acting as a single
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determinant of the prospect of political liberalism in Russia as has been argued in the West 
(e.g. by Weigle, 2000). The most that can be said in face of the multiplicity o f roles that the 
idea of political culture plays in Russian historiography and political theory is that it is an 
extremely loosely defined concept and functions often both as an explanandum and an 
explanans.
The second and third sections of this chapter will focus on theorisations of political 
liberalism as a form of civilisation and as an aspect of modernity. Strictly historical as well as 
politico-theoretical approaches will find their place here. Much of the civilisation section will 
present the social and political theory of statehood as formulated by Aleksandr Akhiezer. In a 
fourth section, what could adequately be described as political theory proper will be portrayed 
and discussed. This will be the location for the analysis of those contributions to the Russian 
debate that deliberately engage with the Western debate and provide a genuine constructive 
synthesis of Western and Russian conceptualisations.
Although the mere presentation of theoretical views might seem rather tedious, one 
should bear in mind that the purpose of the subsequent section of this study is twofold: on one 
hand to prepare the ground for a re-evaluation of Western political theory and, on the other 
hand, to familiarise a Western audience with the highly diverse, not to say amorphous, 
Russian theoretical debate on political liberalism.
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8. Russian Liberalism between East and West -  Influences and 
M isunderstandings
The history of Russian political thought is littered with cases of mistaken identities. For 
example, it is widely accepted amongst historians and philosophers that the appropriation of 
Hegelian thought in Russia in the nineteenth century was riddled with misunderstandings and 
partial, politically influenced, interpretations. Pantin’s remarks on the distorted assimilation of 
Western liberal thought in the second half of the nineteenth century are also corroborated by 
many other accounts. The reconstruction of the way in which Russian thinkers have 
incoiporated Western political thought into their worldview must therefore be of paramount 
importance to any critical appreciation of the role Western political philosophy has played and 
can play in Russian political thought. What follows is an overview of the more recent critical 
assessments of Russian political theorists and historians on the form and content of Russian 
liberalism and the ways in which it diverged from, or conformed to, Western political thought.
The purpose of this sub-section is, firstly, to sketch how Russian historians have 
recently attempted to reconstruct past Russian liberal thought. This field o f re-construction of 
the Russian liberal heritage has probably been one of the most fertile areas of Russian 
research in political theory since the time of perestroika. The articles and monographs 
published on the history of Russian political thought are innumerable now and it is the more 
surprising that this revived interest in the history of Russian political liberalism has so far 
spawned only a modest resurgence of political theory proper amongst Russian academics. To 
outline how Russian historians portray past Russian political thinkers and the liberal political 
movement might seem methodologically incestuous. But it should be remembered that the 
purpose of this section is twofold; on the one hand, to present how Russian academics 
critically re-evaluate their intellectual (liberal) heritage and; on the other hand, to determine 
what this means for notions of the immutable or irreducible content o f liberal theoretical
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concepts and ideas. The former is a view of the arguments intrinsic to the Russian debate, 
whereas the latter strives to achieve a referentiality o f two hitherto by and large separate 
debates.
An appropriate starting point would be some critical remarks on the value and role of 
conceptual appropriation amongst Russian thinkers in the nineteenth century. Zelezneva has 
attempted to give just this in an article for a conference on Russian liberalism held in 1998. 
Formerly a teacher at Rostow University, she now holds the position of Professor for Political 
Science at the Humanitarian State University in Moscow. In her article she argues that 
Russian political thought has traditionally oscillated between originality and the assimilation 
(borrowed -  ‘zaimstvovannyi’) of foreign concepts and ideas, but that to perceive this relation 
as a dichotomy would be to misapprehend the significance o f the original element. 
Assimilating imported theoretical elements, she argues, does not contradict the originality of 
either the concepts or the overall project (objective). Rather, the process of borrowing or 
lending conceptual tools from one intellectual context to another is an organic element of any 
interaction and mutual influence, without which isolation would set in that would eventually 
lead to decay (Zelezneva, 1999, p. 122). The relation between the process o f appropriation and 
the ‘national idea’ is a more complex one, however.6 She argues that borrowing can be seen 
as a source of national consciousness and does not necessarily prevent the development of a 
self-confident nation. On the contrary, it might be a necessary condition for it. She emphasises 
that none of the early Russian liberal thinkers had a simplistic view of the process of 
assimilating foreign intellectual property. For Kovaleskii, the borrowing o f concepts and ideas 
was a process that involved imitation and adaptation (podrazhanie i prisposoblenie). For the 
Russian liberals of the early twentieth century, such as Miliukov, assimilating foreign thought 
was equally seen as a way to realise a self-confident and original principle of national
6 For an excellent overview o f  the recent debate on, and the persistent elusiveness of, the Russian Idea cf. Bettina 
Siber, Russkaia Ideia obiasyvaiet!? Poisk russkoi identichnosti v obshchestvennykh diskussiiakh kontsa XX 
veka, Moscow: AIRO-XX 2002
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consciousness. However, she points out that Miliukov added the condition that the results of 
the influence of foreign thought would depend on the general culture and the culture (pattern) 
of assimilation of society as a whole and in particular its elites. The level o f the culture of 
assimilation is settled (raspolagaietsa) somewhere along the spectrum between blind copying 
and absolute isolation. The closer a culture of assimilation is to the ‘golden middle’ between 
the extreme poles, the more effective the influence of foreign experiences will be for the 
development of a nation and country (Zelezneva, 1999, p. 123). The fact that Russian liberals 
developed a theory o f (theoretical) assimilation would be evidence for the high level o f their 
indigenous culture o f appropriation and would disprove the view put forward by Soviet 
historians of political thought and more recent critics who regard these Russian liberals as 
mechanistic Westerners, propagating the blind import (kopirovania) of the Western 
experience (Zelezneva, 1999, p. 123). She also indicates that an additional argument for the 
creative appropriation of Western political thought may lie in the way that Russian liberals 
used the Western experience for the elaboration of a Russian (liberal) model of societal 
transformation (Zelezneva, 1999, p. 123). Yet, as other historians have pointed out, this model 
of reform failed to capture the imagination of the population and eventually foundered on 
recalcitrant social and political realities. Zelezneva retorts that the failure of the reforms after 
1905 must be ascribed to the errors of individual politicians and their stereotypical application 
rather than to the entire model of transition (Zelezneva, 1999, p. 124).
Her portrayal of Russian liberalism and of the constructive model of appropriation o f 
Western thought is significant not so much with regard to whether or not the modes o f 
intellectual ‘borrowing’ had been sufficiently sophisticated to produce a proper model of 
social and political evolution but rather as an indication that neither the early Russian liberals 
nor she herself believe that concepts and experiences gathered in the West lend themselves to 
simple mechanical transfer without any modification and re-interpretation. This might be a 
redundant point for any historically minded person. However, yet if it can be shown that such
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modifications must extend to the core meanings and content of liberal ideas such as liberty, it 
would prove a powerful argument against the universalism of political theory as conceived by 
Western political philosophers.
In trying to define the parameters o f an immutable centre o f any liberal concept it 
would be helpful to examine the actual interaction between competing concepts in a particular 
historical situation and gauge, from the limits within which a pivotal idea such as liberty is 
viable, the validity of the claim that political liberalism is built on some concepts with an 
invariable content. Quite understandably in the Russian context, the idea of political equality 
as epitomised by the democratic principle has received a lot of attention from Russian 
historian and political philosophers. Given the democratic claims of the Communist ideology, 
the period of transition can easily be re-framed conceptually as a necessary re-conciliation of 
democracy and liberty.
Gadzhiev has devoted some efforts to an analysis of the problem of the compatibility 
of democracy and liberalism with Russian cultural and social conditions and, although his 
political position cannot be described as strictly liberal, his examination of the interrelations 
between the idea of democracy and Russia is relevant to the theoretical concern of the present 
study.
Gadzhiev begins by differentiating between liberalism and democracy in general 
terms. Although liberalism is often closely associated to democracy, not every democracy is 
strictly liberal. Liberalism, he notes, is based 011 the idea of the priority of recognition and 
self-value (samotsennost) o f the individual and the legal framework for its freedoms. 
Democracy, however, privileges the idea o f ‘national’ sovereignty and political equality of all 
citizens with the primacy of the will of the majority. So, while liberalism privileges freedom 
before equality, democracy espouses the direct opposite. However, in recent years, an organic 
conflation of both principles has emerged (Gadzhiev, 1994, p. 109).
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Liberalism has incorporated many of the ideas, principles and values of democracy. 
Originally founded on the idea of individuality, liberalism came to recognise the significance 
of the collective principle and the positive role of the state in social life. Liberalism has been 
permeated (pronizan) by social principles. This constant reformulation of liberalism under the 
pressures o f social and political change moved Gadzhiev to postulate the possibility of a 
specific form of liberal political order for Russia. So, while liberalism as a philosophy or 
worldview (mirovozrenie) has encapsulated a range of core ideas, as a practical political 
programme it has undergone a constant process of revision and transformation (Gadzhiev, 
1994, p. 109). From here onwards he seems to use ‘democracy’ and ‘liberalism’ 
interchangeably and emphasises that democracy presupposes a set of cultural, legal and 
political conditions in order to function properly. Interestingly, his list o f conditions coincides 
remarkably with Kniazeva’s identification of cultural attributes that enabled the English 
liberal political order to work so admirably over the centuries. Gadzhiev cites tolerance, 
transparency, dialogue, critical deliberation, and an ability to compromise as the foundations 
o f a democratic order. He adds that democracy also requires the legal recognition o f political 
opposition as a legitimate partner in the political process, just as much as any viable 
democratic political order is embedded in a pluralistic view of spiritual (dukhovnye) values 
and societal associations, and rejects any totalitarian or monistic identification of the state 
with one party or one official ideology (Gadzhiev, 1994, p.111). Given this broad 
characterisation of the democratic ideal, it seems only logical for him to conclude that the 
most appropriate path for Russia is marked by the introduction of democracy rather than 
liberalism. Arguing that the meaning of democracy repeatedly altered over time (from the 
classical period to modernity), he concludes that it must be possible to carve out a specific 
meaning of democracy for Russia (Gadzhiev, 1994, p .112). Yet, the possibility of democracy 
in Russia depends on the avoidance of a simplistic incorporation of Western norms, principles 
and institutions. Referring to the experience of introducing democracy in Japan and the Far
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East, he points to the importance of preserving the cultural values and the primacy o f group 
interests or the interests of the nation. Democracy should not be identified exclusively with 
individual freedoms (Gadzhiev, 1994, p. 113). Having juxtaposed liberalism and democracy 
and having then predicated the latter on a whole range of aspects o f political culture which 
would normally be counted as components of a liberal orientation, he goes on to say that at 
the micro-level an inner (vnutrenniaia) and deep (glubinaia) democracy has emerged on 
which the national political order can draw (Gadzhiev, 1994, p. 113). Collective interests can 
promote the development of a necessary political consensus and would serve as an original 
guarantee for the adherence of citizens to such an arrangement. The dramatic side o f the 
Russian transformation, he argues, can be understood as a divergence of the political 
structures on a macro- and micro-level. He concludes that Western forms of statehood are 
doomed to fail when imported into Russia, since they clash with the organic socio-cultural, 
political and religious traditions and mentalities that prevail in the country (Gadzhiev, 1994, 
p. 114). For Gadzhiev, the consequence o f such a clash of indigenous socio-cultural and 
political ideals with abstract democratic (Western) principles then is the need to search for the 
most appropriate form of organic combination between the Western principles of market 
economy, political democracy, and the rule of law (pravovoe gosudarstvo) and the traditional 
forms of Russian statehood and sociality. Herein lies the central task o f liberal-democratic 
theorists. Commenting on the inherent limits of the market model for Russia, he points out 
that the success of any market economy depends, paradoxically, on a minimum level of 
support from collectivist institutions and traditions which are, so he believes, non-capitalistic 
in character. In trying to sketch out what such a composition of social and cultural traditions 
with democratic ideas of political participation could look like for Russia, he indicates that the 
insistence on the negative concept o f freedom with its disregard for authority and statehood 
must inevitably lead to anarchy and chaos and that the Russian concept of authority must not 
be seen as inherently incompatible with democracy. In fact, he argues, freedom and
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democracy must, in the absence o f a strong Russian statehood, remain mere talk (Gadzhiev, 
1994, p.l 15). This leads him to state that true liberty and individual right(s), regardless of the 
national, social, religious or any other convictions o f the individual, by no means prohibit or 
contradict the idea and principle of statehood (Gadzhiev, 1994, p.l 15). Consequently, he 
believes that, given the social component of liberties, it makes little sense to speak of abstract 
or ‘natural’ (yestiestvennaia) freedoms if they can only exist in a framework (struktur) of 
authority, vertical and horizontal. His more political conclusions from this analysis of the 
relation between democracy and indigenous social and cultural conditions emphasise the 
importance of a ‘constructive patriotism’ (Gadzhiev, 1994, p .l 16) for the successful political 
transformation in Russia.
Although it could be argued that Gadzhiev’s position is simply a theoretically 
unsophisticated rehashing of the Western communitarian position with a rather less benign 
culmination in his endorsement of strong Russian statehood and ‘constructive patriotism’, and 
that Gadzhiev seems naively oblivious to the political propensities of such patriotism in 
Russia past and present, his distinction between the abstract principle of democracy/ 
liberalism and its concrete application reveals the more useful content of his thought for the 
purposes of the present argument. Others have argued that patriotism is simply a way of 
‘obscuring mass consciousness; that it is practically directed against the concept of liberalism; 
and (that) it propagates that the Western model (of liberalism) is imported’ (Volkov, 1999, 
p.444). With the increasing popularity of Lebed in the 1996 presidential elections, a liberal- 
patriotic ideology took shape that should not be dismissed too easily (cf. Sogrin on ‘national 
liberalism’ in Sogrin, 1999, esp. pp. 160-166).
Although many of Gadzhiev’s views are simply normative in nature and do not receive 
any further theoretical justification, his crucial proposition seems to be that there exists a rift 
in Russian society between the democratic ideal lived and adhered to at the community level, 
which somehow acts as the seedbed of the prevailing cultural and social views of Russian
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society, and democratic principles at the (national) macro-level. To work out the correct 
adjustment of both is the task of the political philosopher and Gadzhiev answers this call by 
suggesting that the notion of the nation as epitomised in Russian statehood can possibly act as 
a bridging link between the two levels -  hence his ‘constructive patriotism’. This conclusion 
might appear to be more politically motivated than coherently justified, yet Gadzhiev’s 
insistence that democracy’s viability as a political order depends on pluralism, transparency 
and the acceptance of opposing religious, political and social views hints at the limits of 
prescriptive quality o f state policies rather than simply suggesting that an overweening 
centrally enforced patriotism or Russian nationalism can (and ought to) connect micro- and 
macro-level. It still remains somewhat obscure on which elements of this inner and deep 
democracy which, he claims, persists at the basis of Russian (and Eastern) society, the 
democratic ideal on the superior level can draw (Gadzhiev, 1994, p.l 13).
However, if we compare his argument about the divergence of the democratic ideas on 
the micro- and macro-level with Kniazeva’s contention that the crux of liberal politics is the 
sustenance of maxims of political collaboration that are exogenous to political liberalism, his 
contribution becomes clearer. He draws attention to the fact that, besides being bolstered by 
indigenous notions of what constitutes democratic politics, democracy operates at various 
levels and the appropriation of Western political concepts, if  it is to be successful, is 
essentially a process of reconciliation between the varying democratic ideals that obtain on a 
national and ‘local’ level. Gadzhiev then seems to assume that the political ideals that are 
indigenous in nature are somehow primordial and must thus act as benchmarks in the re­
formulation of the national democratic ideal. Since he offers no theoretical back-up for this 
thesis of the primacy of the local forms of politics, his position moves dangerously close to a 
Slavophil argument.
Although he does not confront this charge head on, he hints at a way to avoid it by 
pointing out that Russian democracy inevitably must take into account the multiple religious,
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social and moral views of its population. As much as he hopes that the indigenous notion of 
democratic politics will accommodate and has traditionally accommodated this diversity, this 
seems to be a pious hope rather than a fact o f Russian social and political reality.
His argument reveals neatly the limits of the concept of appropriation of Western 
concepts of political liberalism. Postulating the primacy of Russian cultural and political 
concepts and attempting to derive the content of liberal politics from indigenous notions of 
democracy/liberalism must fail to produce liberalism proper. Gadzhiev’s argument for 
‘constructive patriotism’ amounts to a dismissal of any referential content as to what 
democracy could mean beyond localised traditional notions of it. Speaking in the terms that 
Seleznjeva used, his proposition is not appropriation but isolation while still utilising Western 
conceptual tools. His position does not fail so much then on the lack of referentiality of the 
terminology per se but on the missing normative justification for prioritising local notions of 
democracy. If the usage of concepts such as democracy is to make any sense, it has to bear a 
cross-cultural, possibly normative content, that goes beyond the solipsistic re-formulation of 
such ideas describing particular notions obtaining at the sub-national level. Slavophils have 
notoriously been unable to give such a justification other than their insistence on the 
superiority of the Russian culture, and Gadzhiev would be open to a similar charge.
For our present concern this indicates the boundaries of conceptual re-definition, the 
point, as it were, where Western concepts become unrecognisable and would cease to act as 
references to universal norms and values. For those who take a radical particularist position, 
this should not be too bothersome. For a liberal, however, who wants to salvage a minimum 
of conceptual universalizability, it is deeply so. However, to suggest that Gadzhiev’s position 
is implicitly Slavophil could merely be based on a caricature of his view. Yet, the particular 
construction of his argument, assuming the primacy of Russian cultural and political forms of 
life and interpreting them as democratic, opens him up to the charge of misconceiving 
Russian reality and neglecting, paradoxically, the effects that modernisation has had on these
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democratic aspects of Russian local life. Any argument that posits the existence of local 
democracy as a regulatory concept for democracy at the national level must show that the 
supposedly democratic local forms of political organisation have remained intact throughout 
imperial modernisation and the destructive re-structuring undertaken under the Communist 
regime. This reiterates Zelezneva’s idea that a constructive conceptual ‘cross-fertilisation’ 
between East and West very much depends on finding the ‘golden middle’ between what she 
calls ‘isolation’ and mere ‘copying’.
While Gadhiev mentions that the normative foundations of democracy and liberalism 
are mutually exclusive, the former prioritising equality whereas the latter holds individual 
liberty as the most fundamental principle governing political order, his analysis of democracy 
in Russia and its future prospects neglects the complex interrelationship that has existed 
between the two concepts in Russia’s past and present. In contrast to this portrayal of the 
democratic ideal, Pantin argues from a more sophisticated position when he considers the 
mutual relation between democracy and liberalism to be at the heart of the transformational 
problems of Russia in the nineteenthand twentieth century. In contrast to the studies of 
Gadshiev which possess a marked geopolitical edge, Igor Konstantinovich Pantin’s work is 
informed by a more philosophical impetus. Pantin has been editor of the most important 
Russian academic journal in political science Polis since 1991 and at present holds the 
position of Head of Section for History of Philosophy at the Institue of Philosophy for the 
Russian Academy of Sciences (RAN). He previously taught at the Section (‘Laboratory’) for 
Comparative Politology at the same institution.
While Gadzhiev operates with a simple juxtaposition of the two ideas and claims the 
incompatibility of an abstract ideal Western democracy with Russian political culture, Pantin 
argues that this incompatibility is merely a result of the antithetical re-construction of these 
two concepts. Emphasising that the success of the Russian transformation depends on the 
consideration o f the rich traditions in Russia (Pantin, 1994, p.75), an equally important factor
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for the completion of Russian transition is how and when Russia overcomes the antithetical 
understanding of liberalism and democracy. Seen this way, the future of Russian liberalism 
depends not only on how influential liberal views are amongst the wider Russian public but, 
more significantly, on the character of Russian democracy (Pantin, 1994, p.76). Democracy 
thus can facilitate the evolution of liberal values or hamper it.
Pantin stresses that this interaction does not occur in a cultural vacuum but that the past 
experiences of the population influence decisively the choices people make with regard to the 
extent of personal liberties they are prepared to tolerate. Given that Russian culture appears to 
be predisposed to prefer collectivism rather than individualism, the transformational process 
and the infusion and evolution of liberal values and norms in Russia is necessarily a 
fundamentally cultural process (Pantin, 1994, p.77), not simply a question of the introduction 
of liberal political institutions and practices. Certain factors require careful consideration in 
developing new political institutions, and many of these factors did not, and will not, exactly 
facilitate the spread of liberal values in Russia. Pantin mentions the traditionally strong stance 
of the state which rules out a tabula rasa transformation along libertarian lines. Liberal 
governance in Russia, he argues, has failed to develop because the necessary cultural 
ingredients such as personal initiative and the idea o f (individual) self-determination have not 
existed. Consequently, the drama o f Russian history, according to Pantin, consists in the fact 
that democratic and liberal impulses came to collide rather than to complement each other 
(Pantin, 1994, p.80).
This is a view that appears to command a broad consensus amongst Russian historians 
of political thought (cf. Lebedev, esp. pp.114-115). Under this confrontation the two 
ideologies deformed into mutually exclusive forms of political thought, with democracy being 
conceived of as precluding personal liberties, whereas liberals saw in democracy a potential 
danger for individual rights and freedoms that still awaited being properly established in 
Russia. While Russian democrats radicalised and their political ideas adopted a Plebeian and
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destructive edge (Pantin, 1994, p.80), liberals overemphasised the necessity of preserving the 
existing political order and increasingly aligned themselves with the governing (bureaucratic) 
elite. This division between liberal and democratic thought was exacerbated by the problem of 
serfdom and the destitution of the peasantry, which contributed to the appeal of utopian forms 
of socialism (Pantin, 1994, p.81). As mentioned above, Pantin argues that the main mistake of 
the Russian liberals prior to 1917 was their inability to understand that the notion of autonomy 
must be combined with a minimum of economic and legal self-determination for the 
population. This would necessitate a stance in opposition to the government’s hesitant and 
often self-contradictory policies. Since liberals saw the problem of constitutionalism as the 
most pressing one, they neglected the urgent economic and social difficulties of the 
population (Pantin, 1994, p.81).
Whether this is a correct portrayal of late nineteenth century Russian political thought 
can be doubted, given that the Kadets recognised the need for land reform and ‘neo-liberals’ 
such as Soloviev developed a deep philosophical understanding for the interrelation of 
economic, social and political freedoms (cf. Sizemskaia, 1999, pp.209-216;
Novikova/Sizemskaia; Novikova/Sizemskaia, Tri Modeli, esp. pp.218-232, cf. also Walicki, 
1992, esp. chapter on Soloviev, pp. 165-212)
In a discerning examination of the formation of what he calls ‘democratism’, Pantin 
attempts to describe how the political space in Russia acquired a configuration that was 
inimical to liberal thought. He identifies three aspects of ‘democratism’ which contributed to
the capacity |) f  this line of political thought to dominate Russian public consciousness in the
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second half of the nineteenth century and still, subliminally, defines Russia’s conceptions of 
‘narod’ even today. Firstly, the interaction of Bolsheviki and ‘Narodniki’ appears to have 
been far more intense and complex than hitherto assumed. Secondly, despite sharing a host of 
social objectives, ‘Narodniki’ and social-democrats differed fundamentally in their political 
impetus. Pantin’s interpretation o f democratism as a profoundly apolitical movement broadly
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corresponds with Walicki’s characterisation of the populist movement as anti-capitalist yet 
rejecting political struggle (Walicki, 1979, pp.222-235). Pantin reiterates this interpretation 
when he counts as one of the main characteristics of Russian democratism its utter 
indifference towards the form of any future state formations (gosudarstvennovo ustroistva), 
such political ideas being perceived as running counter to the interests of the Russian people 
(Pantin, 1994, p.87). Basing their hopes for reform of the country upon a radical change in 
economic relations alone meant that Narodniki as well as Bolsheviki excluded any moral and 
political factors from their conceptions of change which could have influenced or determined 
the historical path of Russia in directions and ways more conducive to liberal ideas (Pantin, 
1994 p.87). The popularity of this approach proved disastrous for the idea of democracy in 
Russia, since democracy came to be synonymous with the economic liberation o f the lower 
strata of Russian society and eventually shaped the peculiar understanding o f the term 
‘narod’/people as being analogous to the lower orders o f society in opposition to the 
Westernised (politicised) elements of Russian society. It is easy to see what the implications 
of such a pars pro toto interpretation of the term ‘people’ or ‘country’ were for the notion of 
national sovereignty and minority rights. Despite its alleged non-political drift, democratism 
pre-structured the political space in the sense that the Narodniki’s discreditation of ‘routine’ 
politics prepared the ground for a narrowing of the political agenda to economic liberation of 
the lower classes. Identifying these parts of society with the ‘nation’ per se reduced 
entitlements for political participation just as it de-legitimised any diversion from the 
overriding objective of restructuring the socio-economic relations in the country. That the 
Bolsheviki proved most adept at exploiting these reductionist notions of politics and 
democracy, partly because they were, in contrast to the Narodniki, well aware of the political 
implications of the economic reforms as well as o f the primacy of politics (despite their 
acclamation of the priority o f land reform), was merely evidence o f the naivety and 
immaturity of the (non)political views of the Narodniki.
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The consequences for liberal political thought are immense. Besides the implications 
o f the popularity and particular internal structure o f democratic thought in Russia for a liberal 
programme of political and social reforms, the most profound ramifications were, and still 
are, theoretical in nature. For liberals the democratic interpretation of ‘narod’ and liberty 
meant that central notions of liberal doctrine had been distorted beyond recognition and also 
impaired its chances to be integrated into a coherent liberal reform agenda. It reveals the 
semantic problems with which liberals have grappled, and still experience, in conveying a 
specifically liberal notion of political institutions and individual freedoms in general. More 
significantly, the concepts of sovereignty and nation predetermine the form of politics that is 
to be established. Rights and liberties traditionally have found their guarantees in a notion of 
sovereignty directed against arbitrary overbearing and oppressive rulers. If these guarantees 
take constitutional form they presuppose a reference to the idea of a sovereign nation, while 
the latter determines the boundaries of the polity.
In his book on Russian democracy and national sovereignty, Kozyrevaia supplements 
Pantin’s picture of mutual exclusivity with a portrayal of more conciliatory elements. Her 
work focuses on the notion of ‘narodovlastie’ which Russian liberals developed at the end of 
the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. She maintains that for Russian 
constitutionalism and for adherents o f the doctrine of ‘inalienable natural rights’, a conception 
of national sovereignty was integral (Kozyrevaia, 1998 p. 141). The liberal conception differed 
sharply, however, from the democrats’ understanding of ‘narodovlastie’ insofar as liberals 
sought to base their account o f national sovereignty and democracy on the principles of 
individualism and the autonomy of the individual. Russian liberals, according to Kozyrevaia, 
went so far as to claim the indivisibility o f the doctrines of democratic participation and 
liberalism. Well known is Struve’s position for whom a liberal Russian political order was the 
primary aim, yet democracy was the means for accomplishing that aim (Kozyrevaia, 1998 
p. 142). The reservations Russian liberals expressed regarding an unfettered majoritarian
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political principle mirrored the misgivings of Western conservatives about the dangers of 
democratic caesarism (Kozyrevaia, 1998 p. 142). This led them to postulate the need for a 
guided transition to a free society, that guidance or tutelage being the prerogative of the 
enlightened educated (liberal) minority. The dilemma liberals faced, in acknowledging the 
danger of the rule of illiberal masses and the promulgation of democracy as means of 
achieving liberal politics, was how to determine the appropriate role of the state in the 
transformation. The state would have to become a protective shield against any potential anti­
legality of Jacobin character, just as the political authorities would have to tame and contain 
themselves by introducing the separation o f powers amongst the various governmental 
branches. Thus liberals emphasised the legal facets of political power. For Kozyrevaia this 
dilemma was exacerbated by the predominant view amongst Russian liberals that the creative 
potential of democracy could only be opened up by impregnating the new democratic 
institutions with the prevailing religious-moral principle o f the Russian people (Kozyrevaia, 
1998 p. 143) which had already proved helpful in sustaining elements of local self-government 
through the zemstvo movement. The continuity between these provincial and local reform 
experiences and the political reforms at the national level turned out to be a mainstay of the 
liberal model of transformation prior to 1905. Constitutionalism coupled with legalism and 
moderate reformism thus proved to be the most essential and enduring features o f the political 
programme of Russian liberalism (Kozyrevaia, 1998 p.89).
Although liberals thus made significant contributions to the concept of Russian 
national sovereignty and democracy, their views failed to gain widespread acceptance. 
Kozyrevaia stresses that such a reformist agenda would remain incomplete as long as the role 
o f civil liberties and rights remained unspecified. Russian liberals thus had formulated a 
concept of civil society that, on the one hand, depended on a midwife role of the monarchy in 
bringing it into existence, reinforcing the activist role of the state, while on the other hand, 
they saw civil liberties as essential in inaugurating -  and eventually mitigating the possible
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excesses of -  political modernisation, i.e. fully-fledged democracy. What gave Russian 
liberalism its conservative and etatist edge was the central role attributed to the authorities in 
the process of generating a viable civil society and the maintenance of legal guarantees and 
civil liberties. Since society was incapable of engendering a strong counterforce to autocracy, 
just as it proved powerless to provide guarantees against Jacobin notions of radical 
democracy, the moving force o f any modernising attempt had be the political authorities 
themselves. Hence most liberals would pin their hopes on the bureaucratic elite having or 
acquiring the necessary understanding of the necessity o f political and social reforms as well 
as seeing the need to introduce constitutional checks to attenuate the worst dangers of an over- 
mighty state bureaucracy.
While Kozyrevaia paints a more sympathetic picture of the theoretical efforts of 
Russian liberals to develop a coherent concept of ‘narodovlastie’, the failure of the liberal’s 
view of democracy to capture the imagination of the population remains, in her view, 
attributable to the prevalence o f the radical democrat’s interpretation o f democracy as 
sketched by Pantin. Kozyrevaia’s reconstruction of the liberal mould of the doctrine of 
‘narodovlastie’ hints at something far more fundamentally at fault than the mere 
predominance of a competing view at variance with the liberal notion of democracy. It points 
to the conspicuous lack or underdevelopment o f modernising agents in Russian society, or 
more moderately, to the fact that political and social modernisation initiated by the authorities 
would at some stage generate demands for the limitation of the inflated powers of the state. 
Enhanced political authority became the agent of modernisation and guardian of civil liberties 
at the same time as becoming the main impediment to successful democratisation. The only 
solution to this dilemma was to hope for the state to (self-)curtail its political powers 
subsequent to the nascence of a viable civil society. For Kozyrevaia, the central difficulty then 
was that civil society was neither formed in reality nor would it ever have resulted in or have 
been the result o f genuinely independent associational activities (Kozyrevaia, 1998 p.89). The
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ensuing conception of individualism was paternalistic in nature and etatist in origin. Political 
rights would then consequently be seen as derivative of, and subsequent to, civil liberties 
guaranteed by the state, a position that must have been seen as incompatible with the radical 
democrat’s view of political participation and the low value they placed on the civil liberties, 
which liberals priced above all else.
As pointed out by many Russian historians, these deviations from the ‘norm’ of 
Western historical development had lasting effects on the theoretical model o f liberal 
modernisation. In lieu of a developed civil society that entrenched civil liberties and acted as a 
counterbalance to autocratic powers, liberals entrusted the role of agent o f modernisation to 
the state authorities who, at best, would only have a perfunctory interest in social and political 
reforms as long as these would alleviate the worst effects o f capitalist development that had 
taken root in Russia during the second half of the nineteenth century. The evolution of a 
viable Russian civil society thus depended on the willingness of the bureaucracy, hitherto 
working for an unconstrained autocratic regime, to accept constitutional checks on its power 
at the same time it introduced social and political reforms that would eventually lead to a 
fundamental transformation of the status and position of that elite. This utterly unrealistic 
strategy of liberal reform was additionally predicated on the assumption that the creation of a 
middle stratum of society with vested interests in legally circumscribed property relations 
would ipso facto be supportive of liberal values and ideas -  position that has not only 
attracted some theoretical criticism (Karpovich) but can also muster little evidence in reality 
as shown by the evolution of oligarchic capitalism in Russia following the Gaidar reforms of 
1992-93 (for Gaidar’s position see his theoretically instructive work Gossudarstvo i 
evolutsiia, Moscow 1995).
Kozyrevaia and Pantin’s arguments could be understood as having persuasive force 
only with regard to a possible liberal programme of reform, highlighting on the one hand the 
danger of anticipating a constructive role for the political authorities in introducing
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constitutionalism and the rule of law, as well as in creating the legal parameters for civil 
associations, while on the other hand, the prevalence of the radical democrats’ interpretation 
o f the criteria o f inclusion of the notion of the Russian nation and their idea of liberation as 
being solely economic in purpose, posited severe problems for liberal attempts to advance an 
inclusive, participatory, yet constitutionally constrained, form of democracy. Their more 
integrated account of civil political and social liberties and rights offered little ground for 
collaboration with the increasingly radicalised democratic camp. Yet, besides these points of 
practical importance for the liberal programme of political and social change, the theoretical 
implications are even more critical for the applicability o f political liberalism in Russia. 
Kozyrevaia’s argument about the mismatch of the sequence of historical evolution and the 
absence o f modernising and liberalising agents in the Russian context accentuates the possible 
incongruity o f the Western model of protracted and balanced political change (while in the 
course o f it creating the bearers of future legal entitlements and political interests) with the 
Russian model o f ‘catch-up’ modernisation. The answer to the question as to whether or not 
Russian political liberalism should be formulated along the ‘tried and tested’ lines of Western 
theoretical liberalism then lies in the extent to which this conception of Western liberal 
politics accurately reflects the historical process that occurred in the West and how relevant 
the contingent components of this historical process are to the basic benchmarks of liberal 
politics.
That the terminological confusion between liberalism and ‘democratism’ has fatefully 
been replicated under the conditions of the liberal reforms of the Gaidar team has been 
pointed out more recently in an article by Sogrin. The appropriation of the democratic idea by 
the Communist ideology might still prove one of the most difficult stumbling blocs for any 
liberal political reform programme that presupposes the recognition of civil liberties and a 
meaningful inclusive conception of citizenship -  this being at least the simplistic Western 
view of the prospects for Russian liberal politics. Yet, Sogrin argues, the simultaneous
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inception of liberalisation and democratisation under Gorbachev led to a fateful ‘marriage 
between the terms’, a theoretical and ideological simplification where the democratic progress 
o f Russia was perceived as merely involving an assertion of principles, such as private 
property, market economy, individualism, competition. These aspects were taken to mean the 
self-sufficient basis for democracy, whereas they in practice represented liberal values and 
failed to engender democracy and social justice (Sogrin, 1999, p. 152-153). Russians were 
thus forced to learn the lessons of the past once more, realising, firstly, that individual 
interests do not equate to the general interest, and secondly, that the relationship between 
democracy and individual freedoms is not as simple and straightforward as radical liberals 
have taken it to be. Their programme of reform would promulgate a form of economic 
determinism where private property and economic freedoms (realised within a market 
economy) could act as the main conditions and guarantees for democracy (Sogrin, 1999, 
p .156).
The glaring social and economic inequity produced by these reforms highlights, 
according to Sogrin the insufficiency of the liberal’s view of equality as being the equality of 
initial opportunities. The results of the reforms have shown the importance of taking into 
account that starting places are different (Sogrin, 1999, pp. 156-157), something that belongs 
to the canon of liberal thinking, at least since the idea o f positive liberty was accepted as an 
integral and complementary part to political liberalism in its negative mould. The remoteness, 
Sogrin argues, o f Russia from the socio-economic situation of the West (possessing a strong 
middle stratum of society and a minimum of social equality) has thus resulted in the utopian 
character of Russian radical liberalism and the slow reformulation and diversification o f 
Russian liberalism into three distinct forms: national patriotic; social-democratic liberalism; 
and the now widely disgraced radical laissez-faire liberalism (Sogrin, 1999, pp. 160-164). 
Besides reiterating the preconditions for political liberalism, such as economic liberalism, 
Sogrin’s argument stresses once again the terminological confusion that Russian early liberals
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were liable to create between democracy and liberal ideas. The catch-up reforms had once 
again failed on account of neglecting the historically evolved economic, political and social 
conditions in Russia (Sogrin, 1999, p i 57).
In summarising the previous two sub-sections it would be helpful to simultaneously 
categorise the positions with regard to their reference to universalism or particularism 
respectively. As has been mentioned before, such a categorisation does not do justice to the 
variety of approaches favoured often by one and the same author, or to the manifold 
objectives of the explanatory patterns employed by them. Most authors appear to strive to 
transcend the dichotomies that dominated past debates, and references to Westernism and 
Slavophilism are incidental or fulfil a descriptive role rather than employed as 
characterisations of the authors’ theoretical positions. Yet, since the objective o f the present 
study is to examine the extent to which a universalist version of political liberalism might be 
upheld in any shape or form, such a categorisation may be critical to any evaluation o f the 
arguments for and against Western political liberalism.
The section started with a survey of those positions that understand liberalism as a 
cultural phenomenon rather than as a contingent or deliberate result o f historical development. 
Such positions accentuate the apolitical nature of liberal politics, as opposed to any political 
conception of societal agreements. Kniazeva’s position could be taken as supporting a 
universalist or particularist view of liberal politics, depending on the existence of those liberal 
values of tolerance, mutual acceptance, and strict adherence to established arrangements 
facilitating the exchange of political views within a stable constitutional framework in Russia. 
Whether or not the evolution and sustenance of such ‘liberal’ values are likely to come about 
in Russia is of less theoretical concern here than the question of whether or not the 
components of the political arrangement mentioned above can be coherently thought o f as a- 
political in nature. Although this leads us far beyond the intentions of Kniazeva’s argument, 
her position can be taken to be indicative of a pointedly non-political view of liberal politics, a
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notion of politics whose thrust would not necessarily, if theoretically viable at all, be directed 
at an invalidation of universalist positions per se. Since a culturally sensitive view o f the 
preconditions of liberal politics would not be incompatible with a universalist version of 
liberalism. Evidently, dissociating liberal politics from culturally conditioned values such as 
tolerance and respect does not suggest the utter incompatibility of political liberalism with 
such principles but only that political liberalism is parasitic upon their existence. To conclude 
that Russian political liberalism is something impossible to achieve in the foreseeable future 
because the aforementioned values are absent in Russian culture is then something akin to 
committing a category mistake.
The weakness of this position would, however, be that the apolitical character of 
political arrangements such as constitutionalism, simply growing out o f pre-existing cultural 
values, would have to be shown. Ironically, this is less alien to political liberalism in its 
Rawlsian universalist mould than might first appear to be the case. Once the ultimate political 
value is being identified as societal stability which facilitates co-operation or, in a Hobbesian 
sense, mere survival, then a view of liberal politics ensues that is founded unavoidably on the 
prior existence o f tolerance and established procedures of decision-making, possibly cast in a 
constitutional mould. Or, as Rawls put it, comprehensive doctrines could be supportive of a 
political conception of justice with ensuing implications for the pre-existing form of political 
institutions (that, surprisingly enough, look pretty much like the political institutions of 
Rawls’ homeland).
Yet, this argument rests, just like the Rawlsian hope of fashioning political consensus 
on the basis of comprehensive doctrines, on a misconception of what the political character of 
cultural values could be. Tolerance and mutual respect might underpin already existing 
political arrangements but cannot play a creative role in defining the nature of the political 
arrangements. Hobbes understood this well when he argued that the quest for survival can 
induce people to seek the protection o f a powerful authority, yet it need not determine the
161
internal structure of this political authority as distinct from ensuring the sustenance o f such a 
structure. Similarly, tolerance and mutual respect might generate a concern that any political 
regime ought to incorporate these values into the list o f valuable maxims o f governing, yet 
neither of these precepts says anything to the effect that only liberal political arrangements 
can be seen as ideally protective o f these values. It is important to note, that such a position 
must not count constitutionalism as a liberal political arrangement in this regard. Yet, this 
certainly strays too far from the moderate historically-minded position of Kniazeva. She does 
not set out to explain whether or not constitutionalism is constitutive o f political liberalism or 
belongs to the essential ingredients of such. Her argument more modestly reiterates the need 
for a contextual approach in explaining the viability of the liberal political order in England in 
contrast to the failure of past attempts to establish such an order in Russia. And we should let 
it stand as such for we shall return to a stronger reformulation of such an apolitical view o f the 
preconditions of liberalism later in the thesis.
While Pantin’s position shifts the focus o f the debate more to the usage and meanings 
of concepts that have competed in Russian consciousness, it emphasises, on one hand, the 
importance of cultural receptivity to Western concepts and ideas, and on the other hand, 
argues that public discourse and consciousness can acquire pre-figurations that prove inimical 
to liberal ideas in general. Both arguments are fundamentally prioritising cultural conditions 
in explaining the failure of liberal ideas to develop deep roots in Russia. Concepts can acquire 
connotations that turn out to be ultimately incompatible with the meaning they gained in their 
original decidely liberal frame of reference. Depending on whether or not these concepts are 
pivotal for the notion of liberal politics in general, they might inhibit the emergence o f a 
liberal political order. Pantin’s arguments highlight the significance of configurations of 
public consciousness in Russia for the attractiveness of liberal politics to a wider population. 
The predominance of the doctrine of ‘democratism’ with its reductionist notions of the nation 
and liberty inhibits liberal political ideas from taking root not least due to the danger o f sheer
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in- or mis-comprehension by the wider public. The ideas of liberty and nation have become 
imbued with meanings that are contradictory to any liberal interpretation o f them. Pantin’s 
point then is helpful in illuminating the extent to which the applicability of these concepts 
depend on a conducive discursive climate. Liberty does not equal liberty, while the Russian 
usage of concepts of nation and national liberation can be far removed from Western semantic 
practices.
The theoretically critical point here is that the meanings conveyed by political concepts 
are in part products of the interrelations that exist within particular discursive contexts. It then 
depends on the scale of this context to determine whether these meanings acquire universal, or 
retain a solely particular, referentiality. A whole range of positions are conceivable here. One 
might adopt a universalist contextualist position on the grounds that political theory as 
discursive formation is regulated by strict rules of logic and plausibility that ought to be 
intelligible to anybody possessing a certain minimum level of rationality, independent of 
socialisation, cultural influences and upbringing, a position that, as it were, posits political 
theory as a coherent and self-contained conversation. Such a position may not appear 
defensible, given the tendency for most contemporary political philosophy to deduce specific 
formations of political institutions from a set o f general precepts. This seems to locate 
political theory firmly in the particularity of time and space. Yet, it is easy to see that more 
recent political theory of this type represents a departure from the Kantian position that would 
adequately be described by the universalist contextualist position sketched above. 
Contemporary political philosophers may no longer want to share the metaphysical 
assumptions that have been so fundamental to the Kantian construction, yet this also opens 
them up to the charge that their universalism now requires different anchoring.
In contrast, by linking the context that engenders the meaning of theoretical concepts 
to the cultural formation in which it was produced and/or reproduced, one arrives at a 
contextualist contention that can commit one either to a particularist or universalist position.
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This will partly depend on which view one takes on the possibility o f a general convergence 
or identity of world cultures.
Kozyrevaia’s portrayal o f the dilemma of liberals in the late Tsarist and post-Soviet 
period strictly speaking would fall into neither of the categories considered above. It is a 
position that draws its formidable power from somewhere else than by severing or knitting the 
link between political liberalism as a theoretical engagement and its social, political and 
cultural environment. Kozyrevaia draws attention to the fact that, in spite of all the changing 
content of theoretical concepts and ideas, there seems to be an invariant sequence in historical 
development that conditions the evolution of liberal politics. And this for the simple reason 
that liberal politics is a project that requires support and is not an inevitable result o f history. 
Support however is synonymous with constructive agency, deliberate guided behaviour whose 
prerequisite must be an interest or urgency to act. In straightforward historical terms this is a 
call for a liberalising or modernising agent in society and Kozyrevaia’s argument indicates 
that political liberalism must take into account the specific constellation that allows such an 
agent to emerge. Taken as a simply historical account, this may be understood as a plea for 
the historiographical reconstruction of political liberalism. Yet, by examining its theoretical 
implications it can be useful for an evaluation of what is missing in many contemporary 
versions of political liberalism. Kozyrevaia’s account hints at the sequence of the emergence 
and interest-formulation of the various political actors and it appears to be necessary to 
assume that this sequence is not arbitrary. Western political theorists have long criticised the 
view that Western liberalism came into existence as a product of an application of some 
theoretical formulae. This criticism from a more generally historical perspective has received 
some elaboration in the insistence that civil society as a network of non-political, informal 
relations in Western societies evolved prior to, and represented a seedbed for, political 
liberalism. This concept of civil society is exactly the fertile ground that allows interests in a 
liberal political order to grow.
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However, any entirely historical approach to political liberalism would be 
complementing political theory rather than represent a substantial critique o f the efforts by 
political philosophers. The projects o f historians of political thought who are trying to distil 
from historical events a plausible account of how liberal politics came about and the 
endeavours of political philosophers are thus distinct and complementary in their objectives 
and approaches. Yet, a different perspective emerges if  historians’ misgivings about a 
seemingly mechanistic portrayal of the evolution of liberal politics by political philosophers 
are taken as merely indicative of theoretical assumptions that are at work in political theory 
and are in need of further justification. Seen this way the absence o f any reference to 
sequencing in the hypothetical reconstruction of liberal politics might be taken as implausible 
insofar as some concepts presuppose the existence (for practical interest formation) and/or a 
connotative stability (for hypothetical purposes) o f others. One could thus transfer the 
communitarian critique of Kantian individualism onto the platform of interest formation 
and/or semantic conceptual relations by pointing to the fact that liberal politics is nurtured by 
ideas and interests that are growing out of specific political configurations which are 
perceived as being in themselves insufficient for the successful pursuit o f these interests or 
ideas. One notorious candidate that possesses a semantic elusiveness if it is not embedded in a 
specific conceptual context is the idea of liberty. Pantin’s analysis of the meaning of the term 
in the doctrine of ‘democratism’ shows that liberty can be conceived coherently without 
necessarily being inclusive and pre-eminently political in character. Inclusivity and the 
essentially political nature of liberty in the Western context appear then as normative 
assertions derived from the actual evolution of Western political liberalism, rather than as 
uncontested theoretically justifiable foundations on which to build on.
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9. Liberalism, Culture and Civility
A convenient way into the complex problem of the relation between culture, liberalism and 
civility is provided by the argument Pantin presents in analysing the connection between 
liberalism and competing principles for ordering the public sphere, such as democracy or 
‘democratism’ (as he refers to it), indicating that its connotations reach further than the mere 
idea of political participation. Analysing the relation between the democratic ideal and 
liberalism, he resorts to a notion of culture to explain the pre-eminence of the former over the 
latter. Every people, so Pantin contends, chooses and defines its own idea of freedom (i.e. the 
extent of political participation, eventually: democracy) in regard to the situation and the 
people’s past experiences. The difficulty for Russia is that it possesses not just a different 
socio-economic set of conditions or different forms of political life in general, but a different 
type of culture (Pantin, 1994, p.77). This cultural type manifests itself, so Pantin maintains, in 
a paradigm of ‘spiritual-value’ (dukhovnoie tsennost’) nature. This means that for Russia, the 
key cultural terms are not individual in character but social or communal. According to 
Pantin, Russian culture could be called a primitive-collectivist type of culture (Pantin, 1994, 
p.77).
It undoubtedly conditions the chances of radical transformation, given the inertia o f the 
cultural underlying paradigm and the public perception of the state as a location where the 
social ‘we’ is identical to the individual ‘I’. Pantin concludes that under the given 
circumstances of a dominant collectivist culture, political liberalism only has a chance of 
becoming a central political orientation of the population if it adopts a strong democratic 
course. The fact that liberals traditionally have neglected the idea of social equality (and 
continue to do so) made it impossible to forge a pact between democratic and liberal forces. 
While examining the history o f liberalism in Russia in comparison to Western political 
liberalism, Pantin notes that the latter progressed along what he calls a ‘natural’ path, whereas
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Russia clearly departs from the norm in its historical evolution. The glaring despondency of 
the Russian peasantry and the problem of serfdom opened up the exploitation of this exigency 
for reforms by democrats and radicals, resulting early on in the crystallisation o f two opposing 
political reform paths and ideas of political order, liberalism and democratism (Pantin, 1994, 
p.81). National consciousness adopted a simulacrum of this antagonistic constellation, where 
social liberation was conceived of as being opposed to individual liberation. Thus, the 
departure from the Western ‘norm’, so Pantin, is evidenced by the fact that in Russia no 
society (cultural notion) was generated which was capable of giving the liberal conception of 
freedom a real ideal and aim in practical politics (Pantin, 1994, p.81). In fact, Pantin argues, 
Russian liberals, in contrast to the Bolsheviki and the Narodniki, were unable to understand 
properly the problem of liberty as it presented itself in Russia (Pantin, 1994, p.81).
In Russia, so Pantin argues, freedom would not exist unless its idea was coupled with a 
minimum of economic and legal self-determination, thus incorporating a demand for the 
removal of the remaining privileges, such as serfdom, and a stance against autocracy. Liberals 
show(ed) little concern for these issues, in fact aligned themselves for too long with the 
autocratic government. Pantin remarks that the reason for this neglect of the question of social 
and political equality might have been the long-lasting illusion of liberals that only a 
concerted effort o f the autocracy and the institutions o f local self-government could bring 
about the constitutional political structure for Russia which liberals saw as indispensable for 
liberalising Russian governmental institutions (Pantin, 1994, p.82). Yet, more interestingly to 
our theoretical concern, Pantin exonerates Russian liberals for any neglect they have shown to 
the democratic ideals and ideas. He argues that blame should be allocated to the history of the 
country as being locked in a cultural division between higher and lower classes, as well as in 
the limited nature o f the bounds (restrictions) of European civilisation applied to the growing 
force of Plebeian reinterpretation of political change and demands in Russia (Pantin, 1994, 
p.82). Pantin elaborates further on the idea of the incoherent or insufficient assimilation of
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Western culture in Russia when he argues that, although the Russian nobility appropriated 
Western ‘high culture’ and developed it further, they had no feel for the societal ideals or 
connotations that came attached to these cultural forms, such as freedom and citizenship 
(Pantin, 1994, p .82). Pantin seems to suggest here that the assimilation of the various forms of 
social and political life of the West in Russia was characterised by a certain hollowness, an 
inability to transfer not only the empty shells of cultural and social ways o f life but also their 
meaning and often political implications. The resulting weakness of the liberal idea in Russia 
reinforced the dominant role of the state in the process o f modernisation.
Pantin goes on to argue that the difference between democrats and liberals extended to 
the sequencing of liberation. Contrary to the belief of Narodniki and Bolsheviki who 
constructed a link between the economic development of Russia and the subsequent possible 
political transformation, liberals emphasised the priority of political liberties. Yet, Russian 
cultural traditions inhibited a widespread acceptance of the reversed connection between prior 
political liberties and subsequent economic progress of society as understood by liberals 
(Pantin, 1994, p.85). For Pantin, then, the problem of Russian modernisation and liberation is 
the difficulty liberals have (had) in plausibly prioritising political over economic and social 
liberties in obverse dependency to the positions o f radical democrats (Pantin, 1994, p.87). 
Although Russian culture would prohibit a concentration of liberating efforts on political 
freedoms, without them being accompanied by economic liberties, the specific emphasis on 
economic liberation is peculiar to Russia (Pantin, 1994, p.88) and has its cause in the long 
tradition of material deprivation and dependency of the majority of the population. Although 
Pantin’s discussion of liberalism originates in an examination of the cross-fertilisation of 
liberalism and democratism in Russia, his ideas on the collectivist orientation of Russia’s 
culture and its impact on the formulation o f liberal ideas of modem society and reforms are 
relevant to the present discussion on account o f his clearcut (if inaccurate) identification of 
the determinants o f the particular shape and content of Russian political liberalism.
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Pantin rests his explanation of the failure of political liberalism to succeed in Russia on 
a notion of culture being unreceptive to the central liberal concepts as they were formulated 
by Russian liberal theorists in the nineteenth century. Since Russia did not have the privilege 
of experiencing a ‘normally’ sequenced modernisation, the question emerged as to which 
forms of liberty to prioritise. Liberals emphasised political liberties that rang hollow in the 
ears of the majority of the Russian population when not supplemented by economic and social 
liberation. The increasing influence of democratism in Russia meant that the idea of liberation 
gradually shifted towards an increasingly economic reading and this in turn neatly concurred 
with the strongly collectivist hue of Russian culture and the role of the state in inaugurating 
industrial and social modernisation in the country. Besides the implications for political 
liberalism as a political programme that are of less interest for the present context, Pantin’s 
views are relevant insofar as they present an intriguing analysis of the mutual influence of 
political ideas. Political liberalism in his account appears to be a cluster o f ideas that need to 
be receptive to the present circumstances, as well as the prevailing culture. The latter 
conception remains very vague indeed in his account, but it can be surmised that he 
understands culture not as political culture in the strict sense of the term but as a conglomerate 
of often conflicting views on the social and political ideal. He singles out the mainly 
collectivist perspective of the Russian peasantry on self-determination and how this conflicted 
with a simplistic account of individual liberty. This interpretation seems to hint at 
irreconcilable differences between an imported, unreconstructed political liberalism and local 
views about the shape and objective of liberation. This would reinforce the necessity to look 
more closely at the forms and limits of the assimilation of political thought, something that 
will receive more attention later in the thesis.
In another article, Pantin provides a more distinct formulation of his view on the 
relation between culture and liberalism. He points out, along the lines of argument already 
sketched above, that the cultural type of Russian society, in which not the individual but the
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society is the key regulatory concept, is not collectivist in the sense of a simple overemphasis 
on societal vis-a-vis individual concerns. The collectivist aspect of Russian culture finds its 
expression in concrete emanations of national, political and cultural aspects. And while any 
social and political activity originates not in the individual but in the authorities and the 
various social groups ( in line with the direction of modernisation as being initiated from 
above), the interaction between individual and society is in fact a monologic one (Pantin, 
1996, p.400). However, he stresses, in contrast to his previous thesis, that the adverse cultural 
milieu cannot explain the failure of liberalism as a political movement. Rather, he contends, it 
was the readiness and willingness o f the so-called democratic camp to incorporate and 
reformulate the views that prevailed amongst the population into a more general idea of 
politics in a modernising polity (Pantin, 1996, p.403).
Also significant for the discussion is Pantin’s argument that the Russian intelligentsia 
and enlightened gentry selectively assimilated forms of the Western social and political life 
without attaching to them the concomitant connotations that would have deep political 
implications, such as citizenship and freedom. This alerts us to the fact that the process of 
appropriation of foreign ideas and concepts can imply a ‘hollowing out’ of these imported 
ideas. Pantin does not elucidate this process in which the concepts are estranged from their 
original meaning further. But it could prove a crucial aspect exemplifying the extent to which 
political liberalism is forced to adapt itself not only to particular political circumstances but 
also to the vagaries of the intellectual receptivity of the prospective proponent o f such 
political views. The adoption of singular components from the complex assortment of 
imported political views and concepts seems to be possible, yet at the same time it destroys 
the fabric of meaning that was assigned to the various elements in their original settings. How 
far the process of assimilating Western life styles amongst the nobility was accompanied by 
the intellectual appropriation of Western political thought can only be guessed here, yet
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Pantin argues on an implicit level that both processes were structurally determined by the 
predominant culture and hence proceeded along similar lines.
It should be noted here that the question of the adaptability of core concepts of political 
liberalism bears on the problem of how and whether to define liberalism on the basis of 
including an invariable core of concepts and ideas (Pustamakov, 1996, p.61). How far 
adaptability impacts on, or can be reconciled with the notion of, a distinguishable and 
invariable content o f these concepts will have to be examined later.
In a similar vein, Kazban attempts to define the particularity of Russian liberalism as 
well as that of the West as being engendered by a culture which in the West stressed the 
importance of individual freedom (with John Locke as founding father) and private property. 
Liberalism, he argues takes its shape not from an abstract idea of freedom but from the 
specific practical solution it offered to the institutional and legal conditions o f the provision 
and maintenance o f liberty (Kazban, 1993, p.47-48). Constitutionalism thus emerges not only 
as the centra] idea of liberalism, but political liberalism is also by definition particular to time 
and space insofar as the specific formation of constitutional guarantees for individual freedom 
are conditioned by the situation of the country and the position of the liberal elite in the 
political system. For Kazban, Western political culture came to be dominated by political 
liberalism, whereas the relatively weak constitutional faction amongst Russian liberals never 
gained any decisive influence (Kazban, 1993, p.53-58).
Kniazeva similarly argues that the analysis of the evolution of Western political 
liberalism is instructive for an assessment o f the failure of liberals in Russia to muster the 
critical support needed to implement their reforms. Besides the more practical implications of 
her historical examination of British liberalism for the applicability of liberal ideas in Russia, 
her conclusions are insightful for our present concern insofar as she identifies a notion of 
civility and tolerance as the core maxim of British politics. Despite the significance of the 
views of classical liberals and utilitarianism, the prevailing political culture of tolerance and
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civility epitomised in England in the ideas of constitutionalism and parliamentarism can serve 
as an apt characterisation of the relation between opposition and government, resulting in the 
slow but steady emergence of political pluralism (Kniazeva, 2000, p.81). The avoidance of 
political polarisation and the drive towards a broad integration of all significant components 
of English society turned out to be the crucial conditions for societal and political stability 
over the centuries (Kniazeva, 2000, p.83). The main pillar of British liberalism, so Kniazeva 
contends, is the respect for differing opinions, as manifested in parliamentarism, and the spirit 
o f political collaboration (Kniazeva, 2000, p .84). Seconded by the growing adherence of the 
government to the law, the polity acquired a remarkable level of stability and legitimacy 
(Kniazeva, 2000, p.85). She concludes that liberalism is not simply a libertarian doctrine but 
must be understood as the totality of intellectual, political and moral ideas which rest on the 
guarantee of freedom of the individual, which in turn create the ideal conditions for liberty’s 
realisation. What seems significant to her in the English case is that respect for the rights of 
the individual was gradually accepted as the highest objective of societal development. The 
article ends with the rather vague remark that the success of Russian liberal reforms will 
depend on the use o f the accumulated Western positive experience (Kniazeva, 2000, pp.84- 
85).
Kniazeva has offered a most intriguing account of Western liberalism. Although she 
accurately traces the pedigree o f the idea of liberty in English history, she argues that any 
form of political liberalism, whether classical or utilitarian or the social liberalism of the late 
nineteenth century, is bolstered by or, in fact, inspired by a general political culture of 
tolerance and civility that finds its appropriate embodiment in restrained political competition,
n
as epitomised in parliamentarism and constitutionalism . She also emphasises the extent to 
which utilitarian liberals, in promoting their specific political programme of reform, continued 
to rely upon the more general idea of inclusion and stability favoured by ruling classes
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(Kniazeva, 2000, pp.82-83). Although she does not surmise the fate of the Russian liberal 
reforms if these principles were absent or disregarded by liberals, her conclusion seems to 
point to the relevance of these ideas as a foundation for liberal politics, although they do not 
explicitly belong to the canon of liberal concepts and ideals.
From the presentation of these historical perspectives one might draw some tentative 
conclusions. Firstly, Pantin’s argument reiterates the significance of an examination o f the 
process o f selective assimilation of foreign concepts and the possibility that in the course of 
appropriation they become stripped of their original meaning, which was a function of the 
specific role they played in a particular culture. Additionally, he draws attention to the fact 
that any political ideal operates in an intellectual environment which involves some 
interaction with ideas of politics reflecting rival views of social and political order, such as 
‘democratism’. A political liberalism that remains transfixed on an abstract idea o f liberty and 
is unable to translate this abstraction into local political practice must eventually become 
sterile and will fail to marshal the support of the majority of the population. Kazban adds 
further weight to Pantin’s argument by stressing the need for a re-formulation of liberalism to 
take into account the local conditions, thus interpreting liberalism as a specific response to the 
question o f how to guarantee the rights and liberties of the individual in modem conditions. 
Political liberalism thus necessarily acquires a particularistic hue, albeit still dedicated to the 
promotion of individual liberty.
In contrast to their views, Kniazeva’s position appears to be more radical. She points 
out that the various forms of political liberalism that emerged in England over the last two 
hundred years would have been inconceivable in practical terms unless supported by a more 
general framework of political principles that was invariably at work and provided a 
considerable stability of the polity as a whole. The political programme of liberals seems to 
have been in various ways parasitic on these maxims of tolerance for contrary viewpoints and
7 She refers here to the rule o f law and the adherence o f  the government to the rule o f  law, not to a particular
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to have benefited from the already existing political structures o f parliamentarism and 
constitutionalism that were not necessarily intrinsic to a view of liberal politics. Political 
liberalism thus appears as a range of historically varying views of the ideal society that feeds 
upon the stability of politics in general. The ‘survival’ of the political order under the 
onslaught of strong libertarian views under Margaret Thatcher might be an exemplification of 
the resilience and necessity of these political foundations. Whether political liberalism is 
detachable from the ideas of constitutionalism and parliamentarism is questionable. Yet, 
Kniazeva’s point on the significance of a political culture of civility is indicative of the 
presuppositions of political liberalism in England in the nineteenth and twentieth century.
Pantin and Kazban’s positions sketched above share a specific perspective on political 
liberalism insofar as they criticise the supposed inadequacies o f Russian liberalism on the 
grounds of either its unresponsiveness to the cultural and political environment in which it 
operated or the misguided abstraction of its central concepts. Only Kniazeva points out that 
there might be additional features extraneous to the core concepts o f political liberalism that 
sustain a given political culture and which made and still make it resistant to the most vicious 
attempts at social and political laissez-faire politics. This position implies that the objective of 
any policy should be the sustenance of an already existing and functioning political culture, a 
point that would resonate well with some more conservative views of modem politics (cf. 
Cahoone, Oakeshott, and Kapustin’s position as sketched in chapter 11).
written constitution.
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10. Liberalism as  Civilisation
To regard liberalism as a form of civilisation would at first glance strike many Western 
political theorists as odd. Political theory in the West derives much o f its impetus from 
Kantian metaphysics which successfully cleansed political philosophy of its historical context 
and made it into a free standing theoretical operation, to be conducted at any time and, if 
compliant with some basic logical rules, at any place in the world. The only crucial condition 
Kant imposed on philosophising was that it could only be successfully undertaken as being 
part o f the modem world, i.e. as an integral part of the project of Enlightenment. To 
retrospectively de-contextualise even the works of those political theorists who lived prior to 
Kant and knew little about the idea of human progress as epitomised in the idea of 
Enlightenment, led to the significant criticism of this approach by Skinner, Pocock and others 
who emphasised the historical environment as engendering the specific meaning of them in 
their particular historical environment. How much Skinner and Pocock’s insights were results 
of the excesses of these de-contextualised interpretations or, more likely, of the decision of 
most political philosophy after the First World War to discard the metaphysical baggage of 
Kantian philosophy is still a story that needs to be written. Yet, Skinner and Pocock were by 
no means the only scholars whom the picture of political philosophy stripped off its historical 
context would strike as odd. Powerful criticisms have been formulated by MacIntyre and 
Rorty offering alternative readings of the history of political philosophy which incorporated 
an awareness of the loss of teleological foundations (and justifications) in political theory in 
the twentieth century.
However, neither historians of political thought nor philosophers who have been 
critical o f the de-teleological (or de-ontological, for that matter) mould of political theory in 
the West have felt tempted to interpret political liberalism as a civilisational formation, 
something that extends the conceptual boundaries of political culture or even culture in
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general. Western political theorists may have been reluctant to develop this interpretative 
route, perhaps because it is littered with the corpses o f the dinosaurs o f civilisational 
historiography. To share the fate o f Spengler and Toynbee may not be exactly appealing. 
Russian historiography and political philosophy does not share the experience of the 
Spenglerian doomsday history and the ridicule and eventual oblivion into which it fell.
For Russians to view the world as being divided along civilisational lines is a familiar 
perspective. The notion of the Russian nation as a guardian of the civilised world 
withstanding the continuous onslaughts of the barbarian peoples from the East has been and 
still is a popular topos of Russian historiography. It suffices to cast a brief glance at the 
speeches of Russian politicians (and not just mavericks o f the political scene in Russia) to 
realise that various concoctions of the remnants of this missionary and civilising story are still 
alive and kicking in Russia today. For Russian philosophy and historiography this is not 
simply a matter of one interpretative paradigm amongst others. The resurgence o f what could 
be called the ‘civilisational’ historiography and interpretation of Russian political, social life 
and culture is part of the story of recapturing the philosophical and historiographical heritage 
of Russia after the collapse of Communism. It is, in effect, the exchange of one paradigm for 
another and it seems appropriate before embarking on an examination o f the merits of this 
civilisational approach for political theory to review a critical appraisal of it by a Russian 
historian.
Shelokhaiev is best known for his works on Russian liberalism in the nineteenthand 
twentieth century. In an article for the journal ‘Obnovlenie Rossii’ he examines the intentions 
and objectives of post-Communist Russian historiography. Now liberated from any imposed 
ideological interpretation, Shelokhaiev finds Russian historians at fault for uncritically 
replacing one explanatory paradigm with another. What Russian historians think possesses 
some novelty, the civilisational approach, is merely adopted from Western historiography. He 
distinguishes between two approaches that command quite considerable influence amongst
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Russian historians in the nineties. There is on one side the formational-classificational 
approach and, on the other, the civilisational theory o f history. Both are, so Shelokhaiev 
contends, the fruits of Western rationalist thinking based on singular trajectories o f universal 
development and societal progress (Shelokhaiev, 1997, p. 123-124). However, the theoretical 
concern would be, so Shelokhaiev maintains, that, given that both approaches are now in 
advantageous positions because they receive ‘political support’ within the academic 
community, other explanatory patterns are disadvantaged and receive short shrift 
(Shelokhaiev, 1997, p. 124). What he has in mind is illustrated when he explains why he 
believes both the formalist (structuralist) and the civilisational approach belong to the same 
Western arsenal of historiographical forms. At heart, the structuralist or Marxist perspective, 
as well as the civilisational historical perspective, are Eurocentristic since the former 
comprehends history as being determined by deep underlying patterns that are essentially 
immutable and the latter prefers to see the history of civilisations as culminating in Western 
democracy (Shelokhaiev, 1997, p. 124). A synthesis of both, already attempted by Russian 
historians at the end of the Soviet period, has failed to take root. But, Shelokhaiev argues, 
even this would not alleviate the more profound problem of exclusivity. What is needed is a 
balanced historical perspective, capable of accommodating the vast array of different paths to 
the present without predetermining the final destination of these various trajectories 
(Shelokhaiev, 1997, p. 125). The alternative theoretical approach Shelokhaiev suggests is 
seeing societies through the prism of modernisation. Such a modernisation approach would be 
politically neutral and theoretically inclusive on the following counts. Firstly, it would be 
open to other concepts of a range of other approaches. It relates to them, as it were, in an 
ephemeral way and does not privilege any particular one. It, secondly, has a relativising 
impact on rival historiographical forms insofar as it recognises various justifications for any 
variants of historical processes, be they evolutionary, revolutionary or a combination o f both. 
Thirdly, modernisation as an explanatory pattern of historical development does not favour a
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synchronous or asynchronous evolution. This is of particular importance for Russian 
historiography since here modernisation adopted a different pace, was initiated at a different 
time and proceeded in accordance with a different logic to the West. Thus the asynchronous 
character of Russian transformation can explain the ‘friction’ that occurred during the 
simultaneous political, social and cultural changes. Fourthly, modernisation alerts the 
historian to the varying initial positions, the different realisations, and the processes of 
adaptation and cross-influence that take place in different regions of the world (Shelokhaiev, 
1997, p.126-127).
What is relevant for present purposes is that Shelokhaiev conceives of the civilisational 
approach as an ultimately Western historical interpretation that privileges one particular 
destination of societal development, i.e. democracy, and is unable to appreciate the differing 
paces, and levels of synchronisation between the political, social and cultural transformative 
processes. In Shelokhaiev’s analysis, then, the civilisational approach transmutes into a form 
of Western historiography that privileges the specifically Western outcome of transitions from 
traditional to modem societies, that is democracy as constitution of Western political 
societies. The interesting aspect of Shelokhaiev’s analysis is what he consequently regards as 
features of this civilisational historical approach and what as resultant (universal) components 
of modem societies. While democracy is characterised as the telos of the civilisational theory 
of history, the market economy, civil society and the rule of law (pravovoe gosudarstvo) 
acquire the insignia of the modernisation approach (Shelokhaiev (1997), p. 127). What is less 
clear is whether these aspects of modernity are any less teleological than the democratic 
principle, just as Shelokhaiev’s differentiation between democracy and the features of 
modernity as belonging to differing interpretative patterns must obfuscate rather than clarify 
the interrelations between them. He may be right in favouring the modernisation approach on 
account of its overall neutrality with regard to the idea of democracy, yet, what he 
understandably objects to in the civilisational approach, the normative content of democracy
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as a prescriptive principle of political order, is conventionally thought to be far from absent in 
any of those concepts which he enumerates as aspects of modernity. A historical 
interpretation that is based on an explication of the modernising processes in a society may 
very appropriately focus attention on the simultaneity of economic, political and social 
modernisation as a contingent quality of the Western form of modernisation, yet, this does not 
relieve any historian using this theoretical approach from explaining why civil society, the 
market economy and the idea of the Rechtsstaat should be descriptive historiographical 
categories rather than normative properties of Western societies and contain a teleological 
aspect insofar as they represent civilisational aspiration.
But can historiography answer any questions about the normative contents of social 
and political arrangements? History, after all, is the narration of ‘how it came to be’, the 
quintessentially ‘is’. History must ultimately appear as a different category of intellectual 
enterprise to philosophy then, and thus the approach o f many Russian historians interpreting 
Western liberalism as a civilisation may have descriptive, even explanatory, merits, but hardly 
crosses over into the terrain of justification. To attempt to vindicate social institutions by 
drawing on a story about ‘how it came about’ seems to commit a gross categorical mistake. 
But perhaps what is at fault here is our sense of the purpose and objective of political theory, 
of which the incompatibility between historiography and philosophy is a result. What if 
political theory was not narrowed down to a solely normative endeavour, a vindication of 
political formations as they ought to be, or as they have developed? What if  political 
philosophy is to be taken as a broader and, at the same time, a more modest enterprise? 
Broader insofar as we try to enhance its aim from a mere vindication of political institutions 
to providing a portrait of the sense which the political world makes to us. More modest 
insofar as, since political theory is perhaps overburdened with a justification of political order 
on a universal level, we limit our endeavour to giving good reasons why we believe that 
liberal institutions are the proper response to the problems we encounter in the modem world.
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This would clearly open up an opportunity for historical accounts to play a role in considering 
our response to the various situations in which we found ourselves. The metaphysical link 
between such a version of political theory and historiography turns out to be the choices 
political actors make. Just as their actions demand personal as well as public justification, so 
their actions can be rendered comprehensible to us only in a narrative context that constructs a 
connection between their motivation and their environment that requires a response. 
Oakeshott delivered a prime example of such a historicised political theory most poignantly in 
the last chapter o f ‘On Human Conduct’.
The advantages of such an alternative perspective on political theory will be outlined at 
a later stage. For the moment suffice to say that, within the limits of political theory as a 
philosophical project that encompasses the entirety of political behaviour and its emphasis on 
making sense o f the conceptual tools we have to explain it, there is a place for a historical 
explication of how people came by certain political arrangements, not irrespective of any 
normative justification of the social institutions, but complementing this more conventional 
theoretical concern. Thus, to exclude the civilisational approach favoured by many Russian 
historians is to deprive us of a view which others have developed in order to make sense of 
the political order as it exists in the West.
It should be made clear from the outset that Russian usage of the concept of 
civilisation has long has lost its more simplistic function as a theoretical vehicle for a 
vindication of Slavophilism. Above all, Akhiezer’s conception of civilisation has had a 
formative influence, on Russian historiography. His work has spawned a methodological and 
theoretical debate amongst Russian historians about the merits of his concept and his re­
formulations of the civilisational concept for the idea of Russian statehood will be examined 
in greater detail later in this study. For the moment, the concern will lie more with what 
civilisation as a theoretical concept can say about political liberalism in East and West. 
Although the impact of Akhiezer’s work is palpable in the work of other historians who use
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his conceptual device, there is hardly anything approximating theoretical uniformity 
(Akhiezer, 1999). The focus of the following section will be on a selection of articles that 
attempt to understand political liberalism in the West as form of civilisation. To illustrate the 
great variety o f interpretative vistas which the idea of civilisation permits, a view o f political 
liberalism as civilisation will begin the exposition. Although a notion o f political liberalism as 
a form of civilisation must strike Western political theorists as having only limited 
explanatory force, it has the advantage, in contrast to other civilisational theories, o f being 
reconcilable with a strictly Western frame of reference.
In a contribution to a recent collection o f articles, Yuchenkov outlines his idea of 
Western liberalism as an enumeration of various values that came to be associated with it - 
freedom, private property, laissez-faire, epistemological optimism as produced through the 
mechanism of the market economy, education and culture, democracy, legality (pravo 
zakonnost’), equality, inequality of wealth and income, peace, patriotism, freedom of 
movement, federalism, right to self-determination, protection of the environment, tolerance, 
and justice.
While Yuchenkov states that liberalism does not differ in its main objective from 
Communism (the free development of everyone is the condition for the free development of 
all, Yuchenkov, 2002, p.34), he indicates the significance that is attached to the differing 
methods used in accomplishing this goal. After considering von Mises’ characterisation of 
Western liberalism as an ideology or doctrine about the mutual relations between the 
members of a society (Yuchenkov, 2002, p.37), he concludes that Western civilisation is 
founded on the enunciation of the principle within the state of the priority of individual rights 
and freedoms before all collective interests (Yuchenkov, 2002, p.38), while also representing 
the highest achievement of the freedom of the individual. He stresses that this characterisation 
departs from the conventional view of Western liberalism amongst Russian theorists and 
politicians as being founded solely on individualism as a self-contained truth (Yuchenkov,
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2002, p.40). While the initial intentions of his article are didactic in nature, it also highlights 
the central role which liberalism has played in ensuring the survival of Western civilisation. 
Political liberalism thus becomes a doctrine with a clearly delimited purpose, and its 
justification resides in the urgent need of the West to find a solution to the problem of how to 
sustain a given social order in the face of danger of its dissolution (Yuchenkov, 2002, p.38 
paraphrasing Kara-Murza). Liberalism here appears to be uniquely capable of ensuring the 
survival of Western civilisation and draws its justification from this fact.
The centrality o f the idea of societal survival or reproduction is constantly reiterated in 
Akhiezer’s many articles and monographs. It is clearly one of the most pivotal concepts in his 
theory of social orders. In an article on the specificity of Russian civilisation he writes:
‘No civilisation is conceivable (nevozmozhno) without a defining measurement and a 
deep desire (stremlenie) for stability (and) survival (vyzhivaiemosti).’ (Akhiezer, 1999, 
p.72).
This may strike a political theorist as resembling closely a Hobbesian idea of human nature, in 
which the mere survival is a motivation for action. Yet, Akhiezer’s subject matter is 
civilisations not people and their reasons for acting. He offers a sociology of civilisational 
forms, rather than an explication of human behaviour. The missing link between human 
actions and the desired continuation of a given civilisation is provided by the cultural forms in 
which people live and from which they draw their reasons to act. Although the categories 
Akhiezer employs are mostly not concerned with the ideas of justification of political 
structures and human action, the link between cultural forms and human behaviour does play 
a prominent role in his theory. In the first volume of ‘Rossiia: Kritika istoricheskovo opyta’, 
he expounds the relation between culture and human activity thus:
‘In history only those cultures, cultural forms and cultural values are preserved 
(sokhranilis’) which orient the individual to the reproduction (vosproisvodstvo), 
preservation and integration of society. If a culture creates the basis for (its) 
preservation through the activities of the people historically composing the social fabric
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(otnosheni), then (this culture) also preserves the social foundations of its existence. If a 
culture cannot provide this, then its mass social basis perishes, its social institutions 
collapse, which preserved (the culture), and protect (it) from the various dangers. 
Eventually, the dominant culture moves away into the background, conceding its place 
to other cultural forms. Culture and social relations are (the) two aspects of the 
reproductive human activities. (Akhiezer, 1997, p.55)
At the heart of any civilisation then lies the need for a reproduction of its cultural norms and
precepts through people’s actions. Without any interference from ‘outside’, any society would
have a tendency towards holism and self-containment which is, however, undermined by
economic and social processes that collide with the cultural norms inscribed into the social
fabric of a given civilisation.
So far, this contributes no radically new perspectives on political liberalism. 
Akhiezer’s theory of civilisations is o f sociological persuasion, not political in nature. Yet, the 
picture attains a political twist when he outlines the reason for Russia’s inability to produce a 
non-conflicting cultural norm that regulates society and is imbued, as it were, with the 
reproductive codes of Russian civilisation. Akhiezer identifies three main civilisational stages 
of historical development. Each one possesses its own behaviour-regulating code that ensures 
the long-term reproduction and survival of a given society. Traditional civilisation, firstly, is 
oriented towards the preservation of the given. It is a reinforcement of the existing, excluding 
any change in social relations and concerned primarily with how to ensure the survival of 
social relations in their current shape and form (Akhiezer, 1999, p.72). The third civilisation 
and its concomitant moral ideal is liberalism. It proffers a different notion of preservation, 
preferring to contemplate the survival of social relations in terms of constant change. In 
between the traditional and the liberal moral codes and civilisations operates a transitional 
form of morality whose real function and theoretical justification Aldiiezer does not always 
clarify sufficiently. It fact it seems to have more of a regulatory role in the successful 
development of liberalism rather than a vindicable existence on its own. Akhiezer calls it 
utilitarianism and assigns to it the moral code of the utility principle, as a shorthand for
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unfettered individualism, bracketed only by the boundaries of the idea of the necessity to 
preserve society (cf. Yarkova, 2002).
Utilitarianism, as understood by Akhiezer, seems to have a role to play in 
accommodating and fostering the often conflicting trajectories of modernisation which create 
the foundation for the liberal form of civilisation. It has thus more o f an auxiliary role in 
bringing about the conditions for the subsequent civilisational form (cf. Akhiezer’s account of 
moderate and developed utilitarianism in Akhiezer, 1997, esp. pp. 29-31). However it may be, 
Akhiezer’s theory still possesses up to here a sociological edge that limits its usefulness for 
the purpose of this study. Yet, being a historian, he then sets out to explain the transfer from 
one civilisational model to another, from the traditional morality that asserts the primacy of 
absence of change, to the liberal morality which understand change as an integral part of 
preservation. In explaining this transformational process he has recourse to the political 
processes that have occurred in Russia and their deviation from those of the West. The 
particularity of Russian political history is revealed in the fact that social institutions have 
originated by and large in the activities of the state, or autocracy. An example, according to 
Akhiezer, would be the Orthodox Church. Prescribed by by royal decree from the emperor, 
the relations that ensued between autocracy and church were of mutual conditionality. While 
the autocracy drew part of its authority and public support from the Church, the Church was 
tied to the fate o f the autocracy and never gained even relative independence. In contrast to 
the West, where the frictions between the papacy and the various regional (subsequently 
national) monarchies have been part and parcel of political events, the
‘(s)pecificity of the Russian society consists in the fact that no corresponding 
mechanism of mutual permeation of the contrasting cultural layers develop in it, 
(inhibiting) the search for a synthesis between them, and thus eventually producing a rift 
in society. (Akhiezer, 1999, p.76).’
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For political theorists one could rephrase Akhiezer’s idea of a ‘mechanism of mutually 
permeating cultural layers’ as the inevitable development of a public sphere that would 
initially contain the mere utterances of justifications for the differing positions in the 
confrontation between church and state, and would eventually facilitate the more or less 
regulated exchange of opinions and usher in a framework o f conflict regulation. Akhiezer’s 
insight is that political confrontation engenders an infrastructure of dialogue, which 
contributes enormously to the smooth transition to a more dynamic cultural mode. In contrast 
to the emergence of liberal civilisation that is brought about by the creative overcoming of 
mere political confrontation, Russian society remains locked in a counterfeit simulacrum of 
dialogue.
‘In the place of dialogue a rift took shape which can be understood as a reduction of 
dialogue, as its imitation. ... (T)he specificity of the development of the Russian society 
consists in the fact that the weakness of (this) societal dialogue on the level o f the whole 
of society led to the substitution (zamesheniiu) of the existing vacuum with the majority 
of local dialogues creating a direct ground for mass disorganisation. (Akhiezer, 1999,
p.80)
Akhiezer’s account of the generation of liberal civilisation allows two main conclusions. 
Firstly, since each moral ideal imparts a distinct programme for reducing societal 
disorganisation, each value ideal must also contain a notion of what constitutes 
disorganisation and an orderly society. Akhiezer is not sufficiently explicit on this point but 
the implications are clear. Political institutions receive their justification in the broad 
historical (historiographical) sense from the value ideals that contain a view on conceptions of 
order and disorder. This means that the conventional objections raised against merely 
historical justifications of a given political order stand refuted in Akhiezer’s case. The fact 
that certain political institutions exist cannot procure per se a tenable vindication of the 
desirability of their continued existence over time. They will rather be judged by the degree of 
correspondence that obtains between them and the value ideal that structures societal
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consciousness at any particular time. This reveals the liberal content of Akhiezer’s theory of 
social order insofar as it allows and elevates to the status of being worthy of survival those 
political structures which are sufficiently congruous with the value ideals existent in society. 
Akhiezer’s theory thus does not privilege any singular form of political organisation or 
currently established morality.
The second significant insight that a political theorist can gain from Akhiezer’s 
account o f the ways in which Russian history has deviated from Western norms is that 
liberalism as a value system, for which a notion of constant change is an integral part o f any 
concept of the possibility of survival of a given society, is the result o f a peculiar (yet in the 
West generally obtaining) configuration of the political space. The presence of a political 
confrontation that ran so deep as to endanger Western societies necessitated the search for a 
viable form of institutionalising the dissenting voices and their non-coerced exchange. 
Creating a stable framework for the political confrontation was possible for Western societies 
because there existed an immense arsenal of ideas and concepts on how to proceed in the case 
of the strident opposition and political strife that had developed as a result of, on one hand, the 
urgency to tame the worst outbreaks of violence that endangered the very foundations of 
societies in the West and, on the other hand, the need to muster public support for a given 
political position. Hence, the absence of such a confrontational configuration in Russia led to 
the lack of urgency to foster the societal agents capable of building the political realm. The 
results have included underdeveloped societal relations and a crushing dominance and 
impotence of the state authorities as the concept of the weak institutionalised political power 
conveys.
Since Akhiezer formulated his theory in order to explain the oscillation of Russian 
society in history between the poles of the extreme and varying cultural modes of 
traditionalism and liberalism, his conceptualisation of the origin of Western liberalism must 
strike Western observers as an overly benign interpretation of the political and social
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devastation that was inflicted upon Central and Western Europe in the wake of the 
Reformation. Yet, the main insight into the genesis of Western liberalism can be seen as a 
contribution, not only to the historiography of liberalism, but equally to political theory. Thus 
political philosophers must take seriously the idea that a liberal political order may well be the 
product of a peculiar political constellation that failed to materialise in other historical 
circumstances. Political theorists must also take into account the notion that the precepts of 
this liberal political culture are justifiable only in terms o f the quest for social stability and the 
survival of societies. Akhiezer’s theory reiterates the plausibility o f the idea that the maxims 
which regulate the political life of Western societies, such as tolerance, mutual respect, and 
the institutions of civil society just as much as the concept of constitutionalism and the rule of 
law, are vindicable primarily by reference to the contributions they make to the stability o f the 
political order itself. This does not have to remain the case infinitely. What underpins any 
preferable concept of political order at a given time is the degree of correspondence between 
the actual political structure instituted at a given time and how the population conceives of 
what constitutes order and disorder generally. The institutions of a capitalist market, though 
famously proclaimed by von Hayek as an ingenious form of spontaenous order and the means 
o f sustaining such an order, appears thus incompatible with the notion of order harboured by 
the populace o f a traditional society. In fact, it is likely to be understood there as profoundly 
and threateningly disorderly and hence unjustifiable.
In summarising the arguments of this section, I will attempt to draw more clearly the 
connecting lines between Akhiezer’s theory of Russian history and Western political theory. 
Since there will be a later opportunities to criticise Akhiezer’s historical account of Russian 
statehood, there is no need at this point to outline the criticism that Akhiezer’s work must 
certainly evoke. On a positive note, Akhiezer’s notion of the genesis of liberal political norms 
is valuable for political theory insofar as it emphasises the connection between political 
institutions and prevalent cultural norms. Yet, Akhiezer does not commit the fallacy of
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positing a direct link between the two, that would create the grounds for a justification of 
political institutions out of their factual existence. Rather, political institutions are tied to 
cultural norms by fulfilling a certain purpose: to offer the best available modus vivendi for the 
diffusion of otherwise potentially destructive politically motivated confrontations between 
members of society. Hence the notion o f survival or reproduction of a society as being central 
to Akhiezer’s theory. The critical potential of this concept is made apparent by specifying the 
relation that obtains between political institutions and the cultural norms. Akhiezer’s account 
o f the political life growing out of certain notions of order and ideas on how to maintain this 
order enables us to see that, although liberal political institutions can lay claim to being 
imbued with such cultural norms as tolerance or respect, these precepts as well as the political 
institutions themselves are only conduits for mitigating disorder, purposive creations in the 
light o f the danger which a Hobbesian ‘war of all against all’ would pose to the essential 
fabric of society. Both political institutions and societal norms are side-effects of conceptions 
of how best to ensure the survival of society under certain conditions. Modernity, so Akhiezer 
contends, has compelled Western political societies to recognise the need for institutionalising 
dissent and incorporating the possibility of constant revision of social and political institutions 
themselves if societies are to persevere under the onslaught of the globalising forces of 
capitalism and the idea of political participation.
Such a portrayal of the agens within society as the quest for reproduction and a notion 
o f order is not dissimilar to the justificatory pattern for political order as expounded by 
Hobbes and so admirably elaborated by Oakeshott. Just as Hobbesian instrumental rationality 
chooses to establish an overriding authority for the simple reason that only such a creation can 
guarantee the survival of society (and not because the prospective citizens of the civitas desire 
to live under a Leviathan) so Akhiezer’s political institutions do not derive a shred of 
vindication from the values of tolerance and mutual respect, but rather were selected for 
practical reasons as being the most feasible solution to the problem of constant political strife
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that endangered the polity. Yet, just as purposive and limited as the reasons for selecting this 
particular set of institutions are, so limited are also the obligations of the citizens to approve 
or disapprove of the conditions laid out by the authority as prerequisite for communal life 
(Oakeshott, 1990, esp. pp. 108-184 [On the Civil Condition]).
Liberalism for Akhiezer, then, is most appropriately a recognition of the need and 
capacity for constant revision and exchange of opinion. Ideas of freedom and right are 
conspicuously absent from this picture. Akhiezer’s theory, insofar as he is concerned with the 
genesis of political institutions (or the failure of liberal political institutions in Russia), 
highlights the fundamental misunderstanding which lies at the heart of the view of liberal 
political institutions as being erected on the bedrock of individual freedom. Rather, it appears, 
in Akhiezer’s view, that honouring the principle of individual liberty has historically been 
merely a side-effect of the need to mitigate and channel fundamental disagreement. Liberty 
thus emerges as a necessary ingredient for enabling societies to institute and sustain the 
indispensable momentum that modernity requires. Yet, within this scheme of things, it does 
not have to be a value in itself.
Where does this leave us with regard to the claim of political liberalism to universality 
and political theory more generally? If one took the conclusion to heart one would have to say 
that the intimate link between the concept(s) of liberty and political institutions appears to be 
cast into doubt. Paraphrasing Akhiezer’s historical theory one could say that the West 
happens to value two notions of liberty, and that they may be instrumental to the survival of 
Western societies, yet that to vindicate political institutions as they currently exist in the West 
from a position which takes both notions of liberty to be intrinsically valuable is to disregard 
the indication that they are, just as the political institutions we live under, commitments we 
came to make in order to find a solution to the problem of pacifying the political strife that 
endangered the very fabric of society.
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The question a political theorist faces is: are there any good reasons for selecting these 
two particular conceptions of liberty in justifying political institutions instead of any others? 
What must be left for the last section of this study is to sketch the fundamental differences in 
the conceptions of liberty that most contemporary political philosophers are happy to employ 
vis-a-vis a properly idealist notion of personal freedom. The claim of universality thus rests 
on a notion of liberty that not only originates in a particular historical constellation at a certain 
time in history, but which also mistakes the purpose of a pragmatic means adopted for the 
creation of societal peace for an intrinsic value. The negative and positive conceptions of 
liberty are historically determined, just as they came to be valued for good reasons, yet to 
implicate them subsequently into a general justification of political institutions is to over­
extend their conceptual reach. Akhiezer’s account of the crucial historical moments that 
decide the future of civilisations illuminates both the origin o f the concepts of liberty as well 
as their limitation. They were vehicles for the accomplishment of societal aims, and this 
cannot confer universal intrinsic value upon them.
To argue that UC can rest on the value which liberty has for the maintenance of 
societal peace would reveal the potential of the concepts of liberty. Yet, this is an argument 
that has to consider the usefulness of liberty as it evolves in the particular moment and 
circumstances, rather than a universalism that is based on the universal credentials and 
applicability of the notions of liberty propounded.
Or, to put it Kantian terms and in line with the views of O ’Neill, the argument for or 
against a negative and positive liberty, their appropriateness in certain circumstances, and the 
extent to which they play a role in determining the shape of political institutions, are 
arguments that appeal to practical, rather than theoretical reason.
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11. Statehood, Russia and Historical Prerequisites of Liberalism
Aleksandr Akhiezer has over the years developed a highly elaborate theory of society that 
goes far beyond the remit of political theory. His is a theory of society that takes into account 
historical, social and wider discursive conditions. The result is a theory of Russian social and 
political history that has deep philosophical implications. Initially providing it with a 
distinctively sociological thrust, it has over the time been deliberately widened into a fully- 
fledged theory of politics, the Russian state and Russian cultural history. Although it has thus 
acquired a certain integrative explanatory power, it is clearly stronger when applied to 
questions o f Russian history than when taken as a philosophy of mind or psychological 
theory, into which Akhiezer has recently reformulated it (Akhiezer, 2000). For our purposes I 
will focus on Akhiezer’s theory o f statehood that comprises his most famous conceptual tools: 
the theory of the ‘raskol’ (gap, fissure, fracture) and his concept of ‘inversion jum ps’. In a 
first part I will need to outline briefly his theory of statehood as he expounded it in his main 
work as well as in a monograph more recently published in collaboration with I f  in (Hi ’in and 
Akhiezer, 1997) and a rather brief interpretation of the concept of ‘open society’ (Akhiezer 
and Yakovenko, 1997).
The second part will concentrate on the interaction between modernisation, history and 
Russian political traditions and the chances of liberal statehood as they emerge from the 
interplay o f his concepts. A word of caution is, however, in order. Akhiezer’s work has a 
genuinely historical thrust that, although reduced, is never wholly eliminated from his 
conception of statehood. The question must arise whether a theory that is historical in its main 
focus can be of any benefit to political theory (cf. Kaehne, 2002 and 2002a). The affirmative 
answer lies in the fact that Akhiezer’s theory points to significant differences in Russian and 
Western statehood that would go unnoticed if only scrutinised with the habitually deployed 
concepts and foci o f Western theory. The advantage of looking at the Russian state through
191
the conceptual lens of Akhiezer’s concept of ‘raskol’ lies in the illumination it offers. It is a 
commonplace that the theories with which we approach a theme help to determine the picture 
we see. Akhiezer’s theory of Russian statehood juxtaposed to Western state theory is a case in 
hand. Western political scientists have elaborated definitions of statehood, such as 
functionalism and organisation theory, which have been devised and refined in their 
application to Western states. Similarly the advice given to Russians after the collapse o f the 
Soviet regime has been somewhat along the lines of Western conventional wisdom. There is, 
however, even among some Western theorists, a growing fear that the historical conditions of 
statehood might have a bigger impact than anticipated and than Western theory allows. The 
latest fashion in political science to speak of the concept of path dependency testifies to this 
change o f heart. So I would contend that if we seriously want to examine the applicability of 
Western theoretical models of statehood to Russia, we must resubmit Western theories to a 
critical review and see if they can retain their explanatory force.
I
There can be no doubt that Akhiezer’s theory of Russian history has been one o f the most 
formidable contributions to the understanding of the Russian society and history in the last 
decade, whether from Russian or Western theorists. Although it has many veritable precursors 
and the main line of argument bears traces o f similar concepts previously devised, Akhiezer’s 
work is an original contribution to Russian historiography as well as to social theory. We will 
have to establish here how helpful his theory of Russian statehood is in explaining the notable 
differences between Russia and the West and how far these differences will prevent us from 
subsuming Russian statehood under the categories of Western political theory.
Akhiezer’s key concepts revolve around the problem of constant societal disintegration 
that had repeatedly threatened to become irreversible in Russia. Although Akhiezer is 
reluctant to define this state of societal catastrophe more clearly, he does identify societal
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collapse with some particular historical events in Russian history and thus implicitly points to 
some ingredients of such societal demise. For him the Russian revolutions as well as the 
collapse of the Soviet regime have brought Russia to the brink of collapse. Akhiezer does not 
characterise this state of collapse in either functionalist or historical terms where the state 
apparatus ceases to function properly, or to fulfil its most basic tasks. Neither does Akhiezer 
specify the state of collapse as society disintegrating under the onslaught of centrifugal forces, 
eventually leading to civil war. The reason Akhiezer does not provide such a characterisation 
o f the ‘breaking point’ in functionalist terms is that his entire theory is built on the premise 
that Russian statehood is beyond this point of normalcy already. The Russian state historically 
has lingered in a position of unresponsiveness to societal developments or demands. 
Traditionally Russian state and society are seen as disconnected rather than possessing points 
of juncture. Akhiezer uses the term ‘raskol’ that, he thinks, most appropriately describes the 
relationship between state and society in Russia.
In line with his intended sociological focus, he embeds this concept into the tensions 
and contradictions of the Russian social fabric that are generated by the process of 
modernisation and the concomitant change of worldview. Although he avoids the intricacies 
of a history of mentality, his remarks intimate an underlying idea of Russian mentality, or 
worldview ( Weltanschauung). However, for Akhiezer, there is nothing like an immutable 
Russian mentality or national character that forms and informs Russian history. This way he 
clearly distances himself from any interpretations of Russian history that deploy ideas of 
immutable components or elements, such as most prominently, the Slavophil conception o f a 
national character. This makes Akhiezer’s theory dynamic rather than static and equally 
renders it susceptible to re-formulations in the form of discourse theory, which he himself 
alludes to at times.
However, the concept of ‘raskol’ carries in itself a recognition of normalcy from which 
Russia has traditionally diverged. This normalcy as the polar opposite of ‘raskol’, remains
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conceptually unexplored in Akhiezer’s thought but still acts as a teleological corrective in the 
background. It could be described as a form of harmonious relationship between state and 
society where each one is allocated its proper function. What these functions are exactly is not 
clear but it must be assumed that they relate somehow to Akhiezer’s idea of the sameness of 
dicursive practices pertaining in each sphere. More specifically, he refers to the concurrence 
of worldviews amongst the political elite that embody the state and the population. The 
obliqueness in which the differentiation of functions and their particular content remains here 
reveals how far away Akhiezer’s theory of statehood is located from Western political theory. 
He specifies neither purpose nor tasks of the state, nor any particular objective o f state 
activities beyond ‘integration’. Rather, his concept of statehood is premised on the desirable 
avoidance o f societal collapse or total disintegration.
The unique side o f this idea is revealed if and when it transpires to which extent this 
concept is responsive to the historical sequence of different emanations of statehood. By 
defining ‘concurrence’ or ‘correspondence’ of prevailing worldviews in society and state as 
the determining feature for the state’s ‘health’, Akhiezer manages to make his theory 
susceptible to various ideas about the ideal state and society.8 This way the liberal conception 
of statehood gains a relativity that responds well to the Russian historical reality. However, 
Akhiezer’s theory would not simply possess an openness but would rather be plainly 
irrelevant to the advantages which a liberal political regime may bring to the Russian polity if 
the liberal conception of statehood was just one amongst other equally valuable concepts of 
political order. Yet the relevance of Akhiezer’s historical theory o f statehood is re-established 
when proper focus is given to the effects and consequences of the modernisation process 
which he deems irreversible, though contradictory, in nature. In short, Akhiezer claims that 
the liberal conception of politics is uniquely prepared for the challenges of a modem society,
8 Akhiezer’s theory often resembles the somewhat odd ‘theory o f  congruence’ formulated by the American 
political scientist Eckstein in which he assumed that political stability is a function o f the congruity o f  authority 
patterns in state and society. Cf. Eckstein, 1998 and 1999a.
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even if traces of pre-modem social attitudes and behavioural patterns are still discernible in 
the Russian polity. There is no need to detail his modernisation concept here beyond listing 
the most basic aspects that echo Kapustin’s characterisation o f it- secularisation, change of 
political attitudes: concept of authority, change of consciousness, tied in with industrialisation 
and participation in national wealth, nation(-state) as vehicle of politics, economics and social 
affairs.
From the perspective of Western political theory this suitability of liberalism to the 
conditions of modernity is a result of the potentially inclusive character of a liberal political 
order. To define the admissible boundaries and limits of this inclusion has very much been the 
essence of the project of liberal political theory since Rawls. It is to seek a solution to the 
problem as to how a political order can be established that meets the criteria o f liberal 
convictions and at the same time leaves room for illiberal conceptions o f politics and more 
‘fundamentalist’ ideas on religion, society and the economy. Within this frame o f mind a 
liberal conception of statehood possesses an openness and fluidity that other (illiberal) 
conceptions do not. For example, a minimalist legal regulatory framework may fulfil these 
criteria. Yet, Akhiezer’s account of liberal statehood differs considerably from Western 
attempts to carve out a liberal political order out of the whole range of political convictions 
when this often contains illiberal components that would (rationally) conflict with the 
condition of modernity under which societies exist. For Akhiezer, liberal outlooks and 
political views are shaped and informed profoundly by the modernising forces that Russian 
politics often attempted to neglect or counteract. Liberalism as a worldview 
(Weltanschauung) is effectively and ultimately the only form of consciousness that responds 
to modernity appropriately and thus prepares people for the difficulties ahead.
For Akhiezer, although Russian society might at present and for the foreseeable future 
be characterised by the presence of various mutually contradictory worldviews that originate 
in pre-modem as well as modem conditions of life, liberalism exclusively is capable of
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appropriately corresponding to this conditio moderna. Although Akhiezer does not 
conceptually frame this idea of liberalism any further, it clearly functions as a telos of societal 
development in conjunction with his idea of the congruity o f worldviews obtaining between 
state and society. His theory of liberal statehood thus does not accord with the most 
fundamental assumption of the Western liberal project since it presumes a unique 
concordance of liberal convictions within modem societies. For Akhiezer, liberalism is a 
mode of thought that approximates the real world as it represents itself after the process of 
modernisation in Europe. Now, remnants of the precursors to liberal worldviews may still 
linger on even in Western Europe, but Russia, so Akhiezer argues, is particularly afflicted by 
the simultaneity of existing divergent worldviews.
Against the backdrop of normalcy, in which some remainder o f Westernism might still 
have persisted, Akhiezer accounts for the inconsistencies of Russian statehood by providing 
an insightful narrative of the Russian political order for which the concept of ‘raskol’ is 
central. Akhiezer maintains that Russian society has been in a state of fracture or fissure, 
which the state has been unable to bridge. While the outer poles of the spectrum of societal 
concepts are extremes between which Russian society and the desired political order have 
oscillated unremittingly, Russia has, in effect, found herself unable to establish, let alone to 
sustain, a lasting harmonious relationship between state and society. Akhiezer now locates the 
problem of Russian society in its inability to respond mitigatingly to this constant oscillation. 
The state as well as society endeavour to counter the swing from one polar extreme to the 
other with mainly inappropriate measures that eventually reinforce this movement to the brink 
of societal collapse. So, Akhiezer’s conception of statehood is particularly adept when it 
comes to describing the interaction between state and society that repeatedly endangers the 
most basic and necessary integration of Russian society. In order to understand the full force 
of the theory we need to look at the differing worldviews that, according to Akhiezer, shape 
the dualistic poles.
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He terms them ‘syncretistic’ and ‘liberal’. The former relates to the historical period 
untouched by modernisation whereas the latter would refer to the mode of thought most 
compatible with the modem world. Pre-modem consciousness is undifferentiating, subsuming 
the object or ‘the other’ under the subject or ‘the self. In terms o f belonging, a pre-modem 
mind fuses subject and object, or, in (pre)political terms, as Akhiezer puts it, the ‘local 
activities are taken for the whole’ (Il’in, 1997, p.260f). In Russian history this form of 
consciousness finds its expression in the particular communal form of living called the 
‘veche’ (Il’in, 1997, p.254). This has been the traditionally preferred formation of Russian 
society which under pressure from modernising forces, gives way to a bifurcated form of 
societal consciousness: ‘sobomost’ and authoritarianism. Herein lies the origin of the Russian 
state and its peculiar detachment from society. While ‘sobomost’ is little more than the false 
pretence, or reflection of the desire, to live under the conditions of the ‘veche’ that has long 
gone, the state starts off as an appendage of a society that appears to be able to dispense with 
the state’s functions. This renders the state constantly reactive rather than proactive. In this 
picture there is little room for a political order as an overarching arena of political 
competition, or for the institutionalisation of the process of decision-making, reflecting 
society’s diverse norms and ideals.
On the contrary, the Russian state evolved out of a necessity to integrate a country in 
order make it governable by the imperial rulers. It was the exigencies of political rule 
exercised by the Emperor rather than the growing need for (self-) organisation by society that, 
in the Russian context, led to the development of state institutions. Whether this particular 
historical narrative is tme or not, the role attributed to the state illuminates neatly the (alleged) 
redundancy of political institutions and their subsequent failure to gain acceptance by the 
populace, or sufficient legitimacy. In order to overcome this ‘redundancy’, the state with its 
associated political institutions had to cast itself in the role of integrator so that is was 
perceived to be combining the particular parts into a whole, in accordance with the
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dominating worldview. This had at least two consequences: any political order that could be 
comprehended as resting on a particular view of society rather than a comprehensive, all- 
embracing one, lost acceptance amongst the population. This resulted in a constant drive of 
the state (and the political rulers) to mimic the allegedly prevalent social and political 
attitudes of the population at large. On the other side, however, since the state would 
constantly have to promote a comprehensive political doctrine that concurred with the 
population’s worldview, this meant, subsequent to the process of modernisation, nothing other 
than suppressing the resultant diversity in social and political outlooks. Consequently, the 
state became coercive in advancing and imposing a view of political order that corresponded 
less and less to reality.
For the present purposes there are two aspects that seem important in this picture. First, 
Akhiezer seems to re-affirm the narrative propounded by Westemists that state institutions in 
the Russian context have no origin in societal developments. And second, the state as an 
appendage used for the purpose of retention of power is somehow bound to become 
oppressive.
From here it is a small step to Akhiezer’s second fundamental concept: the inversion 
jumps. Under the condition of a chronic schism between society and state as well as between 
the intellectual elite and the majority of the populace, political institutions can muster the 
most basic support only if they adhere to a vision of Russian society that concurs with the 
syncretistic worldview believed to be prevalent amongst the population at large. With the 
growing complexity of society, as a result o f the modernisation process which gathered more 
and more pace in the nineteenth century, the political elite navigated itself into a virtual no- 
win situation. The failure of the reforms of the 1860s testified to the predicament. To radically 
modernise the country could have resulted in potential alienation of the masses, whereas 
foregoing social and political reforms would be tantamount to stifling the urgently needed 
transformations that were necessary to meet the demands o f a modem society. Once the
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failure of the reforms became obvious and the Russian government back-tracked on them, 
intellectual energies were redirected into devising a way out o f this dilemma. A solution was 
found in a political hybrid that would reconcile a syncretistic worldview with the demands of 
modernity - a modem illusion that was a classic form of pars pro toto. For Akhiezer, herein 
lies the power of the Russian formulation of Communism. But Communism also produced in 
itself the germs of its own demise: the adherence to a syncretistic utopia was after all a 
carefully crafted and ‘scientifically deduced’ lie for the sake o f gluing together diametrically 
opposed societal elements, namely an eventually highly complex modem society with the 
accompanying dynamics and a pre-modern Weltanschauung that propagated a societal idyll 
based on a false pretence of ancient Russian traditions.
Whether the state embarked on reforms in the 1860s, or forged a unity of contrasting 
principles under Communism, it would always find itself in a position o f opposition to one or 
another part of Russian society. In order to regain the confidence of the populace it engaged in 
abrupt U-tums which were bound to frustrate the supporters o f the policy previously pursued. 
Since the country was repeatedly driven to the brink of collapse, the state’s reversals o f policy 
were only mirroring the vigour with which it had implemented the previous political direction 
eventually leading to what Akhiezer called ‘inversion jum ps’. Exemplifying this with the 
events of the February revolution, he writes:
‘The driving force in the revolution was inversion- in this case, opposition to extreme 
forms of authoritarianism and the triumph of an ideal associated with localism, that is, 
with maximal organisational atomisation of society on the basis of barter relations and 
autarky.’ (Akhiezer, 1996, p.61 f)
i
In total, Akhiezer presents us here with two theories rolled into one. Firstly, he defines the 
Russian state as a promoter of a conception o f ideal society which it subsequently imposes 
coercively on the polity. This conception might rest on a political ideal that in a modem 
society necessarily, unless liberal in character, abrogates any articulation of alternative
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political values opposed to the one officially promulgated. It thus bears the seeds o f discontent 
and eventual negation in itself. For Akhiezer any conception of politics that is not liberal has 
produced and always will produce the same effect: taking Russia to the brink of societal 
collapse. At the core acts a somewhat vague correspondence theory that postulates a 
harmonious relationship between state and society as the ultimate ideal for the Russian society 
(similar to Eckstein, 1998). This congruity is accomplished when both spheres, the political 
order as well as society at large, are penetrated and ruled by the same worldview, be it liberal 
or syncretistic. Russian history has continually failed to be in such a condition ever since the 
forces o f modernisation were deliberately unleashed by Peter I’s reforms. Political rulers have 
repeatedly either tried to remould society according to the ideals embraced by them, or 
propagated an ideal of political order that coincided with the values and norms allegedly held 
by this section of Russian society that was perceived to epitomise the Russian nation: the 
peasantry and their communal form of organisation.
Secondly, however, Akhiezer also puts forward an idea of liberalism that is at odds 
with the notion of a liberal political order as Western political theory has developed it. 
Although Akhiezer does not seem to be aware of it, he implicitly juxtaposes liberalism to the 
Soviet experience, which in his opinion was a peculiar combination of two contrasting 
worldviews. Communism endeavoured to reconstruct a syncretism in a complex society. This 
amounted to nothing less than a synthesis of mutually exclusive notions of societal ideals: 
wedding local association with statehood, hence something akin to aspiring to create a 
political order that would be de-statist as well as political.
‘The state ideology [of communism] bore a hybrid character, consisting of two strata, 
whose sources were cultures of different super-civilisations. This was not syncretism, 
but its imitation. The ideology of Bolshevism was a refined form of pseudo-syncretism. 
It united the spontaneous view of the whole of society as fraternity (bratstvo), the 
community (obshchina) and the refined ideological construction of professionals [here: 
intelligentsia]’. (Il’in, 1997, p. 265)
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It is easy to infer from this inconsistency of the Soviet order that this experiment carried 
within itself the destructive forces which ultimately would bring it down. Soviet political 
order was a critique o f the liberal order insofar as it purported to be pre-political, but in fact it 
had to acknowledge the need for coercive political authority in order to keep in check those 
parts of society that begged to disagree with this modem reincarnation of the ‘veche’.
For present purposes, Akhiezer’s notion of liberalism is particularly useful. 
Undoubtedly his interpretation of Russian history as a collision between different worldviews 
leading repeatedly to societal collapse has been able to muster much support (Panarin, 1998). 
What is of particular interest, however, is how and why Akhiezer’s conception of a Russian 
liberal political order differs from the one stipulated by Western political theorists. For 
Akhiezer, the liberal state is integrating in purpose and character and he elaborates on this 
proposition by characterising the liberal state as first and foremost a legal framework. So far 
he is broadly in line with Western political theory. Yet, a notion of the state as merely a 
regulatory framework is discordant with his claim that liberalism is a worldview. In fact, he 
characterises it at times as a form of civilisation. The core of this contradiction thus resides in 
the fact that a political order as a minimal regulatory framework is of a different categorical 
remit than liberalism as civilisational or cultural outlook. Someone who finds a political order 
appealing which is founded on the idea of the rule of law and the state as disinterested 
regulator of human affairs would qualify as a liberal according to Akhiezer’s notion of liberal 
state order. With regard to various other matters of social and political affairs that can be 
subsumed under the category of civilisational attitudes this person must, in order to qualify as 
a liberal, expound equally liberal views.
Yet, the Western project of liberal politics has exactly identified the problem of liberal 
politics as one of what to do when civilisations tend to espouse illiberal or non-liberal views 
yet require the creation of a liberal political framework in which disputes can be settled 
peacefully. In other words, the dilemma consists in the distinctiveness o f political and
201
civilisational orders. Cultures, taken as by and large congruent with the Russian idea of 
civilisation, may be hostile to liberal political arrangements. The question is how to establish 
a reliable political framework which (nearly) all, even non-liberals, find reasonable and 
attractive to participate in. Akhiezer’s notion of statehood appears viable only if everybody 
endorses liberal views in the entire range of his attitudes and sentiments. This clearly renders 
the liberal project as such meaningless and reveals that Akhiezer disregards his own findings: 
modem societies live under conditions of complexity that prohibit the concurrence of all 
views on forms and rules of social organisation.
Clearly this contradiction is an upshot of his attempt to combine a sociological analysis 
of Russian history with a notion of an ideal state order. Akhiezer proceeds from the 
assumption that under the conditions of modernity the highly fractured polity requires the 
state as an integrator. In fact any disregard for the high complexity of modem life in Russia 
which finds its way into the particular structure of state institutions would only stand in 
continuity with the Russian history of discordance between mass consciousness and political 
order.
Nevertheless, Akhiezer’s account of Russian statehood translates into a strong 
suggestion for a viable exit strategy from the dilemmas that continually beset Russia in her 
history. Akhiezer identifies the concurrence of worldviews reflected both in political 
institutions and their resultant policies and in society’s beliefs and norms as the component 
critical for accomplishing political peace and prosperity. On the other hand, he makes clear 
that he is sceptical as to when Russia will achieve this state of concurrence. The liberal 
political camp still appears negligibly small in Russia and few have completely discarded the 
illusion of a Russia united again on the soil of communal bliss that allegedly existed there 
until Peter I pushed his country into the wider world.
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II
Akhiezer’s theory of statehood presents us with a valuable new perspective but also poses 
some problems that mainly result from his attempt to amalgamate two different theoretical 
categories. Attention will first be given to the accomplishments that can be o f use to the 
further consideration of Russian statehood and any effort to evaluate the extent to which 
Western state theory is applicable to this particular case.
Akhiezer asserts that it would be possible to define a norm of statehood and claims that 
Russia has historically deviated from this norm. This standard of statehood develops out of his 
understanding o f the relationship between society and the state and how this relationship had 
been distorted in Russian history due to misconceived societal ideals.
There can be no doubt that this notion of a harmonious relationship that is based on the 
congruence of worldviews in society places him in a long tradition of Russian thinkers and 
also echoes the convictions of many politically informed Western publics. It is noteworthy, 
however, that his conception of liberalism as a political as well as a more general worldview 
distances him from those Russian thinkers who conceived of liberalism in a narrower manner, 
mainly as a form of legal framework and political freedoms. The sociological origins of 
Akhiezer’s theoretical approach ensure that this particularly political (formal) perspective 
remains out o f sight for him. The drive of his theory originates in a different source. He 
emphasises again and again that Russia must find a solution to the question o f ‘raskol’ or 
schism that has afflicted Russian history for centuries. The prevention of societal schism is the 
most important task for the political institutions and this can only be achieved if they are 
imbued, as it were, with a similar view of political and social affairs, a similar understanding 
of the world and the position of the individual in this world. This is hardly translatable into 
concrete patterns of political institutions and competences but it does point to an aspect that, I 
believe, is unjustly underestimated in Western political theory. Akhiezer’s point about the 
perennial societal schism that has afflicted Russia reveals the intricacy of the necessary
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congruence of the most basic ideas and norms prior to the establishment o f state institutions. 
It should be clear that Akhiezer’s attempt to analyse the conditionality o f liberal institutions in 
the Russian context mirrors the theoretical efforts of such distinguished Western political 
philosophers as Rawls. Akhiezer’s point powerfully reiterates the problem that Western 
political theory has tried to come to terms with: how can a political order and state institutions 
be stable when operating in an environment which lacks agreed basic norms and convictions. 
Akhiezer’s argument goes in fact even further, doubting that it is possible to deduce a political 
arrangement when faced with incongruous and conflicting views on the world. This calls into 
question the attempts of Western political theorists to isolate something like a political sphere, 
i.e. developing a viable political order which, according to Akhiezer, is nevertheless bound to 
be grounded in the wider social environment. Akhiezer’s thesis questions artificially drawn 
boundaries and emphasises the complexity and embeddedness of human interaction and views 
thereby tying political thinking in with the entirety o f human thought. He resists the 
temptation to conveniently isolate different spheres of thought in order to either block non­
political views from the process of generating a political order or de-politicise this process 
altogether (cf. Gray, 1995). Both are not viable options for the evolution of liberal politics in 
Akhiezer’s theory of liberal statehood. In his view, political orders reflect the entire range of 
convictions and norms that a society happens to hold; any attempt to segregate neatly 
encircled spheres, be they political, social or cultural, is to deny society the richness of 
traditions which are vital in forging a political order capable o f bridging the societal schism 
that afflicts Russia.
A second significant aspect o f Akhiezer’s theory o f statehood, originating in a 
historical account of the relationship between state and society in Russia, lies in his insistence 
that the state as a particular organisational form of society is, or ought to, be the bearer and 
promoter of the prevalent culture. Since his notion o f culture is cast in the typically Russian 
framework of the concept of civilisation and thus exceeds the narrower Western notion of
204
political culture, it has a significance that goes beyond the similar Western view that liberal 
regimes require a liberal political culture to survive in the long run.
This directs attention to another aspect o f Akhiezer’s theory where he diverges from a 
Western understanding o f the state-society nexus. His civilisational approach assumes a 
notion of harmony or congruence that postulates far more than the absence of abject chaos 
and disorganisation. Although the prevention of disorganisation may be an immediate remedy 
for Russia’s problems, a situation of complete congruence between state and society would 
only prevail under the conditions of comprehensive absence o f conflict. Akhiezer’s theory of 
state-society relationship rests on a notion of wholeness that resembles suspiciously the pre­
modem syncretistic worldview. It seems difficult to accommodate in his conceptual 
framework any notion of constructive political conflict or competition. His fairly elementary 
portray of a peaceful modem society that rests on analogous attitudes, values and norms in the 
political as well as wider social sphere appears to still carry some traces o f the same illusory 
worldview which Akhiezer characterised as pre-modem. This point becomes clearer when he 
refers to the inability o f Russian state and society to speak the same language. Political 
articulations by state officials, so Akhiezer argues, have traditionally acquired new meaning 
when they crossed the chasm between them. Elaborating on this argument he writes:
‘The transfer of meaning in a split society (raskolotoe obshchestvo) develops on the 
boundaries of the schismatic (sub-)cultures, of the socio-cultural groups. New meaning 
is formed now even between the meanings. Yet the direction of meanings is 
simultaneously the direction of the programme of reproduction. This means that the 
transfer o f meanings inevitably leads to a dislocation (sdvig) o f content in the 
reproductive activities, to a change of reproductive relations (...), to the formation of 
specific socio-cultural associations which embody and reproduce the schism.’ (ITin, 
1997, p.248)
This way the Russian state faces two potential dangers. Either it does not recognise the 
existing diversity that exists within society, imposes a view of politics which does not 
acknowledge this diversity and becomes inevitably coercive. Or, despite the political order
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being organised in accord with the principles of diversity and honouring the complexity of 
modem Russian society, ‘various self-ascertaining elements of society oppose the state and 
disorganise and destroy it’ (IFin, 1997, p.282). The historical parallel is indubitable. Society 
and, in particular the Russian intelligentsia, has often defined its political stance vis-a-vis the 
state as one of opposition. The intelligentsia has traditionally drawn a great deal of its raison 
d ’etre from such an antithetical stance vis-a-vis the state (Gessen, 1997, p.l67f).
Yet, there can be no doubt that Akhiezer would insist that the necessity for a liberal 
political order in Russia finds its justification in the fact that life is highly fragmented and that 
any non-liberal state order would be bound to invariably neglect this fact and therefore 
aggravate the disorganisation and the chasm that lingered between Russian society and its 
political institutions. Here lies the normative content of his theory of a liberal political order. 
In order to ensure the survival o f Russian society in whatever form, Akhiezer suggests, the 
state ought to readjust itself along broadly liberal conceptions of politics. His conception of 
‘raskol’ determines the extent to which his theorisation of a Russian liberal political order 
adopts this normative content. This represents also a remarkable difference to Western 
political theory insofar as the latter has, in its drive to universalise any justification of political 
order, tried to transcend any historical reference. The obliteration of the historical context as a
j
viable component of political theory (which many more conservative Western political 
theorists have come more recently to re-appreciate) has often been seen as a guarantor for 
universalisability o f their conceptions.
The question which Akhiezer’s theory of statehood poses is this: Does the significance 
of the historical context that Akhiezer elucidated for the Russian case impact on the 
applicability of Western liberal theory? There appear to be at least two possibilities here. 
Either Western liberal thought already possesses a historical component that is universal in 
character and concordant with Russian particularities. In this case we would have to focus on 
the question of the universal character of this historical specification and explain how it
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concurs with the Russian political order. Or, alternatively, as Western political theory has 
succeeded in eliminating any historical reference for the sake of universalisability, the 
applicability of it depends to a large extent either on the re-incorporation of a historical 
component or on the insignificance of the concrete historical conditions that Akhiezer have 
specified. It should have become apparent from the argument so far presented that the de- 
historisation of Western political theory can be considered a fundamental detriment to, rather 
than augmenting, its scope of applicability.
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12. Modernity and Political Liberalism
The attempt to understand liberty as a solution to a particular political constellation and to 
gauge the usefulness of the principle o f personal freedom in history is necessarily bound up 
with understanding the circumstances o f its emergence. Without a sense of the reasons and 
underlying motivations of those who advocated the enhancement of individual liberty in a 
particular situation, there is little hope of being able to support this in situations similarly 
structured. Historians can delineate the intellectual context that contributed to the genesis o f a 
particular idea and its specific significance as it comes to capture people’s imaginations and 
possibly the political agenda of countries. Yet, what is left to the political theorist is to 
determine the coherence of the emanations of political thinking. What appears at first glance
j
as a modest task quickly turns out to combine historical and philosophical skills. It may be 
true that multae viae ducunt Romam, but the Russian political theorist Kapustin has certainly 
developed over the last years one of the most insightful and profound approaches to the 
problem. Boris Gureevich Kapustin was bom in Sverdlovsk in 1951 but moved to Moscow in 
1968 where he studied at the Institute for International Relations. He subsequently served in 
the Soviet Army as a conscript and was stationed in Syria during his service. Having left the 
army in 1976 he enroled as a philosophy student at the Moscow State University and showed 
particular interest in the heuristic significance of the category ‘formation’ for historical 
analysis. Following his graduation in 1979 he worked at the philosophical faculty of the 
Lumumba University and became interested in Western Marxism as it evolved in the 
Frankfurt School. The ‘glasnost’ era confronted him with new problems and questions and he 
worked at the Academy of Social Sciences of the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
on the politico-philosophical dimension of the ‘New Political Thought’ as propagated by 
Mikhail Gorbachev. His studies focused on the chances of reconciling political rationalism 
and idealistic orientations as epitomised in the Communist doctrine and he spent his
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sabbatical leave in 1984/85 at the London School for Economics. In 1992 he was employed 
by the Gorbachev Foundation. His work resulted in the publication of his doctoral thesis 
Global Problems o f  International Societal Development in 1991. He is currently prorector of 
the Moscow School for Social and Economic Sciences. He was several times in receipt of 
various funding from the Soros Foundation through the Institute for Open Society.
His starting point is the what he calls the ‘problem of modernity’. His book ‘Modernity as a 
Problem of Political Theory’ (1998) notes the difficulty in defining modernity: Being not 
simply synonymous with the notion of the ‘present time’ (seichastnost’), the term describes 
rather a problem of life, a problem of vital importance for human beings and peoples 
(zhiznenniaia problema) (Kapustin, 1998, p. 14). Vitality could be paraphrased here as 
existence, or existential. As with any existential or cultural problem, Kapustin writes, the 
problem of modernity is not simply eliminated when a solution has been found (Kapustin, 
1998, p. 15). Rather one can learn to live with a problem, by defining its aspects and trying to 
cope with its effects. Kapustin then dismisses the possibility of defining the concept of 
modernity in an affirmative way. It must seem impossible, he argues, to ascertain the various 
types of institutions, procedures, and norms that would altogether constitute the modernity of 
a given society. What is feasible, however, is to define modernity in a functional and 
contextual manner -  functional insofar as the purpose of dealing with the problem of 
modernity can be described for a given society, and contextual insofar as the problem of 
modernity manifests itself in a specific cultural-historical context (Kapustin, 1998, p. 16). 
With these positions (attained), Kapustin writes,
‘...one can consider the modernity or non-modernity o f any institutions, procedures and 
norms, in particular those that the dominating ideology in Russia and the West 
unreservedly considers as modem features such as the market and representative 
democracy etc. (Kapustin, 1998, p. 16).
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After examining a series of different approaches to the concept o f modernity, Kapustin settles 
for a surprisingly vague definition. He remarks that the problem of modernity is the problem 
of how to constitute order through, or on the basis of, the ‘absolute independence’ o f the 
individual (Kapustin, 1998, p.24). Characterising this definition further, he notes that such a 
concept of modernity necessarily affects everybody. Hence it is not as elitist as the idea of 
Enlightenment could be understood to be. To live in and with modernity is a challenge that 
everybody faces (Kapustin, 1998, p.24-25). The crucial aspect is introduced into this 
definition of modernity when Kapustin denies that there is any singular interpretation of 
modernity that can claim authority (in addition to ‘avtoritetnyi’ Kapustin uses the adjective 
‘istinnyi’ which relates to the Russian idea of eternal ‘truth’. Kapustin, 1998, p.28). Kapustin 
reiterates in this context the existential aspect of the problem of modernity. We will return 
later to the implications this has for the understanding o f the post-Communist, 
transformational process in Russia. For the moment the concern lies with the consequences 
which such a contextualisation would have for the idea of political liberalism. Kapustin has 
repeatedly over the years attempted to outline a definition of political liberalism, that leaves 
enough room for combining Russian cultural particularities and traditions with liberalism, 
and, at the same time, is sufficiently specific in excluding non-liberal views from a coherent 
definition o f what constitutes a liberal political order. In an early article he sketches a 
preliminary concept of modernity and dismisses two conventional ways of defining 
liberalism- firstly, to define it by ascribing to political liberalism a core arsenal of views and 
concepts, and secondly, through ascertaining a canon of views advocated by what are believed 
to be beyond doubt liberal thinkers. Kapustin criticises the first attempt as potentially too 
restrictive and, simultaneously, as insufficiently differentiating. Liberal concepts belong to the 
conceptual repertoire of many conservative thinkers too. In fact, many notions that are pivotal 
to an understanding of liberal political thought have been coined by political thinkers who 
expressed concern about their societies’ drift into further liberalisation. On the other hand, the
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second approach, so Kapustin argues, is highly arbitrary insofar as it assumes a convergence 
of interpretations that does not appear likely to materialise any time soon (Kapustin, 1996, 
p.49). Rather, Kapustin goes on, political liberalism may be seen as the only sufficient 
conceptualisation of the problem of modernity. As it incorporates a ‘methodological 
recognition of the freedom of the individual’ as an orientating (Archimedean) point, the lines 
along which it can be distinguished from non-liberal thought, whether conservative, 
nationalist, or Communist, are circumscribed by this idea o f the centrality of the individual 
(Kapustin, 1996, p.50). Note that Kapustin does not describe individualism as a value that 
‘trumps’ any other. His portrayal of political liberalism retains an element of flexibility in any 
ranking of values on account of its reference to a problem to whose solution liberalism is 
thought to be contributory.
Kapustin then distinguishes three ‘basic types’ of politico-philosophical idea of 
liberalism: gnoseological, ontological as well as technological (cf. also Kapustin, 1994). This 
typology allows him to ascribe the different historical stages in the development o f the idea of 
liberty to the enlisted types. The typology does not represent the particularity of the cognitive 
processes but rather exemplifies distinct views about human activities (Kapustin, 1996, p.52). 
The gnoseological type of liberalism considers the activities of individuals as reflecting their 
understanding of some basic principles in virtue of which individuals develop the willingness 
and readiness to an ordered communal life (uporiadochennyi sovmestnyi zhizn’, Kapustin, 
1996, p.53). The political philosophies of Hobbes and Locke most closely embody the 
gnoseological view. In contrast to this, the ontological type o f liberalism postulates that those 
basic activities of human beings which assist in creating the institutions or collaboration and 
communal life are (based on) the reciprocity between people. Hegel’s notion of civil society 
represents the most radical interpretation of ontological liberal thought, so Kapustin argues 
(Kapustin, 1996, p.53). The most interesting difference o f these two types o f politico- 
philosophical liberalism from the third, technological, view consists in understanding the
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activities of people as channelling and regulating the unavoidable conflict of interests in view 
of the inevitable scarcity of resources and the absence of a shared definition of the good.
This typology may be contestable but it allows Kapustin to describe the different 
stages in the theoretical formation of liberal political thought. The invariant factor in this 
model is the multitude of different activities people engage in, whereas liberalism is a 
theoretical attempt to make sense of them in widely varying circumstances and under the 
auspices of the slow modification of interpretative ‘paradigms’.9 Kapustin is aware that this 
typology shifts the definitional focus of political liberalism from the form and justification of 
political institutions to the question of how a social order that already exists can be preserved, 
having already provided the foundation for individual freedom to come into existence. Most 
importantly, individualism receives part of its persuasive force for modernity from the role it 
ascribes to human beings as agents of the political processes which underpin modernity 
(Kapustin, 1996, p.54).
That Kapustin is highly sympathetic to this latter, technological view of liberalism 
becomes apparent in a later article in which he elaborates upon his earlier efforts to define 
liberalism. In a paper published in the proceedings of a conference on Russian liberalism, he 
outlines the problems faced by theorists in attempting to fix the content o f political liberalism. 
He argues that liberalism has a highly relational character insofar as the circumstances and the 
environment determine the nature of the argument put forward (Kapustin, 1999, p.40). An 
example would be the unrestrained individualism of the Russian reform period that 
undermined the very conditions of personal freedom in the economic and political sphere. 
Furthermore, anything that can be said about liberalism, Kapustin argues, relates somehow to 
its cultural-historically defined views, eventually affirming the non-repeatability of the liberal 
‘experiment’ whose essence consists in finding a solution to the problem of a reasonable 
connection between order and individual freedom in a given situation (ibid.). The lack o f any
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external criteria of what represents a (liberal) solution to the problem of modernity does not 
signify an element of arbitrariness in the selection process. Kapustin adds that, within the 
immense diversity of answers given to the problem, there exist ‘algorithms of liberal 
activities’ that define the character and the fundamental parameters o f the solution to the 
problem. These algorithms represent the perennial themes of liberal political thought. 
Adopting Gray’s enumeration of the core concepts o f liberalism, Kapustin mentions 
individualism, egalitarianism, universalism, and meliorism (Kapustin, 1999, p.51). The upshot 
of this reluctance to define liberalism in terms of substantial principles or to identify its core 
idea among a cluster of immutable principles or concepts allows Kapustin to refuse to accept 
any standardisation of liberal political thought along the outlines of Western political 
liberalism. In fact, it permits an understanding of liberalism as a continuous process of 
problem-solving, the problem in this case being the preservation o f ordered social life. The 
parallel to Akhiezer’s account of civilisations, as invariably calibrating themselves around 
ideas that seem to ensure the survival of communal life, is apparent here. Although Kapustin 
does not share Akhiezer’s theory of the structure and dynamics o f social life that either assist 
or impede the preferred form of social life, both assign priority or special emphasis to the 
necessity of societal survival and reproduction.
Kapustin also believes that this allows him to examine the problem of Russian 
liberalism as being immanently alien to the ‘spiritual material’ (dukhovnyi) and the socio­
economic realities in Russia. Whereas the attempts to define political liberalism by one or 
another of its central ideas or concepts presupposes the notion of a single proper definition of 
liberalism, most of the various philosophical-methodological characterisations of liberalism 
(be they Hegelian, Kantian or Utilitarian) stand in ‘radical negation’ to each other (Kapustin, 
1999, p.44). His approach therefore works from an assumption that liberalism is an 
irreducibly diverse theoretical enterprise, a position that should be sufficiently evident given
9 Kapustin compares the cultural problem o f modernity as being overcome rather than solved to Kuhn’s idea o f
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the perennial problems of identifying a core of immutable liberal positions (similar cf. Gauss, 
2000). Kapustin is aware that with this approach he is in good company with some prominent 
Western critics of the Enlightenment tradition o f political thought. Referring to Rorty and 
Gray, however, he rebuts the notion of the liberal tradition of political thought as being 
entirely contingent upon Western historical experiences. He maintains that liberalism, as a 
valuable form of political thought, must have the capacity to distinguish itself from other 
political theories. The existential twist in Kapustin’s argument resides exactly here, when he 
notes that political liberalism possesses delimiting capacities on account of its relevance for
i
political life and hence for the survival of the polity (Kapustin, 1999, p.49). The significance 
o f the collapse of the Communist experiment is nowhere as obvious as in this anchoring of
! political liberalism in the societal purpose that any political thought invariably has.
!
I In other words, if political liberalism as it emanated in the West is contingent upon the
i
i
| very historical circumstances that existed there, then this contingent character o f liberalism 
j must not be taken to be synonymous with arbitrariness. In a politico-theoretical framework,
! contingency does not beget relativism, as the disastrous failure of communism to effectively
1 cope with modernity has shown. Whether this refusal to endorse a radically relativist position
stems more from the desperate hope that Russia will one day attain a similar political order, or 
is theoretically motivated, is hard to ascertain in the cases o f both Kapustin and Akhiezer’s 
theories. The fact remains that, by virtue of anchoring the evaluation of a given political order 
in the degree to which it creatively responds to the challenges o f modernity, Kapustin has 
introduced a criterion for the vindication of political thought that effectively undermines 
relativism in its most radical form. His approach equally incorporates into the assessment 
procedure a moment o f flexibility that allows the constant revision essential to any political 
order which must accommodate features of modem social and political life. But is his idea of 
political liberalism sufficiently prescriptive? Does it not allow many o f the norms which are
scientific progress by the substitution o f  an old paradigm by a new one. Kapustin, 1998, p. 15
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thought to be intrinsic to political liberalism to be left wayside? Does it, in fact, provide any 
guidance in situations where values conflict and prioritising judgements is required? Is 
Kapustin’s formula not theoretically empty to the degree of being superfluous?
Kapustin denies that connecting political thought with modernity produces a definition 
of political liberalism that is void of any differentiating potential. His starting point for 
demonstrating that his idea o f political liberalism possesses a (albeit diminished) prescriptive 
component is to point to those aspects o f societal life that have emerged over the last centuries 
which are essential to the survival of social orders. He identifies three different elements of 
modem life exclusively congruous with liberalism and at the same time engendered by the 
problems of modem life. Firstly, states are necessarily committed to some principle of 
inclusivity and equality embodied in the ideas of equal value of every individual and equality 
before the law. Secondly, he notes that in the absence of a common idea of the good the only 
plausible alternative appears to be to grant the freedom to everybody to define and find their 
own notion o f personal fulfilment. And thirdly, in absence o f a common idea of this sort, the 
natural way o f developing a social order evidences the agreement between the citizens, 
symbolised by the idea o f the social contract (Kapustin, 1999, p.53). Eliminating those moral 
and ethical norms that collide with reality allows the evolution of the (political and social) 
institutions of the contemporary world (ibid.). This, so Kapustin argues, encapsulates the 
critical-emancipatory potential of the liberal ideology (utopiia). From the perspective of a 
political theorist, the promulgation of these three aspects o f modem life smacks of an 
inadmissible conflation of normative and descriptive elements. A further clarification of the 
real intent and content of Kapustin’s normative argument is still required. The inner 
mechanism through which modernity ‘selects’ those moral norms that coincide with liberal 
worldviews is explained by Kapustin in another extended article in which he uses the 
metaphor of an ‘experiment’ to elucidate this process.
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In this article, Kapustin gives probably the most thorough formulation of his idea of 
the critical connection between modernity and liberal political thought. Kapustin is aware that 
the theoretical territory he has to examine is demarcated by the more or less deterministic 
perception of the relation between history and ideas. If Kapustin wants to show persuasively 
that liberalism as political idea is the outcome of a contingent historical constellation yet 
inevitably the only feasible response to modernity, he needs to sever the link between actual 
history and the liberal idea as a formative force in history and subsequently to reconstruct it 
philosophically.
His solution to this problem appears to be to assign a ‘constructivist’ potential to the 
liberal idea. Constructivism in this context for Kapustin designates a conceptualising capacity 
to the idea of liberty, yet not a formative one in the sense that the liberal ideology would 
‘make’ history. He writes:
‘In this sense the liberal idea is not potent enough to create a liberal-democratic society, 
just as Marxism-Leninism cannot create a totalitarian-Communist society. The 
‘constructivist’ function of the (liberal) idea manifests something else. A conflict can 
arise within society that is not solved and regulated through the preservation o f its 
participants (in their) former socio-cultural definition. ‘Constructivism’ necessarily 
must mean in this case that the new idea of society consists ‘merely’ in the assistance to 
the conflicting parties to find their new definition and to contemplate the possibility of 
their new dimensions of their existence, by virtue o f which they can ‘process’ and 
institutionalise the conflict in order to obtain security and the realisation of their 
interests.’ (Kapustin, 1995, p .127)
Yet, to limit the constructive potential of the liberal idea to the assistance it can provide to 
social and political forces in envisaging their future societal roles and positions in a future 
liberal political structure is to neglect the role the liberal idea can play in the transformational 
process itself. This is where Kapustin’s picture departs from Western political theory in the 
Rawlsian mould, which refuses to acknowledge that the vision of a future society and the 
outline of the path that is adopted towards it are two sides of the same coin.
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‘The liberal idea is (also) constructive in the sense that the realisation o f the possibility 
(of transformation) does not provide the immanent logic of the socio-cultural processes 
and requires the mediating role o f the (liberal) idea.’ (Kapustin, 1995, p. 127)
But note that Kapustin’s picture is still far from adopting an entirely deterministic tone in 
which ideas would predetermine the outcome of historical process. Most appropriately, he 
refers to Hegel in demarcating the difference between a deterministic historiography and his 
theoretical intentions.
‘The ‘constructivist’ idea as an expression of the possibility and the project of a new 
social integrity as a vision (vzgliad) o f existing forces and interests is transcendent to 
their current (nalishnyi- available, ready) existence insofar as they, using a Hegelian 
phrase, ‘remain at the mercy of their spontaneity’, (ibid.)
This idea cannot generate the participants o f the conflict, but it manifests their self- 
consciousness. He sums up the part the liberal idea plays in the development of a modem 
political order in three points. Firstly, the liberal idea assists in the identification of the central 
conflict. Secondly, it presents it to society and thirdly, it provides the ideological forms and 
the formulae of political mobilisation for the realisation of the project of societal preservation.
So far, Kapustin has outlined a notion o f liberalism as a concept that carries in itself 
the formulation of the problem the social and political players face as well as the ways in 
which it can be overcome. The integrity o f this conceptualisation runs more along Hegelian 
lines and sets Kapustin’s theory of liberalism off from Neo-Kantian formulations, such as 
Rawls’, which charges practical reason with the task of discovering (or even creating, in 
earlier versions) the political conception of justice, i.e. a political consensus. Kapustin’s 
approach implies that liberty as the essence of this future political consensus must somehow 
be thought of as being inherent to the workings of this practical reason (the path towards a 
political arrangement). Rawls rejected this interpretation on the grounds of its metaphysical 
requirements which seemed to him to be unfeasible. Yet, the upshot is that liberty must be 
perceived as a political value, rather than a metaphysical idea with co-ordinating potential.
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Rawls thus has to recover liberty’s ‘creative’ potential by constructing a whole edifice of 
reasons that make it, politically, desirable for political players across a range o f different 
comprehensive doctrines. Returning to Kapustin, he has now to show whether or not the idea 
of liberty can have the co-ordinating function it has had in other historical contexts.
Posing the question of the applicability of liberalism, with Russia in the frame of 
whether or not certain conditions thought to be requisite for the existence of a liberal political 
order can prevail in Russia’s present and future, can only, so Kapustin remarks correctly, lead 
to utter tautology. Identifying the liberal idea with the features of a specific theoretical and 
practical model of transformation and associating it with empirical circumstances that call for 
the realisation of this model rids the idea of liberty o f its creative potential. Two logically 
similar, but ideologically contradictory, positions ensue. Either, so one could argue, Russia 
possesses a socio-economic and politico-cultural genotype that is principally alien to 
liberalism, or, on the other hand, one would argue, that if Russia were to acquire a liberal 
political order ‘within her social and cultural fabric there must be reproduced those empirical 
circumstances which are considered to be decisive for the development o f that model of 
liberalism’ (Kapustin, 1995, p. 128). This essentially was the position of the Gaidar reform 
team, which set out to ‘form a middle class’ through privatisation, to imitate the 
corresponding liberal political institutions, and to create a self-regulating market economy 
(Kapustin, 1995, p .129). Yet, so Kapustin argues, this led to the paradox that
‘the absence of the empirical circumstances made it impossible to identify those social 
subjects that desired the transformation. Consequently, one once again had to set hopes 
on the state, which was little else but a euphemism for the ‘bureaucracy.’ (Kapustin, 
1995, p .129)
This succinctly sums up why most attempts at liberal reform in Russian history, when 
modelled on the Western model, acquire this ideological edge. Kapustin’s alternative account 
of what liberalism is must then reveal the problem(atique) that lay at the very origins of
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Western liberalism. As has been mentioned already with reference to other articles, he 
considers this to be a question of societal survival or reproduction under the conditions of 
individuality. After dismissing Hobbes’ account of the creation o f a political order by resting 
the social contract on instrumental rationality, he returns to characterise the decisively liberal 
response to the problem of how to retain and promote a viable social fabric on the basis of 
individualism and individual interests. He uses the metaphor of an experiment to describe the 
emanation of the liberal idea within a society. The meaning of this experiment lies in 
orientating the search for that political order within whose parameters the central liberal task 
can be accomplished:
‘...the socialisation of private individuals and private interests through the provision of
their maximally possible and minimally guaranteed freedoms.’ (Kapustin, 1995, p. 138)
Yet, Kapustin notes that just as the imitation of the Western experiment would not lead to 
Russian liberalism, so it seems that Russia lacks all or almost all conditions which allowed the 
West to channel the liberating drive towards private advantage into economic interests and 
fruitful economic development. He refers to Easton’s criteria, which in his view must be 
present and in a stable relation for a successful implementation of the liberal idea. First, a 
definition of the cultural-ethical identity of the social group under consideration, the question 
as to who constitutes the ‘w e’. Second, the constitutional and institutional structures of the 
regime, i.e. a definition of the rules and procedures (constitution). And third, a determination 
of the distribution of (political and economic) resources. None of the above, so Kapustin 
argues, are existent in Russia at the moment, in spite of their being crucial for a transcendence 
of the mere individualised economic interest. (Kapustin, 1995, pp.140-141). Correspondingly, 
the tripartite structure of politics can be described as ‘qualities’ of people: the first one relates 
to virtue and honour, the second to reason, and the third one represents interest or motivation. 
Now, for Kapustin, the complexity of the liberal experiment consists in the interrelation o f (1)
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to (3), their causal nexus as well as their different ‘rhythms’ of evolution. He abandons 
Hegelian grounds now by claiming that the stability of a cultural identity, Easton’s (1), must 
exist prior to settling the distribution of political power and determining the structure of 
political authority (Kapustin, 1995, p. 140). This leaves the polity in its quest to determine 
Easton’s (1) to (3), relying on one factor only: the private interest of individuals -  a primacy 
that has no parallel in Western political history. The sheer lack of theoretical 
conceptualisation o f the transformational processes, i.e. the unfolding relations between all 
three aspects, amongst liberal intellectuals during the first post-Communist decade thus 
contributed to the fatal primacy of private interests as something like a default position for 
any reform programme (Kapustin, 1995, p .141). To carve out a sensible conceptualisation of 
how (1) to (3) should and could relate in the Russian context must be preceded then by a 
critique of the ‘key notions’ of the ‘liberal idea’ in the nineties. Kapustin pans out three 
different concepts of the nature of the post-Communist society. First, there is the 
‘philosophical-historical’ interpretation of the exit from communism perceiving it as a process 
of overcoming the ‘particularity’ of Russia and rejoining the path of Western Europe.
Kapustin calls this a synthesis of the positivistic evolutionism that prevailed in the 
nineteenth century with the (determininistic) historicism of Marxist persuasion which 
conditions the ‘vulgar’ progressivism and imitative character o f Russian liberalism (Kapustin, 
1995, p. 142). This view is neatly summed up by saying that it rejects the possibility o f there 
being two ‘liberal experiments’. A second notion of Russian transformation takes the view 
that the ‘natural historical laws’ are economic in nature and universal. This view represents, 
so Kapustin maintains, the quintessence of vulgar economism and its fixation on only those 
manifestations that evidence these economic laws. This is the in-built distortion which 
prohibits it from conceptualising those social and political conditions that make those 
‘economic laws’ appear so ‘natural’ (yestestvenno-istoricheskie) (Kapustin, 1995, p .143). The 
dilemma of the proponents of the (universal) economic view o f liberalism is that they have to
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show that those moral-cultural and institutional factors which provide the basis for Western 
liberalism exist in Russian, or, alternatively, if they do not exist, how to create them (ibid.).
The third view is of the structuralist-sociological conviction. It contends that if  the 
social structures of Western (modem) societies and those o f the Russian society were in 
principle similar and the Western societies are democratic, then Russia will eventually come 
to be democratic too. This view assumes a linear, one-directional causal connection between 
social structure and the resultant political order. The advantage is that, if  true, the role of 
(liberal) ideology would be reduced, so Kapustin contends, and it would provide a 
legitimation for a temporary authoritarian regime assisting the transformational process in 
Russia by creating the socio-economic preconditions for a liberal political stmcture. 
Dismissing this proposition by pointing to the market as being by nature a spontaneous rather 
than devised order, Kapustin goes on to emphasise that the error o f most of the formulations 
o f liberal reform lies in their disregard for the sequence in which the content o f the three 
aspects mentioned above must be determined. In fact, Kapustin argues, liberals repeatedly 
abstract from the definition of identity of the polity that is most fundamental to the evolution 
of liberal political institutions (p. 145). Yet, as long as the identity of the polity and the basic 
procedures of political and economic distribution are in question, the regime cannot legitimise 
itself through its effectiveness in relation to the market: it simply cannot act effectively in 
market reforms, as long as the identity of the polity and the manner of resource distribution 
are not determined (ibid.). A temporary order obtains between the three aspects that cannot be 
ignored.
Thus Kapustin concludes that a coherent and specific formulation o f the relations 
between the three components of liberal societies must be found for Russia. The picture is 
further complicated by the fact that the Russian state has lost much of its independence and 
has been ‘appropriated’ or ‘colonised’ by private interests. The question is which factors can 
induce the powerful economic (and synonymous with that: political) elite, to produce a
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workable compromise which stabilises their relations and produces a willingness on their part 
to observe the arrangement installed (Kapustin, 1995, p. 158). Rousseau’s critique of Hobbes, 
so Kapustin argues, has convincingly shown that private interests cannot conjure up a 
common interest, or to put it differently, citizenship cannot be the automatic outcome of 
individualism. Kapustin concludes that the logic of equilibrium that would bring about the 
political compromise must be somewhat contingent on the specific circumstances. The 
difficulty is to how institutionalise the contingent contours of the political solution. What 
remains, according to Kapustin, is to reveal the boundaries o f the liberal experiment by 
reference to the various requirements o f a liberal order: how to obtain a sufficient 
effectiveness while not disrupting the influence ‘from below’ on elitist groups in the 
extremely weak Russian civil society (Kapustin, 1995, p. 159).
To do this, Kapustin eventually returns to Hegel and his idea o f the constructive 
conflict between private and common interests. There is little guidance in figuring out how 
private interests can generate a common interest but Hegel’s idea of the mutuality that is 
involved in private competition may be o f use when taken as relating to the conditions that 
must be fulfilled for a realisation of private interests in the first place (Kapustin, 1995, p. 160). 
And, although this may indicate the possibility of the transformation of private interests into 
general interests, Kapustin leaves it here without even outlining at least the normative task 
that still beckons. His argument is persuasive on the general analysis of the conceptual 
fallacies o f previous liberal theorisations of Russian transformations, yet his conclusions seem 
of only tentative quality as long as he refrains from sketching the possible path to a liberal 
political order that takes into account the need for an appropriate ranking of the three aspects 
which Kapustin borrows from Easton, as well as what the role of liberty in the process of 
determining the sequence or temporal ranking o f the three aspects could possibly be.
Thus he fails to fill the gap between the constructivist view of political liberalism and 
the normative work which he believes is necessary to ascertain the proper historical definition
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of the identity of the polity, the distributive criteria, and the political structures that cast these 
definitions into a constitutional framework providing the resources for legitimation. 
Kapustin’s argument thus remains critical with regard to the history of the liberal idea in 
Russia, yet he misses an opportunity to undertake the normative work required himself. His 
approach, however, will allow us to draw some important conclusions.
There is first the relevance of the Western historical experience that is indispensable 
for Russian political liberalism. The critique of Russian liberal reforms reveals that the crucial 
mistake has been a lack of conceptualisation of the preconditions for individualistic gain and 
interest satisfaction and this, in turn, intimates that the sequencing of the three aspects of 
liberal politics as manifested in Western political history is not merely ephemeral or fortuitous 
but significant. This asserts, if not the primacy of a historiographical reconstruction of 
political liberalism, at least the nature of liberalism as a historical phenomenon. ‘Historical’ 
here, however, is quite a blunt expression. Kapustin’s notion o f a liberal political order as an 
‘experiment’ conveys the historical aspect of it far better. It connotes a situation of a polity in 
continuous search for the correct definition of its own identity and the appropriate political 
formations to express this current level of self-consciousness. The idea of political liberalism 
as an ‘experiment’ also incorporates a sufficient flexibility that reflects the constant change 
which represents a challenge to a received notion of identity. This, however, remains mainly a 
descriptive exercise as long as the framework in which the transformation (or erstwhile/initial 
formation) of the political space can be theorised as a transition from private to common 
interest. Kapustin believes that this must be the proper location for Hegel’s analysis of the 
interrelation between the private and the public, as it is disclosed through the instruments of 
civil society.
Dismissing a Hobbesian argument that rests on instrumental rationality as being 
insufficient for generating a common identity, he pins his hopes on the translation of private 
interests into a common good as exemplified in Hegel’s view of civil society. Yet, without
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specifying the role that liberty (and the idea of liberty) plays in Hegel’s portrayal of the 
emergence o f liberal society and how this can eradicate the mistakes o f the reform-minded 
economism of present day Russian liberals, it remains an empty shell awaiting further 
elaboration. It seems crucial then in tackling the issue to clarify the exact link that relates the 
constructivist function of the liberal idea (in its normative content) with the specific 
formulation of the answers to the three Eastonian questions. Kapustin did not venture into this 
territory any further, but we must.
A brief summary of Kapustin’s argument will help us to sharpen the focus for the 
argument that remains to be made. However, a note of caution is in order. It should be 
stressed for reasons of fairness that the way Kapustin’s argument has been arranged in the 
present exposition does not correspond necessarily either with his theoretical intentions or 
with the order in which he wrote the articles that have been selected for the present purpose. I 
have, to a certain degree, given his arguments a pointedness and at times extrapolated a 
conclusion from them that Kapustin would not necessarily have endorsed or, indeed, have 
seen as a plausible conclusion from his argument in the first place. The justification for this 
lies in the potential uses which Kapustin’s arguments have for the present purpose and which 
go further than he has explicitly recognised.
To start with, Kapustin’s position with regard to a definition of liberalism was 
sketched. He expounded his views in a series of articles, which have drawn some criticism on 
account of their alleged vagueness. He argued that liberalism must be seen as a problem of 
modernity which is intricately linked with two norms of societal life: the preservation of an 
existing order and the accommodation of the paramount propensity o f modem life towards 
individualism. Kapustin seems to assume that both ideas represent norms from which it is 
admissible to reason to a definition of political liberalism. The advantages and disadvantages 
are apparent. Although critics have rejected Kapustin’s notion of liberalism as too vague, this 
opacity does in fact introduce a flexibility to his approach that pays off when it comes to the
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analysis of the liberal idea in Russian history. Yet, the most serious disadvantage is that 
Kapustin needs to show why modernity is inextricably linked with a general idea of 
individualism and the sustenance o f an existing social order as a normative principle. The 
exact relation between individualism and personal liberty remains oblique in Kapustin’s 
picture. Moreover, why should the preservation of an existing social order per se be 
prioritised over the enhancement o f personal liberty? It should be noted, however, that 
Kapustin’s picture does not concur with a strict conservative hierarchy of norms in which the 
preservation of the existing order assumes a position overriding all other societal maxims. 
Kapustin reasons from a position of modernity which, inevitably, rests on a high degree of 
individuality and the aspiration to individual freedom.
Yet, as Kapustin makes clear in his criticism of the Russian reforms under Gaidar, 
individualism describes a wide field of social orientations, not least the excessive economic 
liberalism that came to be so synonymous with greed and unfettered individualism during the 
first post-Communist decade in Russia, something Kapustin characterises as an erroneous 
conception of liberalism and consequently repudiates as being incompatible with Russian 
social and political circumstances and the requirements of a post-Communist society.
Here lies the strength of his conceptual critique of a liberalism that disregards its own 
historical conditionality. Kapustin accurately condemns the libertarianism that underpinned 
the Gaidarian reform efforts as presumptuous insofar as it thought o f itself as creating its own 
prerequisites and assumed that the ideal of liberalism was readily transferable to any 
particular place and time. Kapustin appropriately points to the conditions that are to be 
fulfilled for economic liberty to take root. His argument for the primacy of a notion of 
political identity and procedures for the distribution of political and social resources neatly 
parallels the fundamental criticism by Margaret Canovan of the lack of theoretical attention to 
the preconditions of Western liberal theorising (Canovan, 1996). Yet, Kapustin does not argue 
for a better awareness of the preconditions of liberal political theory. His point on the required
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temporal order o f historical conditions for liberalism amounts to more. It is not so much a 
theoretical point as one resulting from historical retrospection. And the connection between 
theorising a liberal political order in Russia and the ramifications of this historical 
introspection are far from clear. If modernity is characterised adequately by the ascendancy of 
individualism and this introduces additional features into the fabric of existing societies which 
simultaneously threaten to disrupt them, then clearly Kapustin must show what the 
implications for the theory of Russian liberalism are. The normative work which is required 
here must amount to nothing less than an assessesment of the extent to which individualism 
and its proper content may be compatible with the Russian social environment. Or, 
alternatively, one would have to evaluate the indispensability of individualism as a behaviour 
regulating principle for Russia as a modem society. Is a modem society conceivable without 
the Western idea of individualism?
The metaphor of political liberalism as an ‘experiment’ carries some explanatory 
weight. It has several advantages. First, it acknowledges a flexibility that must obtain in the 
relation between the ‘purified’ idea of liberty and the social and political conditions which 
need to accommodate this idea. It rejects the subjugation of politics to abstract philosophical 
concepts and thus reflects adequately the constant need for revision that ensues in the process 
o f theory impacting on reality. Second it recognises the possibility of failure and urges any 
theory to identify the criteria for identifying and analysing such failure. Kapustin assigns this 
to the idea of societal stability, yet I can see no argument for it. He thus leaves himself open to 
the charge of arbitrarily prioritising the idea o f societal preservation over, say, rampant 
economic individualism, which, despite his remarks on it being de-contextualised and hence 
representing a deviation from the historical norm (extrapolated from the West), might still be 
taken as an ultimate destination in conducting the liberal experiment.
Kapustin explores the link between modernity and individualism to some degree in his 
book ‘Modernity as a Subject-Matter of Political Theory’ (1998). There he also offers a
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thorough critique of the transitology literature that has been so popular amongst Russian 
liberal reformers around the Gaidar team. Although Kapustin’s position does not become 
entirely clear, he nevertheless manages to marshal some impressive theoretical arguments for 
what he calls a cultural theory of modernity vis-a-vis the a-cultural perspective favoured by 
transitologists in both West and East. The distinction he draws between cultural and a-cultural 
theories fairly neatly correspond to other, more common distinctions drawn in Western 
literature, such as those between communitarianism and universalist liberalism. His intention 
is to sketch the variations in explanations of modernity through the cultural and the a-cultural 
lens, respectively. Since he favours a cultural approach to the question of modernity, the 
crucial point is whether or not modernity is inextricably linked in his conception with 
(Western) democracy and how he would construct this link -  or, as he puts it himself, ‘how 
and why does the process o f transformation occur from ‘particularism’ to ‘universalism’? ’ 
(Kapustin, 1998, p. 134). Characterising the two different theoretical approaches he notes that 
culturalist theories (henceforth: CTs) attempt to explain modernity in cultural categories, 
whereas a-culturalist theories (henceforth: ATs) conceive of modernity as being neutral to 
cultural background conditions and as universal insofar as it comprises an invariable core o f 
processes, such as industrialisation, secularisation, democratisation and the prioritisation of 
scientific rationality (Kapustin, 1998, p.80). Kapustin points out that proponents of ATs have 
often criticised a caricature of CTs instead of engaging with the more complex issues that a 
fulsome CT raises. By no means, so Kapustin contends, do adherents of CTs ignore the 
constantly occurring institutional change in societies. What CT and AT protagonists really 
disagree on is the concept of human agency and to what extent and how human actions are 
formative in bringing about the changes that contribute to modem forms o f life. For Kapustin, 
this touches upon the crucial question of human freedom and how to theorise it. ‘If human 
beings are free then to which extent can they be (seen) in relation to (the cultural symbols) 
that generate the fabric of their culture’ (Kapustin, 1998, p .82). CTs and ATs also differ in the
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interpretation of societal change, insofar as the former understands it as growing out of, and 
ultimately explicable in reference to, the cultural conditions, whereas AT espouses a view of 
human actions that understands them as being ‘directed towards’ something. Kapustin 
remarks that this idea o f human actions as contributing to a certain ‘project’ is part and parcel 
of any AT, whereas CTs refuse to accept any trajectory of modernity (Kapustin, 1998, p .85). 
In other words, for CTs
‘modernisation is a historically conditioned evolution in which the form of reason is 
liberating itself from its ‘own monologue’ and develops the capacity to question, 
criticise and transform the personal foundations which were hitherto seen as natural and 
self-evident’ (Kapustin, 1998, pp.87-88).
For Kapustin, adherents of CTs can offer the more plausible explanation of the transformation 
of reason that sustains the social and political changes leading to modernity. Advocates o f CT 
do not have to assume a free-floating, independently motivated reason triggering modernising 
processes, but can ground modernity in the cultural conditions that develop gradually in 
changing societies. This equally allows them to dispose of the assumption of the intentionality 
of modernity, comprehending it as a process unfolding according to human design (Kapustin, 
1998. p.90). Two terms, however, permit Kapustin to characterise the role of reason in the 
transformation of societies. Modern reason is necessary and tragic: necessary because people 
must live under conditions of modernity and thus the disintegration of pre-modem conditions 
of living is inevitable. This necessity is grounded in the human condition which is ‘to live 
with the problems and contradiction (of the modem world) and never achieve a final solution’ 
(Kapustin, 1998, p.91). In effect it means the end of the ‘ontological unity of the world’ that 
characterises all pre-modem societies. From now on,
‘reason is necessary because people need to do something unprecedented, for their 
former history, (that is) to produce the foundations (moral and political) of their own 
society (obzhezhitie) without reference to authorities. Reason must (adopt the role) of
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law-giver because of the problematisation o f the (common) good, since the 
interpretations of the norms cannot be limited by authorities anymore.’ (Kapustin, 1998, 
P-91)
Adherents of ATs now work with three presuppositions that allow them to assert that these 
foundations of modem life can be procured by strict adherence to the correct methods of 
reasoning, which are in turn universal. Firstly, Kapustin writes, they must assume that the 
subject of reasoning is not connected with the object matter o f his reasoning, that somehow he 
will be able to adopt an external position to the object considered. Herein lie the origins o f the 
claim of objectivity. Secondly, any (disinterested) observer must be able to relate the object to 
his own idea of perfection. And thirdly, the capacity to reason must per defmitio be 
understood as being universal, not depending or conditioned by cultural environments. 
Kapustin calls the third presupposition of AT the ‘deepest foundation o f any ‘project’ driven 
thought and social-engineering approach to reality’ (Kapustin, 1998, p.93) which is reflected 
in the ideology of the liberal-democratic reformers of the nineties.
Since Kapustin accepts the human condition as a fair and reliable description o f the 
modern predicament, lie would have to sketch an alternative notion o f reason that is capable 
of generating a societal agreement as well as reaches beyond the possibly narrow cultural 
boundaries, i.e. can appear plausible to extraneous reason without resorting to the idea of a 
universal reason. As he expounds the theoretical dilemma:
‘reason that acknowledges its historical (conditionality) deprives itself of its self- 
sufficiency.’ (Kapustin, 1998, p.95)
Kantian and Lockean conceptions of reasons seem to be inapplicable, the former for its 
metaphysical assumptions, the latter for its theological suppositions. (Protestantism would 
indeed cut very little ice in Russia.) In contrast to these two ideas of reason, and perhaps not 
surprisingly, the Hegelian construction of reason is likely to be more amenable to Kapustin’s
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purposes, not least because it offers a unique incorporation o f historical and universal 
features. While the Hegelian Absolute Spirit is somehow fused with the historical context, it 
still asserts the possibility of an objective morality. Kapustin does not seem to think that 
Hegel’s theoretical construct is wholly convincing, but he outlines two plausible 
interpretations. Either one thinks of (Hegelian) reason as being identifiable with one cultural 
context only, repressing/contradicting any others, or modem (Hegelian) reason ‘suppresses 
the ‘otherness’ and originality within its own context’ (Kapustin, 1998, p.97). He appears to 
be inclined to formulate a position in keeping with the second interpretation and argues that 
since ‘truth’ has undoubtedly become unachievable, and insofar as
‘truth as a possibility and a reality o f societal life does not reside in reason but in 
experimentally generating interaction between reasons, what is possible is only political 
reason, hence the reasonability of reason is revealed only in the success of the 
experiment o f free interaction o f autonomous reasons ... and insofar as truth is only 
interaction of different reasons, the real reason appears only as democratic reason or 
reason of democracy.’ (Kapustin, 1998, pp.97-98)
Kapustin deviates here from the Hegelian construct insofar as he pushes the experimental 
aspect of human interaction into the foreground. His move might be justifiable by reference to 
the implausibility of Hegel’s idea of the Absolute Spirit, yet his perspective also discards -  
along with the notion of external i ty or independent criteria forjudging -  the socially sustained 
reason. Although he endeavours to salvage this link, his solution appears to be assertive rather 
than grounded. He writes:
‘(Since) the reasonability (of reason) does not consist in reason as such but in its 
capacity to be communicated with other types o f reasons, recognising its autonomy, 
...this reason is (only) realised highly contextually and experimentally.’ (Kapustin, 
1998, p.97)
Yet, in order to maintain an open relation between modernity, the ensuing political institutions 
and their cultural environment, he still has some explaining to do as to how our conception of
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Western political institutions as the modern institutions came about. For him, it is a story of 
mistaken identity, where the once successful political procedures offering a (temporary) 
solution to the modern experiment acquired an ‘ontological status’ that was ill-suited to such 
tentative framework of merely purposive character. As modem institutions become identified 
with modernity itself, they lose their ‘problematic’ aspect, and hence the creative component 
in the understanding of modernity as problem is suppressed and societal stagnation ensues. 
Modernity, in fact, adopts the very features of its predecessor, traditional societal 
arrangements that are frozen in time and unquestionable (Kapustin, 1998, p. 109). 
Paraphrasing Laclau, Kapustin calls this conversion of the outcome of the modem question 
into the alleged universal conditions of its preservation, the trivialisation that seeks to avoid to 
problematise again and again the relation between modernity and its institutions that are 
thought to be augmenting the political dilemma. Kapustin encapsulates this issue in the 
following way:
‘not what freedom is or how it can be accomplished, but how do ‘free institutions’ 
function, that is those institutions that are considered to be free irrespective of them 
providing liberty as it is currently understood and how people understand it today. This 
is... the ‘trivialisation’ of modernity.’ (Kapustin, 1998, p .109)
To recover the real meaning and creative force of modernity one would have to ‘overcome its 
monologic (character) and assert its right to determine (zakonodatel’stvovat’)’ (Kapustin, 
1998, p .110) the response of a certain polity to the modem dilemma. Kapustin thus sees the 
underlying and unifying feature of modernity in its irreducible plurality of opinions, or, in the 
disappearance of a singular public reason. Given the impermissibility to postulate the 
superiority o f one particular reason over others, the political space must inevitably embrace a 
minimum of democratic procedures in order to allow the necessary recognition of other 
opinions and their equal status, as well as to facilitate the free and unhampered exchange of 
opinions so that an agreement c; n be reached. However, Kapustin qualifies this picture
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considerably when he points out that ‘democracy’ here does not mean representative 
democracy o f the West.
The open-endedness of the modern challenge would be curtailed by preordaining its 
outcome as being fashioned after the Western model. We may have good reasons to advocate 
representative democracy and a capitalist market democracy in certain circumstances, yet one 
has to recognise on the one hand their particularity, i.e. that both are instruments formulated 
and established under particular historical conditions and, on the other hand, that pre-empting 
the outcome of the search for the most appropriate response to modernity in different 
historical circumstances is tantamount to the logical error o f identifying modernity with the 
contingent responses people have given to it. It diminishes its creative potential and would 
amount to what Oakeshott called, 'the transfer of the abridgements’ of the complex traditions 
of politics. The issue of democratic institutions reflects the theoretical depth o f CTs. As 
Kapustin writes in the course of a thorough critique of AT and transitological views, 
democracy for CT is not one of the components of the constellation of modernity but rather an 
indication of the level of non-cocrccd interaction between a plurality o f traditions (Kapustin, 
1995, p. 143).
Democracy as formulated and institutionalised in a certain historical context is thus the 
manner in which it was deemed to be capable of dealing with the irreducible diversity of 
opinions. Yet, Kapustin makes clear that the term democracy relates to a moral and spiritual 
(dukhovnaia) idea rather than being identifiable with a particular set of institutions. By 
proclaiming it as an ethical idea (Kapustin, 1995, p .144) Kapustin reveals his indebtedness to, 
and his unwillingness to foreclose, the rich Russian liberal philosophical tradition, which 
attempted to salvage the moral content of political arrangements in contrast to the ‘cold’, 
‘lifeless’ and mechanistic notions of politics in the West. Soloviev’s attempt to define law as 
an irreducible minimum of morality epitomises this period o f liberal philosophy, just as it 
represents its eventual failure. Kapustin, perhaps inadvertently, produces a conflict between
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the professed political character of modem institutions and the desire to rest them on 
culturally embedded moral maxims. Somehow, Kapustin does not seem to trust his de­
monologic politics. And perhaps his misgivings would be alleviated if he would analyse more 
clearly the moral implications and the moral input into the political arrangement that is 
considered the appropriate response to the disintegration o f a unanimous public reason. 
Although this brief summary of Kapustin’s concept of modernity sufficiently sketches the 
intricacies of the relationship between modernity and political institutions as he understands 
it, it still leaves us with the problem that in order to formulate an appropriate response to the 
modern dilemma, the cultural background that serves as a reservoir of possible answers needs 
to be intact to facilitate meaningful replies. What, however, if  this is not the case? What, if 
Russia’s problem is not so much her inability to finalise the answer, i.e. to forge the 
procedures that would enable Russians to reach a harmonious conclusion, but her lack of 
unequivocal cultural traditions? How much of a coherent social and cultural fabric is essential 
for drawing up an appropriate response? Is Akhiezer right to see the societal rift as the 
ultimate cause of Russia’s disintegration? Does modernity overwhelm those societies that are 
in a state o f cultural ‘confusion’, experiencing a loss of historical experience? The following 
chapter will look at theoretical views which attempt to reconcile Western concepts with the 
Russian political and social situati' n by construing it through the idea of chaos.
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13. Political Theory- Liberalism, Chaos, and Anarchy
One of the most unyielding p r o b l e m s  of liberalism is how to define it. Theorists in the West 
do not usually engage in attempts to determine the content of liberalism, mainly because the 
theoretical debate has a s u f f i c i e n t  semantic and topical stability. So arguments revolve around 
certain themes that rarely have crosscutting potential. Although, say, a profound disagreement 
on the essence of liberalism may l i e  at the heart of the debate on the concept o f justice in a 
liberal political order, no o n e  w o u l d  seriously recast the debate as a confrontation between 
varying definitions o f  l i b e r a l i s m  o r  liberty. That liberalism is conceptually underdetermined is 
corroborated simply b y  l o o k i n g  a t  the various positions that liberals can adopt in different 
theoretical fields without ‘ c r o s s i n g  swords’. Liberalism m aybe identified with such contrary 
positions as rationalism, and s c e p t i c i s m ,  and in fact it has even ‘found room for individualism 
and communitarianism’ ( G a u s .  2 0 0 0 ,  p .1 9 3 ) .  The antinomic structure of liberalism m aybe of 
concern only to those who w o u l d  like to construct a liberal theoretical edifice without any 
inherent tensions or c o n t r a d i c t i o n s .  But while this may well turn out to be unrealistic on 
account of the various f u n c t i o n s  liberalism plays in modem society, from ideology and 
political doctrine to a c o h e r e n t  philosophy of ethics, Russian scholars have been particularly 
‘bothered’ by the lack of a c o h e r e n t  definition of liberalism. The reasons for this seem clear. 
If there was a definition o f  liberalism that could command considerable theoretical support, 
what many Russians believe t o  b e  the pseudo-liberalism of the Gaidarian kind could be 
criticised and ‘unmasked’ a s  e c o n o m i c a l l y  or politically motivated.
Additionally, the question as to whether or not Russia is susceptible to a liberal 
political order could be clarified once and for all. Finding a reliable definition of political 
liberalism, then, is part of the project by liberally minded scholars in Russia to recover the 
reputation of liberalism and dissociate it from the crude neo-liberalism that informed the 
reforms in the nineties.
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A first precipitous impulse may well be to conceive of liberalism as a Weltanschauung, 
a worldview or, as Pustarnakov calls it, ‘an emotional and intellectual ‘landscape’. However, 
as he points out, the ‘ingredients of liberalism are boundless then and a history of liberalism 
could not be written since [liberalism] would be indistinguishable from other directions of 
thought’ (Pustarnakov, 1996, p.60). Far more promising seems to be to identify liberalism 
with an invariable core of ideas that somehow manifests its essence (Pustarnakov, 1996, 
p.60). Pustarnakov contrasts this idea with Kapustin’s concept o f liberalism as being identical 
with modernity (or the modern perspective). He notes that, for Kapustin, liberalism would 
necessarily encompass a whole variety of political and social philosophies, ranging from 
(modem) conservatism to socialism (Pustarnakov, 1996, p.61). Yet, the confusion recedes if 
liberalism is understood in its applicability to many different areas of theoretical concern. 
Liberalism, Pustarnakov writes, has its own philosophy, sociology and ethics. The 
adaptability of liberalism, how ex er. would not mean that liberalism has no identifiable core 
conceptual arsenal. Evocative of Kapustin’s ‘experiment’ metaphor, Pustarnakov argues that 
liberalism must be understood as a response to the socio-political and economic reality of 
Western Europe, while essential components of liberalism, political liberalism, economic 
liberalism as well as philosophical liberalism, have been formulated separately and ‘have 
often been combined w ith non-liberal types of thought’ (Pustarnakov, 1996, p.62). One could 
single out, Pustarnakov thinks, three different sources of liberalism as a comprehensive 
doctrine, and each of them w as formulated in a particular theoretical context that necessarily 
impacted on the content of liberal thought. Economic liberalism grew out of the views of 
Adam Smith and the French proto-liberal physiocrats, political liberalism originates in the 
Enlightenment, while liberalism as philosophy combines elements of rationalism, empiricism 
and the French and English philosophy of the eighteenth century (Pustarnakov, 1996, p.63). 
The undertaking to define Russian liberalism is immeasurably more difficult since it involves 
the reflection in Russian political thought o f the variety and complexity o f the evolution of
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Western liberalism. Pustarnakov suggests that an understanding o f liberalism as passing 
through different stages in its historical formation may be helpful. He distinguishes between 
Western classical, post-classical and neo-classical liberalism, whereas Russia experienced 
only the manifestations o f a ‘para-liberalism’ and a ‘quasi-liberalism’ due to strong influences 
of nihilism and the idea o f ‘narodnishestvo’ (Pustarnakov, 1996, p.365). Russian liberalism in 
the pre-reform era was, though widespread, amalgamated with non-liberal tenets (often called 
bureaucratic or aristocratic liberalism) (Pustarnakov, 1996, p.362). The lack of concurrence of 
the historical stages in the development o f political liberalism in the West and in Russia 
makes it all the more difficult to define a conceptual centre to which political liberalism as a 
theoretical debate gravitates. Pustamakov’s remarks on the need to understand liberalism as a 
doctrine that manifests itself in a variety of theoretical fields and as being explicable only in 
the context of these theoretical areas is well taken. Yet, he fails to draw any conclusion from 
that and seems to withdraw to a descriptive position, giving a historical account of Russian 
liberalism in all its deviation from Western liberalism. In the course of his article it becomes 
clear that he seems to identify political liberalism with constitutionalism, yet he leaves it 
unclear why the conceptual constituents o f this notion, such as the idea of the rule o f law, 
would represent the sole core o f political liberalism.
The dissonance between the rise o f political liberalism in the West and in Russia 
remains vague, however, because Pustarnakov does not clarify the contents o f his threefold 
categorising scheme. What would para-liberalism mean with regard to the idea of 
constitutionalism? And how does this relate to the Western historical experience? Shelokhaiev 
has tried to cut through this jungle of different approaches, and believes that the main 
difference between Western and Russian liberalism lies in the incongruous development of 
civil society and liberal doctrine in Russia. While in the West the institutions of civil society 
have developed in step with the development of political liberalism, in Russia civil society 
remains incipient even to this day (Shelokhaiev, 1999, p.23). The liberal idea disseminated
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through the intellectual Russian elite mainly at the time when the autocratic regime 
strengthened its grip on society, and in consequence liberalism became synchronous to the 
idea of democracy rather than to the notion of independent civil society. This constitutes, so 
Shelokhaiev argues, the specificity of Russian liberalism (Shelokhaiev, pp.24-25), and it had a 
long-lasting effect on the influence and shape o f the idea o f law in Russian liberal political 
philosophy. Paraphrasing Valitzko, Shelokhaiev notes that the particular character of Russian 
liberalism lies in its accentuation of the ‘autonomy of law from politics, and of the logical and 
axiological priority o f legal culture (Rechtskultur) from political freedom’ (Shelokhaiev, 
1999, p.25).
The particularity of Russian liberalism was thus a product, so Shelokhaiev argues 
along the same lines as Novikova and Sizemskaia’s, o f the amalgamation of the rather 
abstract-general idea o f law that prevailed, and it was adopted from the West by the Russian 
humanitarian tradition. The ideal of Recht thus was combined with the principle o f equality 
and societal justice and was recognised in the concept of civil society as the highest moral 
ideal (ibid.). Russian liberalism was thus de-politicised at the same time as it gained 
increasingly an ethical content. The parallel to the later development o f dissident political 
thought such as that o f Vaclav Havel are striking. Just as the problems o f the concomitant 
delegitimation of politics afflict post-Communist dissident political positions, so did they 
prevent Russian liberals at the beginning of the twentieth century from creating and sustaining 
a sphere of politics that proved impermeable to moral precepts.
This de-politicisation of central liberal concepts and their impregnation with morality 
is often cited by Russian scholars as one o f the main characteristics o f Russian political 
thought, with its strong tendencies towards apolitical ethicism, the political thought of 
Soloviev and the inhibiting influence o f Tolstoi are major examples of this. It seems the more 
imperative that political liberalism in Russia becomes capable of conceiving the political 
arena as less an upshot of ethical maxims and more as an outcome of political bargaining.
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This indicates the important role a more Hobbesian account of the genesis of modem political 
order could come to play. Hobbes’ instrumental rationality must seem a sobering contrast to 
the moral construction of politics, as envisaged by Soloviev and other Russian philosophers in 
the late nineteenth century.
Two Russian political philosophers have utilised the notions o f instmmental rationality 
and societal chaos as vehicles for theorising a liberal political order in Russia. Although one 
o f them approaches the topic from the angle o f the theory of international relations, the 
parallels between them are instmctive. However, both of them are dismissive of a strictly 
Hobbesian account o f political order.
Kara-Murza is currently director of the Centre for Philosophical Research of Russian 
Reform at the Institute of Philosophy for the Academy of Sciences and co-president of the 
Moscow Liberal Foundation. In his article he begins with a critical review of Kapustin’s 
argument that liberalism must somehow relate to modernity, if  not be entirely identical with 
it. Kapustin posed the question as to how a political order is possible and remains stable if the 
main pillar o f the social order would be individualism. Kara-Murza criticises the vague 
definition of individualism in Kapustin’s approach. Individualism, so he points out, usually 
rests on a notion o f atomism, whereas modernity allows and even demands a more 
encumbered view o f the individual. Kara-Murza contrast the atomistic interpretation of the 
individual with the idea of personality (lichnost’) which includes a reference to the process of 
socialisation. To confuse, so Kara-Murza notes, individualism with personality ‘is the main 
mistake in the realisation of liberal [thought]’ in Russia (Kara-Murza, 1996, p.56). From here 
he can rephrase the question with which he believes liberalism is most concerned as 
something like this: How is a social order possible when it is not existent yet, or when it is 
under attack? The liberal response, so Kara-Murza argues, is that only the freedom of the 
individual (as personality) allows the preservation of social order under the conditions of 
modernity. Correlating the various seemingly liberal answers to the question of the conditions
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of societal survival along the conceptual lines of chaos and order, Kara-Murza outlines three 
possible solutions.
First, the restorative approach where the restoration of absolute authority is conceived 
of as the only way to create and maintain a social order, as argued by Filmer. Second, the 
Hobbesian proposition that chaos is the result o f the natural features of human beings, which 
thus necessitates a strong political authority. And third, the Lockean solution in which the 
provision o f a private autonomous space for each individual results in a sustainable social 
order. Only the last, so Kara-Murza argues, represents a genuinely liberal solution to the 
problem. The Hobbesian argument fails on account of the impossibility o f deducing liberal 
political institutions from presuppositions about human nature. If humans are indeed barbaric, 
then the emanating political order is very unlikely to look considerably less so. Kara-Murza 
argues that the Leviathan must be essentially illiberal, since its raison d ’etre is noy the 
protection of individual freedoms. The fact that, in the English historical context, the 
Leviathan proved to be instrumental in the separation of the public and private space need not 
imply that that would be the case under Russian conditions too. The protection of an 
autonomous space for individual activities thus rests on the proclivities of the political culture 
in which the Leviathan operates, instead of being inculcated into its very essence. Kara-Murza 
notes that Russian liberalism thus can and must be explained without recourse to the 
Hobbesian monster. For him the main enemy of social order is not conservative restoration or 
even despotism, but Tike the enemy of all civilisational projects’ chaos and barbarity. What at 
first seems a rather vague idea gains in conceptual shape as Kara-Murza further elaborates the 
role of individualism in the civilisational project o f liberalism. He argues that only the idea of 
individual freedom would have the capacity to overcome chaos and barbarity. It has the 
capacity to neutralise the ‘war of all against all’ more successfully than any other form of 
social order since liberalism is inherently non-destructive insofar as it incorporates a view of 
socialisation that counters any Hobbesian solution that would rest on an idea of total(itarian)
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statehood (Kara-Murza, 1996, pp.57-58). The pivot of his theory is that any form of sociality 
can only be maintained by the development of personality as generating autonomous space 
and a Rechtsstaat protecting this individual sphere. Summarising the main tenets o f liberalism 
he writes:
‘Preserving (uderschat’) sociality is not in the power o f total(itarian) statehood 
(historically exhausted and being the source of disorder), but with the help o f society’s 
power, the assignment o f an autonomous space to personalities and the domination of 
the rule of law -  these are the main tenets of liberalism. This leads to some important 
conclusions: Firstly, the archaic sociality, built on the principle o f normative 
distribution, generally does not require anything in liberalism. ... Secondly, in a 
dynamically developing society in the situation when old regulatory (mechanisms) 
cease to fulfil their integrating function, the liberal solution in contrast (to the old 
mechanisms) can turn out to be singularly remedial for the social order. Thirdly, 
liberalism, entering ‘from without’, from an organic context into a context where it is 
not objectively required, often engenders a destructive individualism, inspiring a 
societal chaos. And finally, fourthly, if  the old order already gives way (uzhe ne 
uderzhivaietsa), any attempts at rigid restoration (of the old order) lead only to bigger 
disintegration (razval). If the liberal securities are not socially ready, then sociality can 
turn out to be powerless in the face o f the onslaught of the ‘new barbarity’.’ (Kara- 
Murza, 1999, p.59)
Note Kara-Murza’s caution about any liberalism that is introduced ‘from outside’, something 
that resonates well with the anxieties o f many scholars to define a specifically Russian form 
of liberalism and to prevent simple ‘copying’, as Zelezneva formulated it. For Kara-Murza 
then, liberalism resembles a strategy for containing the barbaric tendencies that are inherent in 
social life. Yet one o f the main foes of any social order in modernity is unfettered 
individualism. It is worth quoting the following passage in full.
‘The temptation of arbitrary will is the most important problem which the classics of 
European liberal thought have considered. Furthermore: the importance and historical 
correctness (pravota) of liberalism was always determined not by the attractiveness of 
its moral presuppositions but by (its) real capacity to neutralise the ‘new barbarity’ 
which is an upshot (vyplesk) of unproductive individualism, and to direct the 
autonomous activites of human beings into a socially constructive course (ruslo). The 
task of liberalism thus became not the declaration o f the freedom of individual in 
general but the protection of the freedom of personality, having achieved a certain level 
of development and having shown ... its civilisational status.’ (Kara-Murza, 1999, p.59)
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Kara-Murza’s conceptual framework is therefore composed of the idea o f social order and its 
accompanying social fabric, the inherent propensity o f human nature to destroy this fabric, 
and the attenuating impact liberalism has on this destructive side of human nature, on account 
of its wholesome notion of personality which mitigates the worst effects of unrestricted 
individualism. The criterion for evaluating the usefulness and justification of a liberal political 
order thus is the sustenance o f social order itself. This is strikingly similar to the views of 
Kapustin and Akhiezer. All of them seem to favour a pragmatic approach to the problem of 
liberalism, which ascribes to liberal ideas a regulatory function in mitigating the worst 
excesses of modem social life. Evaluating liberalism from the perspective o f modernity or 
civilisation, however, must assert the survival of the social system as the overriding criterion. 
This in turn means that Kara-Murza must postulate a certain conceptual distance between 
liberalism and the civilisational project in order to maintain the possibility of assessing 
liberalism in its effectiveness. In all their conceptual vagueness, however, Kara-Murza as well 
as Akhiezer and Kapustin seem to have no qualms in equating modernity with liberalism.
In another article Kara-Murza makes clear that his intellectual device of ‘barbarity’ has 
deeper historical roots in Russian political thought. He points to Pushkin, Stmve and 
Chicherin as having equally conceived of barbarity as the main enemy of the social fabric 
while advocating individual liberties and rights as insufficient barriers against the 
encroachment of ‘barbarity into politics’ as such (Kara-Murza, 1996, p.370) but in need of 
being combined with the intention to preserve and strengthen the autonomous space of 
personality within the community. The picture o f political liberalism that emerges, according 
to Kara-Murza, is one free from moralisation and ‘very pragmatic’.
Yet, in face of the weakness of civil society in Russia, this had brought about the 
dependence of liberalism on the patronage of the state, in contrast to Western experience. 
However, positing the preservation of society as the main objective, so Kara-Murza
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maintains, reveals the points of juncture between liberal political thought and the other 
‘political forces’ which try to guarantee the protection o f individual rights and freedoms’ 
(Kara-Murza, 1996, p.371). And the position that assigns a strong role to the state thus unites 
early Slavophils and liberals in the history of political thought in Russia. Although the 
association of liberal thought in Russia with ‘the communal path’ contributed to the failure o f 
Russian political liberalism as a political movement at the beginning of the twentieth century 
to articulate a tenable position of individualism, the main reason for liberalism’s inability to 
capture the imagination of the population was the Bolshevik’s ability to pass off their own 
political programme as a uniquely workable combination of collectivism and individualism.
Kara-Murza characterises the liberal’s dilemma and their position rather aptly when he 
says that liberals in the Russian context must resist ‘chipping away’ all value from the state 
and community and concentrate solely on preserving the autonomous space o f the creative 
personality (lichnost’). For him, this represents a pragmatic version of Russian liberalism and 
its freedom from moralisation. The crux in differentiating Russian liberalism from Western 
liberalism appears for Kara-Murza to dwell in the extent to which liberalism represents a 
value system or promulgates ethical maxims.
Another account o f a prospective liberal political order in Russia is formulated by 
Fedotova. Although hers is a theory that draws heavily on international relations theory, she 
sketches the main parallels between the notions of anarchy and chaos on the international 
scene and the situation o f Russia in transition. In her account, anarchy is synonymous with the 
lack of norms and institutions for liberals, whereas it corresponds to a lack of central power 
for realists. What unites both notions of anarchy is that the identification and formulation of 
interests (of individual states or individuals themselves) is critical for overcoming the 
anarchic condition (Fedotova, 2000, pp.27-28). The emergence of shared interests is the main 
problem for Russia on the international stage as well as for its internal coherence. For realists 
the remedy is the establishment of a central power, i.e. an effective state apparatus. Otherwise
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the societal relations disintegrate and individuals (or individual states in international relations 
theory, respectively) will have recourse to self-help, which is itself a form of anarchy. Since 
self-help does not inaugurate the formation of institutions, the question of identity and the 
formation of interests is paramount to extricating Russia from the anarchic state (Fedotova, 
2000, p.29). Yet, Fedotova argues, there are good grounds for disputing, as radical liberals do, 
that, ultimately, self-help does not constitute a (rudimentary) form of self-organising co­
operative behaviour. And, although more moderate liberals speak of the preference for stable 
institutionalisation, the incipient social co-operation might offer some ground for optimism.
Whatever the advantages of the different conceptions of self-help as rudimentary co- 
operational forms, the author indicates that self-help only generates a negative identification 
of interests, i.e. it fails to produce a minimum of connectivity that is essential for the 
generation o f (mutual) responsibility (Fedotova, 2000, p.30). Identity is hence solely built on 
self-preservation. The problem then appears to be located in the transformation of 
individualistically orientated self-help into a common interest. Fedotova points to democracy 
as a mechanism to generate a common interest and the state, whose most important function it 
is to further agreements between those private interests, thus bringing about a stability that 
otherwise would require authoritarian means (ibid.). What is so instructive about the Western 
debate on international relations theory with regard to the Russian transition is that most 
Western observers do not realise how much the chances to overcome anarchy depend on the 
capacity o f the international community (or the polity, hence Russia) to become a society 
resting on a form of sociality that so far has proved elusive (Fedotova, 2000, p.31). 
Complicating the situation in Russia is what Fedotova calls the anarchic consciousness of 
Russian society. The conventional reaction to politically generated injustice is revolt, rather 
than reform. For Russians this places (unrestricted, individualistic) volition (as the locus of 
concept of freedom) in a privileged position to alleviate the ills of society, often pushing the 
social structure of Russia to the brink of collapse (Fedotova, 2000, pp.31-32).
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But Fedotova does not stop here. Instead she draws a distinction between anarchy and 
chaos that illuminates in turn two different concepts of order. As chaos can be understood as 
disorder in ubiquity, so anarchy can be perceived as a form of order. From here spring two 
versions of understanding order. On the one hand, order can be taken as
‘the unification of substance and action, the plan-ability (or predictability) of events and 
suppressing those that hinder the realisation of the selected ideals of order. The second 
[model obtains] if  there are certain immutable principles of organisation that provide the 
foundation for the rights of the citizen, but attention is concentrated on the provision of 
its central regulatory meaning without any specific interests to the multifarious 
fluctuations that exist within society.’ (Fedotova, 2000, p.33)
These two models of order, one signifying an identity in kind and form, the other based 
on an insistence on the primacy o f rules, can be translated to the problem of societal and 
international order. As Fedotova notes along the lines of an argument espoused by Bauman, 
overcoming the chaos and creating order rests on an idea o f manageability that is deeply 
ingrained in the project of modernity. Yet, finding a solution to a problem may generate, so 
Fedotova argues, more and new problems, particularly given the possibility that irrational 
consequences might emerge from rational actions (Fedotova, 2000, p.33). The idea of Russian 
modernisation is therefore quite absurd when conceived as a result o f rational actions and a 
model that is being planned (Fedotova, 2000, p.34). For Fedotova this form of order in the 
sense of re-creating the Western order in Russia with the immutable ingredients of democratic 
institutions then must appear to correspond to the first model. Yet, anarchy, so she argues, 
could also be perceived as a rejection o f statehood in general, as contemplated in the notion of 
the ‘state of nature’ tradition. The question, however, then presents itself from a different 
perspective: are there any resources that will empower society to overcome anarchy? But 
since total anarchy as a rejection of any form of rule or rules, even those that are enshrined in 
social traditions and customs, does not exist, this exhibits the utopian character of anarchy as 
a theoretical model (Fedotova, 2000, p.36).
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To understand anarchy not as a characteristic of social movements but as a state of 
society or its consciousness leads Fedotova to contemplate the connection between weak 
central power, the absence of the co-ordinates for federal and regional authorities, insufficient 
institutionalisation and the weakness of social institutions or their inadequate functionality, in 
short the loss of the structures of identity (Fedotova, 2000, p.37). Paraphrasing F. Wendt, 
Fedotova notes that the overcoming of anarchy in the international realm can either be 
accomplished by international government, or by the formation of those structures into which 
the identity and interests games develop.
‘This means that the pluralistic identity corresponding to the context o f problems, in 
which it necessarily institutes itself, is also one of foreshortening of interpretation which 
permits people to unite on the ground of the concepts of citizenship and common 
interests side by side with private (interests).’ (Fedotova, 2000, pp.37-38)
Positing identity (identichnost’) as the foundation for institutions and interests, she contrasts 
the idea of the autonomous, instrumentally rational individual as pronounced by Western 
political theory and the individual living in anarchy who knows negative freedom but not 
autonomy, is dependent and limited in his instrumental rationality ‘insofar as he acts in a sea 
of chaos and (is) personally disintegrating’ (Fedotova, 2000, p.38). Since autonomy is 
recognised in the Russian context as a strategy of isolation, rather than self-determination, the 
problem of international disorder, just as much as the difficulty of societal breakdown, is 
epitomised in the central role of the relation to ‘the other’, the idea of mutuality as a ‘serious 
moral presupposition to co-operation, diminishing anarchy’ (Fedotova, 2000, p.38). 
‘Singulars cannot create a society’ since they lack any notion of responsibility and identity 
(Fedotova, 2000, pp.38-39). Identity cannot be the product of the primary level of sociality 
that is concurrent with a form of adaptation, as Fedotova argues. In fact, if all other social 
forms are replaced by this minimum of conditions of survival, requesting adaptation and self- 
help, then
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‘all social systems are destroyed and are in a state of anarchy: the absence of effective 
central authority, the weakness and insufficiency of social institutions, norms and 
maxims, as well as the absence of the legality and needs in the legitimation of people’s 
actions and the social structure’ (Fedotova, 2000, p.39).
For Fedotova, the crucial question thus resides in the existence of identity, from which 
meaningful human actions flow and social structures and norms receive their legitimacy. 
Russia’s crisis is one generated not simply by weak institutions and a powerless state but by 
the lack of defined identity. Identity, as she observes, determines (zadat’sia) not only power 
but the entirety o f practices. As she notes in a slightly revised version o f this article, the 
question of the role o f the state inevitably arises, and while the external forms of order can 
assume the structure of democratic institutions, anarchy is not effectively overcome as long as 
no collective notions about the general values exist by which the polity would want to live 
(Fedotova, 1999, p. 142). Just as international disorder and anarchy are replaced with order by 
recognising the ‘significance of a collective idea (znania) about the aims of activities and 
interests of each o f the participants’, so is the problem of societal disorder only soluble, not by 
developing democratic institutions but as the result o f ‘the presence of a social will to form an 
intersubjective knowledge and on this foundation identities and interests’ (Fedotova, 1999, 
p. 143). Democracy is thus incapable, in Fedotova’s view, of engendering stable political 
order, so long as it does not foster the articulation of private interests. Summing up, she draws 
from this some strength for an argument in favour of a minimalist state.
‘The essence o f democratic transformation should consist o f the diminution of the role 
of the state in the social system and the provision its activities in the form of well 
institutionalised practices and cultivated norms. Its shortage (or lack o f compliance with 
this) leads to domination of coercion and wilfulness’ (Fedotova, pp. 143-144).
The notion of interest formation indicates how much Fedotova’s account is indebted to 
Hegelian conceptions of the development of reciprocity and self-consciousness. The trouble
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with her account is that she applies a multitude of different conceptual tools and has not 
always tested their compatibility.
Contrasting the development o f an international society with the evolution of a stable 
political order in Russia rests very much on the degrees of rationality that can be ascribed to 
global players as well as individual human beings. Within the limits of a general comparison, 
this identification of the global and the national stages may be permissble. Where this reaches 
its limits is in the degree to which the processes of identity formation can be compared on the 
two different stages. For a state to operate successfully in the international arena it may be 
sufficient to display a more or less coherent idea of its interests, but this carries no intrinsic 
reference to the way this was generated. Strongly authoritarian regimes might just as 
successfully operate on the international stage though granting no democratic rights in the 
interest formulation, as democratic states that honour the right of the citizenry to participate in 
the formulation o f national interests. What counts is not how a state arrives at the position it 
will pursue, but what its position in the wider international framework of interests is and what 
means exist to supply it with the necessary political force.
This is radically different to the ‘identity’ evolution of human beings. As philosophers 
have often noted, human beings go to extraordinary lengths to eradicate internal 
inconsistencies in their views. Not that everyone is equally good at it, or that everyone 
devotes an equal amount of attention to this problem, but it certainly is an irreducible feature 
of human thought to consider contradictions between intellectual positions as ultimately 
unacceptable. Thus the idea that somehow a principle could override any other in the 
consideration of personal identity and interests without giving it much thought is quite 
preposterous. This does not mean that in certain circumstances people prioritise their interests 
and in the process o f ranking them, some maxims may receive short shrift while others gain 
ascendancy. However, it does mean that even in situations where some precepts that are often 
thought indispensable to what constitutes a human being are not honoured, there will be good
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reasons to override them and these reasons can be given. Whether they have the same appeal 
to everybody in the same circumstances is another matter.
In effect between the interest formulation that is carried out at the individual level and 
on the national stage differs in the amount of arbitrariness involved. Within a strongly 
authoritarian regime the interests may be a result o f decision-making that involves an 
immense degree o f capriciousness, whereas within any individual the extent to which 
identities and interests do not reflect good reasons appears driven rather than self-determined.
Still, Fedotova’s approach offers a distinctive insight into the role of identity and 
interest formation in the evolution of a feasible social framework that displays some basic 
amount of required stability. Her argument that the rudimentary patterns o f social co­
operation evinced in the Russian economy after the failure o f the liberal reforms do not 
produce the element o f reciprocity that is needed for the development of social stability 
highlights the importance o f individual self-consciousness and self-understanding for a stable 
social order. It goes without saying that such a self-consciousness does not necessarily have to 
adopt a liberal thrust. Although she characterises anarchy as the absence o f any stable 
framework of co-operation that would in turn facilitate the development of identities, she 
ultimately advocates a minimum of state intervention and the mere protection o f the incipient 
institutions of civil society. This is probably the location of her own liberal conviction. Yet, 
despite the conceptual confusion which occurs at times, her account of liberal politics and its 
prerequisites illuminates the crucial role o f the processes of identity formation. And she 
rightly suggests that Russia’s problem is first and foremost the fluidity and continuous shifts 
in its identity -  something that will be conceptualised as heuristic radicalism in a later chapter.
Fedotova and Kara-Murza’s use of the concept of chaos is reminiscent o f the similar 
role the threat o f societal disintegration plays in Kapustin and Akhiezer’s social and political 
theory. In each case, theiir theorising seems to start from a concern for the existing social 
institutions. They differ in the significance they allocate to the preservation of the social and
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political institutions. However, the difficulty in advocating such an approach to the definition 
of political liberalism lies exactly in the prioritisation of the various features o f political 
liberalism. All of them are aware that a liberal political order is somehow related to the forces 
and/or results of modernisation. Each of them is searching for a unique answer to the question 
as to what extent liberal institutions or mass consciousness are the results of, or the 
prerequisite for, social and political modernisation. The different emphases they put on either 
the historical interconnectedness of liberalism as a political ideology and modernity or the 
interrelation between individualism and modernity may be rooted in their preferences for 
either a politico-theoretical or a historical approach. But what unites all o f them is the fluidity 
and vagueness o f the notion of modernity. Kapustin makes a point in not determining any 
reliable conception of modernity and draws some theoretical persuasive force from this. Yet, 
for all o f them the notion of modernity remains highly opaque. Although the concept of 
‘catch-up’ modernisation as a politically initiated process is used often enough, modernity as 
a product o f modernisation or as a state of affairs possesses normative and descriptive features 
and none of the Russian scholars appear to be willing to part in their conceptualisations of 
liberalism from either a notion of modernity as a regulative idea, or a conception o f modernity 
as a proper description of Russian and global reality.
Few Russian political theorists have ventured into the territory that occupies the 
dangerous ground between universalism and particularism exemplified in the idea of the 
primacy of cultural formation. This may have something to do with the fact that the concept 
of a primacy o f cultural traditions only rarely loses its vagueness. For reasons of clear 
differentiation, we may want to define the notion o f primacy as that which asserts the 
groundedness of political ideas in cultural traditions. Indigenous traditions would define and 
condition political ideas, reflecting not a normative construct but a descriptive one. Whether 
or not such a notion is feasible is not relevant for the time being, but there can be no doubt 
that adherents o f strong particularism would be sympathetic to his argument. Defining this
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position so strictly will allow us to characterise the views o f the Russian philosopher
Shapovalov, who has tried to articulate a universalist position that nevertheless retains
important elements of strong particularism. In a way, he formulates, within a frame o f
reference more akin to Western political theory, what others have tried to do in starting their
argument from a historically-minded position.
*
He starts by noting that his intentions are to elucidate the relations between power, 
social and cultural traditions, and societal opinion and views. The aim o f his article is to find a 
way to conjoin liberal statehood with local cultural traditions that may be inimical to 
liberalism understood as a culturally significant perspective on human life. This juxtaposition 
between liberal statehood and cultural traditions motivates him to exclude first o f all those 
foundations of liberal statehood that would be precluded per definitio. Hence he argues that 
any coercion exercised by state authorities is incompatible with liberal statehood. Yet, if  
coercion is diametrically opposed to effective state power, then it must be necessary to found 
political power on the prevalent moral and cultural traditions. Some relation between power, 
societal opinion and cultural traditions is thus indispensable (Shapovalov, 1995, p. 107). He 
justifies this close connection by pointing to the impossibility o f establishing and sustaining 
societal stability solely with the instruments of liberal statehood (legal institutions) and the 
inadmissibility o f creating societal stability by force as being irreconcilable with the core idea 
of liberalism, freedom (Shapovalov, 1995, p .107 and pp. 112-113). Political liberalism thus 
must be judged by its capacity to avoid running counter to its essence, the absence of coercion 
by state authorities in society.
The real question for Shapovalov is then to determine, not whether the state and the 
moral and cultural traditions are linked at all, but to what extent this link has to be forged in 
liberal societies in order to preserve stability. He discusses two different ways of constructing 
a relation between liberal values and cultural tradition whereby he does not distinguish them 
and, by conceptual sleight o f hand, moves skilfully from one to the other, neglecting the
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profound differences. He starts with an accurate sketch of the Lockean and Kantian positions 
which rest on the proposition that the value of the individual represents a value irrespective of 
his contingent features or characteristics. Human beings ought to be treated as ends in 
themselves, as Kant expressed this idea. Their specific belonging to ethnic groups, particular 
nations or social groupings is irrelevant for the determination o f someone’s value. The worth 
of a person is determined by virtue of his being human. Shapovalov now argues that there 
must be in every society a mechanism that asserts, recognises, and preserves this idea o f the 
intrinsic value of human beings. If this were not to exist in a society, society would deprive 
itself of the very glue that binds it together.
The problem is that in the strictly Kantian perspective this mechanism must not evolve 
out of any interest formation, denying the principle its non-utilitarian content (Shapovalov, 
1995, p. 109). This is the point at which his argument slips from a Kantian position to the 
notion of the Absolute Good as formulated by Soloviev. Shapovalov seems to assume that 
both positions are roughly identical. Soloviev argued, so Shapovalov contends, that only the 
idea of the Absolute Good unites in itself this character o f non-utility in its pure form. The 
Absolute Good (trans-utility, sverkhutilitamost’) in turn is nothing else but the sphere of 
culture
‘insofar as in its relationship to any other sphere it is determined not by the principle of 
‘we-them’ but by the principle of relatedness (otnesennost’) to the absolute values o f the 
good and humanity. This approach from the perspective of trans-utilitarian values 
equalises every person beyond their dependence on their concrete charateristies such as 
national or class belonging, capabilities, positions etc., while those are considered the 
end in the individual that universalism asserts in the capacity o f the norm o f intra­
human relations. Cultural universalism supposes not self-interested relations to reality 
but the aspiration to view and include in it those (relations) that possess universal, 
generally human significance. (Shapovalov, 1995, p .l 10)
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Shapovalov now declares the depths of the individual soul to be the seat o f moral 
universalism, which is impregnable to national belonging and the imprints of the social 
environment. He writes
‘culture is universal since it forms an openness (otkrytost’) towards everyone else, yet 
its vicinity creates the possibility of looking at it with distance. Universalism is by no 
means cosmopolitanism, overlooking the differences between people, in particular, their 
national (differences), or attempting to obliterate similar differences. (Universalism) is 
the recognition o f values, common to all people, irrespective o f their differences. 
(Shapovalov, 1995, p.l 10)
Yet, Shapovalov emphasises that not all societal formations facilitate the development and 
sustenance of universal values. He expresses doubts about the compatibility of mass culture 
and commercialism with universalism. In fact, he believes that the former concur with the 
counterfeit form of universalism, a cosmopolitan worldview. He then attempts to re-construct 
the historical pedigree of universalism and points to the significance o f Christianity for the 
successful ascendancy of universal values. Russia does not deviate from the norm here, as it 
incorporated the Byzantine tradition with the Christian doctrine. Although this is a valuable 
point as such, his argument then adopts a slightly more assertive tone, when he claims that 
Russian culture integrates these universal values (naturally) since it displays the features of a 
‘supra’-ethnicity and ‘supra’nationality (Shapovalov, 1995, p.l 10).
His central argument so far has much to it. His point that any coercion initiated by 
political authorities must go against the very essence o f liberalism may be motivated by an 
overemphasis o f the liberal principle, but it seems legitimate to draw some persuasive force 
from such an argument for the claim that liberalism must be intimately connected to the 
prevailing cultural norms and traditions, unless it slides into the coercive ground. 
Reformulating this position in more Western terms, one could say that a liberal political order 
that is based on sheer disregard for any social and cultural norms appears inherently 
unjustifiable. Yet Shapovalov attempts then to forge a closer link between Russian culture and
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political liberalism. In fact, one could describe his conceptual efforts as a venture in defining 
the validity of a ‘cultural’ liberalism. Except for his slightly overoptimistic views on the 
openness of Russian contemporary culture, which seem questionable, his intentions are quite 
legitimate. What should be a cause of theoretical concern here is the fact that his view rests on 
a conflation o f cultural values and the Kantian principle o f the categorical imperative which 
epitomises the idea of treating people as ends in themselves. Generally speaking, his points 
about the impossibility of founding a liberal political order on an utter disregard for cultural 
traditions and the danger that such attempts will result in societal disintegration are well 
placed. The particular manner in which Shapovalov constructs the link between morality as 
expressed in local cultural values and as displayed in universalism, however, raises some 
grave theoretical doubts.
The first misgiving would return to the Kantian argument and question whether such a 
link between moral traditions and morality as a universal maxim would indeed be necessary. 
Kant undoubtedly formulated the categorical imperative not as a complementary element of 
local moral traditions but tried instead to carve out a maxim for human behaviour that would 
provide a universal benchmark in contrast to the multitude of moral precepts that are, for one 
reason or another, prevalent in human behaviour. The specific way of deducing this formula 
indicates that its main feature, the aspect o f universalizability, is exactly a function o f the 
process of abstracting from the various constellations of locally predominating moral 
principles. Universalism is thus inseparable from the process o f abstracting. To attempt to 
reduce the level of abstraction in Kantian universalism and tie it back into actually existing 
cultural formations may appear a laudable endeavour, albeit not a novel one given Soloviev’s 
work, but it eliminates the prescriptive aspect of Kant’s categorical imperative and must thus 
eventually fail.
Shapovalov acknowledges that a liberal political order must not privilege any 
particular ethical tradition (Shapovalov, 1995, p.l 11) Notwithstanding the philosophical
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problems, his argument that Russian culture somehow either integrates closely with 
universalism or is uniquely advantageous to the values o f universalism is not convincing in 
lieu of any sustained case for the openness of Russian culture. Although he formulates a 
valuable observation when pointing out that liberal politics would ideally be restricted to the 
instruments of the rule of law, and hence must rely to some extent on viable social relations 
regulated not so much by the formal principle of legality but by the ethical norms that 
permeate local cultures (insinuating the existence of what he calls a ‘natural hierarchy’ of 
authority), this obfuscates the issue of the relationship between them once more. The 
intractable problem in Western political theory has been to specify the exact extent to which 
political liberalism rests on or indeed reflects particular (Western) cultures and their norms for 
human interaction. The Kantian project is ill-conceived if taken as a project to outline the 
relations between local and universal norms. The latter draw on the idea of absolute 
normativity, while the former by definition are responses to particular needs and requirements 
of social life. It is not until Hegel that the idea of the categorical imperative acquires a 
historical mode, foreshadowing Soloviev’s attempts.
On a more theoretical level, Western political liberalism would consider Shapovalov’s 
approach as profoundly mistaken insofar as it accepts, in contrast to him, the irreducibility of 
the diversity of cultural norms and values and recognises the need to accommodate them in a 
mutually beneficial political order. The question on which Western theorists fundamentally 
disagree is whether or not, and if yes, which, cultural values can assume a creative role in the 
process of the formation of the required political order. Or, to put it into Rawlsian terms, 
which components, if any, of the comprehensive doctrines can contribute to the evolution and 
maintenance of the overlapping consensus. The magnitude of this problem may be illustrated 
most appropriately by Rawl’s own partial retreat from his initial view.
If we were to continue to conceptualise the issue at stake here in the frame of reference 
of a simple juxtaposition of, and desirable fusion of, local moral norms and universal (liberal)
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precepts we would also very soon be confronted with the problem as to which normative 
structure is to be preferred in the moment of conflict. If, as Shapovalov claims, liberalism 
needs to draw on existing moral principles since it cannot be all-encompassing and must not 
exceed the admissible minimum of coercion, then it remains unclear on which grounds the 
liberal political order can mitigate and regulate conflict between the diverse cultural traditions 
that undoubtedly exist within a modem polity such as Russia. There exists a tension in 
Shapovalov’s theory with regard to his claim that Russian culture embraces heterogeneity and 
hence is compatible with universalism, and the idea that universalism is closely linked to, or 
dependent on, existing moral traditions. The cmcial question is on which traditions does a 
liberal political order eventually draw in cases of conflict and the need for arbitration?
Political liberalism as constructed by Shapovalov would prove to be unable to give an 
answer to this question. It would equivocate between its own universal precepts and the 
multiple norms of local traditions. Akhiezer’s characterisation of Russia’s problems as rooted 
in the rift between society and state once more proves the appropriateness of his formulation. 
The juxtaposition of national cultural norms (be they universal or otherwise) and local 
traditions, rather than being a valuable contribution to the solution o f a theoretical conundrum, 
aggravates Russia’s seeming inability to adopt a political order regulated by principles of 
tolerance and mutual respect.
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Part III
Political Theory, 
Universalism and Russia
14. What is the ‘Russian Challenge’ to Western Political Theory?
The previous chapter has attempted to sketch some valuable theoretical positions that have 
been articulated by Russian philosophers and historians in the debate on Russian liberalism 
during the nineties. Its purpose was twofold: to introduce Western observers to the conceptual 
framework of the Russian debate in its diversity and often confusing plurality, and, on the 
other hand, to prepare the ground for an attempt at synthesis. Before embarking on the latter, a 
brief summary seems to be in order.
Part II started with a promise: to delineate as much as possible the various theoretical 
positions alongside a framework of different conceptual approaches. The subcategories were 
taken to correspond either to a historical or to a politico-theoretical approach. Theorists have 
mainly couched the problem of Russian liberalism in the language of defining features or core 
ideas, whereas historians have preferred to speak of Russian liberalism as a historical 
phenomenon engendered by social and economic factors either present or absent for the 
various reasons in past and present. Both approaches permit a further sub-categorisation 
insofar as particularistic or universalistic conclusions could be drawn on the basis o f either 
approach. In the course of the presentation of the debate, a core area of conceptual overlap 
seemed to crystallise. Whether liberalism is taken as a historical phenomenon or as a 
theoretical concept, it appears to be inexorably tied up with a notion of modernity and 
civilisation. While the latter concept has accommodated a whole range o f different positions, 
mainly due to its definitional vagueness, Kapustin, Akhiezer, and others appear to have 
converged on remarkably similar understandings o f modernity as a prerequisite for Russian 
liberalism. This is the more astonishing as their positions rest on different foundations and 
their conclusions diverge considerably. What follows will try to define, and subsequently to 
defend, more clearly this area of overlap and to cast it in conceptual terms that will allow us to 
draw conclusions which may be useful to the Western debate on political liberalism.
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IChapter 8 in the second part started with a position that stressed the receptive capacities of a
local culture for the chances of political liberalism (cf. Pantin, 1994 and 1996). It indicated
that some central notions of the liberal doctrine required a favourable social and cultural 
context in which they can unfold their full and proper meaning. If such a conducive 
environment is absent, crucial ideas o f political liberalism may be submitted to a re­
interpretation and this might result in a distortion of content. Pantin’s contribution lies in
revealing the intricate connection that exists between the meaning of a term, the cultural 
conditions which alter its meaning, and the resultant distortion of the liberal doctrine if 
submitted to a different social and cultural context. Pantin’s conclusions formulate some 
strong warnings against a mechanistic import of abstract terminology, a concern that he shares 
with a considerable number of Russian historians and theorists.
The emphasis must therefore lie on a constructive and flexible appropriation of the 
theory of a liberal political order, since its conceptual devices and tools necessarily operate in 
a context from which they cannot extricate themselves. Pantin’s use of the term 
‘democratism’ illustrates the extent to which the idea o f liberty becomes, as it were, alienated 
from its Western meaning. This process of alienation is a prerequisite for it to be received into 
the new intellectual environment. A more dramatic fate, Pantin argues, would await those 
concepts which do not undergo this process of appropriation or are identified as being 
inimical to the appropriating context. In other words, some concepts make sense only when 
disembowelled, detached from their original intellectual context, whereas some other ideas 
struggle to make sense at all in contexts discordant with the original environment insofar as 
they have been supplanted by other concepts. The significance of social and economic liberty 
in the Russian context thus shifted the weight to an idea of liberation that inhibited political 
notions of freedom with its attendant conceptions of citizenship and independent civil
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associations. Receptivity of the cultural and social context can therefore be listed as a 
prerequisite for liberal theorising and requires some further specification.
Pantin’s argument hints at the discursive pre-conditions for concepts such as liberty, 
which in turn, in his view, are determined by the prevailing social and political conditions. 
This should hardly be anything new unless one takes this as an indication o f the absence of 
any substantive core meaning o f such concepts and the utter malleability o f them by varying 
circumstances. Not even Pantin would endorse such a radical position. His argument seems to 
reiterate the need of a suitable re-formulation o f the liberal creed under novel conditions (in 
face of the competing and prevalent ‘democratic’ viewpoint). However, what emerges quite 
certainly from Pantin’s argument is the reluctance of the Russian intellectual environment to 
understand liberty as a solely political concept unadulterated by ideas of economic and social 
liberation. This de-politicisation of, or lack of receptivity to, the political dimension of liberty 
seems to be a recurrent theme of Russian political thought and has received quite extensive 
attention over the years.
On the scheme sketched above, Pantin’s position would occupy a place in the category 
‘history’, whereas its universalistic credentials depend on the interpretation of the capacity of 
political liberalism to re-cast the problem of personal freedom in political terms. If liberalism 
as a political doctrine were to ‘succeed’, i.e. adopt more political connotations, it could be 
able to re-frame the political debate in terms more analogous to Western conceptualisations. If 
it ‘fails’, i.e. remains associated almost exclusively with social and economic liberation, it 
would render liberty in its universal meaning a hollow concept, resonating only with that 
minor social stratum of Russian society which values political freedoms over economic and 
social ones. The parallels to the difficulties which the ‘right-wing’ electoral bloc ‘Our Russia4 
as well as ‘Yabloko’ have experienced in trying to capture the imagination (and votes) of a 
broader Russian public are quite striking. The peculiar constellation of Russian pre­
revolutionary and post-Communist politics, which somehow struggles to engender a viable
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political sphere in its own right, is by no means unique within Eastern Europe and seems to 
have contributed to the continuing weakness of political liberalism across the region. 
Liberalism seems to require, more than other political ideas, a stable political arena that can 
accommodate the conflict of interests inevitably emerging in a modem society.
Political liberalism thus appears to be more dependent on a sustainable idea o f the 
‘political’ than its rivals. Whether this sustainability should therefore be enumerated under the 
essential requirements for liberal politics universally, and what shape and content it would 
have, has been elucidated to some degree by Kniazeva’s argument. For her, historically, the 
‘political’ in the West has been pre-stmctured by more general principles such as tolerance, 
mutual respect, and civility. These ideas provide a non-political regulation of the political 
space and the question is whether or not they privilege the introduction o f liberal politics over 
others. In other words, how extraneous to political liberalism are these values and is a political 
liberal order feasible without them? There can be no doubt that tolerance and mutual respect 
and a basic degree of civility facilitate the emergence of civilised politics. Liberal politics, 
however, clearly amounts to more than this. In Rawlsian terms it is questionable whether the 
emerging overlapping consensus can be built on such a ‘thin’ foundation that would enable 
advocates of non-liberal comprehensive doctrines to agree to a political order which 
privileges liberal principles. So Kniazeva’s argument unfolds the historical conditions of 
political liberalism, yet its possible universalistic thmst is undermined by the fact that the 
identified regulative principles for any prospective political order by no means leads to a 
liberal set o f political institutions in a straightforward fashion. Tolerance, mutual respect and 
civility underdetermine the resultant political order. Insufficient though they are, they are still 
necessary components o f political liberalism whereas they seem to be dispensable for political 
doctrines whose chances of persuasion are less favourable under the conditions o f a 
transparent, critical political process.
260
Kniazeva’s argument would therefore elucidate fairly clearly the limits of political 
liberalism under circumstances adverse to values such as tolerance and civility. It seems 
important to note in which respect exactly these values are contributory to liberal politics. 
They facilitate the unhindered exchange of views and opinions and precipitate the emergence 
of a stable framework for this exchange. In this sense they more generally contribute to the 
increase of rational procedure in political decision-making. This does not mean that all 
resources of irrationality are successfully eliminated if politics adopts a mainly regulated and 
procedural structure. It only renders the political sphere more accessible and more amenable 
to rationality. A liberal political outcome is by no means guaranteed but these values provide 
a stability for the political arena that can often tie the polity over the vagaries of social and 
economic transformations which are, at times, deeply affecting the political set-up of society.
Thus, while Pantin’s argument indicates the discursive context of liberal politics, 
which can endanger and possibly eradicate even the very core of political liberalism, 
Kniazeva’s position points to discursive stability as a prerequisite for liberalism. Not only the 
content counts but the conditions under which political views and opinions can freely be 
generated and exchanged. To identify liberalism with the preconditions for political discourse 
would be to negate the fact that many different political convictions can be accommodated in 
a political order solely based on the above-mentioned values and principles. And the 
‘thickness’ o f a liberal political order is a highly contentious issue amongst political theorists 
in the West. Yet, Kniazeva’s contention suggests that a general framework facilitating the 
exchange is necessary for a civilised politics from which liberal political institutions can grow 
given time and favourable circumstances. Seen this way, Pantin and Kniazeva’s arguments 
complement each other neatly, the former indicating the preconditions for viable politics in 
general, the latter explicating the semantic complexity of concepts and ideas as they gain a 
relation to the economic, social and cultural background that prevails at a certain time and 
place.
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While Zelezneva’s position reiterated the significance of a conceptual and theoretical 
appropriation of Western ideas in the Russian context and advocated the identification o f a 
‘golden middle’, Gadzhiev embarked on a more dangerous path in trying to specify the 
applicability o f political liberalism in Russia as a function of ideals of democracy at a local 
and national level that are largely incongruous. In this thematic context the fate of liberalism 
depends pretty much on its capability to offer a feasible type of reconciliation between the 
two, and Gadzhiev singles out a strong statehood as the only conceivable vehicle for such a 
reconciliatory process. Despite the seemingly illiberal consequences of this suggestion (given 
that one inevitably has to disagree with him on the integrative abilities of the Russian idea in a 
multiethnic and multireligious environment), his argument hints at a different form of 
heterogeneity that rarely comes into view in Western political theory. In a quite general way, 
one could describe it as the divergence of ideals of politics prevailing at the local and national 
level. The adjective ‘national’ or ‘supra-national’ must be taken to refer to the intellectual 
corpus of an urban, educated elite, historically far more exposed to the reformist strategies of 
the autocratic, Communist and post-Communist regimes than the local, rural population. 
Whether such a divisive picture of Russian society is still plausible can appear questionable.
Yet, the valuable contribution o f Gadzhiev’s argument lies somewhere else. Although 
Western political theory operates with various accounts of irreducible heterogeneity as it is 
taken to obtain in any modem society, it paints quite a simplified, since spatially uninformed, 
picture of this irrecoverable plurality. The wide neglect o f this further dimension of 
heterogeneity seems the more astonishing as the process o f urbanisation, which lay at the 
heart of modernisation, inevitably produced at least temporarily a split over the ideals of 
politics as exemplified in the events of such magnitude as the French Revolution. The extent 
to which voting behaviour diverges between rural and urban centres in Western Europe 
should have motivated theorists to be more sensitive to this issue and possibly conceptualise it 
as an additional aspect of modem heterogeneity.
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Yet, there is little evidence that Western political theorists take much notice of this 
problem, something that Russian historians may have been more susceptible to, given the 
recurrent attempts to impose reforms from above and the narrow social support base for them 
in Russian society. Quite evidently modernity in Russia had long been a feature of the urban 
centres, just as the Western life style appealed, and was only affordable, to a small educated 
elite. But why should the spatial dimension of the inevitable plurality o f modem life matter? 
Would the way a liberal political order accommodates different political views and 
convictions not be neutral to spatial differentiation? After all, what counts in a Rawlsian 
construct of a political order would be the accessibility o f the political arena to all political 
views regardless o f their location.
Yet, Gadzhiev’s discussion of the problem of divergent political ideals of democracy 
intimates something significant. Western political theory mainly proceeds from the basic 
assumption of a polity in which only a singular political level exists and which gives rise to 
the engagement in a debate for the best conceivable set o f political institutions for this polity. 
What falls by the wayside is the fact that most polities contain multiple layers of political 
arenas, which may be related in terms of conflict, support or simply benign neglect. And, 
because political theory disregards this fact, it renders itself unable to divest itself o f a 
generally national proclivity that has critically been appraised by thinkers such as Canovan 
(Canovan, 1996). This peculiar blindness, however, it has to be said, is only characteristic of 
the contractarian streak o f Western political theory that seems to be incapable of incorporating 
the various levels o f politics involved in the eventual emergence o f a national political order 
(possibly with the notable exception of the work by Robert Nozick, 1971). Naturally, this is a 
different story for any republican view o f politics which is premised on more localised 
notions of politics.
Still, Gadzhiev’s account neatly reveals the inapplicability o f Western political theory 
in the Russian context if reduced to a singular level of political engagement. Political ideas
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and ideals need to be operationalisable not only in the framework of a pluralistic central 
political arena, but even more so as emanations of actually existing forms of politics that 
command various local spaces. In other words, a theory of a liberal political order must be 
able to cope with, and incorporate into its conceptualisation, a possibly entrenched and 
functioning form of non-liberal politics that pertains to a sub-national level and possibly 
works to the satisfaction of the local participants. This may tilt the balance in favour o f these 
ideals that often draw their justification from their mere persistence over time. If  the 
emergence of the ‘political’ out of the ‘pre-political’ is envisaged along the lines o f the 
contractarian model, political philosophers must take account of the fact that some political 
ideals precede the nascent political arena on a national level, and hence, some participants are 
privileged cognitively over others.
A similar point has recently be made in conjunction with the Rawlsian contention that 
the veil o f ignorance is an essential device to screen out presuppositions about political 
arrangements that could prove individually beneficial. This, however, seems questionable, 
firstly, in view of the fact that in reality politics is more likely to emerge as an outgrowth of a 
collision of existing sub-polities rather than out of a conflict of individualised political ideals. 
But, also, secondly, because some participants need to be heuristically privileged in order to 
find some future political arrangement agreeable. As Friedman has argued in an article on the 
South-African transition, under the patently obvious results o f any prospective 
democratisation in the South African transition, any prior knowledge of the political 
contenders about future political positions facilitated a broad political compromise rather than 
inhibited a consensus (Friedman, 1998).
Gadzhiev’s insistence on the divergence of political cultures between the local and the 
national level may have been framed in unhelpful language when taken as echoing a divide 
between East and West, yet his conceptual point about the incongruity between the 
democratic ideals at the various levels reveals a blind spot of Western political liberalism. If
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we envisage the pre-political stage as an arena for the articulation of different political 
(comprehensive) worldviews, political theory has for too long assumed that these worldviews 
represent, as it were, individually held notions of the best political arrangement. Yet, in fact 
the pre-political may well be a conglomerate of collectively held ideas o f ideal politics where 
some of these ideals have already passed the test o f time. This introduces an entirely different 
dynamic into the theoretical picture, something more akin to Nozick’s protective associations 
(Nozick, 1974, esp. pp. 10-25 and passim), which make room for a more flexible account of 
politics growing out of incipient community kernels formed for a circumscribed purpose, 
rather than Rawls’ disconnected individuals which enter into politics in the same way as they 
emerge from it, atomised and unrelated in terms of common experience and intellectual 
baggage.
For the theory of political liberalism Gadzhiev’s position translates into a formidable 
problem. Emerging political orders, whether liberal or otherwise, can rarely be the product of 
an interactive process that comprises only individuals with values and norms that are 
individually constructed and held. In fact, many of those convictions with which prospective 
participants of a political order approach the ‘bargaining table’ have evolved in social 
contexts, have been discarded if deemed inappropriate and re-formulated when necessary, and 
thus can muster support that originates in shared lives and experiences, rather than support 
that rests on individual appreciation outside any communal context.
This does not mean that the privileged position from which these convictions are 
presented cannot be eroded and eventually eliminated by rational criticism. On the contrary, 
the openness of the ‘pre-political’ stage necessarily introduces an element of deliberation 
between those often contradictory norms and values when advanced by particular 
‘communities’. Deliberation, however, if it wants to acquire at least a minimum of legitimacy, 
requires the appeal to criteria that are ideally extraneous to any particular norms and values. 
The difficulty in finding this Archimedean point covers much of the history of political
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thought and whether or not such a deliberative process can ever be ‘successful’ is another 
question. But it would be strange to assume that the ‘pre-political’ is mainly characterised by 
an entirely arbitrary selective process without any recourse to what would, in given 
circumstances, constitute a legitimate procedure of some rational merit.
Gadzhiev’s argument about the contrasting ideals of democracy prevailing on different 
levels illustrates how little use the particularism-universalism dichotomy is. Entrenched social 
traditions and customs may well receive part o f their justification from the fact that they 
continue to be enacted through the actions of the participants who share these norms, yet to 
transfer this onto a national level is an entirely different matter. The main reason for this 
change o f the justifying criteria for political arrangements is that local traditions may operate 
in an environment that often pose a low(er) level o f contestation to them, whereas any 
national level has to take account the salient fact of modem societies, that is the existence of a 
bewildering array of often mutually exclusive doctrines and visions of the good life. This 
increases the extent to which any single custom and tradition becomes challenged and, hence, 
has to seek justification for its existence outside the frame of reference that is provided by the 
experience of shared lives. It has been notoriously difficult for political theorists to identify 
any such criterion on which the value o f the continuation of a particular cultural or social 
tradition can be evaluated (cf. Kymlicka, 1995, and critical of his position Waldron, 1995).
This may offer us a novel perspective for our understanding o f the ambitions and remit 
of universalism. Universalism and particularism may thus plausibly be ascribed to different 
levels o f contestation, at variance mainly because the effects of modernity have impacted 
disparately upon the various layers and spaces of communal life. There may be spatial
* It is conceded that the ultimate form o f arbitrary selection (gambling) can be seen as resting on some notion o f  
legitimacy, insofar as it involves an element o f fairness. But it requires a quite different mind-set to entrust what 
matters in your life to mere coincidence. In fact, few, if  any, people would regard gambling as an acceptable way 
o f decision-making. Throughout Western political theory, from Hobbes to Rawls, there is an understandable 
reluctance to allow individuals to make their most important choices in life on an utterly arbitrary basis. It would 
require that the selective process is to them as equally (un-)important as the outcome o f  this process. Hobbes 
even formulates the impossibility o f going about one’s choices with the mind o f  a gambler in a law o f nature.
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differentiation that could easily give the impression of an irreducible dichotomy within 
Russian society precipitated by the modernising autocratic reforms in the nineteenth century 
and by the forced industrialisation and urbanisation in the Soviet period. Although this 
supplies little argumentative force against basing any political order on the plurality of forms 
of life and values as an initial assumption or ‘working hypothesis’; a conceptual fallacy is 
committed if one would assume that either the resultant political order on a national level or 
the traditions and norms prevailing on a local level have universal appeal and one would 
promote their extension as the only worthwhile form of life. Many Russian philosophers in 
the nineteenth century have been following this pars pro toto route, and even such 
enlightened and critical thinkers as Berdayev talked about the immutability of Russian 
peasant traditions. This does not mean that a liberal political order would not possess a 
proclivity to expansionism insofar as it demands the enhancement of choice. Yet, Gadhiev’s 
attempt to locate one of the conditions for the bridge-building process in the primacy of local 
traditions is clearly at odds with the fact that once entered into a process of defining the best 
possible political structure for society these hitherto little contested traditions and norms are 
requested to expose their justificatory basis. A lack of belief in these justificatory resources 
may have induced Gadhiev to advocate a strong national statehood. The liberal credentials, 
however, fall by the wayside. Universalism and particularism thus appear as misconceptions 
that result from the extrapolation of one or the other form of political life, obtaining at 
different levels and in different locations.
The discussion then proceeded with a presentation o f Kozyrevaia’s position who 
problematised the relation between the state as initiator of the institutions of civil society 
which were supposed to play an active role in the restriction of the powers of the authorities 
and the regulation o f society as a whole. The Russian problem has often been accurately 
described as a lack of independent social actors in the modernising process. She also 
illuminates in her work the intricate connection between the democratic principle and liberal
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political thought that found its vehicle in the idea of narodovlastie. The historical analysis of 
Kozyrevaia must lead to the conclusion that, rather similar to Pantin’s argument, the 
conceptual configuration of Russian political thought in conjunction with the pressing 
problems o f mundane reality proved exceptionally hostile to abstract ideas o f liberty. To take 
this, however, as sufficient evidence against the universalist position would be jumping the 
conclusion. It merely points to the incomplete appropriation o f the conceptual tools in the 
Russian context and the futility to operate exclusively with abstract concepts. This raises the 
question once more to which extent ideas that are thought essential to political liberalism can 
be re-moulded and re-interpreted in a non-Western context. Is there an immutable core? Or 
are liberal positions really ‘relational’, as some theorists maintain (Szacki, 1995)?
The accounts of Kapustin and Akhiezer, politico-theoretical and historical in nature 
respectively, have offered us the chance to glimpse two coherent attempts at constructing a 
case for liberal political orders in the Russian environment. While Kapustin advances a clear 
theoretical argument in favour o f political liberalism and in fact appears to think of it as the 
only feasible form of order for a modem Russian society, Akhiezer appears to adopt a more 
sceptical position. Kapustin declares modernity as being the determining factor that tilts the 
balance in favour of a liberal set of institutions. The universalist resonance seems palpable 
here as he constructs his argument roughly along Hannah Arendt’s lines (Arendt, 1958). 
Philosophically he also formulates an interesting case for liberalism as a constantly shifting 
enterprise, a problem-solving endeavour, thereby denying it any clearly identifiable or 
immutable content o f liberal principles. His universalism is thus formal rather than 
substantive -  a position echoed in the work of other Russian scholars who are equally 
positively inclined towards liberalism yet have misgivings about its compatibility with 
Russian historical traditions.
Akhiezer’s theme on the need for societal survival and the requisite social stability 
shifts attention to an entirely different aspect of political liberalism. It does not only pose an
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ultimate end for the establishment of a political order but also questions the chances o f the 
introduction of liberalism in a society whose internal rift has lacked the constructive capacity 
o f Western political confrontations to create mediating political structures and institutions. 
Akhiezer also contends that Russian pluralism is of a different nature to the Western plurality 
o f values and norms. The latter necessitates the search o f a conflict-neutralising formula, the 
accommodation of mutually exclusive worldviews. Western pluralism thus stimulates the 
growth and development of institutions that assist in domesticating conflict. This is, so 
Akhiezer argues, not the case in Russia. The emergence of a pluralistic society in Russia has 
been accompanied not by an increase in tolerance and civil institutions that ameliorate the 
conflictive potential of the collision of disparate societal norms but by trends which aggravate 
further the already existing cleavage. Thus, while in the West pluralism provides the impetus 
for liberal statehood and tolerance, in Russia it strengthens societal ruptures.
Akhiezer has thus advanced an admirably sophisticated argument against the 
applicability o f Western political liberalism. He has grounded his analysis of the viability of 
political liberalism on a historical account of the genesis and of the discordant effects of 
plurality in West and East. The crux seems to be that West and East differ in the creative 
impetus of societal plurality. Russian political culture rests no more or less than the West on 
confrontation in the political realm but it proves unable to translate this into a productive 
institutionalisation and thus to draw the destructive sting out o f political conflict. Any defence 
o f political liberalism must take notice of this strong argument.
In conclusion, a complex picture of Russian political liberalism emerges and in order 
to evaluate it efficiently it would be helpful to distinguish between the various leading 
questions. Political liberalism as it has come into focus here was neither taken to be a political 
movement or an ideology, nor was it equated in the present study with the manifestations of 
liberty in Russia’s political, social, or economic life. Rather the study has been concerned to 
delineate the Russian debate on the chances of political liberalism and the various notions of a
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political order as it would approximate in the Russian context what Western theorists would 
describe as liberal. Particular emphasis has been placed upon several semantic ‘mismatches’, 
that have been either a result of the distorting capacities of the social and economic reality in 
Russia in past and present, or alternatively, a function o f the unsuccessful process o f 
intellectual appropriation of Western concepts and ideas.
The study has thus paid little attention to question such as whether or not Russians 
currently enjoy a greater or smaller amount of liberty, what the prospects of political 
liberalism is in the terms of political science, or even which are the possible prerequisites of a 
liberal political order to be instituted in Russia. Rather the main objective was to identify and 
analyse the shortcomings, disruptions, and possible distortions in the process of intellectual 
appropriation. In order to make sense of this plethora of semantic levels and the complexity of 
interpretative processes, it is necessary to specify briefly the exact location of the present 
study in the bigger inquiry that relates to the applicability of Western political theory in the 
Russian context.
II
There can be no doubt that at the forefront of many theoretical considerations has been the 
question whether or not Russia can ever become a country o f liberal persuasion and 
institutional structure. Many observers in East and West thus have tried to assess the chances 
Russia has to give itself a liberal political order and to create successfully a concomitant 
liberal political culture in the long term. While many scholars have set out from this very 
same impetus, their work diversifies instantly as they favour disparate approaches in their 
inquiries. The first problem is one of definition. ‘Chto takoe liberalizm’? Borrowing a useful 
conceptualisation from Schopflin (Schdpflin, 2001), one could say, that scholars identify 
liberalism either as a set of institutions, or as an assemblage of values and norms. Historically 
speaking, the former undoubtedly requires a shorter time for implementation than the latter,
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and most observers are aware o f the ostensible cleavage between the short and the long term, 
or between form and content (Schopflin, 2001). Proceeding from this temporal dilemma, 
political scientists and theorists have more recently stressed the interconnections between the 
long duree processes that relate to phenomena of political culture and the political institutions 
that appear to be implementable in a comparably short period of time. They argued that the 
way these political institutions operate is not detachable from the norms and values that are 
encoded in the political culture o f a country. One reason for the failure of the economic 
reforms of the nineties in fact has been the relatively slow and protracted adjustment o f the 
social and economic behaviour of the economic elites. From the perspective of political 
science, scholars sought to identify factors that would induce economic and political actors to 
adopt a more or less liberal framework for the regulation of their economic and political 
affairs.
On the side of political theory, scholars are in search of far more general aspects of 
human behaviour. Their objective is to detect good reasons for all prospective political actors 
of an existing or incipient polity to prefer liberal political institutions over non-liberal ones. 
The problem for political theorists has always been that they need to provide a compelling 
range of reasons that are sufficiently comprehensive insofar as the motifs for adopting a 
liberal order can differ considerably depending on the particular position and status of future 
citizens. The Russian case illuminates this dilemma very vividly. In the Russian reality, issues 
of liberty and rights matter fairly little to ordinary citizens. What is most on their minds is 
often mere survival and the procurement o f the most basic subsistence. While the broader 
population may have some good reasons for preferring a liberal political order as long as it 
contributes to an improvement of the economic and social situation of the country, the 
members of the political and economic elites may have very few such reasons if a liberal 
order does not promote their own unimpeded enrichment or protect their economic 
accomplishments. The tools of political theory are thus comparatively blunt when tackling the
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question of what good reasons there could be to institute a reliable and stable political order 
along liberal lines.
This might be interpreted as an indication o f the futility of political theory in 
considering the chances of political liberalism in Russia. If this were so, political liberalism 
would only be able to play a very limited role something more akin to a mere conceptual 
toolbox for reformers. Since Russians have few incentives for supporting a liberal political 
order, it would then be once again up to the government to implement what it reasonably 
believes to be the best for the country: the rule of law, a market economy, and the procedures 
of democratic political representation. This has been the dominant approach over and over 
again for Russian reformers faced with the reluctance of the Russian population or with the 
formidable resistance of the managers of the former state monopolies in the economic sector 
to accept and assist in the creation of a liberal economy and viable liberal politics. Some very 
valuable contributions sketched in the chapters above have identified the fundamental mistake 
of all reforms as being the one-way relationship between political theory and the practical 
politics o f reforms. They have pinpointed the fallacy to which reformers have succumbed in 
either using abstract concepts imported from the West and neglecting their unsuitability for 
the Russian social, political and economic environment, or in failing to embark on a sufficient 
re-interpretation, creative adaptation and appropriation of foreign concepts and ideas.
This point is not only pertinent for the fate of Russian reforms, something that the 
study is not centrally concerned with, but also for political theory. What the Russian debate 
most accurately teaches us is that political theory, if exercised as an interplay o f abstract 
concepts, involves an illusion that can be fatal to the theoretical enterprise itself. Carrying out 
theoretical work on a purely abstract level may be suitable for Western political theory 
exactly because these abstractions are in fact representations of real political entities, 
manifested in Western political history, and are therefore not devoid of any referential 
capacity. Abstract theoretical work is thus less harmful in a Western context as long as this
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assumed referential context exists. The danger lies in the absence of such, or the growing 
distance between abstract ideas and their real-life contexts in past and present. Or, once again, 
as Schopflin puts it in discussing the ethnic assumptions Western political scientists make 
when talking about Eastern Europe:
‘What is not [perfectly legitimate] is the denial o f this ethnic legacy, of the ethnic 
underpinning of our plausibility structures, as universalists do and then to take the next 
step, which is to equate their own particularisms with universal norms and then to 
impose these on other cultures. What takes place in these situations is an illicit 
conversion of the particular into the universal...’ (Schopflin, p .l 12)
The reason why Western political philosophers can quite innocuously elevate the debate to 
such abstract levels may very well be because they do indeed share the ‘underpinnings of 
plausibility structures’, that is, certain philosophical traditions shared and constantly 
reinvigorated throughout the debate. It would be a red herring, however, to pursue this issue 
as a simple question of the structures of (universal) rationality. What is at stake here is not the 
structure of reasoning, but the meanings of the terms employed. This is the location of the 
enormous epistemic gap between East and West. Political theory is bound to make use of 
models and concepts that involve varying degrees of abstraction, yet if philosophers forget 
that these only make sense in shared (and constantly reinforced) intellectual environments, 
they risk loosing the accessibility and openness o f the debate to prospective participants who 
were hitherto positioned outside of it.
Russian philosophers may have become more accustomed to Western language and 
ways of thinking already. Yet, for Russian political theorists a simple adoption of the Western 
ideas does not suffice. What is needed is the re-construction of the linkage between theoretical 
concepts and the historical context in which they have evolved and made sense, and the 
similar (re-) construction of these ideas in the Russian context.
Seen from this perspective, political theory can thus resume its full function once it 
restores its awareness of the historical contextuality of the ideas employed. It can reasonably
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restate the question as to why most political actors ought to prefer a liberal order over an non­
liberal one. And it can attempt to identify the foundation in which political orders originate 
and from whence they are engendered. Bearing in mind this premise of contextuality, the 
historical account o f the failures to institute political liberalism in Russian history can be re­
appraised. Why, under the given circumstances, have Russians not seen in liberalism a 
suitable alternative to autocratic or Bolshevik regimes? Why is liberalism still not a preferable 
choice for the majority o f Russians? Historians may point out that what governs people’s 
behaviour are short-term gains. And while this behavioural pattern can only be mitigated by 
the emergence o f long standing and stable values and norms such as responsibility, 
moderation, and civility, the latter were conspicuously absent in Russian history and present. 
Compounding the problem for liberals currently in Russia is the widespread discredit into 
which liberalism has fallen subsequent to the failure of the neo-liberal market reforms that 
have been ostensibly associated with political liberalism. Alternatively, historians may argue 
that Russia lacks the institutional structures for a successful implementation of a liberal order. 
All these arguments are potentially the resources of particularism and have been advanced by 
Russian historians and philosophers before.
Where can we draw the connection between a historically minded political theory and 
Russian history o f ideas? How do we usefully relate the insight into the historically sensitive 
character of theoretical concepts and ideas to our argument about political liberalism as 
construed in Western political theory? To accurately locate this point of juncture between 
political theory and historical consciousness requires us to return to the concept of agency and 
the idea of universalism which this thesis intended to defend. The following, concluding 
chapter will attempt to create a synthesis between the two parts of the work by reviewing the 
points made so far and trying to locate them in the overall scheme of argument.
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15. Conclusion
The collapse o f communism has brought about a welcome diversification o f opinions and 
views amongst Russian political theorists. Only a few of these views have been presented here 
and the thesis has by no means laid any claim to paint an exhaustive picture of the varied and, 
at times, very exciting, debate on political liberalism in post-Communist Russia. Rather I have 
been selective in the range of thinkers whose works were discussed here. However, the 
criteria of selection were outlined at the outset. First o f all, I narrowed this sketch of recent 
political theory to those Russian scholars who are active members of the academic 
community. This excluded valuable contributions to the Russian public debate by thinkers and 
politicians such as Yegor Gaidar and Igor Chubais. Some justification for this exclusion 
should lie in the fact that, although the views of Gaidar and others certainly merit some 
attention they rarely take the discussion any further by contributing theoretically challenging 
and novel approaches to the debate. Although Gaidar’s State and Evolution (Gaidar, 1995) is 
noticeably motivated by the search for an overall theory that would explain the results o f the 
Yeltsin reforms, his approach mainly utilizes older conceptual models that seem to have lost 
their purchasing power in political theory today. Others, such as Chubais (Chubais, 1998) are 
well versed in the theoretical debate on Russia, yet their contributions go little beyond the 
reiteration of known and tested conceptual models, or, worse, at times remain locked in 
preconceived and well rehearsed dichotomies of supposedly explanatory force.
It is undeniable, however, that there are significant contributions to the discussion 
about Russia’s role in the world and its future desirable institutional set-up that originate in 
either a conservative worldview, often sustained by an Orthodox set of beliefs,* or a 
communist revisionist ideology. This cluster of contributions has not received any thorough 
attention in this thesis. My conviction was that little that was written from those positions on
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the right or the left* went beyond either simplistic propaganda or, which was more difficult to 
neglect, a certain dogmatic attitude that would often woefully clash with the open and 
ultimately revisable debate by Russian scholars who held broadly liberal or social-democratic 
convictions.
Although I do believe that Russian conservatism has plenty to offer to the debate on 
liberalism, it still seems to fail to escape from the dogmatic versions that rose out o f the 
Orthodox religious community once released from the shackles of conformity. Perhaps there 
is a time for an initial reaffirmation of religious beliefs that may temporarily prove inimical to 
rational debate, just as there is some time to engage in an exchange o f views facilitated by the 
a common acknowledgement of the fallibility of human opinion and belief. Yet, this is mere 
speculation, as things stand, with regard to the Russian public debate on liberalism and 
politics.
Thus, I have deliberately concentrated the review of the Russian debate about political 
liberalism to a field of thinkers who are broadly sympathetic to the basic tenets of liberalism 
(although they invariably disagreed on what these are) and those that have contributed to the 
annual conferences on the past and present of Russian political liberalism held in Moscow in 
the last decade.
The emerging picture of the Russian debate was still marked by a high variance of 
conceptual approaches and foci as well as an astounding diversity o f conclusions. It may be 
tempting for Western observers to deny that the participants o f the Russian debate had 
managed to produce any coherent discursive strategy or that they have identified a common 
field o f inquiry and shared conceptual tools. Accordingly, there were some indications that the 
Russian community had a tendency to congeal around scholarly personalities and form 
schools, the most prominent of which may be initiated by Akhiezer’s approach.
’ While I use these political co-ordinates for convenience and in reference to political forces whose political 
views correspond roughly to the Western political spectrum, I am aware their are not so readily applicable in the 
Russian context.
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Still, I have tried to identify certain significant fields o f interest and dealt with them in 
separate chapters. This may not represent the most ideal or sophisticated solution to the 
problem of how to present the Russian debate, but, given the theoretical amorphousness of the 
discussion on political liberalism in Russia, it seemed the only workable one. I believe that 
this allowed me to portray the Russian debate in its incipient attempts of cohesiveness, just as 
this method would not neglect the high diversity o f theoretical interests and approaches.
This concluding chapter will review the Russian contributions in the light o f the 
theoretical aspiration o f this thesis to identify a viable path towards a universal political 
liberalism. I believe that the Russian debate should encourage us to reframe some basic 
assumptions about political liberalism that have come to form the often unquestioned 
foundation of Western liberal political theory.
But prior to this brief summary, some methodological remarks are in order. The 
central claims of this thesis are theoretical in nature and cannot be inferred from the picture of 
the Russian debate. This is inevitably so, since the differences between West and East seem 
unbridgeable, impossible to translate into mutual relevance. However, what is 
methodologically admissible is that the arguments and points that have proven valuable in the 
Russian debate may be indicative of the shortcomings o f Western political theory if, and only 
if, political liberalism aspires to become a universal discourse on the contours of liberal 
politics that are applicable to Russia, just as they are presumed to be o f some validity for the 
West. My argument in favour o f such an admittedly methodologically fragile connection 
between the Russian and Western debates on political theory has been that, although they 
have little direct relevance to each other insofar as they rarely address each other or the same 
audience, the significance and urgency of such a connection originates in the aspiration of 
political liberalism to have a universal appeal.
There can be no doubt that the categories o f discussion in the Russian debate often 
appear radically different from those in which the West conventionally treats political
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liberalism. However, the purpose of this exercise of relating two different debates to each 
other has been to reveal a new perspective on Western liberal political theory, facilitated by 
the sense of difference that such a differently structured and premised debate would evoke. I 
believe that besides raising awareness of the differences and increasing the chances of 
exchange, there are some aspects of Western liberal political philosophy that the Russian 
debate can illuminate in a helpful light and that can assist us in identifying and eventually 
eradicating some of the blind spots of Western liberalism. Some of these points may seem 
mundane, even banal to Western theorists, but others may reveal the very core o f silent 
premises of Western liberal political theory and require us to think about some parts o f the 
foundation o f the theoretical exercise entirely anew.
I
The thesis has been motivated by a range o f simple concerns with regard to the direction of 
liberal political theory. First o f all, it seemed peculiar that more than a decade after the 
collapse of the communist regime in Russia, little of a common theoretical debate on political 
liberalism has emerged in which both Russian and Western scholars participate. Although 
Russians often hotly debate the chances o f liberalism in their country, the debates amongst 
political theorists still seem largely separate from the West and disjointed to Western 
traditions o f thought. While the linguistic barrier may account for some of this chasm between 
Western political theory and its Russian counterpart, it cannot be attributed wholly to this 
factor. After all, over the last ten years political science has managed to develop a vibrant and 
sustained dialogue between Russian and Western scholars.
Those Russian scholars who have actively participated in debates on Western political 
theory have often done so by joining Western scholars on their territory, debating questions of 
little relevance to Russia herself (cf. Kusmina,1998). Another aspect that may account for this 
lack of involvement is Russia's different philosophical tradition, which has traditionally been
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geared more towards continental philosophy in the Hegelian mould rather than the analytic 
strand favoured in the Anglo-American community of political theorists. Yet, as Kapustin and 
others have shown, the tradition of thought epitomised by Hobbes offers ample opportunity to 
get involved in a fruitful and common theoretical debate with particular relevance to Russia's 
problems.
The initial concern of this work has therefore been to increase the familiarity of 
Western scholars with the Russian discussion that has been going on for more than a decade 
now and to argue, initially on the simple grounds of curiosity, for a sustained interest of the 
Western theoretical community in the Russian contribution to liberal political theory. Yet, 
having established such a case for increased intellectual exchange, the question arose o f what 
Western political theorists could in fact leam from looking at the Russian debate besides 
satisfying their curiosity. This led to the more serious second concern that this thesis tried to 
address.
Reviewing from a Western perspective the, at times, peculiar paths of Russian 
scholarly activity in the field of political philosophy or theory in the last decade, it appeared 
that Western political theory not only had not really tried to engage with Russian political 
theory itself, but also that it in fact had had very little to say on how political theory could 
contribute to understanding the Russian transformation at all. Although political scientists 
have, once again, quickly understood the immense challenge that the Russian post-communist 
dilemma posed to the preconceived conceptual modes and set about developing new 
conceptual tools together with their Russian colleagues, political theorists in the West have 
been notably silent on the post-communist world, with few notable exceptions. It seemed that 
Western political theory, while insisting on its claim to universality, had had little to say about 
the new developments in Eastern Europe. Political theory appeared to refuse to understand the 
new situations in post-communist countries specifically as challenges to the preconceived 
modes o f thought that political science (inevitably, given the state of Sovietology and its
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patently wrong predictions) had understood. This lack of awareness hinted at something 
fundamentally amiss in Western political theory: a practical refusal to acknowledge that 
actual political developments of such magnitude as the collapse o f the communist world could 
bear upon the directions of Western political theory beyond the rushed conclusion/assumption 
that the disappearance of its longstanding rival, communism, from the list o f political 
alternatives would inevitably confirm the viability of, and for some even provide the ultimate 
justification for, political liberalism.
A few (for example Ackerman) have understood that the collapse of the communist 
regimes meant opening an (unwelcome) testing ground for political liberalism and that 
liberalism had entered a series of trials in which its claims would have to be verified without 
recourse to extraneous benchmarks. Yet, surveying the former communist world more than 
ten years after Gorbachev left office, political theory ought to be less complacent about its 
own credentials. Particularly disturbing is the fact that, though universalism was and still is a 
hotly debated and vibrant project for political theory, there were only a few attempts to 
reconstitute the link between political liberalism and the particular dilemmas of post­
communist transformation. Political theory had successfully, so it seemed, woven a tight 
cocoon around itself isolating itself from the questions that the often turbulent political 
development in Eastern Europe would throw up. The particular problem this posed for a 
theorist who deals with Russia is that while such an isolation of political theory from the 
practical context may be widely accepted in established liberal democracies whose biggest 
challenge is to identify an ideal formula for redistributing national wealth, in Russia and in 
some post-communist countries that are still locked in the no-mans land between semi­
authoritarianism and renewed dictatorial regimes, the problem is one of constituting politics 
itself. While in the West the emergence o f political consensus is discussed in view o f the 
distributive ramifications which the various shapes of such hypothetical pre-political 
agreement have, in Russia the question of ‘re-inventing politics’ (Tismaneanu) is of utmost
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urgency and practical importance. While the conclusions of Western political theorists in the 
form o f political institutions deliver some recommendations for re-adjusting an existing 
liberal arrangement, Russian theorists grapple with the problem of what liberalism could 
actually mean in their country. Russians need to forge a viable answer to the question of the 
essence o f liberalism, while the divergent answers Western political theorists give to this 
results in different ideas on the acceptable degree of personal liberty and equality o f their 
citizens.
In short, Russia does not (yet) have the privilege to conduct a theoretical debate on 
political liberalism that is somehow detached from the real circumstances of politics. 
Liberalism in Russia concerns the very foundations of the polity because these foundations 
are up for grabs and not settled in their broad parameters (cf. the recent discussion on the 
applicability of political theory to the Northern Ireland question in Little, 2003). This is not to 
advocate that Russian political liberalism can be constituted by following a (Western) 
blueprint. Rather, the dilemma that Russia faces is that liberalism may well turn out to be a 
series of contingent choices, as Oakeshott once described it. But the fact that liberalism is not 
the product of a social or cultural automatism that is invariably at work in history does not 
mean that we have no business trying to define what liberalism in Russia may possibly look 
like. Yet, this strikes at the heart of the universality claim of liberal political theory and it was 
this problem that informed the agenda for this thesis.
If Western liberal political theory were to continue to have universal credentials it 
would have to renew and, possibly restructure its claims to be of relevance to political 
systems across the world. And surely, this would be unequivocally endorsed by Western 
political theorists when it comes to discussing Western political institutions. No one amongst 
the diverse ranks of political theorists would deny that theory matters to public debates on the 
shape and content of policies and institutions, even though many would disagree over the 
degree to which this is so. Consequently, the notion that there could be a debate that
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anticipated its validity to be of universal character but had little or no applicability or 
significance to Russia must appear untenable.
I have tried to suggest throughout the work that this strange modus vivendi within 
Western political theory may have come about because it has achieved, on the one hand, a 
remarkably stable political consensus (despite all the public disputes that rage about 
apparently inexorable differences in their societies or amongst various communities) and, on 
the other hand, a considerable terminological and conceptual consensus in the discursive 
strategies and procedures of political theory, something that is lacking both between the 
Western and Russian debates as well as often even amongst Russian scholars themselves. 
There can be no doubt that this touches upon the fundamental problem of rationality and the 
extent to which rational thought can account for convergence o f meaning and the coherence 
of discourse. I probably need to note here that although this problem motivates many of the 
theoretical considerations in this thesis, this is not the place to advocate any particular 
philosophical doctrine on the nature o f rationality or any view as to the extent to which 
rationality structures and possibly predetermines the outcome of scholarly debates.
I have, however, indicated that the apparent lack of relevance o f Western liberal 
political theory to the exigencies o f Russian transformation and the lack o f connection to the 
parallel Russian theoretical debate is problematic, especially in view of liebalism’s claim to 
universality.
In brief, I have argued that constructing politics from the angle o f instrumental 
rationality alone, or by utilising the concept of rational agents operating in contexts void of 
conflicts amongst values and ethical principles without reference to specific circumstances 
that determine the outcome of deliberation, is undermining the universality claim rather than 
assisting in rebuilding its credentials. In short, building viable political universalism hinges on 
taking seriously the particular contexts in which political liberalism is defended, rejected or, 
ultimately, practised.
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I believe that this presents us with a strong case for a theoretical as well as a discursive 
strategy for re-constituting universal political liberalism. And this leads us to the conclusions 
that the material o f the thesis may be able to sustain.
II
It may be helpful to distinguish between the theoretical and the discursive claims of the thesis. 
While the latter would relate directly to the travails of political theory, the former would have 
purchase power in political theory only as a contextual argument as opposed to an argument 
of theoretical stringency. Let me outline the discursive claim first.
If we accept that the way in which we can possibly construe Russian political 
liberalism in a post-communist era matters to the outcome of our debate on the form and 
content of the universality claim of political liberalism, then we must consider whether or how 
far the Russian debate on political liberalism that has continued for more than a decade relates 
to this Western dispute. The contextual or discursive claim I have put forward is that, if 
political liberalism aspires to be universal, it must demonstrate its relevance to the Russian 
case o f (re-)building viable liberal politics. Such a demonstration must, at one point or 
another, address the concepts and ideas that Russians have developed in order to think about 
liberal politics. To conduct a debate and try to reinvigorate its significance for Russia without 
relating it to the discussion that the political participants (in our case political theorists) lead 
appears self-defeating.
On the back of this proposition I have argued that, crucially, political theory is a 
debate whose outcomes (determining the framework o f universality) are determined by its 
inputs. Or, to put it differently, universalism appears to be a feature of the (constantly 
reviewed and readjusted) degree of inclusiveness of the debate, a thought that must motivate 
us to seek to take account of, and eventually to integrate, the issues raised by the specific 
Russian discussions on political liberalism into the broader Western debates. My argument
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was that, following this advice, not despite but because of the peculiar conceptual proclivities 
of the Russian debate, the chances of universalism increase since it enhances the references to 
particular contexts. This argument would naturally call for a philosophical (or discursive) 
vindication, something that I cannot provide here. Instead I have argued implicitly by 
adopting MacIntyre's framework of epistemological crises in political thought and pointed to 
the constructive potential of challenging established modes o f thought when alien theories of 
truth are recognised as valuable (MacIntyre, 1996). In a similar vein, Skinner's theory of 
systems of belief ought to warn us about the pitfalls o f constructing conclusive and conflict- 
free discursive environments in which the inputs are kept to a manageable minimum. As an 
alternative, I have pointed to the fact that universalism as a discursive consensus is likely to 
be premised on conceptual and terminological convergence, while the meanings o f terms are 
themselves a result o f intellectual exchange and debate rather than being fixed in advance. In 
fact, it has been suggested previously that the UC may ideally be re-constructed through a 
politico-theoretical Begriffsgeschichte (Koselleck). Several Western scholars have pointed to 
the conducive and perhaps pivotal part which a shared historical narrative can play in the re­
construction of the necessary components of universal political liberalism. On the Russian 
side, scholars have preferred to articulate the constructive potential of the ‘Russian idea’, an 
argument which, as mentioned above, has received little attention in this study because of its 
fuzziness and multiple personae (for example cf. Chubais, 1998)
This contextual argument for acknowledging the relevance of the Russian debate for 
Western political theory echoes the misgivings of other (Western) political theorists who 
criticise the diminished potential o f contemporary liberal political theory to contribute 
something substantial to the practical resolution of political dilemmas (cf. Little, 2003). 
O'Neill's argument for the primacy of agency equally reinforces the drive to engage with the 
Russian debate insofar as her claim o f universality explicitly rests on establishing the 
appropriate boundaries o f accessibility and authority of ethical precepts. Least of all, positing
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a universal liberalism without Russia would reveal a curious lack of semantic sense. Now, let 
us examine the theoretical claims.
This thesis has also suggested that a fresh look at the concept of agency yields a 
surprisingly healthy amount of material for, on the one hand, rebuilding the universal 
credentials of political liberalism, and on the other hand, a deeper understanding of the 
difficulties of defining the contours of Russian liberalism. Out of this contextual concern thus 
would emanate a theoretical drift that points to some possibly fruitful field o f normative work 
that can initiate a common debate between East and West (Western observers should not 
underestimate the reluctance on the Russian side to recognise that Western political theory has 
anything valuable to say about Russia. Cf. Akhiezer’s response to my attempt to inaugurate a 
dispute on Russia and political theory, Akhiezer, 2002).
Now, in adopting O'Neill's concept o f agency it has been argued we can increase the 
relevance of political theory in the Russian case insofar as, firstly, agency reckons with the 
particular backgrounds before which agents operate, and secondly, agency assists our 
understanding of the dilemmas of the Russian transformation. It reiterates the importance of 
the agent's capacity to act and those conditions that facilitate the increase in such capacities. 
The fall of communism was taken to be an unusually intricate challenge of such capacities 
and I have tried to frame this conceptually by describing it as heuristic radicalism. Political 
theory, so it has been argued, must acknowledge the difference in encapacitation or 
decapacitation that exists between the process o f constituting politics in a post-communist 
environment and re-adjusting the aims and objectives of existing political institutions in the 
West.
However, agency, as O'Neill has formulated it, was also found wanting in one crucial 
aspect. Contrary to O'Neill's repeated insistence (though this is ultimately expressed in a tone 
of scepticism), the concept of agency does not entail any principle of building liberal political 
institutions. It delivers us a framework for identifying the very conditions of ethical (and
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virtuous) political existence but says little about specifically liberal underpinnings of politics. 
O'Neill is conspicuously evasive on this point in her more recent work, while her work 
generally exhibits a peculiar tension between its aspiration (political liberalism) and its 
theoretical reach (virtue and justice in liberal institutions). Although this may appear 
regrettable when hoping for a blueprint of political liberalism, I have argued that this 
uncertainty counts in favour of the concept of agency rather than disqualifies it from our 
considerations of the Russian case. In fact, enhancing its openness whilst diminishing its 
libera! drive even further would, so it has been argued by invoking Oakeshott's concept of 
human agency, increase its usefulness in the Russian context.
On the other hand, human agency has also permitted us to view the dichotomy of 
universalism and particularism in another light. It can offer us some constructive account of 
human conduct that would lead to the appreciation of the relativising stance of universal or 
particular political and social practices as forming part of everyday life's choices. Preferences 
for universal or particularistic strategies o f vindicating human conduct thus appear as a 
component of the historically conditioned background of human conduct. The reference to 
supposedly universal or particular practices and modes of behaviour are then specific to the 
argumentative culture in which agents operate. The dichotomy disappears if  we understand 
universalism as the particular scheme of justification appropriate in and to Western societies. 
This implies that universalism becomes a story of habituation within modernity rather than a 
path towards unassailable forms of rationality.
Progressing from here, weak foundationalism was thought to offer an alternative route 
towards political liberalism and it has been argued here that in its core form as put forward by 
H.L.A.Hart does indeed possess some guiding force for the initiation of a viable political 
framework. However, liberalism is not the main objective of Hart's minimum content of 
morality and law, nor could it be. Any buttressed version of weak foundationalism such as 
Haddock's would fail to exert much appeal on those Russian theorists who believe their
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country to be still in a state of pre-modem innocence, unaffected by religious, social and 
political cleavages. However, the fact that such a picture of Russia as slumbering in a state of 
homogeneity is mainly fanciful may not necessarily come to the rescue of Haddock's weak 
foundationalism since, as Gadshiev has argued, political theory must take account of the fact 
that despite the religious and other diversity of modem society, we may very well be dealing 
with a multitude of conceptual layers in some of which individuals may be able to revitalise a 
simulacmm of homogeneity and coherence. Haddock's weak foundationalism cuts ice on the 
national level, yet Russia may retain a resistance to modernity on any lower communal level 
on which thick social obligatory frameworks may provide the same degree of predictability as 
a legal framework does. If this is the case, then the preference for the latter would require an 
appeal to a principle extraneous to the core argument o f transparency and predictability, and 
hence may only be the expression of a cultural proclivity.
These were in essence the discursive and theoretical claims that this thesis formulated. 
What the Russian debate itself motivated us to conclude comprises again a cluster of 
theoretical and contextual aspects so that the arguments presented in the second part of the 
thesis can be distinguished by the extent of their thrust towards stringent theoretical logic or 
contextual persuasiveness. The thesis has grouped these arguments into different themes and 
attempted to cluster them around the discursive character of argument as opposed to the 
strictly politico-theoretical nature of others (chapters 8 and 9 as well as 10 to 13).
Since the summary of the Russian debate in chapter 14 has already listed them 
tentatively, it remains to relate these results more specifically to the practice o f Western 
political theory. I have grouped them, once again, around the discursive, contextual and 
theoretical thrusts of their arguments.
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I l l
One of the most important points that this thesis has tried to make operates on a contextual 
platform. We may describe these sorts o f propositions as related to the way in which we say 
or present something, referring to the very preconditions o f conducting political theory as a 
discourse. I am aware that none of the Russian authors have intended their arguments to be 
used as a counterfoil to a debate on the shortcomings o f Western political theory. Many of the 
contributions presented in the previous chapters were not primarily intended by their Russian 
authors to form part o f a political theory debate in the first place. Yet, I do believe that we can 
distil some important fundamental insights from the Russian debate for our own enterprise, 
redefining and re-building the universalist credentials of political liberalism.
To a certain extent, saying something about such a strictly regulated and intentionally 
rationalised discourse as political theory is easier than saying something about such a 
diversely structured and internally unstable discussion as a public debate. In the light of the 
dysjuncture between the Russian and Western debate, however, these characteristics of 
political theory appear partly more aspiration than reality.
The fundamental lesson that Pantin and others have provided for us is that the very 
possibility of theorising requires a semantic stability that is currently lacking in Russia. I have 
argued that, although such a semantic stability has been accomplished amongst Western 
theorists, this has almost solidified into discursive strategies that have a disturbingly exclusive 
edge. Utilising MacIntyre's concept o f epistemological crises, I have pointed to the 
constructive abilities o f accepting epistemic challenges by recognising the diversity of 
terminological and conceptual meaning and understanding political theory as an enterprise 
that continually re-constitutes its own conceptual tools and devices. In effect, I contend that 
our liberal universalism is only as universal as the questions we dare to ask. Integrating 
differences without banning them from our semantic foundations is a precondition of making 
good on our aspiration to construct a viable political liberalism with universal applicability.
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Pantin and others have pointed to the fact that, while discursive stability facilitates the search 
for solutions to pertinent questions, it may also foreclose difficulties and black out problems, 
thus diminishing the universal appeal of our theory. While Russia in its political public debate 
as well as in the theoretical debate amongst academics is searching for some tentative 
semantic stability, Western political theory has accomplished it by means of excluding the 
creative influx from other discursive contexts. Taking seriously the differences between 
Russia and the West is the first step towards creating the new semantic and epistemological 
equilibrium that Western political theory as a healthy and vibrant intellectual enterprise 
requires.
This leads us to the next lesson that Western political theory should learn. As some 
Russian scholars have also argued, the appeal o f liberalism is irreparably damaged if  political 
liberalism is somehow supplanted by other prevailing political ideas such as the notion of 
democratism. Discursive stability thus pairs up with discursive prevalence. And liberalism 
may well have diminished chances of revival in Russia because o f the predominant position 
o f rival political concepts such as democratism. Liberal values, rights and liberty have 
patently failed so far to become the central terms around which political dialogue and debate 
is structured.
This alerts us to the notion of interdependence between the various spheres o f society. 
The predominance o f democratism hints not only at the preconditions for the development o f 
a liberally minded public, but also at the prerequisites of conducting political theory. Politics 
needs to be perceived as a clearly demarcated sphere with its own principles of regulation and 
internal structure. Without this any discussion on the pro and cons of, say, market orientated 
welfare policies confronts an immature idea of politics that will prove unable to defend itself 
from an equally empowered position. The history of Russian political theory shows this 
clearly. The view that politics is inferior to ethics, which has dominated important fields of
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Russian political thought, is only echoed recently by the colonisation of politics with 
economic principles of organisation.
It seems that liberalism requires a specifically conducive constellation of debate that 
enables politics to rebut the expansionist tendencies of other organising principles. On the 
back of sufficient maturity and a degree o f independence, the arguments for or against the 
introduction o f economic or ethical principles into the realm o f politics can be debated in an 
atmosphere that secures a balanced outcome. While these are those arguments that have 
contextual character as opposed to those o f strictly theoretical nature, the Russian debate can 
highlight equally some theoretical lessons to be learned for Western political theory.
Political theory concerns itself with determining the appropriate relation between 
moral principles and political institutions. Liberal political theory then posits the idea of 
liberty at the heart o f this enquiry, and most liberals understand it to possess a particular 
quality that makes it the overriding criterion in the attempt to define the proper balance 
between morality and politics. This particular quality is supposed to be its ability to contribute 
more than all other aspects of social life to the autonomy of an individual. Although the 
relation between autonomy and liberty is a complex one and there exists considerable 
disgrement amongst liberals as to the proper contributory role of liberty (cf. Kekes, 1997), 
liberals would deny that any notion of autonomy can be conceived without liberty as core 
principle. This has led some liberals to contend that the increase of liberty must be the sole 
objective of the various political arrangements to which a society commits itself. Liberal 
conservatives (often unfortunately lumped together under the label of communitarians) have 
criticised this position from various viewpoints and with different objectives. One o f the most 
recent criticisms has been formulated by Cahoone, who argues that simply articulating the 
principles of liberty as an aim of social and political institutions often runs counter to securing 
the very essence o f society whose social cohesiveness and practices are what allowed us to 
demand the augmentation of individual liberty in the first place (Cahoone, 2002). He goes as
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far as to say that the preservation o f society must thus logically precede the increase of 
individual liberty, since the latter is inconceivable without the former.
Now, without counting this as circumstantial corroboration o f Cahoone's claim, the 
Russian debate has conventionally been shown to attach particular significance to the idea of 
civilisation in its Russian, Eurasian or Orthodox emanations. I believe that within the context 
of re-crafting a political liberalism of universal appeal, we need to take account o f the pre­
eminence of such a concept in the Russian debate. There can be no doubt that this would 
horrify some liberals (although this reaction may have come to change in the wake o f the 
terrorist attacks in 2001) for whom the concept of civilisation bears religious or ethnic 
undertones, and stands for exclusivity, boundaries and particularism with malign 
consequences. It is no accident that the revival of the civilisational idea in conservative 
historiography and political propaganda on the continent at the beginning of the twentieth 
century coincided with a frontal attack on the principles of Enlightenment and, implicitly 
economic and political liberalism, although the anti-Enlightenment thrust was toned down in 
the Anglo-American versions.
Consequently liberals may be reluctant to grant the idea of civilisation any ground in a 
debate that rests fundamentally on the motivations and aspirations of the Enlightenment. Yet,
I can see little chance o f forging a common debate on political liberalism between Russian 
and Western political theorists without recognising the tremendous purchasing power that this 
concept has in the Russian domain. That does not mean that it ought not to be submitted to a 
rigorous and rational criticism. But it does mean that Western political theorists should 
acknowledge the relevance of this idea for any future debate on the understanding and 
definition of Russia in the modem world.
For the purpose of clarification: I do not intend to advocate any particular hierarchy of 
values or a specific ranking of organising principles that should guide us in determining the 
appropriate relation between ethics and politics. Rather I would contend that, in order to
291
rebuild the universalist credentials of political liberalism, theorists need to reassert the 
openness o f the discursive field and the possibility of valuable conceptual import from other 
debates. Civilisation thus should assume its deserved stance amongst other ideas and should 
be treated with the semantic revisability that we are happy to ascribe to many other conceptual 
terms. As things stand, given the Russian discursive proclivities, I cannot envisage a debate 
on Russian identity without some recourse to this notion.
Yet, these remarks served only to highlight and identify some possible tension 
between the contemporary Western and Russian theory of politics. Now for the real lessons 
that Western theorists can take on board. The first aspect concerns the prerequisites o f politics 
as Kniazeva has indicated in her analysis of British political history (Kniazeva, 2000). Politics 
may well be undergirded by a raft of civic values which political theory only marginally 
conceptualises. The political consensus of a polity may be underscored by a general attitude 
towards politics that either hinders or facilitates the convergence o f political views. Also, and 
more importantly, the emphasis on procedures only effects the collaboration between the 
various political forces if the outcome of negotiations or the procedures themselves are not 
conceived as simple vehicles for securing the advantage of one over the other party. Echoing 
the Lockean account of political contract, individuals may have to be bound by a set of ethical 
principles prior to their political negotiation on the basic institutional arrangements. While 
Locke was optimistic that they would be, Russians may prefer to share the Hobbesian 
scepticism and thus postulate that politics is not a game of rational players, but one between 
individuals with a baggage of historically evolved commitments to various, often conflicting, 
moral norms.
The second point relates to the difficulty which Western political theory has in 
acknowledging additional levels of differentiation in between individuals and nations. 
Criticism of the tendency of Western political theory to fail to conceptualise the multiple 
arenas of social life in between the nation and the individual has been forthcoming for a while
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(Canovan, 1996)). Yet, the contours of the typical communitarian critique have replicated the 
problem on the level o f the community rather than solved the dilemma. Gadshiev's insistence 
that political theorists need to accord differential treatment to different levels of human life 
may only be a vehicle for his (political) hope that the locally embedded practices may serve as 
a template for national political principles, but we may take his point as indicating the 
shortcoming of a two-layered approach in political theory in the first place. Political no:ions 
such as legitimacy and principles of justice are complex emanations that develop at the 
intersection o f various strands of human life in which individuals are involved. And, as 
Gadhiev's argument indicates, the high diversity of different webs of meaning in which 
individuals locate themselves may entail that some practices are associated with high 
legitimacy while others are severely contested. Recognising the various intermediate layers of 
social interaction in political theory would free us from the dualistic scheme that underwrites 
much of political liberalism and has often proven to be detrimental to sensible 
conceptualisations o f political reality.
In conjunction with such a plea for the recognition of the multifacted networks o f 
human life, Western political theorists equally need to grant that some o f these forms of social 
co-operation and interaction are epistemically privileged over others. In the Russian con ext, 
this does not translate straightforwardly into a communitarian agenda. In a country that only 
recently exited from a ruthless centralism, local political practices may be incipient and 
immature, fomenting uncertainty about rules of the political game. I believe something abng 
these lines may have provided the main arguments for the introduction of the new federal 
districts in Russia under Putin. However, what is significant in light o f the difficulties o f 
perceiving the options and alternatives that political agents have under the condition; o f 
heuristic radicalism, is that deliberate attempts at destroying those political practices that are 
habituated in the polity must decrease the capacity of political agents rather than resulting in 
the desirable increase.
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A far bigger challenge arises when asked to reconcile the different historical 
trajectories o f political liberalism in East and West. Given Akhiezer's course o f argument, this 
challenge does not spare those liberals in the West who contend that Western liberal 
institutions are the product of a contingent historical constellation, a historical 'accident' as it 
were, originating in a unique interplay of political and social forces over time. Oakeshott is 
probably the philosophically profoundest proponent of this view. In a sophisticated construct, 
his version of contingency is tied in with his notion of agency. Liberalism, so he argues, is the 
result o f a plethora o f choices that have a reason but not a cause (Oakeshott, 1991). His 
radical focus on human agents as origin and movens o f history also inhibits simple 
accessibility of history to those who wanted to reconstruct the course of human history. And it 
is only Oakeshott's radical view o f historical contingency that proves immune to Akhiezer's 
theory o f history that informs his notion of political liberalism. Any moderated version of 
contingency, however, faces the full brunt o f Akhiezer's argument.
At the core of Akhiezer's thesis stands the idea that chasms (‘raskol(y)’) within 
societies has produced (and many continue to produce) fundamentally different outcomes. 
While the narrative o f Western liberalism appropriated societal schisms as a requirement for 
pacification and institution-building, Russia's societal rifts are more of a destructive rather 
than a constructive character. In effect, Akhiezer challenges established Western historical 
narratives on their own ground by questioning the proper source and origin of their 
uniqueness. The fact that similar constellations can have entirely divergent outcomes points to 
deeper underlying factors that a historical reconstruction of Western liberalism must appraise.
This does not make Akhiezer any more sympathetic to radical contingency as an 
organising principle of (post-) modem historiography. Yet, he does attempt to, and succeeds 
in, creating a narrative o f the Russian Sonderweg.
What does that mean for political theory? Why should the business of re-forging 
historical narratives be of any concern to those who are concerned with determining the
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appropriate relationship between justice and politics? The argument goes back to John Gray: 
A liberalism that is not sure of its origin cannot be sure of how best to defend itself. It may be 
conceded that historiographical portraits of political thought are methodologically distinct 
from theoretical arguments as employed in political philosophy. Yet, it seems impossible to 
revitalise the universalist credentials of political liberalism when historiography contaminates 
its foundations with the bug of cultural particularism. That does not render theoretical 
arguments in favour o f liberal political institutions any less valid. But it does undermine any 
of those justifications of political liberalism that retain even a tenuous link to the cultural and 
historical contexts o f liberal politics. Or to put it differently, if  we can work through a purely 
theoretical constructivism, we would not have to worry about reconciling divergent historical 
narratives.
Unfortunately, even Rawls had to concede crucial ground in 'Political Liberalism' to 
his critics and admit that his version of justice equally assumes a given cultural and political 
environment, a culture of democratic dispositions (Rawls, 1993). Therefore Akhiezer's 
insistence on the divergent outcomes of societal schism matters to the theory of political 
liberalism and a reconciliation of historical trajectories may be counted as a prerequisite for 
any viable argument in favour of UC. Acknowledging, instead of ironing out, the differences 
takes this project further. That Akhiezer himself is in fact hostile towards such a reconciliation 
and insists on the particularism of Russia must add further urgency to addressing his 
argument. But the list o f differences still does not end here.
The importance o f shared cultural and political backgrounds was also highlighted by 
Kara-Murza and Fedotova, who utilised the notion of chaos in their conceptualisations of 
political liberalism. Kara-Murza argued that an abstract notion of individualism would fall on 
equally infertile ground in Russia. He proposed to supplement the concept of the individual 
with a necessary embeddedness into social and cultural circumstances. He consequently 
suggested that this modification of the notion o f individualism should be reflected in
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terminology and argued that the term ‘personality’ would approximate more closely this 
modified conception of the individual, thus echoing past Russian political philosophy.
Fedotova similarly found the idea of chaos conceptually attractive. The peculiar 
structure of her argument added much to its lack of clarity, but it appeared that she was 
reiterating the need for societal stability as a prerequisite for political liberalism. Contrasting 
international relations theory with political theory (focusing on the level o f the individual and 
a particular political society), she argued that chaos would inhibit social co-operation, and 
politics would thus require a stable framework depending, in large measure, on the existence 
of a self-conscious notion of (national as well as individual) identity. It has been noted by 
Western political scientists that identity may require ideological commitment and that this 
would facilitate the genesis of a societal consensus, whereas liberal political theorists seem to 
deliberately shun the language of ideological commitment. This reluctance may turn out to be 
misguided. As Shari Cohen aptly remarks:
‘Ideological commitments allow elites to recognise and trust one another in order to 
co-operate to make decisions that postpone personal gain for a longer term goal.’ 
(Cohen, 1999a, p. 119)
Although the emphasis on the need for a stable notion of identities may seem plausible to 
many Western political theorists, the implications of this view may receive less favourable 
comments. Fedotova is no exception among Russian scholars in seeming to assume, firstly, 
that these desirable ‘stable’ identities are mainly uncontested, and secondly, that identity 
politics is broadly innocuous in character. These marked differences in attitude towards 
identity politics represent one of the biggest obstacles to a reconciliation of Western and 
Russian views. Yet, perhaps, O ’Neill is right in claiming that, at times, the recognition of 
incompatibility of different opinions goes some way towards finding workable solutions for 
conflicts. Seen in this light, this thesis attempted to contribute to such an acknowledgement of 
differences as a first stepping stone towards a universal political liberalism.
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IV
Our starting point was a dilemma. Liberal political theory enquires whether or not there are 
any stable modus vivendi that can serve as foundations o f social co-operation in lieu of a 
shared and uncontested idea o f the good. The dilemma has been that Russia, like so many 
Russian political theorists, refuses to acknowledge that Russia is bereft of this basis for 
building viable political institutions. Liberalism thus inevitably appears as a trait, a redundant 
feature, not as a necessity in order to provide the platform for a reconciliation of divergent 
notions of the good. When Western scholars test this supposedly unifying idea of Russian 
identity any further, it often appears as fuzzy as it is servile to many purposes. The 'Russian 
idea' is many things to many different people (Siber, 2002). But above all it is a smokescreen 
that serves a political purpose for some, and prevents the engagement with the real theoretical 
dilemma for many Russian scholars. This thesis has not critically analysed the various uses 
and abuses of the Russian idea or tried to outline the proper contours o f a viable idea of 
Russian identity.
Equally, I have documented my doubts that an entirely procedural conception of 
liberalism would make any sense (in East and West) apart from leading directly into the 
formal constitutionalism that the Weimar Republic epitomised, while proving so woefully 
inadequate to face the challenges o f radical politics. Rather the thesis was motivated by an 
altogether different intention. I attempted to show that for constructing universal political 
liberalism it is worthwhile looking at a debate that appears radically different from Western 
political theory. The way in which Russian theorists debate their prospect o f building liberal 
institutions, so I argued, matters to our chances of forging a universal liberal political theory. 
Western theorists may still cite the differences between Russia and the West as an excuse for 
not engaging with the often peculiar conceptual tools and ideas of Russian political 
philosophy (and, paradoxically, they often concur in this reluctance with many of their
297
Russian colleagues). Yet, I would contend that this is a self-defeating move since it means 
rejecting an epistemological challenge that actually takes us further in our quest for a 
universal political liberalism.
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